Connected and Disconnected in Viet Nam: Remaking Social Relations in a Post-socialist Nation by Taylor, Philip
CONNECTED & DISCONNECTED 
IN VIET NAM
Remaking Social Relations in a Post-socialist Nation

VIETNAM SERIES
CONNECTED & DISCONNECTED 
IN VIET NAM
Remaking Social Relations in a Post-socialist Nation
EDITED BY PHILIP TAYLOR
Published by ANU Press 
The Australian National University 
Acton ACT 2601, Australia 
Email: anupress@anu.edu.au 
This title is also available online at press.anu.edu.au
National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry 
Title: Connected and disconnected in Viet Nam : remaking social
 relations in a post-socialist nation /
 editor Philip Taylor.
ISBN: 9781925022926 (paperback) 9781760460006 (ebook)
Subjects: Social interaction--Vietnam.
 Vietnam--Social conditions--21st century.
 Vietnam--Social life and customs--21st century.
Other Creators/Contributors:
 Taylor, Philip, 1962- editor.
Dewey Number: 959.7044
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a 
retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, 
photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
Cover design and layout by ANU Press. Cover photograph: Monk on Sam Mountain 
with iPad by Philip Taylor.
This edition © 2016 ANU Press
Contents
Preface  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . vii
Introduction: An Overture to New Ethnographic Research 
on Connection and Disconnection in Vietnam  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1
Philip Taylor
1 . Social Relations, Regional Variation, and Economic  
Inequality in Contemporary Vietnam: A View from  
Two Vietnamese Rural Communities  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .41
Hy V . Luong
2 . The Dynamics of Return Migration in Vietnam’s Rural  
North: Charity, Community and Contestation  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .73
Nguyen Thi Thanh Binh
3 . Women as Fish: Rural Migration and Displacement  
in Vietnam   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .109
Linh Khanh Nguyen
4 . ‘Here, Everyone is Like Everyone Else!’: Exile and  
Re-emplacement in a Vietnamese Leprosy Village   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .141
Yen Le
5 . ‘The Red Seedlings of the Central Highlands’: Social  
Relatedness and Political Integration of Select Ethnic  
Minority Groups in Post-War Vietnam  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .173
Nguyen Thu Huong
6 . The Struggle to be Poor in Vietnam’s Northern Borderlands: 
Political Metis and Biopower in the Local State Arena  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .203
Peter Chaudhry
7 . Thai Entourage Politics in the Socialist State of Vietnam  .  .  .  .  .  .239
Ha Viet Quan
8 . Searching for a Khmer Monastic Higher Education  
in Post-Socialist Vietnam   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .273
Philip Taylor
9 . Described, Inscribed, Written Off: Heritagisation  
as (Dis)connection   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .311
Oscar Salemink
10 . Geographies of Connection and Disconnection:  
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Preface
Thirty years after the launch of economic liberalisation and global 
reintegration policies in the mid-1980s, Vietnamese are experiencing 
profound realignments in their social relationships. Revolutions in 
industry, consumption, exchange, and governance have transformed 
people’s relations with each other and have fostered new social 
identities and networks. New media technologies, communications 
infrastructure, and education opportunities have widened cultural 
horizons and nurtured new ambitions and outlooks. Millions of 
Vietnamese are on the move as students, industrial workers, and 
marriage migrants have taken leave of home communities, and forged 
new links to people and places. In the process, divisions have opened 
up between city and countryside, the old and the young, and people 
of different regions and ethnicity. Vietnamese mobilise existing 
connections of various kinds to bridge the gaps, but also find themselves 
unequally situated to build new relationships or take advantage of 
new opportunities. Social relationships once considered backward 
or obsolete are being re-evaluated as resources for development, and 
practices and places that were once deemed marginal are assuming 
new centrality.
This book explores the dynamic processes of connection and 
disconnection that are remaking Vietnam’s social landscape. 
It  features essays by scholars from Vietnam and abroad who draw 
on research conducted in diverse Vietnamese localities. The essays 
were first presented as papers at a Vietnam Update conference held at 
The Australian National University (ANU) in December 2014. This is 
an annual conference series that discusses a theme of contemporary 
relevance to Vietnam’s socioeconomic development. The theme selected 
for the 2014 Vietnam Update was ‘connection and disconnection’. 
Conference presenters engaged with topics such as social capital, 
development from below, socially inclusive growth, and the new 
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subjectivities emerging in Vietnam’s globalised, market-based society. 
The essays selected for inclusion in this book share a common research 
methodology and disciplinary approach. As ethnographic reflections 
on connection and disconnection, they offer a unique perspective on 
how Vietnamese in a great variety of circumstances relate to each other 
and redefine what it means to be Vietnamese.
The 2014 Vietnam Update conference was opened by ANU Chancellor 
Professor Gareth Evans. His informative speech reflected on changes 
in Vietnam and in Australia’s relationship with Vietnam since 1990, 
when he presented a paper at the inaugural Vietnam Update in his 
capacity as Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Carl Thayer and 
Suiwah Leung provided an overview of recent political and economic 
developments to contextualise the thematic papers. Attending the 
2014 Update were representatives of the Australian Department 
of Foreign Affairs, the Embassy of Vietnam, the US Embassy in 
Vietnam, and the Japanese development agency. Many Australian 
aid-funded PhD scholarship students attended the Update, along 
with numerous other academics and students. The participants also 
included representatives of  commercial, non-government, religious 
and community organisations, and many individual Vietnamese-
Australians. The audience members took an active part in discussions, 
and their feedback to the presenters has been incorporated into the 
chapters in this volume. 
The 2014 Vietnam Update was hosted by ANU College of Asia and the 
Pacific. The organising committee comprised ANU scholars David Marr, 
Li Tana, Ben Kerkvliet, Sango Mahanty, Greg Fealy, Peter Chaudhry, 
Ha Viet Quan, and myself. They took responsibility for paper selection, 
program design, and the funding and running of the conference. 
A large share of the conference organising work was shouldered by 
administrative staff in the Department of Political and Social Change 
of ANU College of Asia and the Pacific. The organisers wish to thank, 
in particular, Kerrie Hogan, Kate Hulm, Allison Ley, Phạm Thu Thủy, 
Luke Hambly, Melissa Orr, Daniel Striegl, Beverly Williams, and Sean 
Downes They helped to ensure that the conference was well-attended, 




The Vietnam Update organisers would like to express our gratitude 
to the Australian Government Aid Program of the Department 
of Foreign Affairs for generously providing funding for the 2014 
Vietnam Update. This support enabled us to fund the participation 
of a large number of paper presenters from Vietnam, along with other 
international specialists, and to help cover some of the costs of running 
the conference and publishing the results. Also making a significant 
financial contribution to the Update and the production of this book 
were the School of Culture, History and Language and ANU College 
of Asia and the Pacific. The series organisers are grateful to these 
sponsors for helping to disseminate this new research on Vietnam.
As editor of this book, I would like to thank the many individuals who 
contributed to its production. For their timely and constructive advice 
on the chapters, I thank the peer reviewers Philippe Le Failler, Ken 
Maclean, Erik Harms, Jean Michaud, Truong Huyen Chi, Keith Taylor, 
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Introduction: An Overture 
to New Ethnographic 
Research on Connection and 
Disconnection in Vietnam
Philip Taylor
Connections are the source of life in Vietnam. The tangible and intangible 
ties that bind Vietnamese people to their families and compatriots are 
characteristically rich and are constitutive of self, community, and 
nation. In traditional Vietnam, the person was enmeshed in relations 
(quan hệ) of hierarchy and reciprocity that structured family life and 
the thicket of mutual exchanges that typified the traditional village. 
The Vietnamese polity has long drawn metaphorically on relations of 
this kind, as rulers have utilised idioms of kinship and debt to secure 
legitimacy, command loyalty, and promote social cohesion. History 
has been made by people who were able to inspire a following and 
call on the resources of their entourage to repel an enemy or found 
new settlements and alliances. Vietnamese from all walks of life have 
long cultivated social relationships to deal with the authorities, form 
martial unions, make a living, and gain promotion. As social certitudes 
have dissolved and been recast by the experience of revolution, war, 
and market-based global integration, one constant has been the role 
played by such relationships. As the nation has changed, connections 
have remained central to what it means to be Vietnamese.
Although it remains true to speak of the ubiquity of connections, 
it is important not to overlook the diversity and dynamism of social 
relationships in Vietnam. Ethnographic research reveals that the 
mode and intensity of social connections available to contemporary 
Vietnamese vary according to class, region, gender, and ethnicity. 
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Seen as ‘social capital’, connections are often viewed as a resource to 
be augmented for the benefit of self and society, however, it should be 
recalled that not all connections are equally efficacious or desirable, 
and some may come at a steep cost to the individual and society. 
Social disconnection, too, is a recurrent theme in Vietnamese life, 
be it in the form of death, demotion or exile, or disavowal of one’s 
personal ties and background. Vietnamese frequently have sought 
social reclusion in pursuit of ends as varied as moral integrity, 
ritual potency, tranquillity, and status. When existing relations are 
severed deliberately or unavoidably in times of life transition or social 
upheaval, people find themselves drawn by circumstances into new 
connections and in that moment new social intimacies and identities 
are born. 
The theme of disconnection has been central in Vietnamese history. 
Repeatedly, Vietnamese have found themselves divided or uprooted 
in times of war, political separation, or societal crisis. The very idea 
of what it has meant to be Vietnamese has been repeatedly reset in 
moments of historical rupture: when the indigenous peoples of the 
Red River plain came under Chinese rule around two millennia ago; 
when Vietnamese formed their own polity after living for 10 centuries 
as Chinese imperial subjects; when peoples from disparate cultural 
and historical traditions were incorporated into Vietnamese social 
space; and when the nation was reborn successively in encounters 
with colonial, neo-colonial, socialist, and market-based orders. 
The historian Keith Taylor has proposed that Vietnamese identity be 
regarded as fundamentally discontinuous: comprised of numerous 
distinct orientations that have arisen at different conjunctures in time 
and space (K. Taylor 1998, 2013). Portrayals such as this have been 
drawn in rebuttal of a nationalist past that assigns Vietnam with a 
singular, unified, and continuous history. Yet Vietnamese historians 
also have emphasised discontinuity, for instance by downplaying the 
country’s debts to China or stressing division, conflict or contradiction 
as themes in the country’s history. 
Perhaps the most commonly debated instance of disconnection 
in contemporary Vietnam is the situation of Vietnam’s numerous 
‘national minorities’ (dân tộc thiếu số), many of whom are said to have 
had, until recently, at best tenuous connections to the lowland state. 
These peoples are often characterised as suffering disproportionately 
from poverty, isolation, social exclusion, and cultural deprivation, 
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while at the same time being subject to the intrusive and paternalist 
development policies of the ethnic majority–dominated central state. 
However, relatively little is known about whether those deemed as 
minorities regard themselves as marginal, or how they might turn 
participation in the nation-state to their own advantage. More research 
is required to determine to what extent the intensive state-building 
activities in the periphery have their origins in the national capital 
or arise out of the desires and relations of residents of the periphery 
themselves. Also in need of further investigation is whether nation-
building initiatives integrate, or alternatively parochialise, their 
intended beneficiaries, and what vernacular development paths have 
been forged by the people inhabiting Vietnam’s multifaceted and 
continuously re-imagined internal frontiers.
This volume offers a series of ethnographic explorations into the 
themes of connection and disconnection in contemporary Vietnam. 
The essays provide detailed accounts of connecting and disconnecting 
that put these processes into context, show how they are experienced 
by social actors and reveal their consequences and meanings. 
The cases demonstrate that the nature and significance of social 
connections are diverse with regards to region, class, gender, and 
ethnicity. The approach adopted is practice-oriented in that it does 
not assume these relations are governed by universal rationality or 
inalterable cultural templates, but that they are imbued with explicit 
and tacit meanings made consequential through action and in context. 
The accounts emphasise agency and dynamism in showing how 
connections are forged and broken by actors, without implying that 
all people enjoy equal capacity in this regard or that connections are 
a panacea that can enable the individual to overcome the constraints 
of circumstance. The essays investigate the diverse attempts by state 
authorities to prescribe and regulate the ways citizens connect and 
disconnect; however, they also show that state intentions are not 
always realised. To understand how and why Vietnamese citizens 
connect with each other, and the world around them, requires close 
investigation of local and personal histories, conditions, and meanings.
This opening essay frames the contributions with a review of research 
on the numerous realms of life in Vietnam that have been shaped by 
connection and disconnection. It then broaches the themes addressed 
in the first four chapters in this volume, which investigate disparity 
and disconnection in the lives of contemporary Vietnamese of the 
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lowlands. Moving next to the relationship of ethnic minorities to the 
Vietnamese national project, it outlines the research agenda taken up 
by four of the contributors who explore agency and diversity in the 
ways minority populations engage the state. In a concluding section, 
which reflects on the volume’s final two chapters, it examines the 
profound realignments in people’s orientation to heritage, history, 
and place that are consequent on Vietnam’s integration into the 
international order.
Into a Vietnamese Landscape of Social 
Connection
Both connection and disconnection have been prominent topics in 
the study of Vietnamese society and history. Nevertheless, rarely 
has the attempt been made to trace in a systematic manner how such 
processes interact in diverse arenas of life in Vietnam. This review 
of the scholarship in select disciplines examines the significance of 
connections and their absence in a variety of contexts, endeavours, 
and events. I commence by exploring the interplay of connection 
and disconnection in the formation of modern Vietnam’s social and 
political landscape.
The density of the social networks that characterise the nucleated 
villages of northern Vietnam is well documented (Gourou 1936; Toan 
Ánh 1968; Nguyen Tu Chi 1980; Jamieson 1995:28–36). Several scholars 
consider the cohesion fostered by this mode of social organisation 
to have been a resource enabling the flourishing of the Vietnamese 
people. For instance, cooperation in rice production and collective 
defence was a factor in the Vietnamese polity’s demographic strength 
and its ability to expand into new lands at the expense of more loosely 
structured Southeast Asian neighbours (Gourou 1936:133; Lieberman 
2003:393). At the same time, the relative autonomy of villages — 
in relation to the court and to each other — is said to have given 
the Vietnamese social system resilience in times of crisis (McAlister 
and Mus 1970; Woodside 1976). As Hy Van Luong has observed, 
indigenous models of social relatedness offered formidable resources 
in dealing with the power inequalities of colonialism and capitalism. 
Political leaders were able to draw on the gender and age hierarchies 
and the insider/outsider distinction characteristic of Red River Delta 
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villages to mobilise the population against enemies, while sentiments 
of trust and mutual obligation of the kind generated in village gift 
exchanges helped cement cooperation in arduous struggles. Such 
cultural resources were crucial to the mobilisation of villages in 
revolutionary action in the French colonial period and again in anti-
corruption protests in the 1990s. Since the đổi mới reforms of the 
1980s, kin connections have been used as a resource for accumulating 
economic resources (Luong 2003, 2005, 2010).
Nevertheless, the very tightness of these social relationships and their 
hierarchical and autarchic nature also posed threats to the construction 
of a national society founded on socialist egalitarian principles. Much 
of the work of socialist nation-building under the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam (1954–76) was dedicated to undermining traditional modes 
of relatedness and reattaching individuals to the nation and ideals of 
modern socialist citizenship. State cultural authorities intervened in 
social and ritual life in northern Vietnam to simplify life cycle rituals; 
curtail extravagance in feasting and gift exchanges; undercut deference 
to local landlords and village elites; and prescribe appropriately 
modern, civilised, and cultured modes of living (Kleinen 1999; 
Malarney 2002; Luong 2010). In tandem, the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam state promoted egalitarian gender roles and marriage 
practices while also criticising romantic and individualist ideals 
of personhood that had become prevalent among the urban middle 
class since the late colonial period (Pham Van Bich 1999; Ninh 2002; 
Werner and Bélanger 2002; Phinney 2008). Intriguingly, the receding 
of the socialist state from many aspects of social life since the late 
1980s has been accompanied by the revival of traditional life cycle 
rituals, marriage practices, gift exchanges, patrilineages, and village 
festivals. However, the simplified, modest, and egalitarian aspects of 
these revived practices show that the period of socialist reforms did 
leave some mark on northern Vietnamese cultural life (Luong 2003; 
Malarney 2003).
The fabric of society in southern Vietnam, by contrast, is renowned 
for being more loosely woven, with a higher preponderance of what 
the sociologist Mark Granovetter (1973) calls ‘weak ties’, as well as 
being more open, mobile, urbanised, and globally interconnected 
(Hickey 1964; Rambo 1973; P. Taylor 2001; Biggs 2010; Luong 2010; 
Harms 2011). From early in the history of Vietnamese colonisation, 
this new frontier was associated with a regionally distinctive social 
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structure and governance style that was personalistic, egalitarian, and 
informal (Sơn Nam 1997; Li 1998; K. Taylor 1998; Choi Byung Wook 
2004; Dutton 2006). In the French colonial period, this looseness, 
openness, and mobility was associated with the rapid development 
of high levels of land concentration, social inequality, itinerancy, and 
social banditry (Brocheux 1995; Engelbert 2007; Biggs 2010:23–125). 
Cultural and societal changes in the colonial and postcolonial periods 
were also highly sensitive to global currents and trends (Ho Tai 1992; 
Brocheux 1995; Jamieson 1995; Do Thien 2003; Peycam 2012). With 
the dismantling of socialist command and control policies in the late 
1980s, the south quickly gained national predominance in commodity 
production, trade, and business, and it continues to be associated with 
high levels of cultural innovation, social differentiation, and mobility.
However, southern Vietnam is also home to several important folk 
movements that have reorganised society along communitarian 
lines. Markedly localist and religious in inspiration, and coalescing 
around charismatic authorities, these movements have been seen as 
a compensatory response to the anomie and chaos of the southern 
frontier and the inequalities engendered under colonialism (Wolf 1969; 
McAlister and Mus 1970). Each of these particularist groupings forged 
a unique response to the challenges of frontier society. The Hòa Hảo 
Buddhists (who are also inspired by Confucianism) emphasised charity 
over ritual ostentation; their prophet mocked people’s reliance on the 
spirits for patronage, and promoted a conception of the person as 
indebted for his or her existence to the ancestors, nation, Buddha, and 
humanity (Ho Tai 1983). The Cao Ðài synthesised numerous strands of 
religious and philosophical learning into a grand and eclectic canon, 
and assembled a formal pantheon of spirit teachers to whom believers 
had access via their mediums (Hoskins 2015). The Cham Muslims 
reorganised life around mosques that served as hubs for a markedly 
cosmopolitan community, in which local authority and prestige 
stemmed from prowess in long-distance trade and religious travel 
(P. Taylor 2007a). Khmer society in parts of the Mekong Delta assumed 
the form of a Khmer cultural archipelago in a broader Vietnamese 
milieu, with each Buddhist temple operating as a civilising centre and 
miniature polity unto itself and offering its affiliated lay community 
a great variety of services (P. Taylor 2014).
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The communist-led revolution represented a different response to the 
challenge of colonialism, one in which the theme of disconnection is 
clearly evident. Historians of the revolution trace its inception to the 
assault on tradition and the embrace of the new that characterised 
Vietnam’s nationalist ferment in the first decades of the twentieth 
century (Marr 1981; McHale 2004). Some scholars have drawn attention 
to the extraordinary youth of the leaders of the revolution whose 
social radicalism was more in tune with global modernist currents 
than with the hierarchical and conservative mores of their parents. 
This radical orientation was in turn replaced by an expectation that 
revolutionaries conform to the discipline of a party whose policies 
were aligned with strategic shifts in the international communist 
movement (Ho Tai 1992, 2010). However, the unity on display in the 
proclamation of independence from France in 1945 was superficial, 
for the party itself was divided, and struggles within the party over 
the correct revolutionary path persisted over subsequent decades 
(Brocheux 1995; Marr 1997, 2013). More significantly, the party’s rise 
to power alienated a plethora of non-communist nationalist groups and 
hardened the resolve of many Vietnamese to fight against it (Guillemot 
2010; Chapman 2013).
Although fought in the name of national unity, Vietnam’s wars were a 
time of grievous division between Vietnamese of different backgrounds 
and political allegiances. The character of the wars as a civil conflict 
was already evident in the First Indochinese War (1945–54), which 
pitted people of different political, ethnic, religious, social, and 
regional affiliations against each other (Le Failler 2011; Lentz 2011; 
Keith 2012:213–241; Chapman 2013; McHale 2013). Two Vietnamese 
states — the north and the south — emerged out of this war, with 
different social and political systems, and alliances to rival international 
power blocs (Fall 1967; Jamieson 1995). Divisions internal to each of 
these states also were on display during the long war they fought with 
each other from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s. Such contestation 
was particularly tumultuous in the south of the country, where the 
‘Vietnam War’ exacerbated, and in turn was shaped by, numerous 
conflicts based on religious, ethnic, class, generational, regional, 
and urban–rural divisions (Hickey 1993; Topmiller 2006; Hunt 2008; 
Miller 2013). Sadly, the curse of conflict continued to afflict Vietnam as 
it was drawn almost immediately into another decade-long war with 
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neighbouring Cambodia and China, countries with which Vietnam’s 
socialist leaders previously had entertained warm and supportive 
fraternal relations (Nguyen-Vo Thu-Huong 1992; Goscha 2006).
Nevertheless, social connections featured prominently in Vietnam’s 
wars. The trust, loyalty, and cohesion born out of shared suffering 
and confinement in colonial prisons and long residence in remote 
guerrilla bases were decisive to the ability of Vietnam’s communist 
leaders to survive and coordinate a nationwide resistance in a context 
of intense surveillance and repression (Zinoman 2001; Nguyen T. Lien-
Hang 2012:17–47). Việt Minh agents cultivated a network of civilian 
supporters in the cities who supplied the rural-based resistance with 
goods and information (Goscha 2013). The communists’ major opponent 
in the south, President Ngô Ðình Diệm, was often accused of being 
inflexible and non-accommodating towards the religious, ethnic, and 
localist affiliations that structured society in this region. Nevertheless, 
he put siblings and other family members in key government positions 
and made use of his Catholic connections to mobilise support and 
advance his political interests (Miller 2013:41–53). At the grassroots 
level, Heonik Kwon describes how in Central Vietnam there was more 
to the experience of war than that of being helpless victims caught in 
an arbitrary clash between impersonal and alien forces. Even in the 
region that witnessed some of the Vietnam War’s most brutal battles, 
war was waged and its disastrous effects were mitigated against by 
virtue of peoples’ membership of a fine meshwork of numerous small 
interlocking social networks (Kwon 2008:69–71). 
Many of the policy shifts that occurred in the post-war period were 
made possible owing to social connections. For instance, the liberal 
market reforms announced in the mid-1980s have been analysed as a 
response to a combination of economic crisis, ideological conversion/
confusion, and bottom-up resistance (Fforde and de Vylder 1996; 
P.  Taylor 2001; Kerkvliet 2005). However, several scholars also 
emphasise the role played by senior party leaders with long-standing 
ties to local areas and authorities who encouraged and protected a 
variety of ‘spontaneous’ economic activities that contravened official 
policy. These leaders’ ties to local authorities and other party leaders 
at the national level were instrumental in getting these local initiatives 
endorsed as formal policy (Dang Phong 2004; Rama and Vo Van Kiet 
2008). Connections also facilitated reform in the field of cultural policy. 
In a vivid illustration of networking politics in Vietnam, Thaveeporn 
9
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Vasavakul shows how networking between state officials, researchers, 
popular organisations, mediums, and local followers was critical to the 
official rehabilitation of the mediumistic cult of the Holy Mothers in 
the 1990s and early 2000s in northern Vietnam (Vasavakul 2003:35–42). 
In his provocative analysis of Vietnam’s political system, Martin 
Gainsborough sheds light on the centrality of social connections 
to state power and policy. Senior state officials stand at the apex of 
patronage networks. Individuals who win high office are put upon to 
channel the spoils of office such as licences, contracts, exemptions, and 
investment to their network members, to the exclusion of others, and 
are reciprocated with loyalty, money, and shares, among other gifts 
(Gainsborough 2010:146–147). Gainsborough acutely observes that 
patronage shapes the major political event in Vietnam: the five-yearly 
party congress. The significant policy shifts that are often announced 
in these closely followed events are less the outcome of experimental 
policy development, ideological struggles between factions, or the rise 
and fall of sectoral, regional or generational interests, but rather are 
centrally the result of struggles between the influential members of 
patronage networks. The formulation of policy at such events consists 
less of adherence to ideology or principles than the jockeying for 
position among individuals who, if successful, will be able to share 
the spoils of office with his or her network of clients (Gainsborough 
2010:135–155).
In an era of market socialism, connections nourish economic life. 
Nguyen-Vo Thu-Huong provides a cogent ethnographic analysis of 
post-socialist business practices, which she describes arrestingly as 
the ‘hooking economy’. In an economy characterised by uncertainty, 
the privileging of state enterprises, informational deficits and 
regulational laxity, private entrepreneurs gain resources and contracts 
by establishing personal relations of patronage with state and quasi-
state economic managers. Many deals are struck in entertainment 
venues, including those that offer a variety of prostitution services. 
The sex industry thus features both as a metaphor and the context for 
the practices of ‘hooking’, which are integral to post-socialist business 
(Nguyen-Vo Thu-Huong 2008:3–24).1 Gainsborough too has reported 
on the links between Hồ Chí Minh City entrepreneurs and local 
1  Kimberly Hoang illustrated similar processes in her ethnographic study of Hồ Chí Minh 
City’s night life (2015). 
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administrative authorities. By establishing bonds with highly placed 
officials, with whom the proceeds of business are shared, companies 
can negotiate opaque and treacherous legal terrain with reduced risk 
of political or legal repercussions, while making life difficult for their 
competitors, who the authorities might move against (Gainsborough 
2010:38–39).2
Although connections mitigate risk, they may also in themselves pose 
a threat to security and social cohesion. In the early 2000s, exposure 
of the octopus-like network built by the gang boss Năm Cam brought 
to light the collusive relationships that existed between criminal 
syndicates and highly placed officials and powerful departments such 
as the police (Gainsborough 2010:48–49). Researchers have exposed 
the corrupt relationships between timber traders and state authorities 
that facilitate the illegal timber trade across the Lao–Vietnam border 
(To Xuan Phuc et al. 2014). Special interest groups (nhóm lợi ích) 
linked to powerful officials also highlight disparities between rich and 
poor. As Bill Hayton observes, businesses and individuals strive to 
put themselves under the umbrella (ô dù) of protection provided by 
connections to high-ranking state and party leaders. The cultivation 
of such relationships can confer immunity from prosecution and 
leeway in a complex and competitive business landscape, along 
with specific benefits such as jobs, promotions, and scholarships. 
Meanwhile, people without an umbrella are extremely vulnerable to 
harassment and prosecution. These patronage practices have fostered 
a small and privileged elite who owe their fortune to birth, marriage, 
and fortuitous connections. Their wealth and privilege in a country 
where substantive poverty is still widespread jars uncomfortably with 
the socialist rhetoric coming from the country’s leaders who stand at 
the apex of the elite (Hayton 2010:22–25). 
2  In their study of land investment in rural Vietnam, Thomas Markussen and Finn Tarp 
infer that people who have relatives in the government are able to draw upon those kin links 
to secure tenure over land and avoid the expropriation of their land by the state. Having such 
favourable connections to the authorities, they contend, gives people the confidence needed to 
make investments in their land (Markussen and Tarp 2014). 
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The Dynamics of Disconnection and 
Reconnection 
Ethnographic studies of connection from below show that social 
relationships provide a means by which Vietnamese people can 
moderate the excesses and iniquities of market-driven development. 
In his study of community environmental regulation, Dara O’Rourke 
shows that linkages within local communities and between community 
activists and the authorities are beneficial in changing the behaviour 
of serious environmental polluters (O’Rourke 2004:68). Linkages 
to extra-local actors such as the media enable community demands 
to reach higher level authorities.3 Social ties between a firm and its 
workers, consumers, suppliers, or neighbours influence the way it 
responds to complaints about pollution. Social relationships are also 
at the heart of regulation, and agencies with strong linkages to the 
community are successful in implementing state policies. Nevertheless, 
O’Rourke warns that social relationships between factory managers 
and authorities, or between individuals in state agencies, can also 
enable environmental polluters and decrease the responsiveness of 
authorities to community demands (O’Rourke 2004:224–227). 
People in socially precarious circumstances may intensify relations 
of mutuality to reduce the risks of market-based society and fill 
the gaps left by the shrinkage of the once omnipresent state. In her 
research in rural Hà Tĩnh, Pam McElwee observed that poor farmers 
experienced hardship and uncertainty as a result of their production 
of rice and other goods for global markets. In response, they partook 
of a moral economy which was similar to that described by James 
Scott (1977) in his study of Mekong Delta peasants under French 
colonialism (McElwee 2007). People at the margins of subsistence 
in Hà Tĩnh spread risk by exchange relations with each other and 
with wealthier community members, upon whom they exerted moral 
pressure to distribute their wealth, effectively enforcing a social price 
on private accumulation. The farmers also criticised the heartlessness 
and lack of social responsiveness of officials who made their lives, 
3  Andrew Wells-Dang’s study of networked civil society politics in Vietnam similarly 
reveals that relationships between environmental activists, the press, scientists, retired officials, 
local  residents, and the authorities have been key to efficacy in environmental activism 
(Wells-Dang 2012). 
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and that of their families, difficult with overbearing enforcement of 
regulations. In protesting against official indifference and malpractice, 
poor farmers in the 1990s and 2000s were influenced by norms of 
fairness and sufficiency (McElwee 2007). Nguyen Van Suu (2007), 
Ben Kerkvliet (2014) and John Gillespie (2014) similarly have noted 
that protests against corruption and land confiscations frequently 
have been motivated by these kinds of moral economy concerns. 
Faced by the inadequacy of officially prescribed social and cultural 
relationships, numerous communities in Vietnam make recourse to a 
variety of vernacular translocal connections. Such decentred networks 
are particularly evident among members of ethnic minority groups 
whose integration into the national community has not always been 
equitable and harmonious. The transnational networks of minority 
actors include commodity chain networks maintained by Hmong 
people in the northwest of the country with China (Turner, Bonnin, 
and Michaud 2015), transnational business and cultural associations 
of the ethnic Chinese in urban areas (Yu 2006), and the cross-border 
networks mobilised by Cham Muslims in Vietnam’s southwest for 
work and religious travel in Malaysia (Tran 2016). Other translocal 
linkages are controversial or divisive, such as the mass conversion 
to evangelical Christianity of minority groups like the Hmong 
(Ngo 2015), the rejection among some groups of official ethnic labels 
(Nguyen Van Thang 2007), or the appeals made by diasporic actors 
for ethno-nationalist solidarity among Central Highlanders (Salemink 
2006:39–42). As discussed by Oscar Salemink in his chapter in this 
book, these decentred forms of ethnic reconnection create dilemmas for 
the government which, in order to reassert authority over its minority 
citizens, has begun to backtrack on its modernist reform agenda 
and rehabilitate identities and practices that were once criticised as 
backward, elitist, and autarchic. 
In Vietnam, social relationships are never merely received or static but 
are dynamic and constantly being actively managed. For the women 
who dominate Vietnam’s marketing sector, success in livelihoods 
comes from proficiency in the arts of self-representation. Ann Marie 
Leshkowich shows that much of the work done by traders in 
Bến Thành market, as they represent themselves to customers, their 
peers, and market regulators, consists of the agentive enactment of 
social identities. Market women often essentialise themselves, claiming 
to be — as women — naturally adept at their trade; construing 
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themselves as struggling working class; distancing themselves from 
the state; or claiming ties of kinship with their customers and paid 
workers. However, rather than treat this self-essentialism as simply 
a strategy to grasp advantage as opportunities arise, Leshkowich 
regards it as a form of historically constituted political and economic 
subjectivity. She shows that their profession or trade has been 
alternatively stigmatised, romanticised, dismissed, and celebrated in 
shifting state policies that have created uncertainty, anxiety, and risk. 
By essentialising themselves as women, as traditional, as kin, or as 
workers, the traders of Bến Thành make themselves legible within the 
discourses employed in the regulation of their behaviour. Through 
such enactments, they are able to experience control, predictability, 
and meaning in their profession and lives (Leshkowich 2014). 
The practices of performative sociality exemplified by market traders 
are among the variety of practices by which Vietnamese have been 
shown to mould and shift their social relationships. Anthropologists 
and linguists have demonstrated how Vietnamese gender and 
age hierarchies, along with relations of parity and sameness, are 
reproduced and situationally modified through modes of address 
and self-reference, as well as in discipline and at play (Luong 1990; 
Rydstrøm 2003; Sidnell and Shohet 2013). In his ethnography of 
culinary practices in the town of Hội An, Nir Avieli shows how dishes 
consumed at a variety of meals communicate subtle messages about 
the character and significance of social relationships. Intriguingly, 
his study reveals that commensality may not only create kinship 
and generate bonds, it may also divide and distinguish (Avieli 2012). 
Vu Hong Phong demonstrates how, through alcohol consumption, men 
in a multiethnic frontier context bond with their male peers (Vu Hong 
Phong 2008:148–149). Analysing relations between hostesses and 
their clients in the bars of Hồ Chí Minh City’s sex industry, Kimberly 
Hoang describes how performances of masculinity and femininity in 
such sites affirm and contest global racial and class hierarchies (Hoang 
2015). Markus Schlecker shows how, by returning to their home 
villages to take part in feasts and festive occasions, people in Hà Nội 
materialise a new post-socialist orientation to the ‘ancestral village’ as 
a place of traditional relatedness and belonging (Schlecker 2005). 
Several studies explore the active limiting of one’s sphere of relatedness. 
In the context of middle-class Hà Nội, Alexander Soucy (2014) describes 
the management and pruning of social relations that takes place during 
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the issuing of wedding invitations. Catherine Earl shows how, through 
work, leisure, consumption, and marriage choices, women in Hò Chí 
Minh City secure urban middle-class membership and distinguish 
themselves from their lower-status compatriots (Earl 2014).4 Erik Harms 
examines the socially destructive urban redevelopment practices that 
demolish and scatter existing residential communities, and replace 
them with exclusive, high-class enclaves that promise to separate 
their new residents from the undistinguished urban masses (Harms 
2012, 2014). Perhaps the most disturbing practices of social truncation 
take place in reproductive health clinics, where technologies such 
as ultrasound are routinely used to detect foetal abnormalities and 
unwanted female gender in foetuses. Subsequently, abortions are 
commonly prescribed and undertaken, sometimes illicitly, to secure 
desired reproductive outcomes and interdict the formation of socially 
undesirable persons and relationships (Bélanger and Khuat Thi Hai 
Oanh 2009; Gammeltoft 2014).5 
The dynamics of social disconnection and reconnection are especially 
pronounced in the experience of migration. Vietnamese have been 
subject to many varieties of coerced migration, be they conflict-induced 
refugee movements, de-urbanisation campaigns, official programs to 
open new economic zones in remote border areas, or environmental 
refugee flows (Hardy 2003). Migrants who have moved voluntarily or 
under compulsion have often found themselves transplanted into an 
unfamiliar or unpleasant social setting where they experience tense 
and brittle relations with their new neighbours (McElwee 2008; Hansen 
2009). In other cases, they may feel socially isolated and excluded 
from the opportunities for connection or advancement in their new 
social environment (Huong 2004; Nguyen Minh 2015). In such cases, 
social connections play a key role in enabling movement and re-
emplacement. Research on migration in Vietnam has demonstrated the 
value of family and homeland networks in facilitating chain migration 
to new economic frontiers and urban spaces (Carruthers and Dang 
2012; Winkels 2012), nurturing children who have been left behind 
(Locke et al. 2012), and gaining empowerment in the cities (Karis 2013). 
4  For a collection of insightful essays on practices of middle-class distinction in contemporary 
Vietnam, see Van-Nguyen Marshall, Drummond and Bélanger (2011).
5  A detailed account of sex-selective abortion is provided in Tran Thi Minh Hang (2011).
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The work of reconnection is a key theme in the Vietnamese diaspora’s 
relationship with the homeland. Formed largely out of processes 
of disconnection and rupture, the large community of Vietnam-
origin people who live overseas has been visiting home and sending 
remittances for at least three decades (Small 2012; Schwenkel 2014). 
Transnational flows of cultural and entertainment content, via DVDs, 
television, internet, and social media, connect the diaspora with the 
old country, although in both contexts the reception of these influences 
is met with controversy and surveillance (Carruthers 2008; Valverde 
2012). Return gifts of money express obligation and relatedness; 
however, the gifts also create social distance within transnational 
families (Nguyen-Akbar 2014). Such gifts court the risk of being 
seen as insufficient or, alternatively, excessive, having the capacity to 
humiliate and wound both the recipient and giver alike (Thai 2014). 
The inflow of foreign currency also can express counter-cultural forms 
of non-official relatedness that transcend nation-state boundaries and 
the borders between the living and the dead. Allison Truitt shows how 
remittances in US dollars express the debt of overseas Vietnamese to 
their relatives in Vietnam and how in turn the living repay their debt 
to the ancestors through counterfeit versions of the same currency 
(Truitt 2013:83–103).
Connections to the spirit world are enacted in dynamic and multiform 
ways, and occupy a prominent place in Vietnam’s post-revolutionary 
social landscape (Malarney 2003; P. Taylor 2007b). Through their 
offerings to the ancestors and the potent spirits of the land, Vietnamese 
repay their debts to the proximate yet otherworldly beings who 
guarantee security, enforce morality, and make life possible (P. Taylor 
2004; Pham Quynh Phuong 2009; Jellema 2007). The sanctified gifts 
that worshippers bring back home from pagodas and shrines spiritually 
nourish their families and materialise the relations of mutual care that 
bind the spirits to the living (Endres 2011; Soucy 2012). By being 
inducted as a spirit medium, people who are marginalised, ill, socially 
anomalous, or dogged by misfortune may secure healing and social 
reintegration as the follower of a master or a child of the spirits (Fjelstad 
and Hien 2006; Norton 2009; Salemink 2010). The links maintained 
with the spirit world are multilateral and mutually generative: with 
offerings, worshippers might rehabilitate a ghost as an ancestor and 
thereby transform their own social identity (Kwon 2008; Marouda 
2014); via afflictions visited upon their kin, a war martyr might 
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signal their need to be recovered from the oblivion of national history 
(Malarney 2001; Gustafsson 2009). The ties between spirits and their 
earthly Vietnamese adepts today span the globe, with both mediums 
and the religions that institutionalise interactions with the spirits 
found in the many locations around the world where Vietnamese 
people have made a home (Fjelstad and Hien 2011; Hoskins 2015). 
A final illustration of the generative power of connections highlights 
the role of social networks in assembling the knowledge that 
Vietnamese have about themselves and their own society. Many of 
Vietnam’s leading intellectuals and academics belong to lineages 
of intellectuals. Despite the socialist emphasis on mass education and 
the production of expertise, both kinship and kin-like relationships 
have been essential in nurturing intellectual capacities and 
dispositions in the face of criticisms about elitism and the levelling 
tendencies of socialist academic culture (Bayly 2007). In contemporary 
Vietnam, Eren Zink found that the academic field is constituted out 
of connections. Institutes and departments can be filled with people 
from the same kinship network or birthplace, and a tangle of personal 
relationships cross-cut institutional and national boundaries. People in 
one’s network positioned in departments and ministries can enable an 
institute to secure project funding or access sensitive information that 
gives cogency to an analysis (Zink 2013:157–171). Scholars who lack or 
fail to nurture such ties may find their careers thwarted, irrespective 
of their talent and hard work. The work of scientific production relies 
crucially on the cultivation of relationships, and the history of the 
emergence of a new idea is very much the story of the connections 
activated and the debts incurred in the process of its assembly and 
articulation as new knowledge. 
Making Connections and Disconnections
This review of scholarship demonstrates that connections are a 
pervasive and influential dimension of Vietnamese life. Important 
insights into Vietnamese politics, society, and culture come from 
research that has carefully traced the social linkages and disconnects 
that have shaped events in these domains. The essays in this volume 
take these findings as a point of departure as they explore issues that 
call out for more rigorous scholarly treatment, and uncover new stories 
about connection and disconnection.
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One of the most fundamental questions about social connections is 
the degree to which these resources are equally available and useful 
to people from different social backgrounds. Hy Van Luong observes 
in his contribution that Vietnamese from all walks of life consider 
social connections to be a reliable way to resolve all manner of daily 
problems, ranging from medical care for a family member to credit for 
business expansion. However, he also shows that the extent to which 
contemporary rural Vietnamese have recourse to social capital varies 
considerably in relation to their economic status and their regional 
location. His study sheds light on the inequitable distribution of a set 
of social resources whose subtlety and significance have previously 
not been adequately described by researchers attempting to measure 
inequality in Vietnam. While it may be true that gifts have the power 
to bind people together, Luong reminds us that not everyone has the 
same capacity to give gifts.
Hy Van Luong’s chapter draws upon fieldwork data from two villages 
— one located in the Red River Delta and the other in the Mekong 
Delta — which was collected in 2005–06 and 2012–14. It shows that 
the social relationships upon which people rely are sustained and 
strengthened by meals, drinks, gifts, and favour exchanges. As incomes 
rise, many households and individuals spend more on these gifts and 
exchanges to sustain and expand their social capital. However, he 
finds that the poor are much less capable of doing so than the rich 
and the powerful, especially considering that the monetary value of 
‘standard’ gifts has increased significantly at life cycle ceremonies. 
He also identifies variation between the two rural regions. Northern 
Vietnamese villagers have strengthened various forms of associational 
ties, complete with their life cycle ceremony gift obligations, to a greater 
extent than their southern counterparts. The rich evidence martialled 
in this chapter demonstrates that although social connections may 
matter to all Vietnamese, the quantity and quality of connections 
to which people have access, the benefits they bring, and the costs 
imposed in the effort to maintain them, are not evenly distributed. 
Paradoxically, Vietnamese of different regions and classes are divided 
by social connections in a way that is both shaped by and continues to 
shape profound differences in their social circumstances and cultural 
identities. 
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The capacity of gifts to sustain relationships between people who have 
been separated spatially and by class is the focus of the chapter by 
Nguyen Thi Thanh Binh. It focuses on the case of a successful business 
migrant who returned to her Red River Delta village from the south of 
Vietnam after a long absence. Like many Vietnamese return migrants, 
her initial intention was to make bequests to her family and ancestors, 
however, her giving soon also extended to non-kin, such as the 
village poor, and sponsoring communal feasts and the refurbishment 
of communal buildings. Her actions earned her accolades from the 
villagers for her generosity of spirit, and this adulation exerted moral 
pressure upon her to give more and more. The extraordinary and 
unexpected dynamics that led her to accelerate her rate of giving not 
only drained her financially, they also aroused intense debates about 
her motives and background. Assessments of her character ranged 
from views of her blessed fate and Buddha-like qualities to dismissive 
and disparaging comments about her capability, personality, and 
family morality. Ultimately, the tensions and ill feelings unleashed by 
her charitable actions caused this return migrant to rethink her plans 
to re-establish herself in her native village. 
This story of a failed return offers a timely treatment of the dislocating 
experiences of migration. Told from the perspective of a returned 
migrant, it shows how nostalgia for the homeland arising out of the 
disappointments of migration can precipitate the desire to return 
and reconnect. When acted upon, however, such sentiments can 
lead to disenchantment, serving instead to underline the change in 
subjectivities brought about in the experience of migration, as well 
as the gulf in moral expectations between rural and urban localities. 
Seen from the perspective of the villagers who hosted her return, this 
case illustrates the value of migrants to marginal rural communities 
both as a link to new worlds and opportunities, and as a source of 
remittances and models for social reinvigoration. At the same time, 
it reveals how the joyful anticipation of attending a homecoming may 
easily deteriorate into dissension and mutual mistrust, showing how 
the gap in status and experience that divides migrants and their home 
villages is not easily bridged by acts of good will or by sentiments of 
belonging to a common ancestral homeland.
The chapter by Nguyen Khanh Linh provides a graphic illustration of 
how divisive social connections can be. She studied a rural locality near 
Hải Phòng City that is distinctive for its very high rate of transnational 
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marriages. Women from the fishing commune of Hải Thành enter into 
more marriages with foreigners than any other locality in Vietnam, 
many of them marrying men from wealthier rural localities in China 
and Korea. At the same time, a great number of the women who marry 
into Hải Thành come from other generally poorer rural localities in 
Vietnam, in a sense ‘replacing’ the local women who have married out. 
Significant realignments in social status and subjectivity are occurring 
among the women of Hải Thành owing to their involvement in these 
very different marital alliance networks which connect them to East 
Asia and elsewhere in Vietnam. 
As Nguyen Khanh Linh’s chapter reveals, the flows of female marriage 
migrants into and out of Hải Thành make it a remarkable node in a 
vast hypergamous chain that links numerous far-flung rural localities 
in Vietnam and overseas. However, just as the passage of women into 
and out of Hải Thành makes visible stark differences between rich 
and poor rural localities, it also brings about yawning gaps between 
the women themselves. The study examines the marked difference in 
class and status between the out-marrying and in-marrying women. 
These distinctions are marked on the bodies of the two classes of 
women and are interpreted in local discourses as innate differences 
of race, ethnicity, and morality. The sharpening and essentialising of 
distinctions between women and between ruralities that occurs as a 
result of these translocal marital alliances offers a sobering example 
of how connections can accentuate inequalities in extreme and 
diverse ways. 
Yen Le’s chapter ventures into the little-known world of leprosy 
sufferers in Vietnam, where it uncovers valuable insights into the power 
of disconnection. Drawing on the author’s ethnographic fieldwork in 
Quy Hòa, a segregated village for leprosy-afflicted people in South 
Central Vietnam, the chapter tells the villagers’ stories about social 
exile and reintegration. It traces the cases of elderly villagers who 
contracted leprosy between the 1940s and the 1980s, showing how the 
stigma provoked by a leprosy diagnosis and the disability caused by 
the disease brought about a form of social death and induced them to 
seek refuge in this isolated settlement for leprosy sufferers. Shifting to 
the ethnographic present of 2011, it elucidates why ‘sameness’ is such 
a salient discourse in the village and how, as a defining characteristic 
of the community, it has reconfigured the villagers’ lived reality of 
leprosy. The notion of ‘sameness’ determines boundaries between 
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leprosy-affected residents and ‘healthy’ people, and between ‘inside 
here’ and ‘out in life’. It reveals a strong sense of connection shared 
among community members based on perceived commonality and 
equality on the one hand, and, on the other, disconnection from the 
outside world engendered by persistent leprosy stigma and sufferers’ 
self-stigmatisation. 
Through examining the ontologies of leprosy sufferers’ connections 
and disconnections, Yen Le sheds light on the construct of leprosy 
and the lived reality of people affected by the disease in contemporary 
Vietnam. In doing so, her chapter also seeks to answer why exclusive 
communities for people with leprosy still exist long after leprosy has 
been declared medically curable, and when outpatient treatment has 
replaced segregated institutional care as the preferred public health 
approach to treatment. Her chapter shows that while the medical 
rationale for segregation no longer exists, the existential problems 
leprosy sufferers continue to endure provide justification for their 
continuing attachment to segregated communities such as Quy Hòa. 
Debating Disconnection in Vietnam’s 
Minority Worlds
As noted in the preceding discussion, the ultimate symbols of 
disconnection in present-day Vietnam are the minority nationalities. 
Much of the international development literature on Vietnam 
focuses on the socioeconomic gap between the majority Kinh and 
ethnic minority groups. Studies seek out the drivers of the ‘ethnic 
gap’, which are believed to include factors such as remoteness, lack 
of connectivity, poor land and water quality, low schooling, weak 
market access, and poor governance (Imai and Gaiha 2007; Baulch et 
al. 2010). The attention of policymakers is fixed on the cultural traits, 
language deficits, and customary practices and beliefs that are said 
to keep people poor and hold them back. Stereotypes proliferate 
in popular discourses about minority people’s backwardness and 
insularity, and their lack of awareness of what it takes to prosper in 
the modern world. The incapable and needful minority other is very 
much the central figure of the present-day era of high development in 
the national periphery. Such a figure not only functions as a pretext 
for development but may indeed have been produced by it.
21
INTRODuCTION
In marked contrast, many anthropologists hold to the view that 
Vietnam’s minority others suffer from an excess of connection to the 
state project. It is not difficult to find critiques of the harm done by 
state development policies, which are deemed to be utopian, arbitrary, 
inflexible, paternalist, and all-encompassing. Scholars who adhere 
to the view that redemptive agency comes from below, or from the 
periphery, find signs of resilience in activities that are resistant, 
evasive, transcendent, or resourcefully recombinant; in short, inspired 
by a logic of disconnection from the state.6 In the terms coined by 
James Scott, such tactics consist of ‘the art of not being governed’ 
(Scott 2009). A logical implication of this perspective is that the only 
scope available to ethnicised actors to remain true to themselves 
exists beyond the realms of what the state has set in train for them 
as its subjects (for a critical discussion, see Salemink 2015). Such an 
interpretation would disqualify the state itself as an arena in which 
minority actors might exert authentic agency. This may be a major 
oversight given that the state is such a significant presence in the lives 
of its minority citizens and has shaped the agenda for continuity and 
change in their traditional homelands for well over a half century in 
most localities. 
Four essays in this volume show how the state may serve as a vehicle for 
minority self-assertion, each in unique ways. The chapter by Nguyen 
Thu Huong examines the dynamics of political disconnection among 
the minority peoples of Vietnam’s Central Highlands. Her research 
reveals that the Bahnar, among other groups in Kon Tum Province, 
are under-represented in state employment and service provision 
positions. Relative to the Kinh, most of whom are migrants, the 
indigenous people of this highlands province appear to suffer from a 
low level of inclusion in state structures and lack influence in political 
decision-making. In part, such inequalities reflect discrepancies in 
social and cultural capital. They also give expression to disparities 
in political capital, which are rooted in differential war experiences. 
However, Nguyen Thu Huong proposes that an alternative explanation 
for this situation is that the highlanders may be disinclined to take 
office. She illustrates this proposition with comments by Bahnar 
6  Jean Michaud’s notion of ‘Hmong infrapolitics’ forcefully articulates this perspective 
(Michaud 2012). These themes also are apparent in many of the essays in the book edited 
by Philip Taylor, Minorities at Large, as well as in an article by the same on vernacular rural 
development (P. Taylor 2011, 2007c). 
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individuals that show how they discount themselves from responsible 
office and state-orchestrated rituals on the grounds that such pursuits 
are incompatible with their own distinct morality and identity as 
minority peoples. 
Such an approach resonates with James Scott’s analysis of upland 
lifeways in historical Southeast Asia as structured around purposive 
avoidance of the lowland state’s embrace. However, Nguyen Thu 
Huong’s analysis is more nuanced than this in showing that such 
orientations are not universal among the peoples of the Central 
Highlands, but rather are contingent upon the complex historical 
relations that groups and individuals have had with state-building 
initiatives in this locality. She also avoids homogenising state–
ethnic relations by showing within one select group the markedly 
gendered nature of their practices of state evasion. Moreover, in 
a way that appears to fundamentally depart from the state evasion 
paradigm, she discovers that acts of selective withdrawal are linked 
to projects of cultural exceptionalism, moral purification, and gender 
differentiation, which themselves draw upon discourses employed by 
the state to mobilise and govern its ethnic minority subjects. Hence, 
far from being an entity that minority peoples must artfully avoid 
in order to obtain authentic self-realisation, the state itself provides 
the stage and the script through which people may enact their ethnic 
difference.
In studied contrast with the tactical retreats staged by the Bahnar, 
the Hmong and Nùng residents of the northwest commune of Vĩnh 
Thủy actively engage the state by assertively deploying its categories 
and programs. When Peter Chaudhry conducted his fieldwork in this 
mountainous commune in Lào Cai Province, he found that the majority 
of its residents were categorised as poor and had long been reliant on 
state handouts. One possible interpretation for commune residents’ 
entrenched poverty status would be to link it to their marginality and 
lack of opportunities to better themselves. An alternative approach 
would be to view it as a sign of local people’s subjugation to the 
state’s upland development project. However, Chaudhry soon came 
to observe that to be designated as poor had obvious value to local 
residents themselves, and was a status that locals actively strove 
for and contested. Far  from being an index of disconnection or 
disempowerment, locals assertively manipulate and milk for maximum 
benefit this category of disadvantage assigned by the central state.
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Vĩnh Thủy is thus a prime exemplar of what Peter Chaudhry refers 
to in his chapter as an ‘agentive periphery’. However, what he has 
uncovered in this border commune is not a pure and resilient modality 
of local power that flourishes at the limits of the modern state’s reach, 
for it is the central state that furnishes the resources for peripheral 
actors to act in such an autonomous manner. Nevertheless, poverty is a 
resolutely local project, as evidenced by the local relational categories, 
moral economy considerations, and status and schisms at stake in the 
designation of households as poor. Local officials build patronage and 
create legitimacy in local eyes by exercising discerning judgement 
in the allocation of poverty alleviation resources. Householders are 
strategically ingenious in pressurising officials to decide in their favour 
and presenting themselves as eligible for the handouts. Poverty is a 
hybridised category of subjectivity that proliferates at the interface 
between local and central state criteria and needs. Chaudhry describes 
this as an example of political metis, whereby modern state biopower 
is reworked through local circuits of meaning and relatedness into 
a biopolitical project with strikingly local characteristics. 
What degree of autonomy is open to ethnic minority actors under a state 
known for its centralising efficacy and assimilatory bent? Surprising 
answers to that question can be found by examining the case of Thai 
elites in northwest Vietnam. In his research among high-ranking Thai 
state cadres in a Thai-dominated province of the northwest, Ha Viet 
Quan found that a number had formed around them an elaborate 
entourage of clients, subordinates, partners, and allies. Exploring 
these political networks through participant observation, he found 
them to be personalistic, hierarchical, flexible, and assimilatory, and 
held together by performance and mutual obligation. Moreover, 
these social formations were politically significant. The Thai cadres 
exercised power through their personalistic networks: implementing 
state programs and initiatives; securing appointments, promotions, 
and contracts; and fending off assaults on the prestige of the leader 
from the leader of rival networks. In sum, the mode of power embodied 
by these senior Thai cadres very much resembles the traditional model 
of entourage politics characteristic of the Tai culture area in the era 
before the rise of centralised bureaucratic states. Remarkably, Ha Viet 
Quan found it thriving openly among the political class in a region 
that, for over 60 years, has been under the rule of a socialist state. 
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Ha Viet Quan concludes from his evidence that the mode by which 
the state exerts power in Vietnam is not as uniform as is often assumed 
by scholarly observers, or, indeed, is evident in the state’s own 
rhetoric. Rather, the case of the Thai northwest suggests that the 
state is amenable to heterogeneous modes of authority and indeed is 
comprised by such heterogeneity. An additional implication is that 
this mode of personalistic rule is not threatening to the projection of 
state power in the uplands but is precisely the means through which 
the state prosecutes its agenda in such regions. The central state is 
reliant on powerful Thai elites to effect its writ, and the elites in 
turn reproduce their power through their favourable connections to 
central authority. Another revelatory implication of this study is that 
the incorporation of culturally and politically distinct groups into the 
Vietnamese national project does not necessarily come at the expense 
of those groups’ identity and authority; to the contrary, those unique 
qualities may be enhanced in the process of political integration. 
Minority autonomy is thus obtainable without eroding the authority 
of the state project; in fact, to the contrary, the state’s prestige is 
burnished as its power is exercised through such means. 
Although participating in state structures enables minority actors to 
advance their own interests, when the government prescribes how 
they may do so, the results can be unpredictable. The chapter by Philip 
Taylor focuses on the efforts by the Vietnamese government to control 
the educational mobility options available to the Khmer monastic 
population in Vietnam. Khmers in Vietnam have a highly developed 
vernacular education network based in their Buddhist monasteries. 
The socialist government not only permits the operation of this 
religious-based education network, it recently has supported the 
development of a Buddhist institute in Vietnam as the peak educational 
destination for Vietnamese Khmers. Like elsewhere in Southeast Asia, 
this intervention in monastic education was designed to consolidate 
national identifications among local Buddhists. However, the effort 
was far from successful, as Khmer monks continued to travel to centres 
of monastic learning outside of Vietnam. The state-prescribed option 
has been bypassed by Khmer monastics, who are determined to pursue 
far more expansive educational alternatives.
The determination of Khmers in Vietnam to chart their own monastic 
education routes illustrates the tensions between the territorialising 
nation-state and the decentred itineraries of citizens who are inspired 
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by their own spatial imaginaries. Having historically migrated to 
monastic centres in Cambodia to pursue higher education, Khmers in 
the Mekong Delta found their traditional avenue of social mobility 
blocked by the rise to power of socialist states in both Vietnam and 
Cambodia. In time, the Vietnamese government developed its own 
Khmer vernacular higher education system, modelled on the Buddhist 
university system found in Theravada countries. However, the option 
failed to satisfy Khmer people’s desire for cosmopolitan self-realisation 
and experiential immersion in a Khmer-language educational milieu. 
Resisting parochialisation within Vietnam, Khmers trod other paths, 
including educational migration to Burma, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and 
post-socialist Cambodia. Their sometimes illicit journeys illustrate the 
challenges posed to states by the demotic aspirations for connection 
unleashed by globalisation. The official response, which has been to 
actively police educational returns, exemplifies the pitfalls minority 
citizens face in an era of aspirational transnational travel.
Disconnected and Reconnected in History 
and Space
Much hope for social betterment is invested in Vietnam’s global 
integration, yet with it has come a sense of anxiety about the threats 
that powerful international processes and actors pose to Vietnam’s 
very identity. One of the ways the state has responded to this sense 
of threat has been to confer on certain cultural practices and objects 
the status of being part of a Vietnamese cultural canon. Similarly, the 
contemporary concern to register and protect strategically significant 
places, such as national parks, borderlands, and historical sites, 
responds to official apprehension about unregulated change and 
threats from without. However, these efforts to fix the meanings of 
items and practices as iconic heritage run counter to dynamic popular 
processes of modification and re-signification, and may serve to 
undermine or obscure their value to local populations. Equally, the 
rush to secure certain sites for the benefit of the Vietnamese nation 
risks removing them from the realm of everyday use and ironically 
may render them less accessible to local people. These contradictory 
processes of securing and losing control over culturally significant 
practices and sites are topics explored by the final two essays in this 
volume.
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As Oscar Salemink observes in his chapter, Vietnam is experiencing a 
rapid heritagisation of its cultural legacy. Numerous cultural and ritual 
sites, objects, and practices have been formally recognised as national 
heritage by the state in line with UNESCO criteria. Taking place in 
tandem with these developments is the transformation of heritage into 
spectacle, as state authorities and tourist companies stage festivals 
that celebrate a variety of local practices as ancient and distinctive, 
thereby securing possession of them as icons of Vietnamese national 
identity. However, as Salemink shows in his chapter, this ritualised 
connection with the nation paradoxically comes at a price of local 
disconnection from the cultural site, object, or practice that is officially 
labelled cultural heritage. He contends that, especially for religious 
sites, objects and practices, heritage recognition casts a secular gaze 
on cultural life. Among other things, it effectively disenfranchises 
attempts by locals to modify and reinterpret their ritual practices and 
cultural identifications in meaningful alignment with the profoundly 
altered conditions they experience as subjects of marketisation and 
global integration. In other words, when sites, objects and practices 
are inscribed as heritage, the dynamic values invested in them by 
various constituent communities risk being obscured and discounted.
Focusing on the transformation of the cultural traditions of Vietnam’s 
Central Highlanders into heritage displays, Oscar Salemink’s chapter 
shows these processes at work. The use of ceremonial gongs was 
once widespread in the Central Highlands, and traditionally was 
embedded in the ritual and social lives of numerous highland 
peoples. Powerful forces have rapidly marginalised these practices, 
ranging from social and ritual reform in the socialist period to the 
major economic and social changes occurring under conditions of 
capitalist commoditisation. Highlanders have responded to these 
ruptures by embracing Christianity as an autonomous form of 
vernacular modernism, while their diasporic representatives have 
promoted alternative identifications for highlanders as members of 
a collectively oppressed people. In an attempt to counter these new 
identifications, state cultural authorities have moved to endorse fading 
practices such as gong use as authentic, and stage cultural festivals 
that celebrate their status as cultural heritage. Oscar Salemink argues 
that, through this process of secularisation, local communities’ own 
cultural responses to their contemporary predicament are effectively 
disqualified, while outside players — cultural experts, state agencies, 
tourist companies — effectively take over the management and staging 
of highland heritage for their own benefit.
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The final chapter, by Edyta Roszko, looks through the lens of a 
dispute between Vietnam and its large neighbour China to examine 
the territorial and historical recentring of a once marginal island off 
the Central Vietnamese coast. China’s expanding political and military 
influence in the South China Sea to secure the supply of natural 
resources has recently led to numerous maritime confrontations 
with Vietnamese sea users. Its attempt to enclose virtually the entire 
sea has been a focus within Vietnam of public anger and political 
contestation. One location where we can see some local consequences 
of this contestation is Lý Sơn Island, which is considered as a historic 
and contemporary stepping stone to the Paracel island chain and a 
border zone in Vietnam. China’s seizure of Vietnamese vessels, and 
the arrest and months-long detention of Lý Sơn fishermen have been 
widely covered in Vietnam’s mass media, adding fuel to a heated debate 
about disputed areas in the South China/Eastern Sea, and stirring new 
imaginings about the role of the sea and its islands in the nation’s 
history.
Against the backdrop of the South China Sea dispute, Edyta Roszko 
analyses how the small and marginalised coastal location of Lý Sơn 
has become central to the state’s sociocultural project of redefining 
Vietnam from a rice-growing culture to a maritime nation. Responding 
to media discourses, Vietnamese people have come to see the contested 
waters and islands as inalienable national territory and, through their 
practices of patriotic tourism to Lý Sơn Island, they demonstrate a 
new identity as citizens of the sea. While such attention brings new 
status and economic opportunities to a once peripheral place, it also 
has required from Lý Sơn people a shift in subjectivities in response to 
the state’s re-territorialising project. Moreover, the growing national 
interest in the island’s historical and cultural heritage comes at the cost 
of obscuring from consciousness islanders’ cosmopolitan legacies of 
travel and trade, including, indeed, their relations with China. In the 
context of conflict and contestation, islanders have been disconnected 
from key aspects of their identity and history as they simultaneously 
have been recentred as heroic subjects of a new maritime nationalism. 
Offering lessons that reach far beyond the study of Vietnam, the 
dilemmas confronted by Lý Sơn Islanders highlight the global stakes 
entailed in local experiences of connection and disconnection in even 
the most obscure lives and places.
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1
Social Relations, Regional Variation, 
and Economic Inequality in 
Contemporary Vietnam: A View from 
Two Vietnamese Rural Communities
Hy V . Luong
The salience of social connections or social capital in Vietnam is 
summed up in a contemporary Vietnamese saying regarding different 
factors of importance in the Vietnamese labour market: ‘nhất hậu duệ, 
nhì quan hệ, ba tiền tệ, bốn trí tuệ’ (‘Of first importance is descent; 
second are social relations; third is money; and fourth is the intellect’). 
Such a  saying may over-simplify reality, but it is a fact that ethnic 
Vietnamese from all walks of life think first and foremost of social 
connections in their search for the solutions to various problems 
in their daily lives: from the purchase of a motorcycle and many 
other consumer durables, to medical treatment for a family member, 
to securing a job, a loan, or a business contract. 
In both the quotidian maintenance and cultivation of social relations, 
and in their mobilisation in moments of need, ethnic Vietnamese 
usually invoke ‘sentiment’ (tình cảm). Notwithstanding the strong local 
ideological emphasis on ‘sentiment’, the maintenance and cultivation 
of social connections or social capital require the investment of time 
and material resources; time and material resources needed in offering 
advice, giving gifts, doing favours, or in hosting death-anniversary 
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meals and wedding banquets, among others. In this context, people 
from different social strata are far from being on a level playing field. 
This is reflected in my research data over the past decade from two 
Vietnamese communities, the village of Hoài Thị (2012 pop. 1,141) 
in the northern Red River Delta, and the community of Khánh Hậu 
(2012 pop. 14,213) in the southern Mekong Delta, which have both 
experienced good growth in income in this period.1 However, my 
field data show not only some impact of wealth and socioeconomic 
stratification on the cultivation of social capital, but also of a major 
regional variation in social capital configuration. Northern villagers’ 
social connections include many relations formalised through the 
establishment of patrilineages and numerous voluntary associations, in 
contrast to the pattern in rural southern Vietnam. Northern villagers 
also mobilise their social connections more effectively, at least in terms 
of material assistance from people in their networks. Towards the end 
of the chapter, in reference to the larger debate on the salience of social 
connections in the political economy and sociocultural fabric in some 
other East Asian societies (for example, Gold et al. 2002:10–17; Walder 
1986; Yang 1994, 2002), I argue that it is problematic to attribute the 
salience of social connections in Vietnam solely to the shortage of goods 
and services, the weakness in the Vietnamese formal institutional 
framework (lack of strong commitment to institutional rules), 
1  Khánh Hậu is well known in the literature on Vietnam as it was studied in the late 1950s 
by three American social scientists and their Vietnamese research collaborators (Hickey 1964; 
Henry 1964). In 2006, although most of its land was still used for agriculture, Khánh Hậu was 
incorporated into the municipality and provincial capital of Tân An due to its proximity to Tân 
An, and divided into two ‘urban’ wards (phường), Khánh Hậu and Tân Khánh. In this chapter, 
I use ‘Khánh Hậu’ to refer to both of the recently created wards and their population (7,863 in 
Khánh Hậu and 6,350 in Tân Khánh in 2012). Khánh Hậu is located at about 55 kilometres from 
Hồ Chí Minh City, while Hoài Thị is situated about 30 kilometres from Hà Nội. In 2012, Khánh 
Hậu’s population was 12.5 times larger than Hoài Thị. Khánh Hậu’s area was also 21.8 times larger 
than that of Hoài Thị (1,073 hectares in contrast to 49.3 hectares). Hoài Thị villagers have a very 
strong sense of identity and live in a nucleated settlement, quite distinct from the five other 
villages (thôn) in the commune of Liên Bão. This strong village identity, below the commune 
level, is typical of the Red River Delta of Northern Vietnam. In contrast, Khánh Hậu is a spatially 
dispersed community, with no clear boundaries among its hamlets (ấp) and no strong identity 
among the population of any hamlet.
I first conducted research in Hoài Thị and Khánh Hậu in 1990–92. I have carried out systematic 
and comparative research on these communities three more times in the past decade and a half, 
with primary funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of 
Canada, and with the collaboration and assistance of Vietnamese researchers at the University 
of Social Sciences and Humanities in Hồ Chí Minh City, the Southern Institute of Social Sciences, 
the Ethnology Institute, and the National Institute of Cultural and Arts Studies.
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the  subsequent uncertainty in the social environment, and people’s 
mobilisation of social capital for problem solving. This salience is also 
partly and deeply rooted in local models for and of social reality. 
Social Connections in Local Sociocultural 
Fabric: A View from Two Rural Vietnamese 
Communities
To the extent that ethnic Vietnamese consider social connections or 
social capital a fundamental aspect of their lives, these connections 
are not only mobilised in daily life. These relations are also ritualised 
in the attendance and gifts at life cycle events such as weddings and 
funerals, and, to a lesser extent, in the invitation to and attendance 
at the annual death anniversaries of relatives and acquaintances. 
As average income has significantly risen in the past three decades 
in Vietnam, the financial investment in the cultivation of social 
connections has increased correspondingly. This increased investment 
is partly reflected in the size of weddings, funerals (Figures 1 and 2), 
death anniversary feasts, and, in northern Vietnam, in the revitalisation 
and creation of patrilineages and numerous voluntary associations to 
strengthen social capital.
In Hoài Thị and Khánh Hậu, the average number of visitors at funerals 
in studied households increased respectively by 66 per cent and 
88  per  cent over three-and-a-half decades (respectively from the 
average of 160 in 1976–85 to 265 in 2006–12 in Hoài Thị, and from 
146 to 274 in Khánh Hậu).2 As a widely shared Vietnamese practice, 
one pays respect to the deceased not only when the deceased is one’s 
relative, friend, co-worker, or a member of the nuclear family of one’s 
2  As Hoài Thị had a small population, a census was conducted in the entire village in 2000, 
2005, and 2012, focusing on household economy and social capital. A survey using the same 
instrument was carried out in Khánh Hậu in 2000 using a random probability sample of 340 
households. This sample increased to 367 households in 2005 and 411 in 2012 in order to include 
households splitting off from the original sample and to reflect the increase in population. 
In 2005, in the research project on gifts and social capital, the Dinh hamlet in Khánh Hậu was 
also chosen for in-depth research on gifts and social relations, in comparison with Hoài Thị. 
The method of participant observation was also used in 81 of the surveyed households (40 in 
the Dinh hamlet of Khánh Hậu; 41 in Hoài Thị) for two months in 2005 and for a shorter period 
in 2012. Most of these households also recorded their gift flows from February 2005 to January 
2006. In-depth interviews were also conducted with 111 of the surveyed households (40 in the 
Dinh hamlet; 30 in other hamlets of Khánh Hậu; 41 in Hoài Thị) in 2005 and 2012.
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friend/co-worker, but also when the deceased is a parent or parent-
in-law of one’s friend and co-worker (tứ thân phụ mẫu), even when 
the deceased did not reside in the same household with the latter. 
These  funeral visits are made without invitation from the family or 
relatives of the deceased. Visitors routinely present cash gifts to help 
defray funeral expenses, unless, as an option among the well-off in 
southern Vietnam, the family of the deceased publicly announces the 
non-acceptance of cash gifts. (When the family of the deceased in 
Khánh Hậu or in southern Vietnam does not accept cash gifts, visitors 
usually bring incense and fruits.) In native discourse, the visit and 
the gift reflect the sentiment (tình cảm) of the visitor towards the 
deceased and/or his/her family members. They also help to reaffirm 













Hoài Thị (n=104) Khành Hậu (n=111)
Figure 1: Average number of visitors to funerals in surveyed 
households since 1976.
Source: Author’s research .
At weddings, the invitation list is determined not only by the bride and 
the groom, but also by their respective family members. (In both of the 
studied rural communities, the bride and groom’s families normally 
hold separate banquets and have independent invitation lists.) Besides 
relatives, friends, and co-workers of the bride/groom, and friends and 
co-workers of the parents of the bride/groom, very close friends of 
the bride/groom’s adult siblings are also usually invited. Invitations 
reaffirm not only the social relations of the bride and groom, but also 
those of their parents and adult siblings. This extension of invitation 
to people in the social circles of the bride/groom’s parents and adult 
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siblings is facilitated by the widespread use of kin terms among 













Figure 2: Average number of wedding guests in Hoài Thị 
and Khánh Hậu, 1976–2012.
Source: Author’s research . 
Nowadays, wedding guests routinely make cash gifts which normally 
cover or exceed estimated meal costs. However, special relations with 
the bride/groom and with his/her parents and siblings are symbolised 
by much larger gifts, if guests’ economic conditions allow them. 
More specifically, the bride/groom’s grandparents, aunts and uncles, 
first cousins, and close friends normally make much larger gifts 
than other guests, and may choose to make gifts in gold (necklaces, 
bracelets, earrings, etc.) instead of cash. The size of the gift also 
depends on the giver’s economic circumstances, as one informant in 
Khánh Hậu explained to me regarding the cash gifts by his siblings to 
his daughter at her wedding in 2004:
HL: I would like to ask more about [the gifts from] the maternal aunts 
and uncles of the bride [interviewee’s daughter] … I see here that 
Mr Năm gave 200,000 VND; that Mrs Bảy in Thủ Tửu [hamlet] gave 
500,000 VND; that Mrs Tư … gave only 50,000 VND; that Mr Tám 
gave 100,000 VND. Those four people are full brothers and sisters. 
Why were their gifts so different?
Male Interviewee: Let me tell you … Mrs Bảy gave 500,000 because 
she was wealthy. Mr Năm gave 200,000 because although he was 
fairly well-off, he was less wealthy than Mrs Bảy. Mr Tám gave 
100,000 VND because he had to take care of ancestral worship in his 
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house, and because he was not that well-off. Mrs Tư was poor. She 
was married, but lived without a husband. She [consequently] gave 
50,000 VND. When her children get married, I will give gifts of 50,000 
VND … And when a child of Mrs Bảy who gave 500,000 VND gets 
married, I will give back 500,000 VND … It [the gift] depended on the 
giver’s circumstances. Whatever he/she gave, I will give back the same 
amount. (Hy V. Luong’s interview with the male head of Household 9 
in Khánh Hậu)
However, the principle of strict reciprocity in the above excerpt is 
more applicable among non-relatives and distant relatives than in close 
friendship and kinship relations. In the context of close relations, the 
size of the gift also depends on the circumstance of the recipient. When 
I asked the male head of Household 48 in Khánh Hậu why he had given 
a wedding gift of 300,000 VND ($18.91 USD) to his nephew (deceased 
elder brother’s son) and only 100,000 VND ($6.30 USD) to his wife’s 
nephew (wife’s elder brother’s son) in the early 2000s, he emphasised 
his sympathy for his nephew growing up without a father in contrast 
to the much wealthier household of his wife’s brother.
Vietnamese families in Hoài Thị, Khánh Hậu, and, in fact, throughout 
the country, carefully keep the lists of gifts at weddings and funerals 
for one to three decades for the purpose of reciprocity. The act 
of reciprocity does not have to be performed on the same occasion 
(a wedding gift for a wedding gift, a funeral gift for a funeral gift); 
it can be for a variety of events or occasions. It also does not have to 
be in the same form of gift (cash gift for cash gift); a generous cash 
gift can be partially reciprocated by such favours as more attentive 
or expedited services (sales, medical, bureaucratic, etc.) or service fee 
reduction (discounted prices, waived fees, etc.). Favours can also be 
reciprocated by generous cash gifts at weddings, funerals, and other 
ritual events. More generally, gifts not only reflect social relations 
but also actively structure social relations, giving advantage to those 
people who can afford generous gifts.
Annual death anniversary feasts are less elaborate and smaller in scope 
than weddings and funerals. To the extent that the death anniversary 
organiser’s economic resources allow a more extensive invitation list, 
death anniversary feasts are not restricted to the spouse, children, 
parents, siblings, and other close relatives of the deceased. Also invited 
are close friends of the deceased and their spouses, fairly close friends of 
the event organiser and of the organiser’s children, parents and possibly 
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some siblings of the organiser’s children-in-law, among others. Some 
death anniversary feasts in Hoài Thị and Khánh Hậu have 150–250 
people in attendance, especially the first major one after the funeral. In 
Hoài Thị, as local authorities have taken a stand against feasting visitors 
at funerals, as a symbol of gratitude families of the deceased invite 
funeral gift givers to the first major death anniversary on the 49th or 
50th day after the passing of the deceased. The invitation lists to first 
death anniversaries in Hoài Thị usually comprise more than 100 names. 
Beyond first death anniversaries, it is not uncommon for Khánh Hậu and 
Hoài Thị households of some means to host 60–150 guests at their most 
important annual death anniversaries. In Hoài Thị, death anniversary 
guests nowadays usually bring incense and cash gifts, a controversial 
departure from the once prevalent practice of not giving gifts to fellow 
villagers at death anniversaries (see Luong 2010:408–409).3
The controversial and quickly spreading practice of cash gifts at death 
anniversaries in Hoài Thị was reportedly started by young villagers, 
many of whom had not reached a life stage of being responsible for 
organising death anniversaries of ancestors. Unable to reciprocate the 
death anniversary feast invitations by their relatives and acquaintances, 
they felt the need to make cash gifts at death anniversaries. An elderly 
Hoài Thị village leader commented on this new practice:
The cash gift practice at death anniversaries started with young 
people just three to four years ago [around 2010–11] … For a long 
time, we had instituted the rule of no gift whatsoever when villagers 
attended death anniversaries within the village … People followed this 
practice for a while … Then, as living conditions improved, people 
began bringing fruit to death anniversaries. One year, at the death 
anniversary of the mother of a retired official whose children all lived 
far away, there was so much fruit that this retired official’s wife decided 
to re-sell it afterwards, as the fruit could not be given to her children 
and grandchildren, this was not well received in the community … 
We consequently instituted the rule of no fruit gifts and re-affirmed 
the rule of no gifts at all at death anniversaries. It was observed for a 
few years. Then younger villagers began giving cash gifts, as they felt 
awkward coming empty-handed to a death-anniversary feast. As some 
people made cash gifts, those without gifts felt awkward and made 
cash gifts too … Nowadays, a family may spend a few million đồng a 
3  In my ongoing re-study of seven rural communities in three regions of Vietnam, Hoài Thị 
is the only one where gifts at death anniversaries can take the form of cash. 
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year on gifts on those ritual occasions, because for a funeral, the gift is 
100,000 đồng at a minimum, to be followed by a 100,000-đồng gift at 
the 50th-day death anniversary. 
The practice of cash gifts at death anniversaries started with younger 
Hoài Thị villagers because few of them had entered the life stage when 
they could host death anniversaries for deceased parents. Among 
middle-aged and older villagers in both Hoài Thị and Khánh Hậu, 
it is a common practice for brothers to divide the hosting of feasts 
on the death anniversaries of parents among themselves so that they 
can reciprocate relatives and friends who have invited them to death 
anniversary feasts and other events (see Luong 2013). 
Regional Variation in Social Relational 
Configuration
Many similarities between Hoài Thị and Khánh Hậu notwithstanding, 
wedding banquet data (Figure 2) show an important difference in 
the social relational configuration between the two communities. 
More specifically, Hoài Thị villagers have invested considerably more 
time and resources to cultivate social connections, informal or formal, 
than people in Khánh Hậu.
The self-recordings from February 2005 to January 2006 by 64 
households (23 in Khánh Hậu and 41 in Hoài Thị) regarding the ritual 
events where gifts were (potentially) exchanged and social connections 
strengthened, reveal that Hoài Thị households on average attended 
many more such events in a year than their Khánh Hậu counterparts 
(55.8 events on average in Hoài Thị, compared with 32.8 in Khánh 
Hậu).4 The average number of death anniversaries and weddings 
attended by Hoài Thị households was twice as many as that attended 
by those in Khánh Hậu; and 11 times as many house construction 
celebrations (see Table 1). These household self-recordings are 
congruent with the data on household-organised and invitation-based 
events such as weddings, showing that the size of these events has 
4  In Khánh Hậu, only 29 of the 35 households agreeing to self-recording for one year recorded 
the events with gift exchanges attended by the members of their households. In my interviews 
with 35 Khánh Hậu households in November and December 2006, I determined that the self-
recordings by six of 29 households were far from complete, and that we had reliable data from 
only 23 of the 35 self-recording households.
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increased much more significantly in Hoài Thị than in Khánh Hậu 
over the past three-and-a-half decades. They confirm that Hoài Thị 
villagers made stronger efforts to cultivate social ties.
Table 1: Average number of gift-exchange events attended 
over a 12-month period by studied households in Hoài Thị 
and Khánh Hậu, 2005–06.
Hoài Thị Khánh Hậu (Dinh hamlet)
Number of events attended 55 .8 32 .8
Of which:
Death anniversary 27 .8 13
Wedding 21 11 .4
Funeral 2 .8 4 .5
House construction 2 .2 0 .2
Other 2 3 .7
Source: Author’s research . 
In the northern village of Hoài Thị, the more noticeable increase in the 
size of wedding banquets over three-and-a-half decades and the greater 
attendance at events with gifts reflects a very different social capital 
configuration than in Khánh Hậu. More specifically, Hoài Thị villagers 
have made significantly greater effort to organise voluntary associations 
and to revitalise patrilineages in order to strengthen social ties which 
involve obligations at life cycle ceremonies and death anniversaries. 
In 2005, when comparative data on kinship and voluntary association 
ties in the two communities were systematically collected, the striking 
differences in social relational configuration between Hoài Thị and 
Khánh Hậu became evident. More specifically, within the kinship 
domain, the kinship network in Hoài Thị was much denser than in 
Khánh Hậu. Due to the relatively high degree of community endogamy 
across generations, every Hoài Thị villager was related consanguinally 
or affinally to numerous others in the village (see Luong 2010:401–402). 
Of equal importance was the establishment or re-creation of numerous 
associations in Hoài Thị, a process which has intensified over the past 
two decades. They ranged from patrilineages to voluntary associations, 
the most important being same-age associations (hội đồng niên). Through 
these institutions, in which Hoài Thị villagers invested considerable time 
and financial resources, they strengthened their social networks and 
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social capital — social capital as defined by Bourdieu as ‘the aggregate 
of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of 
a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships’ 
(Bourdieu 1986:249). The strength of Hoài Thị villagers’ social capital is 
partly reflected in the higher number of events involving gift exchanges 
which they attended.
Kinship
Hoài Thị patrilineages were revitalised from the 1980s onwards. 
They played an increasingly important role in both rites of solidarity 
and rites of passage. For example, at the village tutelary deity’s 
procession during the village festival in the first lunar month, 
many lineages presented their offerings to the deity and had them 
carried in the procession in order to assert their identities. Many also 
organised the worship of lineage founders and established ‘education-
encouragement funds’ (qũy khuyến học), recognising the educational 
achievements of students in their lineages. At funerals, patrilineages 
made their own offerings to deceased members and organised their 
male members in order to assist with funeral processions and grave 
digging. A Hoài Thị villager related how the patrilineage of her 
husband raised funds for funeral offerings:
Female interviewee: The [Nguyễn] Sỹ patrilineage specifies that the 
patrilineal kin who [according to customs] wear [white] mourning 
head bands would each contribute 10,000 [VND to the funeral gift 
from the patrilineage to the household of the deceased]. So, when the 
mourning head bands are distributed to a household, the household 
gives the money. Three bands, 30,000 VND; 2 bands, 20,000 VND. 
(Nguyễn Tiến Lộc’s interview with Household 480 in Hoài Thị)5
In Khánh Hậu, the descendants of Nguyễn Huỳnh Ðức organised 
themselves into the only patrilineage in the community, whose 
activities centred on the death anniversary of the lineage founder on 
the ninth day of the ninth lunar month. The activities of the Nguyễn 
Huỳnh patrilineage in Khánh Hậu were more limited in scope than 
those of the patrilineages in the village of Hoài Thị: it neither had an 
education-encouragement fund, nor was it actively involved in the 
5 Nguyễn Tiến Lộc was a member of one of the two field teams in my research project. So were 
Tạ Hữu Dực, Nguyễn Anh Tuấn, Nguyễn Thị Nhung, and Huỳnh Ngọc Thu whose names are 
mentioned at the end of some other interview excerpts.
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funerals of its members. In the larger context of the Mekong delta, 
patrilineages were rarely established, and when they existed as in 
Khánh Hậu, the scope of their activities was considerably more limited 
than observed in the Red River of North Vietnam. The reciprocal 
obligations among the members of the same patrilineage in Hoài Thị in 
particular, and in the Red River Delta in general, strengthened their 
relations and enlarged their social capital.
Non-kinship
In Hoài Thị, the strengthening of kinship ties through patrilineages 
was a part of the larger institutional framework for enhancing social 
capital. Hoài Thị villagers had established numerous non-kinship 
associations with formal rules for mutual assistance. Most notable 
were the same-age associations (hội đồng niên). About two-thirds of 
Hoài Thị men between the age of 18 and 60 belonged to the same-
age associations whose membership was village-bound. Same-age 
associations had strict rules regarding gifts and mutual assistance on 
major occasions in association members’ households: wedding (a major 
collective gift to an association member), house construction, and 
funeral (of members, members’ spouses and parents; with collective 
offerings and labour assistance at the ceremony). (Only 24 of the 319 
Hoài Thị women in the 18–60 age range joined same-age associations.) 
One villager explained the importance of same-age association ties:
When asked about whether they were happy with the membership in 
the same-age association and whether the membership had led to a good 
amount of mutual assistance, the whole group concurred that a same-age 
association was better than a same-school-class association (hội đồng học). 
A same-school-class association did not bring together all the friends of 
the same age from the village. If the same-school-class association was 
formed among classmates from a senior secondary school, some members 
would be from other communes. Such fellow association members could 
not understand one another as well as childhood friends of the same 
age and from the same village. When one joined a same-age association, 
one’s household, although having only one son, would have ten sons 
[from a same-age association with ten members]. When one’s household 
had a house constructed, all association members would come to help 
without pay and need to be fed only. Even when an association member 
was absent, his younger or elder brother would come to help as a 
replacement [for the absent association member]. Or when a member’s 
household had a wedding, fellow [same-age] association members came 
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to help set up the banquet area. Those who worked away from the 
village and could not help before the main wedding day would make an 
effort to be at the wedding. (Fieldnotes of Tạ Hữu Dực about Household 
383 in Hoài Thà)
The remaining voluntary associations in Hoài Thị, while less 
important than same-age associations, were numerous: education-
promotion associations (hội khuyến học), elderly male group at the 
communal house, elderly female Buddhist association, all-women 
incense-offering team (đội dâng hương), adverse-circumstance women’s 
group with incense burners at the pagoda (nhóm bát hương), same-
military-service association (hội đồng ngũ), same-circumstance women’s 
associations (hội  đồng tâm), alumni associations, same-occupation 
associations, parallel-verse singing (quan họ) club, spirit medium group 
(nhóm con nhang), and a retired state worker group. Male  villagers 
participated more in the formal voluntary associations than their 
female counterparts (Figure 3) because, according to many female 
informants, married women had more domestic duties (including the 
care of children and grandchildren).
In contrast, voluntary association membership was much less common 
in Dinh hamlet of Khánh Hậu,6 despite a population size three times 
greater than Hoài Thị. In 2005, the number of voluntary association 
memberships for every 100 persons aged 16 or above was 112 among men 
and 70 among women in Hoài Thị, and 17 among men and 7.6 among 
women in Khánh Hậu (Figure 3).7 By 2012, this difference had widened. 
Specifically, in Hoài Thị, eight neighbourhood associations had been 
6  Khánh Hậu also had a poetry club and traditional music club whose activities were partly 
sponsored by the local government. But relatively few Dinh hamlet residents were members 
of these clubs. The three Cao Dai temples in Khánh Hậu, however, formed three communities 
within which there was mutual assistance in the form of praying at funerals.
7  These statistical figures for villagers above the age of 16 do not include rotating credit 
associations, which involve mostly households and household budgets. There was an average of 
0.56 rotating credit association memberships per household in Dinh hamlet of Khánh Hậu compared 
with 0.4 in Hoài Thị. In terms of gender, in the northern village of Hoài Thị, both men and women 
participated in credit associations, while in the southern community of Khánh Hậu, it was mainly 
women who participated in credit associations. Since data on credit association membership were 
collected not at the individual level but at the household level, they are not used in the calculation 
of the number of association memberships per 100 adult men or 100 adult women.
In both Hoài Thị and Khánh Hậu, there were also state-organised associations, such as women’s 
association, peasant association, elderly association, youth association, and trade unions (only in 
Khánh Hậu). In 2005, the rate of membership for every 100 residents above the age of 16 was 44 in 
Hoài Thị and 11 in Khánh Hậu for women’s association; and, for other state-organised associations, 
84 for both men and women in Hoài Thị, and 14 for men and 9 for women in Khánh Hậu. 
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formed, covering 37 per cent of village households. Women going 
through the same Buddhist ceremonies (lễ quy y) had also formed mutual 
aid associations. Membership of the Buddhist association also increased 
from 75 in 2005 to 157 in 2013. The quan họ club membership doubled 
from 22 to 44. Declining membership of same-circumstance women’s 
associations (hội đồng tâm) was due to their transformation into rotating 
credit associations, requiring contributions beyond the capacity of a 
number of members. The number of other voluntary association ties 
remained essentially unchanged. In general, the number of voluntary 
association ties per 100 adults in Hoài Thị increased from 2005 to 2012, 
while it did not increase in Khánh Hậu. The difference between two 
communities in voluntary association membership thus widened during 
this seven-year period.
Table 2: Voluntary association membership in Hoài Thị 
and Dinh hamlet of Khánh Hậu, 2005.
Hoài Thị Khánh Hậu
Population 1,032 2,894
Association membership
Communal house association/group 41 42
Buddhist (prayer) association 75 40
Ritual teams 48 7
Spirit medium group 8
Cao Đài children’s team 6
Education-promotion association 86 6
Same-military-service association 41 2
Same-occupation association/group 7 13
Same-age association 240
Same-circumstance women’s association 45
Adverse-circumstance women’s group 21
Alumni association 24 14
Retired state worker group 14 9
Quan họ singing club 22
Gymnastics club 5
Traditional medicine philanthropy group 22
Rotating credit association 100 385
Source: Author’s research .
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Figure 3: Voluntary association membership — number of 
memberships per 100 residents above the age of 16 in 2005.
Source: Author’s research .
The northern–southern difference in social relational configuration is 
a major feature not only in the rural landscape, but also in big cities 
such as Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City. In Hà Nội, numerous same-
village associations (hội đồng hương) exist among people born and raised 
in somewhat distant villages in rural northern Vietnam, but in Hồ Chí 
Minh City, same-village or even same-commune associations among 
people migrating from rural southern Vietnam are unheard of. Even 
same-district associations are rare. Only same-province associations 
exist with very limited membership among people coming from the 
same province. While southerners do draw upon their ego-centred 
informal networks in urban contexts, northerners establish formal 
voluntary associations much more often.
If the high frequency of endogamous marriages rendered kinship ties in 
Hoài Thị multiplex in that the same two persons had different kinship 
roles vis-à-vis each other, depending on the tracing path (see Luong 
and Diệp Ðình Hoa 2000:50–51), the formation of numerous voluntary 
associations, mainly in the past two decades, rendered social relations 
in Hoài Thị considerably more so. At major events such as weddings 
and funerals, many villagers had to present multiple gifts, many 
through their associations, because of these villagers’ multiple relations 
to the household with such an event. In the context of intricately tight 
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intra-village social networks and multiplex relations, it was difficult 
for any Hoài Thị household not to be fairly heavily involved in gift 
exchanges within the village.
From a diachronic perspective, the proliferation of voluntary 
associations accounted for an important part of the significant increase 
in the number of guests at such ritual events as death anniversaries 
and weddings in Hoài Thị, as explained by a villager:
Male interviewee: When I got married, we served about 35 trays of 
food [to about 175 guests]. [In those days] … a wedding was attended 
by close relatives like first patrilineal cousins. Nowadays, [given the] 
same-age and same-school-class associations (hội đồng niên and hội đồng 
học), invitations are sent out to a larger number or even to the entire 
village … Not in my day … It is only in the past few years when same-
age associations proliferate, [there are] more wedding invitations. 
(Nguyễn Anh Tuấn’s interview with Household 412 in Hoài Thà)
From a synchronic perspective, both the tighter kinship network in 
Hoài Thị than in Khánh Hậu and the proliferation of social ties through 
voluntary associations in Hoài Thị also underlay the more frequent 
attendance of Hoài Thị villagers at ritual events with gift exchanges. 
The larger number of events attended by studied Hoài Thị households 
reflects their generally larger social capital by which, as discussed 
below, they successfully mobilise material assistance on numerous 
occasions, ranging from job introduction (heavy concentration of 
villagers with non-agricultural incomes in the alcohol retail trade and 
in the construction industry in Hà Nội) to easier access to interest-free 
loans and to house construction in Hoài Thị itself.
The material assistance mobilised through social capital can be 
examined in greater depth through three cases: one well-off household 
in Khánh Hậu in 2006, and two relatively poor households, one in 
Khánh Hậu and one in Hoài Thị, undertaking household renovation 
in 2003 and 2005 respectively. Both of the poor households were 
in the second (below-average) income quintile in their respective 
communities, with the Hoài Thị household earning an annual per 
capita income of 4.7 million VND ($317 USD), compared with 3.7 
million VND ($250 USD) in Khánh Hậu. The Khánh Hậu household 
received house construction gifts from only 11 households, worth 
1 million VND ($63 USD), while the Hoài Thị household received cash 
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gifts from 106 households (85 from Hoài Thị) totalling 5.1 million VND 
($328 USD) on the occasion of its house renovation in 2003. These gifts 
added to the flow of interest-free loans for house construction (see 
below), enabling the Hoài Thị household under analysis to spend more 
on its house renovation than otherwise possible. In Hoài Thị, cash gifts 
and labour contributions came not only from kin and neighbours, but 
also from same-age association members, among other people whose 
social ties were formed or strengthened in the past two decades. 
Among better-off Hoài Thị villagers, material assistance for the purchase 
of property and house construction was also quite substantial. A 37-year-
old trader in Household 379, whose per capita income of 45 million VND 
($2,300 USD) in 2012 placed it in the top income quintile in Hoài Thị, 
related the material assistance that he had received:
When I had the house built in 2006, it cost 260 million VND ($16,227 
USD). My friends lent me a good part of the money, interest-free … 
When I asked a friend for a loan of ten million VND ($625 USD), he told 
his wife to get a tael of gold and gave it to me. A tael of gold was 
19 million VND ($1,186 USD) at that time. He said, ‘How come only ten 
million VND? Take this. Give the house a good paint instead of leaving it 
unpainted …’ I chose to pay him back in three instalments, two-tenths 
of a tael, half a tael, and three-tenths of a tael. He said, ‘No hurry. Take 
your time and make sure that you have enough money for other things.’ 
When I bought a piece of land in the village, 85  square metres, for 
over 700 million VND ($35,700 USD) later, I had to borrow over 300 
million VND from my friends, all interest-free. 100 million VND from 
one friend, and scores of million VND from each of some other friends. 
And $3,000 USD from my elder brother’s daughter. (Excerpt from Hy V. 
Luong’s interview with Household 379 in June 2014)
The reciprocal gift/labour exchange and interest-free loans allowed 
Hoài Thị villagers in particular, and northern Vietnamese rural 
dwellers in general, to build more expensive brick houses, even 
when they had very limited resources of their own. In contrast, in 
the southern Mekong Delta, many poor rural dwellers constructed 
simple and less expensive houses with thatched roofs, wooden walls 
and earthen floors.
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Because of the aforementioned difference between Hoài Thị and 
Khánh Hậu in social capital configuration, despite the higher annual 
per capita income in Khánh Hậu than in Hoài Thị (31 million VND 
($1,482 USD) versus 23 million VND ($1,094 USD)), in 2012 the average 
number of people from whom surveyed households could borrow at 
least five million VND interest-free for at least one month was 15 in 
Hoài Thị and 5.5 in Khánh Hậu. In other words, social capital could be 
mobilised more easily in Hoài Thị than in Khánh Hậu.
However, social capital is a double-edged sword (Portes 1998; Geertz 
1963). It can be mobilised for the purpose of resolving various 
problems in daily life. But it also involves obligations to people in 
one’s social network. In the context of lower per capita income in the 
northern village of Hoài Thị than in the southern community of Khánh 
Hậu, and in the face of larger numbers of kinship and non-kinship ties 
with gift obligations in the former, Hoài Thị villagers have introduced 
rules and practices for limiting ritual expenditures and gift expenses. 
By 2012, beer flowed without limit at death anniversary feasts and 
wedding banquets in Khánh Hậu, while in Hoài Thị, the number of beer 
cans offered at ceremonies was restricted. As cash gifts at weddings 
minimally covered the cost of the meal, these usually amounted to 
100,000 VND (about $5 USD) in Hoài Thị in 2012 in contrast to 200,000 
VND (about $10 USD) in Khánh Hậu. Despite the larger number of 
events attended by Hoài Thị villagers, the annual per capita spending 
on ritual events such as weddings, funerals, death anniversaries, 
among others, remained lower in Hoài Thị than in Khánh Hậu, both in 
2005 and in 2012 (see Table 2). Hoài Thị villagers succeeded in holding 
down their gift and ritual expenses and simultaneously increasing 
their social capital, more than people in Khánh Hậu.
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Table 3: Per capita spending on gifts in 2005 and 2012 
in million of VND (in constant 2012 value of VND).8
Hoài Thị Khánh Hậu
Year 2005 2012 2005 2012
Number of surveyed 
households in community
(n=247) (n=280) (n=367) (n=411)


















% of income spent on 
gifts at ceremonies
13 .5% 10 .8% 13 .2% 10%
Source: Author’s research .
Class and Social Capital
Although ethnic Vietnamese of all social strata attach great significance 
to social connections or social capital, opportunities for maintaining 
and expanding social capital are not equally available to all members 
of society. While the poor can express their sentiment through advice, 
support, and sociality, those with wealth and political power, forming 
a dominant class, are in a much stronger position to cultivate social 
relations by organising more events, inviting more people to these 
events, and by offering financial support and interest-free loans to 
people in their social networks. 
Survey data (Table 4) indicate that in 2012, in both communities, the 
average net per capita expenditure on rituals (mostly on weddings, 
funerals and death anniversaries) and gifts at these rituals hovered 
in the range of 1.75 to 2.5 million VND for the first (lowest), second, 
third, and fourth income quintiles. These expenditures are both 
8  As average incomes rose during the period between 2005 and 2012, gift and social relational 
expenditures per capita, controlled for inflation, also increased in absolute amount (by 25 per 
cent in Hoài Thị and 40 per cent in Khánh Hậu). There is thus no evidence that, as wealth 
increased, villagers became less involved in the gift economy. However, in both communities, the 
percentage of income spent on gifts and social relations dropped from over 13 per cent in 2005 
to the range of 10 per cent in 2012. The declining percentage of income spent on gifts and social 
relations probably resulted from a greater investment in education, among other items. In our 
general household survey in 2000, with 207 households in Hoài Thị and 340 in Khánh Hậu, we 
did not ask about gift/ritual spending. Data are only available for 40 households in Hoài Thị and 
70 households in Khánh Hậu in 2000 on the basis of a different research instrument, making 2000 
data not strictly comparable to 2005 and 2012 ones.
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for gifts in attending those rituals in other households, and for net 
expenditures for the organisers, after deducting the cash gifts from 
guests. Many poor households in the bottom income quintile in both 
communities had to spend annually (almost) as much per capita on 
ritual event gifts as those in the middle income quintile in order to 
maintain their social relations. For households in the bottom income 
quintile, these ritual expenses to maintain social capital amounted 
to an average of 23 per cent of income in the southern community 
of Khánh Hậu and 31 per cent in the northern village of Hoài Thị. 
At the opposite end, although households in the top income quintile 
clearly spent more on ritual expenses to cultivate social relations and 
obtained more benefits from their larger social capital (reflected in the 
much larger number of possible interest-free loans), on average, their 
ritual expenses amounted to less than 10 per cent of their income.
Table 4: Per capita income and ritual expenditure by income 
quintile, 2012 (income and expenditure in million of VND; 
USD equivalents appear in parentheses).
Income quintile 1
(lowest)
2 3 4 5
(highest)






















% of income spent on 
ritual expenditure
31% 13% 12% 10$ 7%
Average no . of possible 
interest-free loans at 
or above 5 million VND 
($238) 
10 .7 9 .9 16 .4 15 .8 21 .7






















% of income spent on 
ritual expenditure
23% 11% 9 .6% 7 .5% 9 .6%
Average no . of possible 
interest-free loans at 
or above 5 million VND 
($238) 
2 .3 3 5 .8 3 .4 11 .7
Source: Author’s research .
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Why did the poor in both Khánh Hậu and Hoài Thị tend to accept the 
burden of ritual expenses, which took up a relatively high percentage 
of their income, and which caused considerable tension in intra-
household relations? As seen in two of the three cases below, the 
burden of ritual expenses was accepted by households in order to 
reciprocate assistance received in the past (at weddings and funerals, 
among other occasions) and to maintain their social relations, which 
would increase the likelihood of future assistance from people and 
households in their networks.
In 2005, Household 91 in Khánh Hậu comprised a 73-year-old woman 
living with her granddaughters, aged six and 12. Household income 
was derived mainly from the remittances from her youngest son and 
daughter-in-law (the parents of her granddaughters) who had received 
1.5 hectares of cultivable land in the Plain of Reeds as a part of the 
resettlement of landless cultivators in the late 1980s. The elderly 
woman’s mother had a long ancestral root in Khánh Hậu, while her father 
came from a neighbouring commune. Her deceased husband’s family 
had settled in Khánh Hậu for at least one generation. Her daughter-
in-law came from a neighbouring commune located in Tiền Giang 
Province. In 2005, the daughter-in-law returned to Khánh Hậu during 
slack seasons to help take care of the two granddaughters, while the 
son stayed in their new village to take care of the land. With an annual 
per capita income of 3.1 million VND ($196 USD) in 2005, Household 
91 fell into the bottom income quintile in Khánh  Hậu. However, 
it  had ancestral worship duties to five deceased persons, including 
the elderly woman’s husband, parents-in-law, and grandparents-
in-law. Due to its limited financial resources, it annually organised 
only one big death anniversary banquet (that of the elderly woman’s 
husband), which cost about 2 million VND ($125 USD). The elderly 
woman in Household 91 reportedly attended 53 events in a 12-month 
period in 2005–06, presenting gifts worth approximately 2.3 million 
VND (about one-quarter of the total income of this household, 
equivalent to $146  USD). They included 26 death anniversaries 
(mostly among the elderly woman’s relatives and acquaintances in 
Khánh Hậu), 12  weddings, eight funerals, four birth celebrations, 
three visits to sick acquaintances, and one house construction party. 
The overwhelming majority were organised by the elderly woman’s 
relatives, children-in-law’s parents, and neighbours. Although some 
of the elderly woman’s gift money came from remittances from her 
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oldest son living in another province and occasional gifts from her 
four married daughters in Khánh Hậu, the bulk of the gift expenses, 
as well as more than half of the big death anniversary expenses, had to 
be covered by her youngest son and daughter-in-law. (It is customary 
for youngest sons in the southern third of Vietnam to inherit their 
parents’ houses, a greater portion of their parents’ land, and to assume 
a greater responsibility for ancestral worship, in contrast to the pattern 
in the Red River Delta, where the oldest son tends to assume this role.) 
The gift burden on the youngest son and his family was a major source 
of conflict between the elderly woman and her daughter-in-law, to the 
point that they were barely on speaking terms with each other during 
our fieldwork in 2005:
Mrs C. [daughter-in-law in Household 91] said that she would be 
ready to pass on her family affairs to whoever was willing to take 
them over ... that the family had no savings year in, year out … that 
money was heavily spent on ritual gifts … [She referred to Mrs K., her 
mother-in-law, in the front room with] another reminder [to her] about 
the need to go to the funeral of Mr Tư in Thủ Tủu [hamlet]. Mrs Sáu 
[a neighbour of Mrs C.] also made a similar complaint that it was a 
heavy burden getting married to a youngest son and living in a family 
with ancestral worship obligations, and that earnings were heavily 
spent on ritual banquets.
Mrs Sáu went home to go to bed. I continued talking to Mrs C. until 
10 p.m. Mrs C. complained and talked about all sorts of things centring 
on the conflict with her mother-in-law and the costly ritual banquet 
expenses in a household with ancestral worship duties ... Her mother-
in-law [reportedly] spent a lot of money [on gifts to be brought to 
ritual banquets]. [Mrs C. said] no matter how hard she worked, money 
was always short, and that they were regularly in debt. Her mother-in-
law readily accepted invitations, and spent 100,000 VND on a wedding 
gift [above the normal figure of 50,000 VND for a wedding in 2005] and 
50,000 VND on a funeral gift. Occasionally, Mrs C. suggested [to her 
mother-in-law] to scale down the gifts. Her mother-in-law reportedly 
said that she could not behave like a dog. [When Mrs C did not give 
the money for a ritual banquet gift], the mother-in-law, after changing 
her clothes [to go to the banquet], kept repeating: ‘Maybe I am a dog.’
Mrs K [the mother-in-law] would attend the funeral as the in-law of 
the deceased’s in-law. Mrs K called Ms Sáu [nicknamed] the Fatso in 
to give the money, but Mrs C understood that it was her obligation 
to give the money to Ms Sáu. Mrs C. talked quietly to Mrs Sáu, 
and the latter left with no money. Mrs C left to visit a neighbour. 
CONNECTED & DISCONNECTED IN VIET NAM
62
Mrs K. [the mother-in-law] walked in and out of the house and told 
me: She [C.] did not care about funerals, as if I would not die [implying 
that C. did not care about the future reciprocation of acquaintances 
at Mrs K.’s funeral] … Mrs C said that [her mother-in-law] said that a 
gift of 50,000 VND was not adequate [at the funeral]. Because Mrs K. 
would go with the mother-in-law of her children, she reportedly 
wanted to give a 100,000 VND gift. (Fieldnotes of Nguyễn thị Nhung 
on Household 91 in Khánh Hậu in August 2005)
The large number of events attended by the elderly woman in 
Household 91 was due partly to her strong integration in the local 
social and kinship network, the need to reciprocate past gifts, given 
at her husband’s funeral in 1994 and her five children’s weddings 
over the years, the formal gift-exchange relations with her children-
in-law’s parents, as well as the anticipated need for a good and large 
future funeral for herself attended by people in her network and those 
of her children, including the recipients of her ritual gifts. Despite its 
relative poverty, Household 91 had an extensive social and kinship 
network and thus more social capital than many richer households in 
Khánh Hậu.9
In 2005, Khánh Hậu Household 16 comprised five members, a couple 
(husband aged 44, and wife, 39), their two sons (aged 17 and 2), and 
the wife’s mother, who was temporarily residing with them to help 
care for their two-year-old son. Although the husband was born 
elsewhere, due to his father’s work assignment in another province, 
he had long-standing connections to Khánh Hậu, where his maternal 
grandfather had been a large and influential landowner before the 
political change in 1975, a change that adversely affected the maternal 
grandfather’s landholding due to the new regime’s collectivisation 
policy. The husband had numerous close relatives in Khánh Hậu, and 
the land on which his house was built was bequeathed by his maternal 
grandfather. The wife came from Tân Hội Ðông, a neighbouring 
commune located in Tiền Giang Province. This household had 
9  In 2012, the number of death anniversaries attended by the members of Household 91 
increased to 34, and the total ritual expenses to 8.75 million VND ($417 USD), triple that of 
expenditure in 2005. (The ritual expenses per capita in this household were 2 million VND a 
year.) However, the tension between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law subsided apparently 
due to the significant increase in the annual per capita income of the household to 33.6 million 
VND ($1,600 USD) compared to $196 USD in 2005 thanks to the greater agricultural income 
of the son and non-agricultural income of the daughter-in-law. The ritual and gift expenses of 
Household 91 took up only 6.25 per cent of the household income in 2012. 
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0.45 hectare of land on which the husband worked, and the husband 
also helped the wife in her phở (beef noodle) business in the provincial 
capital of Tân An (6 kilometres away). Their annual per capita income 
of 3.1 million VND ($210 USD) in 2005 put them in the bottom income 
quintile in Khánh Hậu. Despite the relatively limited income of the 
household, the husband had an extensive kinship network in Khánh 
Hậu, while his wife possessed her own in her native commune, as well 
as in Khánh Hậu, where one of her sisters had married into a Khánh 
Hậu family. Among the husband’s close relatives were his parents and 
four brothers with their families in Khánh Hậu, one married sister in 
Khánh Hậu, and three sisters married to husbands in a neighbouring 
commune or in the nearby provincial capital. The husband also had 
a maternal uncle, some maternal aunts, and numerous first cousins 
on both his father’s and mother’s sides in Khánh Hậu. The wife had 
her parents and seven married siblings, as well as numerous aunts, 
uncles, and first cousins, in her native commune neighbouring Khánh 
Hậu. The husband and wife in Household 16 attended a total of 51 
gift-exchange events in the 12-month period under study, including 
25 death anniversaries, 12 weddings, two wedding-preparatory 
ceremonies, seven funerals, three birth celebrations, one visit to a sick 
acquaintance, and one other ritual. Among the 25 death anniversaries 
were four banquets held at the household of this husband’s maternal 
uncle, each of which required gifts to be brought.10 As the husband 
was not the youngest son in his natal household and as his parents 
were alive and living with his youngest brother, he did not have any 
death anniversary to take care of. He also reportedly cut back on the 
number of death anniversaries attended in 2005 out of concern for the 
cost of gifts and the need to support his elder son’s possible university 
education. But in 2005, this household still spent 3.1 million VND a 
year ($210 USD), about one-fifth of the total family income, on gifts 
for 51 events organised by other households. This resulted from the 
couple’s strong integration into the local social networks in Khánh 
Hậu and in a neighbouring commune.
10  As a reflection of his wealth, the maternal uncle organised four death anniversary banquets 
with significantly overlapping guest lists (about 100 guests at the death anniversary of his father; 
40 at that of his mother; and 40 and 20 at those of his two sons). In Khánh Hậu, despite the 
widely reported pattern of dividing death anniversary duties among siblings and close relatives, 
it was not uncommon for a household to hold many death anniversary banquets in a year if it 
had the economic means to do so.
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In 2009, the husband in Household 16 passed away. The wife had to 
sell a part of the family’s landholding to pay off the husband’s medical 
expenses, and her sister-in-law took over the phở (beef noodle) business. 
In 2012, the wife in Household 16 worked for the sister-in-law in the 
morning and the early evening. The wife also peddled roasted rice 
paper (bánh tráng nướng) in the afternoon to earn extra income in order 
to bring her monthly income to 3 million VND ($143 USD). With the 
elder son being an officer in the armed forces and her mother returning 
to the neighbouring commune, Household 16 had only two members. 
Its annual per capita income rose to 18 million VND ($857 USD), putting 
the household in the second income quintile (below average). In 2012, 
despite having a nine-year-old child to support, Household 16 had to 
spend 2.7 million VND ($129 USD, or 7.5 per cent of total household 
income) on ritual gift expenses, including at 19 death anniversaries. 
The wife in Household 16 talked about this ritual expense burden and 
the need to reciprocate people who had made cash gifts during her 
husband’s illness and later at his funeral:
Interviewee: I sell [roasted rice paper] in Khánh Hậu to earn some 
extra money in the afternoon [besides assisting my sister-in-law with 
her phở and beefsteak business]. It costs a lot of money to cover ritual 
feast expenses and gifts … So many of them. Cash gifts, for example, 
on the occasion of month-old celebrations (đầy tháng) and first birth 
days (thôi nôi) for kids. Next month, there will be two of these events 
for my husband’s niece and nephew [sister’s children]. I already made 
a 200,000 VND gift when the baby was born. Next month, 200,000 
VND [$9.52 USD] more for his month-old celebration. My husband 
used to take care of such events. Now I have to deal with them all …
Gifts for nieces and nephews have to be 200,000 VND. For other kids, 
100,000 VND … I also have to visit sick people in my network and 
that of my husband … Because when my husband was sick, they came 
to visit and gave gifts. They gave 50,000 VND, and now when I visit a 
sick person in their families, I have to give 50,000 VND. For funerals, 
the gift has to be 100,000 VND. 50,000 VND looks miserly.
…
Interviewer: When your husband passed away, did you accept cash 
gifts?
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Interviewee: Yes. The cash gifts were sufficient to cover funeral costs 
… The gifts ranged from 20,000 VND, 30,000 VND, 50,000 VND to 
100,000 VND. Money could buy more in those days [in 2009, thus 
gifts had a comparatively lower value]. The funeral gifts amounted to 
over 30 million VND [$1,650 USD]. 
…
Interviewee: I have to wake up at 4 a.m. in the morning. I have not had 
any rest until now [interview taking place at the phở restaurant owned 
by the interviewee’s sister-in-law] … Now, I am roasting rice paper 
and going to walk around the community to sell it. I work so hard.
Interviewer: Any siesta?
Interviewee: No. I work hard to earn some money to host a death 
anniversary feast for my husband.
Interviewer: When can you go home?
Interviewee: Around 5 p.m. I go home to take a shower and burn 
incense for my husband, and return here to work until 8:30 in the 
evening, during which I also wash clothes for my sister-in-law and 
her children.
Interviewer: No washing machine?
Interviewee: No, all by hand.
Interviewee [crying]: It is a lot of hard work to earn money. But my 
sister-in-law provides meals for me and my son every day … A lot of 
hard work. I sell roasted rice paper to earn some extra money. Many 
times, in roasting the rice paper, I cry and cry … I try to earn some 
extra money and try to save for my son … I do not spend a lot of time 
during the day at home, because I feel so sad there … Now, I roast about 
20 rice papers in over an hour, and then go around peddling them, and 
earn 20,000 VND for the work [one-fifth of her daily income]. (Huỳnh 
Ngọc Thu’s interview with Household 16 in November 2012)
Some poor and elderly people, as in Household 543 in Hoài Thị, decided 
not to accept death anniversary invitations in order to hold down their 
ritual gift expenditures. Household 543 in Hoài Thị, comprising an 
elderly couple, had an annual per capita income of 1.33 million VND 
($63 USD in 2012) mainly from government assistance, which put them 
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among the poorest in the village of Hoài Thị.11 They spent nothing on 
ritual gift expenses in 2012, as they felt that they could not afford 
to. Unlike most other Hoài Thị villagers, they also believed that they 
could not borrow 5 million VND interest-free from anybody in their 
social network. The elderly couple’s social capital and the ability to 
mobilise it in the form of interest-free loans was greatly diminished 
due to their lack of spending on ritual expenses. This lack of spending 
on ritual expenses reflects the extreme poverty of this elderly couple 
(in contrast to Household 91 in Khánh Hậu, the first case earlier 
discussed). In 2014, when I asked about their lack of spending on 
ritual expenses, the elderly couple talked at length to me about their 
embarrassment in not being able to maintain their ritual and social 
relation obligations:
HL: Do you still give cash gifts at death anniversaries, or are they 
waived, as you are now over 80 years old?
Husband: For the elderly over the age of 80, the cash gift is only 50,000 
đồng ($2.40 USD). It is all right not to give a cash gift [given the age], 
but it looks better if one is given.
Wife: He does not give cash gifts at death anniversaries. That is why 
he said, ‘if one is given’. Without a cash gift, we come and stay for 
a short time … It feels embarrassing. 
HL: When the two of you turned 80, did your children organise a feast 
for you and your acquaintances?
Husband: No, they did not … if I organised a death anniversary 
feast for my father, inviting other people, then [I would feel better] 
attending the death anniversaries organised by the latter … As I do 
not host a feast on my mother’s or father’s death anniversary, I do not 
go to death anniversaries that much.
11  The social welfare net in Vietnam has expanded noticeably in the past few years, well 
beyond the anti-poverty program started in the 1990s. New programs include modest assistance 
of 2.16 million VND ($103 USD) a year and a free health insurance card to the elderly from 
the age of 80 onwards and to other single elderly without much income and without children 
as a source of support; and assistance to disabled people, including victims of Agent Orange, 
with annual payments varying with the degree of disability (see Lưu Quang Tuấn 2012:13–14). 
In  2012, the elderly couple in Household 543 had one person with a minor mental problem 
who was eligible for 2.18 million VND ($103 USD a year) under the program of assistance to the 
disabled. In summer 2014, the government assistance to this couple had tripled to 6.54 million 
VND ($310 USD) because the disability assistance amount was doubled, and because the other 
person qualified for assistance provided to people aged 80 years and older. 
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Wife: My children do not organise a longevity meal for us [and our 
acquaintances] … When other elderly people have longevity feasts, 
I do not dare to show up despite the invitations … My husband and 
I are old. We are not able to host a death anniversary feast [for either 
parent of his]. Neither are our children. The longevity celebrations 
[for us] are less necessary than death anniversary feasts. If we are not 
able to host a death anniversary feast, there is no need to talk about 
a longevity celebration … It all boils down to the eldest [son]. If the 
eldest son took the initiative, the three younger sons would follow 
and contribute … If the eldest said that I would organise a longevity 
celebration for the parent, no way would the other children dare not to 
move in tandem … It is embarrassing not to be able to host an annual 
death anniversary for a parent [of my husband]. Embarrassing not to 
be able to do what other households have done … My first cousin T. 
[in the village] hosts a feast on the occasion of the death anniversary 
for my uncle [T’s father], and invites me … Another cousin of mine 
going to the same event asks me to go with her. I have decided not to 
go, but do not want to go into details with her … It would be a shame 
for me to say that because of our inability to host a death anniversary 
feast, I cannot go … I feel miserable … [Husband tells her to stop 
talking about this problem.] It is all right to stop talking about this 
issue, but we would be the laughing stock of the village if we just go 
and eat at death anniversary events without being able to host one 
at our place. We end up cutting ties with relatives, close or far. We 
do not dare to go to those events. Except for one recent event, I did 
show up. People filled my bowl with foods, but I felt so bad inside 
that I could not really eat. (Author’s interview with Household 543, 
June 2014)
The cases discussed above, and the lack of significant variation in the 
average ritual gift spending per capita among the four lower income 
quintiles in both communities, indicate that the relation between 
ritual spending and household income is far from being linear. 
My  preliminary analysis suggests that besides household wealth, 
many factors affect ritual and ritual gift spending:
a. Sibling rank: In Hoài Thị, the eldest son assumes official 
responsibility for ancestral death anniversaries and social relations 
with relatives, although he may allow younger siblings to host some 
death anniversary feasts. In Khánh Hậu and in southern Vietnam 
at large, it is the youngest son who is supposed to assume such a 
responsibility. As the youngest son of Household 91 in Khánh Hậu 
is not resident, his wife felt this responsibility as a heavy burden. 
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In contrast, without official responsibilities for family rituals 
and social relations with relatives, the male head of Khánh Hậu 
Household 16, as well as the male trader in Household 379 and the 
elderly male head of Household 543 in Hoài Thị, had lower ritual 
and social relation spending than those with such responsibilities. 
b. Stage in life cycle:
i. People in their 20s tend to have many friends getting married, 
leading to higher wedding gift expenditure.
ii. People in their 30s tend to have fewer ritual gift obligations in 
general (the trader in Household 379 in Hoài Thị as an example).
iii. People in their 40s and 50s tend to be responsible for the 
weddings of their children, and to reciprocate the wedding gifts 
received at these events with similar gifts at friends’ children’s 
weddings. Those who experience the death of a parent/s also 
begin assuming death anniversary duties.
c. Degree of integration into local social networks: Hoài Thị villagers 
have close-knit social networks and tend to be well integrated in 
their community. In contrast, in Khánh Hậu and many southern 
communities, where there is a higher degree of geographical 
mobility, a number of newcomers in a community tend to be 
not well integrated and to have fewer obligations (see also Luong 
2010:417–418). 
Those factors complicate the relation between household income and 
social capital and ritual expenditure; this relation is not statistically 
linear among lower- and middle-income households. The highest 
income households in both Hoài Thị and Khánh Hậu tend to spend 
more lavishly on social relations in order to strengthen their social 
capital, which results in significantly greater assistance actually or 
potentially received (see the data on interest-free loans in Table 4). 
However, the incapacity of the poor to spend much at all on social 
capital cultivation — as reflected in the case of the elderly couple in 
Household 543 in Hoài Thị — weakens social ties and results in less 
assistance received in the form of interest-free loans. 
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Conclusion
How can we explain the difference in social capital configuration 
between Hoài Thị and Khánh Hậu, a difference that, I think, is 
characteristic of the difference between the northern and southern 
Vietnamese lowlands in general? The difference in social capital 
configuration lies not only in the greater efforts of Hoài Thị villagers 
in cultivating and formalising social relations (partly through the 
establishment of patrilineages and voluntary associations), but also in 
the greater return from these efforts, as reflected in the considerably 
greater sources of interest-free loans that can be tapped by Hoài Thị 
villagers than by those in Khánh Hậu.
Beyond Vietnam, the importance of social connections has been 
attributed to shortages in political economy and formal institutional 
weakness, leading to greater uncertainty and people’s reliance on 
social connections in order to reduce uncertainty (Guthrie 1998; 
Walder 1986). Can the greater efforts of northern Vietnamese to 
cultivate social relations result from more shortages of goods and 
services and greater institutional weaknesses in northern Vietnam 
than in southern Vietnam? There is no evidence that Hoài Thị villagers 
have recently faced more shortages and greater uncertainty due to 
institutional weaknesses than the people of Khánh Hậu. With the 
strong economic growth in Bắc Ninh Province in recent years, Hoài 
Thị villagers have no trouble earning steady and fairly good incomes in 
the private or informal sector, and finding quality goods and services. 
There is no clear evidence either that the conformity to institutional 
rules is weaker in northern Vietnam than in southern Vietnam, 
leading to greater uncertainty in the sociopolitical environment 
and, consequently, to greater reliance on social connections for 
problem solving in northern Vietnam. Beyond the case of Vietnam, 
Japan seems to have much stronger formal institutional frameworks 
than Vietnam and does not have any shortage of goods and services. 
Yet gifts and social connections remain a very important part of the 
Japanese sociocultural fabric and political economy. I would argue 
that it is simplistic to attribute the importance of social connections 
solely to shortages of goods and services and institutional weaknesses. 
A  strictly institutional explanation of the importance of gifts and 
social capital would fail to do justice to their salience in Vietnamese or 
Japanese sociocultural life and political economy. I think that we also 
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need to take into account different enduring models of and for reality 
in northern and southern Vietnam, enduring models that account 
not only for the greater investment in social capital, but also, among 
other things, for the greater strength of patrilineal descent in northern 
Vietnam than in southern Vietnam (cf. Yang 2002 in Yang’s debate with 
Guthrie in the Chinese context).
I would suggest that the enduring northern Vietnamese model for 
social reality involves a greater formalisation of social relations, 
both in terms of obligations and organisation (patrilineage and 
voluntary associations, with their explicit rules), and, as a reflection 
of comparatively less commercialisation in a rural community, more 
mutual assistance in time, labour, and interest-free loans (see Table 4) 
and less monetary expenditure per event. In Hoài Thị and the Red 
River Delta of northern Vietnam in general, at the community level, 
social relations, whether kinship-based or not, also tend to be more 
centripetal, leading to considerably tighter social networks within 
the community. In contrast, in Khánh Hậu, social relations are less 
formalised in terms of organisation and obligations, with less mutual 
assistance in time, labour, and interest-free loans. In Khánh Hậu and 
the Mekong Delta of southern Vietnam in general, at the community 
level, kinship and non-kinship relations tend to be more centrifugal, 
leading to looser social networks within the community. In Khánh 
Hậu, ritual events such as death anniversaries are organised in a free-
flowing spirit, with less effort made to control costs, leading to higher 
expenses per event both for organisers and gift-bearing participants. 
Thus, while social relations (quan hệ) are important in the social fabric 
of both northern and southern Vietnamese communities, they take 
on different configurations, with varying degrees of effectiveness in 
mobilisation. It is possible that the different social capital configurations 
and enduring models for reality in the Red River Delta and the Mekong 
Delta of Vietnam result from the long-standing greater spatial mobility 
in the latter in a frontier context, which renders formal organisations 
less stable and less effective. We can attempt to analyse long-term 
historical and environmental reasons for the difference in the model 
for reality between the northern Red River Delta and the southern 
Mekong Delta in Vietnam (see, for example, Rambo 1973). But it is not 
clear that this difference can be reduced to short-term differences in 
political economy and institutional contexts.
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The Dynamics of Return Migration 
in Vietnam’s Rural North: Charity, 
Community and Contestation
Nguyen Thi Thanh Binh
This chapter tells the story of a return migrant in Bắc Ðồng,1 a village 
in Hà Nam Province of northern Vietnam where I carried out extended 
anthropological fieldwork in the late 2000s.2 From my first days in 
this village, I had heard stories about a rich village woman living in 
Hồ Chí Minh City whose life and career had become legend. According 
to these stories, she had been one of the richest people in Sài Gòn 
in the 1980s and 1990s, a room in her house was sometimes full of 
money, and hundreds of workers were under her command. People 
in the village had different ideas about this lady’s path to success and 
the way she exercised her power. In some ways, she was magical for 
them. Even her name, Núi, evoked a sense of mystery about her life. 
1  People and places in this chapter have been assigned pseudonyms for purposes 
of confidentiality.
2  This chapter draws upon ethnographic research conducted in Bắc Ðồng village, Hà Nam 
Province from July 2007 to May 2008. While living with and taking part in the villagers’ 
everyday lives, I interviewed and collected life histories from a wide range of villagers, including 
my main interlocutor, who I met at her home in Hồ Chí Minh City. I am grateful to Bà Núi and Bắc 
Ðồng villagers for sharing their experiences, insights and time with me. I would like to thank 
Philip Taylor for his extensive feedback on chapter drafts, and thank Ben Kerkvliet, Hy Van 
Luong, John Kleinen, Andrew Kipnis, Diana Glazebrook, and the two anonymous readers for 
their constructive comments. Harvard-Yenching Institute and the Research School of Pacific and 
Asian Studies, The Australian National University, provided funds for this research.
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In Vietnamese, Núi means mountain, and people imagined that she was 
a mountain of money. Moving to the south in 1975 after the American 
war, Núi  maintained contact with the village through her family 
and a number of migratory villagers who went to work in or visited 
her enterprise. Since the 1980s, she had sometimes sent gifts to her 
relatives and made small donations to the poor, and larger donations 
for village affairs. Bắc Ðồng people’s memories and imaginings about 
Núi and her life in the south might have ceased there if, at the end 
of 2007, this mythical woman had not suddenly visited her old home 
after almost 20  years. Her return became an event in the village. 
People were curious about the way she looked, how she treated the 
surrounding people, and what she did in their village. They wanted to 
touch and get up close to this powerful figure who had returned from 
a far away and prosperous world. Núi aroused in the villagers various 
expectations and hopes.
Initially, Núi planned to stay in Bắc Ðồng for a short time to fulfil her 
obligations to her family and ancestors. As people learned that Núi 
was happy to see them, however, more and more villagers gradually 
came to visit her. In response to the sentiment of her homeland fellows, 
Núi decided to stay longer, give more gifts to people, and donate more 
money to renovate ritual places in the village. Her ‘heart’ of giving to 
the village’s spiritual places and to the poor generated debate among 
the villagers as to whether she represented a new model of personhood 
and ethics, or standard of behaviour for the local elite and the rich. 
Some Bắc Ðồng people, especially women, wanted to build a new 
kind of patron–client relationship with Núi, and for a period of time 
it seemed that a new inclusive community of villagers, reliant on her 
generosity, was emerging. This dynamic interaction saw Núi give more 
in response to the villagers’ warm reception and she began to imagine 
the village as a welcoming and intimate home in which she might find 
a place after decades of living far away. The story did not end well, 
however, as envy and criticism from a part of the village population 
undermined the trust and warmth of these relationships, dashing the 
dreams and hopes of all parties in these interactions. Chastened and 
confused, the protagonist Núi returned to her southern, urban home, 
perhaps never again to return to her home village.
The somewhat tragic story of Núi sheds light on the phenomenon 
of return migration. As a fertile terrain for migration studies, the 
experiences of Vietnamese migrants who return home have been 
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examined by several scholars.3 The comparative literature shows that 
return migration may, in some instances, be viewed as the outcome 
of a failed migration strategy or, conversely, as satisfaction of one’s 
original economic or cultural goals (Cassarino 2004:255). Return 
migration may enable one to reinvest one’s migratory earnings in a 
place where one has a comparative advantage, or convert them into 
forms of social or cultural capital that may not be attainable in the 
migratory destination (Bourdieu 1986; Carruthers 2002). Some studies 
emphasise the factors that ‘push’ migrants to return home: the 
hardship and stress of life as a migrant; poor health or personal crisis; 
or the legal, institutional, and cultural obstacles to integration in the 
migratory destination (Brettell 2000:100). Alternatively, migrants may 
be ‘pulled’ home by homesickness, family crisis, or out of a sense 
of familial obligation (Gmelch 1980; Jellema 2007). The return home 
can be conflict-laden and mutually disappointing, both from the 
perspective of the returnee and their kin and neighbours. Returnees 
may be the focus of admiration, envy or mistrust from neighbours and 
kin owing to their exotic status, their relative wealth or practices of 
conspicuous consumption (Khater 2001). The gifts borne by returned 
migrants may accentuate social distance between giver and receivers or 
communicate uncomfortable messages about status differentials just as 
readily as they might inspire sentiments of belonging and relatedness 
(Hung  Cam Thai 2014; Nguyen-Akbar 2014). Migrants who return 
home to rural settings may feel torn between their ‘old’ insider status 
(with the weight of kin obligations this entails) and their ‘new’ status 
as an outsider or stranger, as well as between the pleasure of belonging 
to a close-knit community and the loss of autonomy that a return to 
rural living entails (Phillips and Potter 2005; Laoire 2007). Elements 
of each of these strands can be identified in Núi’s story, which can 
be profitably explored to shed light on the meanings of home and of 
return for those Vietnamese migrants who have re-engaged with their 
homelands.
The phenomenon of return additionally casts into relief the 
circumstances of those who remain at home. Núi’s home of Bắc Ðồng 
is a rice-growing village in the southern part of the Red River Delta of 
Vietnam. Located in a marshy area of the delta where the soils are poor 
3  See, for instance, Carruthers (2002), Jellema (2007), Dang Nguyen Anh et al. (2010), 
Hung Cam Thai (2014), and Nguyen-Akbar (2014). 
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and people struggle to make a living, the village has been the recipient 
of various rural development programs to increase connectivity, 
improve irrigation, increase rice yield, teach new trades, and diversify 
livelihoods. Nevertheless, at the time of my fieldwork in 2007–08, 
only 30 per cent of households in the village were considered well 
off, because they had made the switch from farming to non-farming 
livelihood activities. The majority of villagers lived at subsistence 
levels and about 10 per cent of households were categorised as poor 
(most of these households comprised elderly occupants). Migration 
has been the most common local livelihood strategy over time. Such 
journeys began in the late 1960s, with official population transfers to 
the uplands, and most recently migrants have flowed to urban and 
industrial zones in Hà Nội, Huế and Hồ Chí Minh City in search of jobs 
as industrial labourers and following small business opportunities. 
One of the most significant waves of out-migration occurred in 
the late 1970s, shortly after national reunification, as a stream of 
villagers flowed to the ‘promised land’ of southern Vietnam. As one 
of the pioneers of this southwards movement, Núi was an ambivalent 
figure. The business she set up in the prosperous urban south served 
as a bridgehead for her fellow villagers and earned her prestige for 
helping them to escape the poverty and hardship of their home 
village. Yet during her visits home when she dispensed lavish gifts, 
the villagers were both awed and disconcerted at the discrepancies 
between their own humble circumstances and the fortunes of this 
plump, white and wealthy stranger.
The fervent hopes and intense disappointments unleashed by Núi’s 
controversial return home demonstrate how local sociocultural 
expectations powerfully shape the meanings and trajectory of return 
migration. Pertinent in this regard is the complex malaise that had 
taken root in her home village in the decades since her departure. 
Characterised by a sense of confusion and marginalisation, these 
sentiments can be linked to the dislocations experienced by the 
villagers during the transition to the market economy. Núi’s fellow 
villagers had witnessed the retreat of the socialist state from a formerly 
all-encompassing social support role and the loosening of social 
bonds brought about by the disestablishment of collectives, the rise 
of  individualistic economic competition, and the steady outflow  of 
migrants. Not coincidentally, the same period saw the eruption of a 
number of new religious movements in the village, with many villagers 
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placing their confidence in mediums, fortune tellers, faith healers, and 
in prophets who envisaged the prospective return of a saviour figure. 
These movements, which were widespread in the Red River Delta in 
the market integration era,4 held out the promise of social restoration 
and cosmic re-integration to villagers who had been dislocated 
and disoriented by rapid sociocultural change. It was within this 
turbulent context that Núi’s return home took place. The manner in 
which some villagers construed her as an almost otherworldly figure 
is indicative of the messianic expectations that structured her home 
visit. The envy, insidious rumours and blatant criticism she and her 
followers attracted also show the status and value conflicts and enmity 
that characterised life in the village. Not surprisingly, these powerful 
and contradictory sentiments put this return migrant on course for a 
stormy homecoming.
This chapter discusses the hopes and fears that the people of Bắc 
Ðồng village invested in a returned wealthy migrant. By investigating 
responses to her prodigious charitable giving, it explores what local 
people made of her identity, life and motives for giving, and how 
they used her activities to reconstruct and critically re-imagine their 
relationships to each other. I show that in the context of new and 
old forms of social differentiation, elderly women and the poor in the 
village construed this village returnee as a Buddha-hearted person and 
turned her into a patron of the village community. The community 
of veneration that coalesced around this wealthy returned migrant 
sparked conjecture and controversy — unleashing status and value 
conflicts and generating a debate about the ethics of her charitable 
giving. The warm sentiments precipitated by her return visit 
momentarily inspired in Núi dreams of reconnecting permanently to 
her homeland, but ultimately the conflicts it provoked resulted in a 
homecoming that was temporary and mutually disappointing.
Mysterious Rich Woman
Like other people in the village, I was curious to know what Núi looked 
like. In the first days of her visit, only close relatives and people who 
had received her gifts and donations came to visit Núi at her brother’s 
4  See, for example, Ðỗ Quang Hưng (2001) and Nguyễn Quốc Tuấn (2012).
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house. Others were curious but reluctant to approach her to avoid 
being misunderstood as ‘catching the rich to be relatives’ (‘thấy người 
sang bắt quàng làm họ’). They waited until they knew more about how 
she treated people. Gradually, they learned from each other that Núi 
behaved nicely and seemed close to everyone. Through her family 
members, Núi sent a message to all of the villagers that they were 
invited to come to her house. Many decided to visit her to show their 
homeland sentiment and take the opportunity to learn more about her. 
Núi welcomed all of the guests, talking to them a little to see whether 
she still remembered who they were, what their relationship was to 
her, or what memory they had of her. Afterward, she often invited 
visitors to see video tapes and photos of her family life. During that 
time, Núi told people stories about a prosperous and modern Sài Gòn, 
and explained the differences between the lifestyle in the south and 
the north. People were full of admiration when they saw photos of her 
big house or the imposing wedding party of her son at a five-star hotel 
in Sài Gòn. Many women found it interesting and exciting to gather 
at Núi’s place in the evening, and they began to visit with increasing 
frequency. 
Each evening, around 20 people gathered at Núi’s brother’s house. 
Several elderly women who were relatives and had received gifts 
from Núi decided to stay with her and take care of her. They cooked, 
cleaned the house, and gave massages to her, for she had developed 
rheumatism and experienced difficulty moving about. Núi became a 
centre of attraction for the villagers, attracting women in particular to 
gather at her place. However, in interaction and conversations, most 
villagers appeared self-conscious in front of Núi. People tried to be 
careful and polite, especially some of the ladies who lived with her 
and served her. They always addressed Núi respectfully, to the point 
of fawning over her. Everyone, including myself, became drawn into 
this hierarchical interaction — more because of Núi’s majesty than her 
gifts or money. Some people who were ranked as elder sisters or aunts 
in her lineage wanted to greet and talk to Núi in the familiar way that 
they often did to other village fellows, but they had to change and 
adjust their mode of address when confronting Núi directly. This was 
partly because Núi was different from people in the village. To them, 
she looked white, plump and healthy, and was dressed in beautiful 
clothes and wore make-up. When some young women in the village 
saw Núi for the first time, they commented that she was as beautiful as 
79
2 . THE DYNAMICS OF RETuRN MIGRATION IN VIETNAM’S RuRAL NORTH
a fairy queen that they had seen in a movie. Many people were awed 
by her regal manner and the decisive way she behaved and talked 
to them, which reminded them of her status as a business person 
and boss. 
Her return aroused debate among Bắc Ðồng people about her fate 
and wealth. Many villagers linked her success to the favourable 
orientation of her ancestors’ graves. People surmised that someone 
in her grandparents’ generation in the village had been well off and 
possessed some knowledge of classical Chinese script. He must have 
consulted a geomancer when building the grave for the ancestors. 
Some  villagers believed that the direction chosen for the grave 
fortuitously brought success to the daughters of the family only. 
In Núi’s parents’ generation, one of her aunts had become the owner 
of a big farm in Thái Nguyên Province, where many villagers went to 
find jobs before 1954. Meanwhile, Núi’s father had lived an ordinary 
life in the village. However, Núi’s eldest sister advanced no further 
than becoming a local labourer, like her younger brother. Hence the 
villagers believed that Núi had a special fate (số) that was different 
from others. Some believed that the mystery to her fortune lay in her 
name. Some said that it had been given to her when her parents were 
evacuated from the village to a mountain to avoid a French mopping-
up operation during the First Indochina War. Others believed that 
there must have been a mystically significant reason for her parents to 
give her that name.  
Many villagers explained her career and richness in terms of good 
fortune (gặp may). Several people believed that when she had moved 
to the south after 1975, by chance she was able to buy the house of 
a family who had migrated to America and had found a pot of gold 
hidden inside. Afterwards, she used this capital to do trading and 
develop her enterprise. Another hypothesis was that she gained 
business success by manipulating her husband’s reputation. As her 
second husband had been a southern revolutionary who became a 
cadre in the north after 1954, people believed that after he returned 
to Sài Gòn in 1975 he must have acquired a high position in the new 
government. Núi would then have received many gifts and bribes 
from people who came to ask for her husband’s favour. Also thanks 
to his power, Núi could easily gain success in her trade and business. 
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Given these ideas, Bắc Ðồng people rarely used the term ‘talented’ 
(giỏi) to describe Núi and her career. They tended to emphasise the 
words ‘rich’ (giàu) and ‘lucky’ (may mắn), and believed that many 
young people were now more talented than her in business. However, 
they still deeply respected Núi’s special qualities. Some villagers told 
each other that Núi could quickly determine whether a newcomer was 
trustworthy simply by looking at him/her from a distance. That is why, 
they said, in her business in the south, Núi liked to see prospective 
employees face-to-face before offering them work. If they did not 
appear to her to be reliable and trustworthy, she politely declined to 
employ them and gave them money to find another job or to return 
home. When Núi returned to the village, she surprised people with her 
ability to quickly understand the situation of the people she met. The 
villagers told each other that she was very ‘sharp-witted’ (tinh). For all 
of these reasons, from the first days of her return, many Bắc Ðồng 
people showed their respect to Núi. In all of the meetings or rituals in 
which she participated, even the village cadres and representatives of 
the elderly association in the village respectfully addressed her with 
elaborately polite speech. On the occasion of official rituals at the đình, 
the organisers invited her to sit on the same mat as the oldest men. 
People treated her as a distinguished guest, a daughter of the village 
returned home. During rituals at her lineage hall, Núi was invited to sit 
with the lineage elders. People in her lineage showed their happiness 
at having a daughter like her, who could bring fame to the family. 
The respectful title Bà Núi (Madam Núi) was used popularly by all Bắc 
Ðồng people regardless of their gender or age. 
Her Giving
Another intriguing aspect about Núi that generated much commentary 
among the villagers was her status as a generous benefactor. In just a 
short period of time she gave away an enormous amount of money, 
becoming one of the most generous patrons the village had ever 
seen. What is remarkable about this generosity is that it appears 
not to have been part of her original intentions for her return visit. 
Instead, it seems to have been elicited in the context of the villagers’ 
interactions with her.
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Like many emigrants in northern Vietnam, the practice of ancestor 
worship was the critical factor that brought Núi back to Bắc Ðồng. 
As Kate Jellema (2007) has illustrated, in the midst of đổi mới, a quest to 
‘return to origins’ transfixed the entire nation and ancestors exerted a 
strong pull on modern Vietnamese, wherever they resided. According 
to her, to ‘về quê’ (return to the homeland) is a rite, an act of filial 
devotion, at once expected and demanded, forced and desired (Jellema 
2007:58). Following this ideology of northern migrants, which also 
receives endorsement by the state, Núi initially intended her visit to 
fulfil her obligations to her family. She simply wanted to build a royal 
tomb for her parents and ancestors, and a new house for her brother, 
an ordinary labourer in the village. In this sense, she wanted to share 
her success with her family and meet her familial obligations.
At the beginning of her visit, Núi gave gifts only to relatives, as is the 
custom of Vietnamese who return to their homeland. When some poor 
villagers who had previously received Núi’s charity via her family 
came to thank Núi for her kind heart, she responded compassionately 
by personally offering them further gifts. Gradually, it became Núi’s 
routine practice — when confronted by relatives to whom she felt 
she should give something, or by poor and disabled people who had 
difficult lives — to give 100,000 đồng or more. Her close relatives 
and the old women who surrounded and served her every day often 
proposed to whom Núi should give her gifts and advised Núi of 
the recipients’ circumstances. Núi’s giving became a popular topic 
of discussion among the villagers, especially women, as to who had 
received her gifts.
The local government also decided to approach Núi after several weeks. 
Representatives of the village ritual committee5 came to greet Núi 
and thanked her for the donation she had sent for the village festival 
the year before. They invited her to participate in rituals at the đình 
(the village communal house). Later on, Khôi — the village head — 
organised a meeting at the đình to express the gratitude of the village 
for Núi’s previous contribution to village affairs and the poor. Khôi 
then went on to ask Núi for a donation to his project — already under 
construction — to rebuild the village road to the temple. In response 
5  Like other Vietnamese villages in the Red River Delta, the committee of historical sites, 
which was later renamed the committee of rituals and festivals (ban khánh tiết), of Bắc Ðồng was 
established in the early 1990s to take care of the village communal house and its rituals.
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to this call and the sentiments demonstrated towards her by the 
cadres and villagers, Núi decided to contribute 20 million VND (about 
$1,000 USD) for the temple road and 20 million VND to renovate the 
đình’s floor, which she thought made the temple look dirty and dark. 
Not  long after that, Núi decided to spend another 20  million VND 
building a road to the ladies’ temple to replace a path along the edge 
of a rice field after the elderly had complained to her about this path 
and she herself had experienced difficulty walking on it. In addition, 
Núi brought large quantities of fruit, cake and meat as offerings to 
the village temple and pagoda on significant occasions. After offering 
the food to the spirits, she shared it with the elderly, or  sometimes 
with the whole village. By the end of the year, Núi again compiled a 
list of 60 poor families in the village and gave each of them a total of 
30 million VND (about $1,500 USD) to celebrate the New Year. She also 
gave scholarships for poor and talented students and bought toys for 
the village kindergarten.
As Núi gave more and more, she became a hot topic in the daily 
conversations of the villagers, who paid attention to her every 
movement. Local cadres and representatives of the elderly association 
in the village made frequent visits to show their care for her, to present 
their plans and projects and to discuss village affairs in an attempt to 
gain her support. Influential people (có máu mặt) in the village, such 
as those who took care of the followers at the two shrines of the village 
and some mediums, also often visited Núi to talk to her about the 
possibility of investing in their groups’ ritual interests. All the formal 
and informal social groups in the village considered Núi as a patron 
and tried to take advantage of her presence to invite her donations to 
their cause. Owing to her influence as a donor and her prestige, many 
villagers also expected her to be able to influence leaders to do a better 
job at managing the village. A woman recounted with satisfaction an 
occasion in which Núi had firmly chastised the village head:
Once I heard Núi comment to Mr Khôi, the village head, that: 
‘You  should not be strict about rituals. I myself was seized by the 
spirits so I shared with the mediums in the village. You should 
organise an annual festival and not make it bureaucratic. If someone 
makes a mistake, you should solve their problem yourself instead 
of sending them up to the commune. I used to manage hundreds of 
workers and I could solve all their problems.’ Khôi could only nod his 
head. (Mrs Ðặng, 68 years old, an elderly small trader and farmer in 
Bắc Ðồng)
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Although Núi denied that this exchange had taken place, circulation 
of the story indicated that people expected Núi to be able to change 
or have an influence on their local government. As her house became a 
centre where people, especially women, brought news of village daily 
life for discussion, Núi quickly grasped the situation of the village, the 
concerns of people and gossip about individuals. Some people came 
to ask her to mediate their personal grievances with other villagers, 
considering that her experiences of life outside of the village gave her 
the insight to offer judicious advice. 
The esteem and honour that many Bắc Ðồng people reserved for Núi 
encouraged her to give more, and nurture new ideas for the future. 
During the two months of her first return trip to the village, Núi 
contacted her family in Sài Gòn several times to order additional gifts 
and money to be sent to Bắc Ðồng, since the level of demand had 
exceeded her expectation. When I asked them what they thought 
about her, most villagers said that Núi was ascendant (nổi lên) and 
venerated (được tôn sùng). The dynamics of the process show that 
her giving and other activities in the village were the result of an 
interaction between the demands and sentiments of Bắc Ðồng people 
and her response to them — rather than any intentional plan. 
Many women in the village thought that everyone who received 
something from Núi owed her a debt of gratitude (ơn), and thus felt 
compelled to fawn upon her (quỵ luỵ). These explanations by Bắc Ðồng 
people fit with the idea of the gift as an offering that inherently creates 
in the recipient an obligation to reciprocate (Mauss 1967). In reality, 
only a few Bắc Ðồng people who received many gifts and favours 
from Núi tried to give her something in return, such as some fresh 
fruit from their garden or help with her housework. The majority of 
recipients felt that they could not give any equivalent material gifts in 
exchange, since Núi did not need anything they could give in return. 
Therefore, when a person accepted a gift from Núi, they also accepted 
that they were now indebted to her — but could only repay that debt 
through the expression of sentiment, respect or submission. Similar to 
the way that cash gifts given by returned overseas migrants to their 
relatives in Vietnam impose upon and burden those who receive them 
(Hung Cam Thai 2014:15), Nui’s gifts aroused in her recipients a sense 
of obligation from which they could not easily extricate themselves. 
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Given this, some people in Bắc Ðồng, especially the rich who were 
concerned about their manners (giữ ý), tried to keep their distance 
from Núi or avoid receiving her gifts. However, as Núi’s giving became 
a phenomenon, most people were interested in receiving a gift which 
they viewed as a blessed token from a successful returned migrant 
that had the capacity to bring them joy and fortune. Her generosity to 
them was considered by many to be the result of their own fate, rather 
than Núi’s own good heart. One old lady, who was the mother of some 
successful traders in the village and had no special relationship with 
Núi, told me that since she had witnessed Núi’s gifts to many people, 
she also expected Núi to give her about 100,000 VND, the value of a 
health tonic that she sometimes took. By the end of Núi’s visit, many 
people said that it was not only individuals who were indebted to 
Núi but indeed the whole village, for everyone in the village had 
eaten the pork meat and sticky rice that she had offered to the village 
deities during festivals and then shared out among the villagers, and 
on account of everything else she had done for the village. It was clear 
from their exhilaration that many people felt happy and proud to have 
been individually touched by her largesse. 
Through giving, Núi was able to accumulate status and power. 
As more and more villagers received gifts from Núi and accepted the 
responsibility to show their sentiment for her, her prestige continued 
to rise. Many considered her generosity as the action of a fortunate 
person sharing with others the blessings (lộc) that she had received 
from the spirits. Her actions were similar to the wealth distribution 
practices of potlatch found among indigenous peoples of the American 
northwest coast, in which chiefs or the rich would build status by 
hosting lavish feasts and compete to give away food and property 
(Codere 1950; Jonaitis 1991). Closer to home, Núi’s gifts were akin to 
the gifts distributed by Vietnamese spirit mediums to their following, 
whose largesse is motivated not simply by altruism or the imperatives 
of kinship or camaraderie, but by the obligations invested in those 
enjoying a status as masters — as spiritual patrons in a patron–client 
relationship (Endres 2011:13–36). 
All of the villagers agreed that if Núi had no money or had not given it 
to people, she would not have been feted in the village. If a person gives 
only the average amount of charity to help the poor, they will receive 
esteem no greater than that enjoyed by ordinary people. In Núi’s case, 
besides helping the poor she had also given her heart (tâm) to village 
85
2 . THE DYNAMICS OF RETuRN MIGRATION IN VIETNAM’S RuRAL NORTH
affairs, thus she received the respect of local government officials 
and the esteem of the villagers. Before Núi returned to the south to 
celebrate New Year, Bắc Ðồng village held a farewell for her. The 
event offered an opportunity for the village to evaluate her efforts 
and think about how to express their gratitude. After many days, at 
a meeting comprising all of the representatives of the village — the 
people, government and party (hội nghị dân-chính-đảng) — Khôi and 
the village leaders decided to present to Núi a classical Chinese script 
painting consisting of the word ‘tâm’, meaning ‘heart-mind’.6 
In his speech at her farewell, Khôi tried to explain the meaning of this 
word and the reason the village wanted to give the script painting 
to Núi. Khôi understood tâm as the soul, spirit and heart inside the 
human person. Whoever had a good heart to do good things would be 
appreciated and supported by the spirits. However, to make sure that 
he and the villagers gave this award to Núi with a full understanding 
of its meaning, Khôi asked for advice from an advisor in Hà Nội, 
a journalist called Thức. Even though Thức had some knowledge of 
classical Chinese script and had been researching traditional culture 
and religion for a long time, he carefully spent several hours checking 
dictionaries and reference books before answering Khôi’s question. 
He wanted to quote official books and classical texts. During a phone 
conversation with Thức, Khôi wrote down the meanings of the word 
that the journalist had summarised from various textbooks. According 
to his research, the main meaning of tâm was that whoever had a pure 
heart would be a Buddha. Thức wanted Khôi to emphasise that Núi 
had a valuable tâm because she helped the poor and gave offerings 
to the gods without any ulterior motive. Her tâm was not only 
recognised by human beings but by the spirits. Thus, she and her 
family would receive ‘good fortune’ (phúc). In response to this spiritual 
and meaningful gift, Núi thanked the village for giving her happiness 
beyond her imagination. Then she elaborated further the meaning of 
tâm. She explained that in the south she had learned from Buddhist 
monks that ‘tâm is Buddha and Buddha is tâm’ (tâm tức Phật, Phật tức 
tâm). She understood that Heaven and Buddha gave birth to humans, 
and that Heaven can be characterised by benevolence, righteousness 
6  In his analysis of the self in Vietnam, David Marr (2000) defined and translated tâm as ‘heart-
mind’, meaning the bearer of inner awareness, sentiment, knowledge and moral judgement.
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and morality (nhân, nghĩa, đạo đức), and behind the meaning of those 
three concepts is tâm. If a person has tâm, they can achieve anything 
they want (muốn làm gì là làm được).
These learned discussions about the meanings of tâm suggest that it is 
a broad and abstract concept. However, in the minds of many villagers 
with whom I talked, its meaning appeared to be less complicated. 
People simply thought that Núi had tâm because she believed in 
spirits, had Buddha in her heart, and tried to give to both living 
beings and the gods in order to receive good things for herself and 
family. As Marr (2000:770) notes, unlike most other concepts derived 
from the Chinese classics, tâm is not bound by hierarchy. The heart-
mind of even the lowliest person in society is able to commune with 
other heart-minds, with nature, the spirits, and the universe at large. 
In the case of Núi, the villagers were compelled to admit that she was 
good, and gave and contributed to the community on these terms. 
Although she was not really talented or distinguished in terms of her 
‘merit’ (công) to the country,7 she deserved to gain the honour and 
esteem of the people. One elderly man said that, 
People do not esteem her [Núi] so much because of her talent [giỏi], 
social relationships [quan hệ] or morality [đức] … but her tâm towards 
the village affairs. (Mr Lâm, 70 years old)
However, this gift of thanks was enough to make Núi feel happy 
before returning home to Sài Gòn, ending her first return visit full of 
passion and emotion. Meanwhile, for many Bắc Ðồng people, her visit 
encouraged them to hope that their own situations and that of the 
village might continue to improve with ongoing assistance from this 
extraordinary benefactor.
Her Reasons for Giving
Although tâm, or heart, was how Núi’s motives for giving were 
interpreted by Bắc Ðồng village leaders, it only partially captured Núi’s 
own reasons. For her, the role played by fate was more important. As a 
person whose life had once been as deprived as those villagers she had 
helped, and whose prosperity had come unexpectedly, she believed 
7  For a discussion of the concept of công, see Jellema (2005).
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that fate had played a crucial role in her success. She intuited that 
demonstrations of kindness to others might positively influence 
one’s own fate. Additionally, she felt sympathy for people whose 
circumstances reminded her of her own difficult life. As her business 
career drew to a close, her health declined and relations with family 
members in the south became strained, she was particularly receptive 
to the warm homecoming that she received in Bắc Ðồng village. 
Núi explained her actions with reference to her own life history and 
it is therefore useful to retell Núi’s rags-to-riches story to understand 
what considerations influenced her actions. 
Given her family’s poor situation, Núi could attend only the first grade 
of school before dropping out to stay at home and help her parents take 
care of her younger brother. When Núi was 16 years old, she started 
to learn about petty trade. She travelled to northern mountainous 
provinces such as Thái Nguyên, Yên Bái and Lạng Sơn to practice 
buying and selling goods. During her trips to Yên Bái, Núi met and 
married the son of a landlord she often stayed with. One year after the 
wedding, when Núi was 20 years old, she gave birth to a son. At that 
time, her parents-in-law asked Núi to live with them and help with 
farming activities. But Núi disagreed. She decided instead to return 
to Bắc Ðồng village with her four-month-old son. However, her own 
parents were not happy with her decision and did not invite Núi and 
her son to live with them in the family home, thus she moved again. 
When Núi was 24 years old, on a trip to Thái Nguyên Province she met 
a southern military cadre who worked in a factory there. He was older 
than her by 20 years. She decided to marry him, for he was alone in the 
north while his family lived in Sài Gòn. Núi and her son then moved 
to live with him in a small apartment in Hà Nội. After she remarried, 
Núi had more children and became the primary breadwinner when 
her husband took early retirement soon after marriage. His pension 
was not enough to support a family in that subsidised period. Thus, 
she had to do various kinds of work to earn a living, including 
spinning silk for the ward’s embroidery team and selling pork and 
chicken meat in the grey market (chợ đen). The 10-year period that 
she lived in Hà Nội — from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s — was a 
hard and miserable time for Núi. Apart from economic difficulties, she 
also suffered from discrimination and prejudice from her family and 
neighbours about her marital life. She felt devastated when her team 
leader refused to advance her salary, despite her children being sick in 
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the hospital and, on another occasion, when commercial management 
cadres confiscated 3 kilograms of meat — her whole capital — in spite 
of her explanation that her husband was a wounded southern soldier 
and her family was extremely poor. Such incidents made her recall the 
north as a land of harshness and poverty. 
After unification in 1975, Núi followed her husband to Sài Gòn. In the 
beginning, she just sold fried bananas on the pavement. Later, she 
followed a friend into a business where she served traders who came 
from the north by helping to connect them with buyers. Thanks to 
her husband’s position as a ward cadre, his connections, and her own 
efforts, more and more traders approached her for assistance and Núi 
earned a substantial income. Every day, several dozen traders resided 
in her house and sometimes she could earn a tael of gold in a single 
day. After three years in this business, she bought a big house in the 
city centre. From that time, Núi emerged as an influential trader in 
Sài Gòn. 
In the early 1980s, her assets totalled more than 50 tael of gold. 
However, in 1982 Núi lost most of her capital through trading antique 
furniture. During that difficult period, by chance, a man from Ðình 
Bảng village asked her to help him sell carved wooden furniture. 
At first, Núi earned a commission by selling the furniture in Sài Gòn 
but then expanded to Phnom Penh, Cambodia. In 1985, she opened 
an enterprise in her home to produce carved wooden furniture and 
by the 1990s she was exporting her products to Japan, Taiwan, and 
other eastern Asian countries. Included in her 100-strong workforce 
were around 50 people from Bắc Ðồng. Some of them came to Sài Gòn 
with a letter of recommendation to Núi from their parents or relatives. 
Others asked relatives in the south to accompany them when they 
approached Núi for a job.
Núi thought a lot about training craftsmen, and in the mid-1990s she 
sponsored 10 boys from poor families in Bắc Ðồng to learn the craft 
of furniture making in Nam Ðịnh Province. Núi also accommodated 
some young boys from poor families from Bắc Ðồng in her home in Sài 
Gòn, where they were taught carving skills and, at the same time, sent 
to a local school to complete their education. Even from a distance, 
Núi remained connected to her village through such acts of patronage. 
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Núi’s business thrived in the 1990s, when many of its products 
were exported. Each month, many container loads of goods were 
dispatched abroad and car loads of money were transferred back to 
her house. However, in 1999 her enterprise suddenly came to a halt. 
The  intermediary companies between Núi’s company and Japanese 
and Taiwanese buyers resented the large profits being derived by 
Núi and responded by establishing rival enterprises and enticing 
most of Núi’s workers to work for them. Thus, her enterprise came to 
a standstill due to a shortage of labour.
Núi accepted this turn of events quietly and calmly, switching to real 
estate where she redirected her energy and capital into buying land. 
She purchased 5,000 square metres of agricultural land in Thủ Ðức 
District, an undeveloped part of the city at that time. The subsequent 
urbanisation of this agricultural land rendered Núi’s investment to be 
worth around 20 billion VND (close to $1 million USD). However, after 
that deal, her business career again came to a halt and she experienced 
a series of personal crises.
Since 2000, Núi has been ailing. Her leg developed a kind of 
rheumatism. She began to walk with a stick and sometimes needed 
assistance to move about. Her husband also died around that time. 
Most of her children were incapable of running the business, since 
they were used to depending on her. Three of them switched to 
small business, which only provided a subsistence income. The three 
youngest children continued to receive monthly stipends from their 
mother. Two of them had become drug addicts by 2008. In 1999, 
during her most prosperous period, Núi was able to send one of her 
sons to study in Canada. After graduating he remained in Canada and 
could have applied for professional employment and citizenship, but 
his ordinary academic performance led him to work in a field which 
provided no more than a subsistence income.
Looking back over her life, Núi was proud of her achievements. 
Although she was not as rich as the richest person in the south, what 
she had achieved was remarkable, given that she had left her home 
village and given birth to seven children in poverty. She was respected 
as a successful business person. It was in relation to her family that 
she believed she had failed. Extremely preoccupied with her business, 
Núi had been unable to take care of or teach her children well. 
Consequently, her children took life for granted and had no capacity 
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to work hard as she had done. Núi reflected that the dependence of 
her children gave her power over them that other richer women do 
not have; she made all the decisions about the family and her property. 
As previously noted, initially Núi planned to go home simply to build 
a house for her brother and grave for her ancestors before she got 
older and weaker. But Núi had not imagined how enthusiastically the 
villagers would welcome her. The emotion of the villagers encouraged 
Núi to stay longer and give more in the belief that this might be a 
decision made by the spirits. The spirits had led her back to the north 
to give and, as had previously happened in her life, they would give 
her other things in return. Explaining her giving, Núi said that the 
money gifted was like the blood vessels of the body. She had learnt 
from Buddha that only someone who cut a blood vessel without 
feeling hurt would not regret giving away their money. In her case, 
she did feel hurt but was compelled to do it in order to follow the 
spirit’s call. In addition, Núi accounted for her actions in the village 
in terms of her compassion towards her natal village. Returning and 
being surrounded by many poor women made Núi feel sympathy for 
her fellow villagers who were in essence just like her — except for the 
intervention of fate. Witnessing people suffer hardship and poverty 
also made her feel less sad about her own family life and reminded her 
of her own good fortune/luck. Given her strong belief in fate and her 
sense that she was on the threshold of another major turn in her life, 
Núi gave liberally in the anticipation that something extraordinary 
was about to happen. 
Contradiction and Misunderstanding
While Núi’s generosity may not have been clearly understood by the 
villagers, her manner of giving stimulated a great deal of commentary 
and conjecture. For many Bắc Ðồng people, Núi’s giving was a strange 
and extraordinary phenomenon that they had never seen or heard of 
before. People not only wondered about how Núi had become rich but 
also about the source of her donations. Some people believed that most 
of her charitable gifts came from a Canadian charitable organisation. 
This idea might have derived from her son’s residence in Canada, 
causing people to imagine that she had contact with such a network 
through him. Some villagers could not believe that she took money 
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from her own pocket to give to others. As most knowledge about Núi 
came from villagers who had either worked for her or visited her in 
the south, her actions remained mysterious to most people. Even the 
way she gave surprised the villagers. 
When offering charity, Núi carefully considered the situation of the 
poor to assess whether they genuinely needed help. If she found out 
that the children or close relatives of the poor people in the village 
were rich, she would not give them anything. Although hunger and 
poverty have existed in the village for a long time, Bắc Ðồng people 
found it hard to grasp the concept and practice of charity that Núi 
introduced. At first, some people were reluctant to receive money 
from her. In other cases, children of the elderly objected to their 
parents receiving help. However, people gradually got used to Núi 
making a record of poor households’ situations and her habit of taking 
documentary photos. She often made a detailed list of households 
and tried to understand clearly each of their circumstances in order 
to give them a suitable amount. Her gifts were flexible and fair but 
also arbitrary. I overheard women telling each other that Núi never 
gave gifts to people who complained about their difficulties but wore 
jewellery made from gold. 
During her giving, Núi also set conditions on the contributions she 
made to poverty eradication or construction projects, which potentially 
threatened the authority of village officials. When Núi decided to give 
money to all of the poor households in the commune, she asked the 
local government to give her a list of poor households categorised 
according to her own criteria, instead of the official criteria and list. 
When donating money to build the temple road or repair the đình, she 
could easily calculate the cost of these works without the assistance 
of local cadres. People understood that it was difficult to swindle Núi. 
An elderly man on the ritual committee revealed that the local cadres 
had felt embarrassed when they calculated that a project to upgrade 
the road to the Lady’s shrine would cost 24 million VND (about $2,200 
USD). With her ability, Núi easily knew that it would cost less than 
that. But she politely responded that, given her limited budget, she 
would like to take over the construction work herself to reduce the 
cost. As a result, she only had to pay 17 million VND. This incident 
reminded Núi that the local cadres also expected something from her, 
at least for the time they devoted to village affairs. Núi shocked them 
when she offered them a gift of 10 million VND. She nicely explained 
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that it was a reward for their hard work for the village. The fact was 
that Núi had to determine who was who in the village and find the best 
way to live with people. By being involved in the practice of giving, 
she wanted to help harmonise social relationships in the village. 
Returning from a far-away world, Núi brought to Bắc Ðồng many new 
values, most importantly the values of kindness, charity, and ‘heart-
mind’. Some old people said that they had never seen anyone as kind 
and giving as Núi. The villagers learned that Núi had practiced charity 
and giving for a long time in the south, where such activity was 
common. Apart from these charitable practices, Núi also represented a 
different way of life and thinking. People were surprised that she did 
not think exclusively about herself, her children, and her family. Núi 
claimed that whenever confronted with a decision to spend a lot of 
money on luxurious personal effects or expensive meals in a restaurant, 
she tried to limit her spending in order to save money for charity. Even 
though Núi owned property worth about $1 million USD, none of her 
children had a big house or expensive car. She gave each of them no 
more than a fixed monthly stipend. As noted above, Núi built a new 
house in the village for her only brother, gave him a monthly stipend, 
and gave other relatives larger and more frequent gifts than outsiders. 
But she never met her relatives’ expectations, giving them just enough 
to live on and giving more to people who really needed it. By acting 
in this way, Núi said she could overcome the traditional Vietnamese 
ideology of ‘family first’ and think about others as well. 
This way of thinking and behaving was strange to the villagers. 
Núi tried to make people understand that in the outside world, people 
acted beyond family obligations, beyond the concept of ‘amoral 
familism’ (Banfield 1967), and cared about other members of society. 
In the south, she said, individuals like her could take on the work 
of caring for the poor or victims of disasters, work that, in the 
village, was usually regarded as a responsibility of the government. 
Núi encouraged people to change their minds and act like people in 
the outside world. She advocated that the poor accept responsibility 
for their situation and try to overcome their poverty. If a person did 
not want their close relatives to be ranked as poor, they ought to 
take care of them and help them to better themselves. Núi criticised 
as hypocritical the egalitarian and communal discourses in the 
village by making people aware of the reality of social stratification 
and urging them to do something about it. She said people should 
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love each other more and do more to help people outside their own 
family. Her advocacy of these values and ways of relating to others 
generated much debate among villagers as to whether this new form 
of personhood represented a good model or not. 
From the outset, the rich doubted Núi’s charitable intentions, claiming 
her to be motivated by self-interest and querying the morality of 
her wealth (Jellema 2005:233). Some hypothesised that in the past, 
Núi must have done something bad or evil to become rich and now 
she wanted to undertake charity to lessen her guilt. This hypothesis 
originated either from the idea in contemporary society that to be 
rich is immoral, or from the experiences of the rich in Bắc Ðồng 
themselves, such as fierce competition among traders, sibling rivalry 
and fighting, exploitation of labourers, and rampant cheating by 
traders. Meanwhile, others surmised that Núi gave to have a peaceful 
heart and to forget about the fact that some of her children were drug 
users. Nevertheless, even though some rich villagers expressed their 
doubts about Núi’s kindness and morality, they were prepared to 
admire what she had done for the village. 
Some villagers whose children had previously worked for Núi in Sài 
Gòn ventured the observation that Núi had been a difficult boss. It was 
said that she favoured people who were clever with their hands and 
words and bestowed privilege on these, while lazy persons and those 
who did not know how to please her fell into disfavour. Núi stated that 
a clear distinction existed between boss and worker in the south. She 
liked labourers to refer to themselves as ‘con’ (children) in her presence, 
and address her formally as ‘bà’ (madam), regardless of how old they 
were or their kinship relationship with her. Villagers felt compelled to 
use this respectful mode of address (bẩm bà) in their interactions with 
her. Some people thought that this approach engendered politeness 
in villagers, while others thought of it as bossy (hách dịch). Many Bắc 
Ðồng people felt it was difficult to submit to her in that way. 
The way Núi had managed her workers in the past became a hot topic 
of discussion among villagers. It was claimed that her relationship 
with workers was a strictly patron–client one. It was a begging and 
giving relationship (xin-cho). She selected labourers carefully and 
implemented strict contracts and supervision. In order to retain her 
workers and to help them save money to bring home, Núi paid their 
full salary only at the end of the year. Every month, she gave them 
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a small amount of money to buy necessities for personal consumption. 
If a worker needed an extra amount, they had to make a special request 
and provide a good reason. Workers were required to stay within the 
confines of their houses. Visitors had to seek the guard’s permission 
to contact workers. Despite the fact that her management approach 
aimed to protect workers from social evils and assist them to save their 
remittances, many Bắc Ðồng migrants decided to leave Núi’s enterprise 
after a certain time. One former labourer who subsequently established 
his own enterprise compared Núi’s management model to colonial-style 
capitalism. According to him, she exercised authoritarian behaviour 
(cửa quyền) over others. By contrast, modern young capitalists like 
him applied a model of ‘agreement’ (thỏa ước) based on the principle 
of ‘two sides each have profit’ (hai bên cùng có lợi). However, many 
parents in the village admitted that her strict rules had helped their 
children grow up and be successful. 
After Núi came back to the village and began distributing money, 
some villagers complained about her being bossy and difficult. 
If anyone needed her help, they had to report to her in the manner 
of a subordinate (thưa chuyện). Only important persons such as Khôi, 
the village leader, were received formally by her. Usually, Núi let her 
nieces or some ladies help her serve tea for the guests. Some villagers 
did not feel respected when they were invited to sit at the table and 
talk to her while she was seated on the bed in the next compartment. 
For some, this arrangement resembled a colonial-era scene whereby the 
poor or subordinates came to ask favours from landlords or mandarins. 
It was unclear whether Núi treated people like this because it was her 
own way or because of her bad leg. Some villagers also questioned 
her morality since, according to them, Núi did not care enough for 
her family and relatives in the village. Even though Núi built a big 
house for her brother and gave him a monthly stipend and gave more 
to her nieces than to others, whenever she gave gifts to the poor, some 
of her more distant relatives claimed that she was not treating them 
fairly. Moreover, it was said she easily got angry and was prone to 
scold her brother and nieces if they did not follow her orders. As a 
result, some gossiped about her ‘giving but cursing’ (cho rồi chửi) 
without noticing that sometimes Núi felt tired and stressed due to her 
family members’ reliance on her. 
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All of these dynamics show that local reaction to Núi’s giving was 
extremely complicated. Most villagers acknowledged their esteem for 
her as a result of her giving and her ‘heart’. Some intellectual men 
of Bắc Ðồng told me that they had observed that it was labourers, 
who accounted for 60 per cent of the village population, who most 
welcomed and venerated Núi as their saviour. Her giving, according 
to those educated people, was like a capitalist giving to the poor. 
It made the poor feel less unequal and helped send a message to the 
rich in the community that they should not be selfish; instead, they 
should be kind and should share and give like Núi. On the other hand, 
her undisclosed motives and her rational approach to giving aroused 
controversy and disappointment in many people. Well-off villagers 
were the group most likely to raise questions: about her motives, 
her recent business ‘failure’ in Sài Gòn, her first marriage, and her 
‘immoral’ background. Her failure to privilege her closest relatives 
served as additional ammunition for some villagers who, perhaps 
influenced by familial ideology or motivated by envy, used rumour 
and speculation, and their reserves of time and local connections, to 
try to cut Núi down for not caring adequately for her own family. 
Her potlatch-like generosity could not protect Núi from these barbs or 
put her esteem beyond dispute.
Limits of Giving
Despite these undercurrents, Núi’s first return visit ended happily for 
both her and the villagers. Village leaders and people kept expecting 
and hoping that she would take the initiative and the main role in 
new rebuilding projects. Núi left the village with a vague promise that 
she would try her best to do more work for the village if the spirits 
let her. Returning to her big and quiet house in Sài Gòn, she missed 
the warm atmosphere in the village where she had been esteemed and 
surrounded by an entourage. Bắc Ðồng village was scheduled to hold 
its festival two months after Núi’s return to the south. On behalf of 
the village, Khôi tried to convince Núi to participate in the event, but 
Núi hesitated before making a decision. Since closing her furniture 
enterprise, she derived her main income from land trading but 
intended to sell most of her property and divide the profit between 
her children, as an inheritance. She would then keep a part of the 
profit for herself to enjoy her last days of life and to give to others in 
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the form of donations. But, owing to the fall in the property market, 
she had not yet been able to put her plan into action. Thus, most 
of the money she had spent on living expenses and for giving had 
been borrowed with interest. However, the call from Bắc Ðồng was 
so strong that at the last minute Núi decided to borrow more money 
and fly back to the village. Later on, she disclosed that this decision 
went against the advice of the spirits. As Núi often consulted with the 
gods before undertaking any significant action, she went to the temple 
to pray and ask the spirits whether she should return to Bắc Ðồng 
a second time.8 The two coins she cast to obtain the spirit’s answer 
showed that she should not return, but Núi ignored this advice.
Responding to the expectations of the villagers, on her second visit 
Núi gave even more than she had during her first one. She gave 
59 million VND to 59 poor households in the commune to help support 
their recovery from the coldest winter in recent history. The commune 
held a big official meeting at a hall to receive this donation. In this 
meeting, Núi gave a speech about how poor she had been and 
encouraged people to overcome their difficulties. Later, the district 
radio station conducted an interview with Núi. Subsequently, she 
decided to spend a further 100 million VND to rebuild a lotus pond 
in front of the village temple. During the village festival, Núi offered 
a big pig and a lot of sticky rice as offerings to the god, and gave the 
meat to the villagers.
Things became more complicated when Núi decided to buy a house 
for her own use in the village. She aimed to use it as a place to stay 
whenever she visited Bắc Ðồng. After she died, it would be given 
to the lineage to use as their ancestor hall. This news caused wide 
discussion among villagers about whether Núi would stay permanently 
in the village or not, and why. Her decision reignited gossip that Núi 
had been forced to return to live in the village because she had gone 
bankrupt in the south, and because her children had become drug 
addicts, leaving no one to care for her. 
Women in the village expressed excitement about her house purchase, 
thinking she had decided to return to Bắc Ðồng. Some even visited 
Núi at her new house and asked her if she would stay permanently. 
8  Mediums or followers of Tứ Phủ religion often practice ‘xin đài’ to seek a sign of the spirits’ 
approval by throwing two coins. If they fall head and tails, it means the spirits approve.
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Tired of her living arrangements being the subject of speculation, 
when two elderly women in the village asked her, ‘Is it true that 
you will live here?’, and added, ‘Now then, stay here with us’, Núi 
answered angrily: ‘My god, do you want me to abandon my children 
and property? Would you ever do that to your children?!’ The two 
ladies felt ashamed, saddened and surprised by Núi’s response to them. 
They judged Núi’s behaviour as improper and said that it showed an 
authoritarian attitude toward villagers. Explaining this incident, Núi 
argued that she was countering anyone who spread malicious gossip 
about her. When the two elderly women shared their version of what 
happened with others, most Bắc Ðồng people showed no response or 
comment — they were caught between venerating Núi and judging 
her according to moral norms. 
The story became more serious when a daughter of one of the elderly 
women, Thúy, decided to retaliate. One morning, when Núi was 
receiving the president of the commune’s Women’s Union, who had 
come to convince her to donate to her association, Thúy came to revile 
Núi with terrible words. Addressing Núi as a selfish old hag (con mụ 
béo), she claimed that Núi was a bad and immoral woman who had 
more than one husband and had used her wealth to shout at and scold 
villagers. Núi and the communal cadre sat quietly for an hour while 
they endured Thúy’s verbal abuse. After this incident, Khôi and the 
village leaders sympathetically offered to send Thúy to the commune 
authorities for discipline. Many people who held Núi in high esteem 
came to console her and said that she should not bother about Thúy, 
that no one in the village wanted to touch Thúy, and that Thúy was 
a stubborn and undesirable (thành phần bất hảo) woman who had 
married and then divorced a strange man from the border area where 
she worked as a petty trader. Returning to the village, Thúy dared 
to heap insults on and fight with anyone. She even abused her own 
mother. However, in this case she wanted to defend her mother to 
redeem her own status. Commenting on what happened, the head of 
the village Elderly Association explained that when a person emerges 
as an economic power there will always be some who envy them. 
Further, no one dares to touch those with political power but people 
dare to abuse those with other powers, implying that economic power 
is not as strong as political strength. This incident made those who 
venerated Núi feel a bit discouraged. On the one hand, they were 
worried that Núi might abandon her role as patron. On the other hand, 
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they did not want to get involved in a debate about their patron’s 
morality, which had been questioned by some people who doubted 
her kindness and ‘heart-mind’. 
Around this time, Núi’s relationship with family members in the 
village also soured. Her children in Sài Gòn never complained or 
intervened in Núi’s donations. They had grown used to her practice 
of giving and charity in the south. However, when she returned to 
Bắc Ðồng the second time, she met many objections from her close 
relatives and family in the village. While Núi had intentionally given 
more to her brother, sister, nieces and nephews than to outsiders in 
order to keep their relationship on a good footing during the first trip, 
family members now expressed disappointment and discontent when 
they compared what they had received with what outsiders were 
given. They wanted to receive much more than just stipends or small 
investments from her. They complained to their neighbours, and many 
villagers questioned whether Núi cared more about outsiders than her 
own siblings. Since her gifts could not reach all relatives and villagers, 
she also received subtle reminders from some distant relatives that 
she had forgotten to give to them. During the festival, when a woman 
who was possessed by the spirit at the Lady’s temple saw Núi, she 
said obliquely that ‘there is someone [she meant Núi] who only takes 
care of outsiders and neglects descendants and relatives’. Núi was 
perceptive enough to understand immediately that this woman’s 
mother was one of her cousins to whom she had not yet sent greetings 
or a gift. Núi immediately arranged to send something to this cousin.
Things took a turn for the worse after Núi departed the village the 
second time. Two of her nieces abused some elderly women who had 
been staying with Núi in order to take care of her. Her nieces wanted 
these women to stop serving Núi in order to assume this task (and its 
rewards) for themselves. This incident led Núi to believe that her 
family in the village was hindering her work of giving and her good 
reputation. Subsequently, Núi phoned me and during our hour-long 
conversation she confessed her fear that people in the village would 
no longer come to her and that her entourage would abandon her. 
Núi called for my urgent help to mobilise her surrounding followers 
and encourage them to believe that she was able to handle what was 
happening. Núi’s confession demonstrated to me that she was worried 
about losing the new identity and status that had been created through 
her interactions and acts of giving to the people and community. 
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After the incidents mentioned above, the villagers began to openly 
discuss Núi’s popularity. Some men disliked and disagreed with the 
way many women in the village ‘bootlicked’ (bợ đỡ) and fawned 
upon on Núi. They criticised those ladies who looked after Núi more 
respectfully and carefully than they would their own mothers. It 
seemed that those men did not want to see manifestations of inequality 
and economic power in their community. Meanwhile, on their visits 
home or through their families, some successful young business 
people from Bắc Ðồng working in Sài Gòn and abroad made it known, 
perhaps brashly, that they could do more giving than Núi in the near 
future. A competitive spirit emerged among other rich migrants from 
the village who claimed that they too could attain the kind of esteem 
and power held by Núi. At home, competitive young people working 
as traders also raised objections to the idea of venerating Núi, or 
indeed any rich person. 
Following these interactions, Núi reflected sadly, ‘homeland is a bitter 
fruit’ (‘quê hương là quả đắng’).9 Thúy’s public scolding reminded her 
that people still remembered her past. The story of her miserable 
impoverishment in Hà Nội, her record of more than one husband, 
and marrying an older man and becoming his second wife were 
still recalled by people. It felt to Núi that her attempts to acquire a 
higher reputation in the village were the subject of obstruction and 
challenge, and that the villagers had not changed — northern people 
were still narrow-minded, selfish and envious. Their thoughts were 
extremely hard (tư tưởng nặng nề). The rich were despised and the poor 
disdained. While the villagers were talented, they were not prosperous 
and not happy due to their narrow-mindedness and limited horizons. 
After returning again to the south, Núi saw the northern delta as a 
place with limited prospects for development owing to its restricted 
area and poor markets. Núi reappraised southern people as broad-
minded, tolerant and easy-going. Their hearts were like that of Heaven 
(lòng người như lòng Trời). 
Nevertheless, from the remove of her home in the south, Núi persisted 
in safeguarding the esteem she had earned in her natal village. 
She pressured family members to continue giving to her followers in 
9  Most Vietnamese are familiar with the famous line of poetry ‘quê hương là chùm khế ngọt’ 
(‘homeland is a bunch of sweet star fruit’). In contrast, Bà Núi experienced homeland as a bunch 
of bitter fruit.
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line with her previous plans. To patch things up at the village level, 
Núi thought about building a big gate for the đình and repairing the 
pagoda. However, these ideas could not be implemented as Núi was 
unable to sell her property due to the economic recession.
During that time, Núi chose to invite me to her house in Sài Gòn. 
She  did not hide her aim of using me as a tool to remedy gossip 
about her in the village. Núi told me she thought that the villagers 
trusted me and would believe in what I saw and told them about her 
life in the south. She arranged several meetings for me with some of 
her children. She took me to visit one of the most famous temples 
in Sài Gòn where she was highly esteemed, and one of the biggest 
pagodas in the city where the master monk received her warmly and 
respectfully. She wanted to demonstrate that her wealth was real, that 
her children were under her command and taking care of her, and 
that the most honourable places and people in the south held her in 
esteem and acknowledged her good character. I felt nervous about 
Núi’s expectations of me and wondered what I should tell the villagers 
about her life in the south. To my surprise, however, when I returned 
to Bắc Ðồng, no one in the village asked me about my trip. I tried to 
mention my journey and Núi to encourage questions but the villagers 
tended to ignore my attempts. I wondered if they were trying to avoid 
debate or simply wanted to forget the sad story of a person in whom 
they had invested a lot of hope but who had become a lightning rod 
for contention and disappointment in their village.
Conclusion
The controversies surrounding this Vietnamese return migrant’s 
efforts to reconnect with her home village offer revealing insights into 
the complex dynamics that shape homecomings and other projects of 
reconnection in migratory societies. In some respects, her return visit 
was in no way out of the ordinary, motivated at it was by a desire 
to return to her homeland to acquit her filial obligations at the end 
of a difficult working life that had brought both success and failure. 
Nevertheless, the direction and eventual outcome of her return journey 
was unpredictably shaped by the force of the imagination and the 
dynamics of class differentiation and status. The expectations invested 
by Bắc Ðồng villagers in this rich return business migrant set her on a 
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new course of helping the whole village and diverted her efforts away 
from her original intention to assist her own family. The difficulties 
villagers had in comprehending and contextualising her actions led 
to misunderstanding, conflict, and eventual mutual disappointment. 
We can learn much from this story of conflicted return through the lens 
of social drama (Turner 1974), and by drawing out the perspectives of 
each of its key protagonists. Núi’s own story shows that, like many 
migrants in northern Vietnam, she originally wanted to return to fulfil 
her culturally prescribed obligation to her ancestors (Jellema 2007). 
Return migration theorists might describe this motivation as the 
satisfaction of a migratory strategy, one that responded to the cultural 
‘pull’ factor of familial obligation (Gmelch 1980; Brettell 2000; Cassarino 
2004). However, what she encountered in her natal village made Núi 
feel sympathy and compassion for those suffering poverty and misery 
as she had in the past. She saw herself in her fellow villagers and 
this inspired her to give much more widely than familial obligation 
alone would dictate was necessary. Her emotional rediscovery of 
the village as a home in which she was esteemed was both epiphany 
and consolation for Núi, who had experienced harshness, hope and 
disappointment as a migrant trader under the socialist subsidy period, 
and again in a later phase of life as an urban capitalist trader. However, 
the reasons for her generosity were misunderstood and resulted in 
contradictory social, emotional and intellectual reactions. Instead of 
eliciting gratitude, her actions aroused envy and criticism among 
fellow village elites. In the end, the community of sentiment that had 
coalesced around her collapsed, brought down by the very familial 
ideology that had drawn her home in the first place.
In the context of increasing social differentiation in this rural setting, 
many of Bắc Ðồng’s poorest people spontaneously venerated this 
wealthy returned migrant and incited her to become a patron of 
the village. Many elderly women in particular aspired to form a 
community surrounding her, reliant on her generosity. Infused 
with sentiments of solidarity, mutual obligation and hierarchy, this 
following provided a space of refuge — not dissimilar to that provided 
by Buddhist pagodas or mediumistic followings in the northern 
delta — for people marginalised by the ideology of the patrilineal 
household (Luong 2006:382–383; Endres 2011:13–36). The villagers’ 
construction of this homecoming migrant as a miraculous being also 
shows the important role of the religious imagination in creating a 
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space of hope for the marginalised in the rural north. Conceptions 
of Núi as a Buddha-hearted person, a bringer of blessings, or a fairy 
queen illustrate the spiritual aspirations attached to her charitable acts. 
The village leadership also sought to acknowledge her contributions 
in these terms when they commended her as a ‘heart-minded’ person. 
Nevertheless, criticisms directed towards this spontaneous community 
of veneration also reveal the existence in rural northern villages of 
a vein of scepticism towards spiritual-based hierarchies that may 
derive from, or indeed pre-date, the ideological reforms of the high 
socialist era (Malarney 2003; Taylor 2007:29–36). The controversial 
homecoming ended in mutual disenchantment between Núi and the 
people who had expected so much of her. The story shows the power 
of the imagination and the limits of that power in the constitution of 
community in contemporary Vietnam.
The homecoming also provoked a number of ethical conflicts. One of 
the most heated stemmed from the familialist ideology of the village. 
Although motivated by a sense of filial reciprocation and the obligation 
to support her less fortunate family members, Núi’s giving quickly 
escalated to include all manner of non-family members. As such, 
she was motivated by the universalistic ethics of Buddhism and an 
explicit critique of the orientation of ‘amoral familialism’ (cf. Banfield 
1967) that limits ones sphere of ethical responsibility to the family. 
However, her behaviour was noted as an ethical violation by family 
members. Their objections to her generosity cannot be seen merely 
as examples of individual opportunism or greed, for this critique of 
her neglect of family members was voiced widely by other villagers, 
suggesting that she was in contravention of a more generalised 
norm. Núi’s bewilderment at her fall from favour and the sweeping 
contrast she drew between the ‘open-hearted’ character of the south 
and the ‘narrowness’ and ‘hardness’ of the north can be read as a 
fundamental conflict between different ethical systems: the family-
centric ethics of her northern rural birthplace and the Buddhist, 
modernist and capitalist ethics internalised during her long sojourn 
in the urban south. 
A second plank of familialist ideology that became a source of 
contention were the traditionalist norms of feminine submission, 
fidelity and sacrifice (Ngo 2004; Pettus 2004). When Núi spoke harshly 
to a pair of elderly women, Núi suddenly found herself on trial by 
village gossips for her lack of wifely fidelity, and her inadequacies 
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as a mother. In turn, her most vocal accuser was quickly silenced 
on the grounds that she too was severely lacking in feminine virtue. 
Núi shared these values, for it was her sensitivity to the implication 
that she had willingly abandoned her children that had caused her to 
speak out harshly against her elderly village dependants. Underlying 
all these attacks was an ideology of feminine submission. Women 
who asserted themselves too forcefully in public were prone to being 
disparaged as lacking in core feminine virtues. No amount of good 
will generated by Núi could immunise her against this assault on her 
character. Indeed, the very act of giving made her vulnerable to this 
angle of attack, for villagers themselves posited links between her 
wealth and her infidelity, and her generosity and her lack of support 
for her own children. These attitudes suggest that traditional gender 
ideologies continue to be mobilised to discipline women’s involvement 
in the rural public sphere in northern Vietnam, for it was Núi’s very 
influence and stature that made her vulnerable to the charge that she 
lacked feminine virtue. 
The final set of serious conflicts was provoked by the challenge that 
Núi’s charitable acts represented to local structures of authority and 
status in the village. Intriguingly, for this wealthy capitalist from the 
south, the elites who responded most warmly to her charity were the 
members of the village party and state administration. They hoped, 
perhaps naively, that her wealth could be channelled to support their 
village reconstruction projects, thereby elevating their own status. 
However, older educated villagers and men in particular objected to 
her sudden cult-like status on two grounds. The first was that it flowed 
almost entirely from the money she had accumulated from her business 
dealings, and hence did not connote talent or morality, indeed quite 
possibly the reverse. In these respects their critique of her status 
could be tied to the long-standing stigmatisation of commerce noted 
in northern Vietnamese rural communities (Malarney 1998). Second, 
they resented what they saw as a bossy and high-handed manner. 
In these respects she challenged status hierarchies in the village 
that prioritised age seniority, learning, and male gender.10 Criticism 
directed at Núi’s dealings with villagers may have reflected the 
10  For an extended discussion of these hierarchies elsewhere in the rural Red River Delta, 
see Luong (2010:62–80).
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influence of socialist ethics as much as a traditional discomfort for raw 
displays of great power and wealth. In short, her actions humiliated 
a section of the village elite, whose status was derived from tradition. 
A different group of elites who resented her approach were Núi’s 
fellow new rich. They did not so much resent her method as her 
success at it. These fellow elites were conflicted, for although she 
represented a new model of personhood and ethics for the local rich, 
she also represented a competitor. Their aspirations to outdo Núi in 
charitable prowess signify that this village is becoming an arena for 
status conflicts based on new criteria of externally derived wealth. 
Her case thus illustrates the complex terrain on which claims to status 
operate in contemporary northern Vietnamese villages. Although 
this wealthy migrant’s charitable giving created new hierarchies 
between herself and marginalised village members, such hierarchies 
were unstable and prone to elicit contestation on both traditional 
and modern grounds. As such, this case reveals that far from merely 
enveloping all participants in warm sentiments of solidarity and 
concord, the charitable practices of returned migrants also have the 
capacity to promote invidious social comparison and dissension within 
rural communities, and to inflict harm on both charitable donors and 
recipients alike.
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Women as Fish: Rural Migration 
and Displacement in Vietnam
Linh Khanh Nguyen
This chapter discusses the pattern of rural-to-rural migration to 
and from a rural fishing community called Hải Thành1 in northern 
Vietnam.2 I unpack this double migration pattern in order to illustrate 
the intimate relationship of mobility, social class and displacement. 
Hải  Thành is famous in Vietnam as the community that has sent 
the largest percentage, nationwide, of its young women abroad in 
transnational marriages to foreign men in East Asia (transnational 
women). Hải Thành men are also well-known offshore fishermen who 
travel away 20 days per month and who, due to the transnational 
marriages of local women, have had to look for wives from other 
rural communities (translocal women). By comparing the gendered, 
racial and social elements of migration by translocal women with 
transnational women in this community, my chapter centres on how 
different kinds of movement become coded with specific kinds of 
class status and subjectivities. In order to accomplish this, I explore 
the diversity of rurality, within and between countries, which is 
often conflated in much scholarship as ‘the rural’. I investigate how 
1  Hải Thành is a pseudonym.
2  I gratefully acknowledge support for preparing this chapter from the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin 
und Gerd Bucerius Foundation, which has funded the author for two years. I also thank the 
2014 ANU Vietnam Update organisers, Philip Taylor, and two anonymous reviewers for their 
comments on this chapter.
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migration from one rurality to another can be understood through 
the lens of social mobility. Ironically, this practice also engenders 
the social displacement of translocal women. This unwelcome 
ramification causes us to question the uncritical celebration of 
mobility and complicates the assumed linear, simplistic relationship 
between migration and social mobility. The case of translocal women 
in Hải Thành also illustrates that movement and non-movement are 
connected and mutually defining rather than dichotomised. Together, 
they create ongoing dynamics that characterise the lives of women in 
Hải Thành.
This chapter is based on 17 months of research in Hải Thành, from 
2011 to 2014, including an 11-month period of intensive fieldwork 
from 2013 to 2014. During this time, I socialised with and interviewed 
local men, transnational women, and translocal women and their 
in-law families. I lived with two local families for more than a year, 
frequented Hải Thành people’s homes and boats, ran errands with 
them, and attended local weddings and religious ceremonies. I took 
Korean classes with Hải Thành women and taught English classes 
for Hải Thành children. I also participated in the night life of Hải 
Thành, spending time in cafes and shops where young people hung 
out. These relationships and activities provided me with insights into 
the intimate and social life in Hải Thành, allowing me to understand 
their desires, values, prides, and struggles and disappointments as 
their lives are transformed by migratory forces, both internally and 
internationally.
Hải Thành in Motion: The Fishermen 
and the Women
Located near the Gulf of Tonkin, Hải Thành is a small rural fishing 
commune (xã) belonging to the Thuỷ Nguyên District (huyện) of Hải 
Phòng City in northern Vietnam with a population of around 12,000 
people. Despite its small population and rural location, Hải  Thành 
residents have a long history of movement and transnational migration. 
For example, Hải Thành men have been fishermen for generations and 
embark on monthly trips of 20 days to fish squid near Bạch Long Vĩ 
Island in the middle of the Tonkin Gulf (110 kilometres from home). 
Because the technique for fishing uses light attraction, Hải Thành 
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fishermen are usually home every month from the 10th to the 20th day 
of the lunar calendar, for during this time the moon is bright, making 
prey harder to catch. Their monthly movement between the island 
and home is both circular and routinised. 
The lucrative fishing industry of Hải Thành enables both the fishermen 
and the community to thrive. The majority of Hải Thành fishermen are 
boat owners who often hire workers from provinces in the centre of 
Vietnam to work on their boats because local labour cannot meet the 
demand of the growing fishing industry. Each boat worker gets paid 
5 to 7 million VND ($250–350 USD) per trip, which is relatively high 
according to local living standards. The rest of the profit or loss goes 
to the boat owners, who can earn more than 100 million VND ($5,000 
USD) on a good trip, but lose millions when hit by storms. 
Although squid fishing is generally very profitable, it is certainly a 
laborious, treacherous and difficult job. Fishermen often talk about 
the long hours of work (12 hours or more per day) and how dangerous 
the job is, especially when the weather is rough (storms, cyclones, 
rain, high tides, etc.). The danger and hardship of the job, however, 
do not concern Hải Thành fishermen as much as the competition 
they face from Chinese fishermen. In December 2000, Vietnam and 
China signed an agreement concerning the delimitation of the 
continental shelf boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin in which Vietnam 
will occupy 53.23 per cent and China 46.77 per cent of the Gulf area. 
The two governments also established a joint fishing area between 
the two countries (BBC Vietnamese 2009; Uỷ Ban Biên Giới Quốc Gia 
2000). While it is a joint fishing area, in reality only Chinese boats will 
fish in the area because Vietnamese boats cannot compete with them. 
According to Hải Thành fishermen, Chinese boats are at least five times 
bigger and 10 times more expensive, and their lights are so bright that 
they attract all the squid to their boats. It is only during 10 weeks in 
the summer (from April to June) when the Chinese government orders 
a yearly fishing ban (in an effort to rehabilitate marine resources) that 
Vietnamese boats will fish in the joint area. These two months are 
usually the most profitable of the year for the fishermen of Hải Thành. 
While local men have been moving to the sea for generations, local 
women have been migrating to East Asia for marriages in the last 
decade. I refer to this group of women in my research as transnational 
women. In Vietnam, marriages between young rural Vietnamese 
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women and Taiwanese and South Korean men are quite common. 
Socioeconomic changes in Taiwan and South Korea — such as 
changing gender expectations, outmigration of rural women, and 
the preferences for sons that result in more males than females — 
have  made it difficult for rural Korean and Taiwanese men to find 
spouses and caused them to look to Southeast Asia and China for 
prospective spouses. Statistics show that Vietnamese women are 
the second-largest group of transnationals, after Chinese women, to 
marry Taiwanese and South Korean men. From 1995 to 2010, around 
300,000 Vietnamese women married East Asian men (Bélanger et al. 
2010). Hải Thành is the rural commune that has the highest number 
of transnational women nationwide, estimated to be around 2,500 
(Duong 2013). In a community of only 12,000 people, 2,500 women 
is a significantly high proportion. Transnational marriages between 
local women and East Asian men started in Hải Thành in the early 
2000s with only 12 marriages. Since 2005, the number of transnational 
marriages has escalated annually, peaking in 2008, when 600 local 
women migrated to Taiwan and South Korea, according to Ms Ngọt, 
the chairwoman of the local Women’s Union. The statistics from the 
Hải Thành Youth Union in 2013 show that the number of Hải Thành 
single women over the (legally marriageable) age of 18 who remain in 
the community is fewer than 20 (Duong 2013). In fact, the number 
of transnational marriages is so large that, since September 2012, 
the city of Hải Phòng has banned transnational marriages in several 
communes, including Hải Thành, after facing increasing complaints 
that local men could not find prospective wives. This ban, however, 
has not succeeded in limiting transnational marriages in Hải Thành 
as Hải Thành people just pay to have their residential status (hộ khẩu) 
transferred to different provinces on paper without actually moving. 
After the marriages are finalised and migration completed, they 
transfer their residence back again. 
The popularity and feasibility of transnational marriages in Vietnam 
relies in no small part on the family networks and the private 
matchmaking agencies that facilitate transnational encounters and 
subsequent marriages. Vietnamese women who have successfully 
migrated through marriage can act as a go-between to find a husband 
for their sister or cousin. As such, transnational marriages through 
family networks can offer greater security and trustworthiness than 
marriages arranged through a matchmaker agency. The matchmaking 
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agencies, however, are able to bring many Korean and Taiwanese 
men to Vietnam, allowing more choice to women and lessening the 
waiting time for suitable potential matches. They are, consequently, 
more popular than family networks in orchestrating transnational 
marriages. Often, the men have to bear most of the cost for transnational 
marriages. As Wang and Chang (2002) explained, for example, when 
a Taiwanese man wants to seek a Vietnamese wife, he must pay a fee 
of between $7,000–10,000 USD. He then visits Vietnam where he is 
shown and introduced to a number of potential women at local hotels. 
All potential brides are brought together in a room and he moves from 
one woman to another, asking through a translator a few questions 
to whomever he finds attractive. He then selects a bride (this process 
usually takes less than an hour), a wedding is arranged soon after, and 
when the paperwork is done the bride migrates to Taiwan. To ensure 
a smooth process, the matchmaking industry includes sub-agents 
in both Taiwan/Korea and Vietnam who handle recruitment and 
paperwork. Information gained through my fieldwork indicates that 
transnational marriages between Vietnamese women and East Asian 
men cost around $10,000 USD. 
The popularity of transnational marriages in Hải Thành has also 
dramatically changed the nature of the marital transaction. Since the 
majority of transnational marriages happen in southern Vietnam, until 
the mid-2000s few Taiwanese/South Korean men looked for wives in 
the North, where Hải Thành is located. As the supply of willing wives-
to-be surpassed the demand, Hải Thành families paid large sums of 
money ($1,000–3,000 USD) to matchmaker agencies to make sure that 
their daughters were introduced to Taiwanese/South Korean men and 
that the required paperwork was completed. It is a common saying in 
Hải Thành that local women bought their husbands. But the situation 
has now changed: since 2007, the number of transnational marriages 
in the South is declining, while it is gaining momentum in the North, 
especially in the city of Hải Phòng (Trung Kien 2013). The  supply 
of Taiwanese/South Korean men has exceeded local demand and 
local women no longer have to pay money to matchmakers and have 
significantly more choice in deciding which men they want to marry. 
This situation applies to transnational marriages arranged by both 
agencies and family members.
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Since Hải Thành women opt to marry foreigners, Hải Thành men 
have no choice but to marry women from other places, usually remote 
places far from the community. Some local men who do not want to 
be fishermen have gone to big cities (such as Hồ Chí Minh city, Ðồng 
Nai, or Hải Phòng city) to work in factories and have met their wives 
there. The division between the rural and the urban in Vietnam is 
clearly manifest in the fact that almost all of these women who marry 
Hải Thành men in big cities are themselves from rural places, having 
migrated to the cities for work. Once Hải Thành men get married and 
have children, most of them decide to return to Hải Thành, because 
the fishing industry there pays more, and because they have an 
extended family to care for and who will also help look after their own 
children. For the majority of Hải Thành men who are fishermen, their 
profession cripples their ability to find potential spouses. The  long 
monthly trips away from home hinder their capability to court non-
local women and maintain relationships. Many of them also have to 
resort to matchmakers. Ironically, their translocal marriages become 
very similar to the transnational marriages that they often criticise: 
there is often a matchmaker (an acquaintance of both sides), the bride 
and the groom meet briefly, and if they like each other a wedding will 
be held soon after. These women are often from rural areas poorer 
than Hải Thành and some are ethnic minorities (Thái, Nùng, Tày, and 
Hmong). The community at large and the women themselves consider 
translocal marriages as ‘marrying up’ for the women. Hải Thành, while 
still a rural place, is significantly wealthier than other rural localities 
thanks to foreign remittances and the profitable fishing industry. 
One can argue that, like transnational marriage, money also plays a 
role in translocal marriage. Additionally, once they get married, both 
the local and foreign husbands want their wives to stay home out of 
fear that they may become runaway wives.3
3  I personally only knew of two cases of runaway transnational and translocal women, but 
heard people say they knew of several women abandoning their husbands. When probed more 
closely, many of these stories were also second-hand. I suspect that the ‘runaway bride’ exists 
more as a cautionary tale than a common reality. 
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Women as Fish: Marriages in and out 
of Hải Thành 
While Hải Thành is a rural place, its highly mobile population has 
impressively changed the face of this once poor community. Local 
people always proudly say that their lives are equal to those in the 
cities. They constantly reminded me of that fact by pointing out that 
their incomes rival those of urbanites and by showing that they have 
nhà tầng (houses of multiple floors), xe xịn (expensive scooters), quán 
đêm (a night life) and so on. Hải Thành has received support from 
the city of Hải Phòng to widen its local port, to build new roads 
connecting it directly to the centre of the city, and to turn half of its 
farming land into housing projects by 2025. But the most noticeable 
change created by the sudden wealth in Hải Thành is the lifestyle of 
young local people. Hải Thành people are famous for frequenting bars 
and restaurants, gambling, using drugs, dressing inappropriately and 
having carefree sexual relationships before marriage. The urbanites, 
of course, look down on Hải Thành people, taking these behaviours 
as proof that these rural yet financially able people lack cultural 
capital, are uncouth and insatiable. Urbanites in Hải Phòng often use 
the expression ‘ăn chơi như người Thuỷ Nguyên’ (dress and party like 
the Thuỷ Nguyên people) to mock the uncultured status of the rural 
people of this district in general, and of Hải Thành in particular. 
The changes in the lifestyles of the young people are often used to 
explain the pattern of out- and in-migration in Hải Thành. Young Hải 
Thành women choose to marry Taiwanese and Korean men because 
they do not want to marry badly spoiled local men who supposedly 
waste money on drugs, alcohol, and gambling. Local men want to 
marry women from other rural localities because these women are not 
spoiled like Hải Thành women, who have a reputation for being lazy, 
extravagant, and promiscuous. Thus, a double rural-to-rural migration 
pattern is created due to marriages: translocal women move from 
rural places in Vietnam to Hải Thành, and transnational women move 
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from Hải Thành to rural places in Korea and Taiwan.4 The internal 
rural-to-rural migration occurs to compensate for the transnational 
rural-to-rural migration. 
While marriage is the driving force of the double rural-to-rural 
migration, to local people, especially fishermen, transnational and 
translocal women are viewed very differently. They are both described 
as fish, but while one can be caught, the other is elusive. The local 
way of fishing is to burn light bulbs at maximum capacity to attract 
squid and fish. After a while, the fish and squid become blinded by 
the lights, and that is when the fishermen pull the net up to catch 
them. Many fishermen told me that they use the same method to court 
translocal women: the fishermen show off their wealth and generosity 
while meeting the women, waiting for the ‘blinded’ moment to woo 
them into marriage. Of course, sometimes that tactic scares off women, 
but the majority of women in my research indicated that the financial 
difference between Hải Thành and their own community acts as an 
important factor in their marriage and migration. 
Transnational women, on the other hand, are the good fish that get 
away. Similar to the way that Hải Thành fishermen complain that they 
cannot compete with Chinese fishermen over fishing, they also cannot 
compete with Korean and Taiwan men over local women. Moreover, 
the women, like the fish, have the ability to cross national borders 
while the (fisher)men are stuck within the border. The fish that gets 
away, as always, is seen as better. The fish that the Chinese fishermen 
catch are believed to be bigger, and the transnational women that the 
Korean and Taiwanese men marry are said to be better than translocal 
women. 
The fish metaphor is very apt in showing that although very similar, 
translocal women are often judged to be inferior to transnational 
women. In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss how this comparison 
illustrates the intimate relationship of social class, migration and 
displacement.
4  Some transnational women reside in urban areas abroad and are considered luckier than 
those in rural areas. Urban residency is an increasingly important criterion for Hải Thành women 
when choosing their potential husbands.
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The Rural as Destination: The Politics 
of Rural Migration
Mobility scholars have recently noted the conceptual and cultural shift 
in the refashioning of identity in which movement becomes the basis 
of new identity formation (Urry 2000). There is an understanding that 
‘not only one can be at home in movement, but that movement can 
be one’s very own home’ (Rapport and Dawson 1998:27). As such, 
Urry (2000) spoke of a mobile identity, Beck (2006) of a cosmopolitan 
identity, and Clifford (1997) of an uprooted identity. Moving away 
from the literature on migration and diaspora that views movement as 
a form of dislocation and displacement from home, Chu (2010) argues 
that to move is to belong in a desirable world where mobility is often 
considered a force of social reproduction. 
However, not all movement is the same, and where one moves matters. 
Some directions of migration — such as rural to urban, and domestic 
to international — are deemed attractive and beneficial, especially in 
postcolonial countries, for they are often associated with increases in 
economic and social status and cultural-cosmopolitan values (Salazar 
and Smart 2012).5 The consequences of these biases are twofold: rural-
to-rural migration is often unnoticed, resulting in diverse ruralities 
becoming homogenous, and people who move from one rural locality 
to another, especially internally, are often excluded from the social 
and mobility capital associated with more desirable rural-to-urban or 
international migration. 
Rural-to-rural migration is often ignored in mobility studies. Scholars 
tend to focus on rural-to-urban migration, both internally and 
internationally. Vertovec (2011) claims that the city is the foremost 
setting for the anthropology of migration because of its everyday 
multiculturalism and its large scale (see also Caglar 2010; Levitt and 
Jaworsky 2007; Brettell 2003; Bommes and Radtke 1996). As such, 
most recent research on migration and movement is based in big cities 
such as New York, Miami, Barcelona, Frankfurt, Manchester, London, 
and Beijing (Glick-Schiller and Caglar 2011; Foner 2010; Però 2007; 
5  There is not always a preference for international migration over internal migration. 
Kalir’s research shows that for small business entrepreneurs in booming China, moving abroad 
as construction workers actually means ‘moving down’ with respect to one’s social mobility 
(Kalir 2013). 
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Stepick et al. 2003; Zhang 2002). This lack of attention to the rural 
as a migration destination fails to account for the significance of 
rural localities as accessible, desirable and transformative migration 
destinations for many rural people.6 It also creates the biased 
assumption that only cities, and not rural places, are diverse, resulting 
in an unbalanced interpretation of migration. 
It is the diversity of ruralities as well as the hierarchies among 
them that  open up economic opportunities and contribute to the 
transnational and translocal marriages in Hải Thành. Most of the 
fishermen’s wives are from relatively poor rural areas, ranging from 
the northern mountainous provinces (Bắc Giang, Bắc Kạn, Cao 
Bằng, Hà Giang, Lạng Sơn) to the provinces of the mid-north coast 
(Thanh  Hoá, Nghệ An) and Central Highlands (Buôn Mê Thuột). 
This is how a woman in Hải Thành described the home place of her 
daughter-in-law in Thanh Hoá when she visited it:
The road was small and very dark; there were not many lights like 
we have here. The houses were sparse and surrounded by forest. 
I jokingly told the in-law family that if they fought and the wife left, 
the husband would not be able to find her because she could easily 
hide anywhere. Their house was as big as the house I built for my 
chickens. It still did not have the concrete exterior layer and you 
could see the bricks in the wall. And there was no bathroom. Oh, if 
they had a bathroom like ours, it would have cost them a couple of 
hundred million. 
The fact that their hometowns are poorer than Hải Thành is openly 
admitted by the translocal women themselves. They remark on the lack 
of jobs for young people and on the insufficient income from farming 
that creates hardship and distress for rural people. One  translocal 
woman from Ninh Bình acknowledged: 
My hometown is very poor and the majority of people are farmers. 
Even though we toil away in the fields, we barely make anything. It is 
a little better now, but not much. When I was young, we were so poor 
that my two older siblings did not go to school but stayed home to 
help my parents. The whole family depended on a small plot of rice. 
6  For studies of rural-to-rural migration in Vietnam, see Carruthers and Dang (2012), Winkels 
(2012), Taylor (2007) and Hardy (2003).
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We also raised goats on the mountain, about 10. We only sold one or 
two of them when we were in dire need, not daring to sell more in case 
we needed money later. 
The poverty of rural Vietnam and the insufficiency of farming have 
pushed most rural youths looking for jobs to the cities. Hải Thành, 
however, is different. Most translocal women recognise that, compared 
to their hometowns, it is easier to make a living in Hải Thành. Although 
the amount of land for farming in Hải Thành is so small that most 
families do not sell their rice or vegetables; the women have access to 
other job options. Near the commune, within the rural district of Thuỷ 
Nguyên, are three textile and shoe factories where women can find 
work. Within the commune, jobs such as mending and fixing fishing 
nets and traps become available whenever the fishermen are home. 
Women can also go to Cát Bà Island to raise farmed fish and clams, or 
trade and sell seafood. However, these kinds of jobs provided by the 
fishing industry are often limited to local people who grew up in Hải 
Thành and know the ins and outs of fishing. Some translocal women 
have set up street-side shops to sell food and drink because Hải Thành 
people, unlike many other rural folk, have money to spend. Little 
profit is generated by these ventures, and most translocal women, even 
if they work, are still dependent on the income of their husband and 
parents-in-law. What differentiates women in Hải Thành from those in 
other rural areas of Vietnam is that many women in Hải Thành do not 
need to work to sustain their families.
Not only are there differences between ruralities in Vietnam, but also 
between those in Vietnam and South Korea. Although Hải Thành is 
considered better than many other rural places in Vietnam, it trails 
behind in comparison to rural areas in Korea. Rural Korea is described 
in local discourses as cleaner, more beautiful, more sufficient, and 
more modern. One Hải Thành woman, after visiting her daughter in 
Changwon, Korea, said: 
They have a huge amount of land but they are able to work on all of it 
because they have machines. That is why they can live comfortably as 
farmers. Unlike us here, we always struggle with not making enough. 
There are plenty of jobs even for older people like me. And everything 
is so clean, no dust. Even in the summer, the sun is not unbearable and 
in the winter, you work inside the greenhouses; you don’t freeze like 
you do in Vietnam. You know, my complexion was so much lighter 
after a year there and there was no dirt stuck in my fingernails even 
after work. It is just so much better. 
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These economic differences, among other factors, motivate translocal 
and transnational marriages and migration, and make many women 
willing to marry outside of and far from their hometowns. These 
differences draw people to Hải Thành and rural Korea, turning 
them into rural places of great diversity. The literature on migration 
often fails to account for the differences among ruralities as they are 
conflated into ‘the rural’, and in so doing, little attention is paid to 
the rural-to-rural migration that is motivated by economic mobility. 
In my interviews and conversations with local women (before they 
marry transnationally) and translocal women, they express the hope 
that marriage will end their struggle to make ends meet and will help 
them achieve better lives for their children. Unfortunately, although 
economics are no longer much of a concern for both groups, translocal 
women do not necessarily reap the sorts of benefits of social mobility 
accorded to transnational women.
Connection, Hierarchy and the Politics 
of Race, Class and Gender in Migration
King and Skeldon (2010) have shown that a division remains in 
migration studies between internal and international migration, which 
form two almost entirely separate literatures with different conceptual, 
theoretical, and methodological standpoints that rarely talk to each 
other (see also Kalir 2013). Since the emergence of the ‘migration-
development nexus’ in the 1990s, both scholars and policymakers 
have tended to focus almost exclusively on the relationship between 
development and international migration, overlooking the fact that, 
in most developing countries, internal migration is equally important 
(King and Skeldon 2010). This overemphasis on international over 
internal migration also stems from the intellectual bias that views 
‘nation’ as the appropriate and significant unit of analysis (Wilding 
2007; Hage 2005). The problem with the separation of internal and 
international migration is that it ignores many similarities in the 
migration processes between the two and provides only partial insights 
into the complex livelihoods of migrants and their communities 
(Glick-Schiller and Salazar 2013; Cohen 2011; King and Skeldon 2010). 
121
3 . WOMEN AS FISH
In Hải Thành, both internal and international migration are crucial 
to sustaining the community in terms of economy, lifestyle, and 
population. Their interconnection is clearly seen in the relationship 
between translocal women and transnational women in Hải Thành: the 
in-migration of translocal women compensates for the out-migration 
of transnational women. More importantly, the identity and status of 
one group is defined against those of the other group. 
While transnational women and translocal women are similar in many 
aspects (they both, supposedly, marry up and both migrate from 
one rural place to another rural place), most people in Hải Thành, 
including the women themselves, insist that there are no similarities 
between the two groups. The differences cited are numerous. First and 
foremost is the amount of money that transnational and translocal 
women respectively remit to their parents. The remittances from 
transnational women can reach up to $4,000 USD per year and can 
enable their parents to build new two-storey houses within three to 
five years, a major source of pride and social status in Hải Thành. After 
the houses are built, the remittances from transnational women are 
used to cover the living expenses of the parents and are put in the bank 
for investment. As a result, many parents of transnational women stop 
working and stay at home. They become a group of ‘walking people’: 
early morning or late afternoon, they (especially women) take a walk 
around the neighbourhood for daily physical exercise. Some even 
show off their comfortable lives by wearing ‘modern’ clothes and gold 
jewellery on their rounds. Local people told me that only ‘walking 
people’ have time to walk because they have transnational daughters; 
others are busy working. Wealth, in this community, is expressed 
through the body and having leisure time. More interestingly, even 
though both the fishermen and the walking people move in a circular 
manner (the former between home and Bạch Long Vĩ Island, the latter 
around the neighbourhood), fishermen have no choice but to move 
because their living depends on fishing. Urry wrote that ‘unforced 
“movement” is power … for individuals and groups a major source 
of advantage’ (Urry 2007:51, emphasis added). Walking parents, by 
choosing to walk around the neighbourhood, show off their wealth 
and social status thanks to their daughters living abroad. Translocal 
women, on the other hand, mostly only give money to their parents at 
New Year, and the sum is small in comparison, ranging from $50–100 
USD. That sum is not sufficient to help their parents build houses or 
quit working to take a walk every day. 
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Translocal women are also considered to be not as talented as 
transnational or local women. One Hải Thành resident summarised 
the commonly heard arguments:
If they [translocal women] were talented [giỏi giang], they would not 
be staying at home all the time. Moreover, if they were so talented, 
why would they have to marry so far away from home? They would 
have been taken by local men already. 
Both of these lines of reasoning are problematic, because they fail to 
acknowledge in-marrying women’s understandable lack of familiarity 
with the fishing industry, as well as how common translocal marriages 
have become throughout rural Vietnam. As agriculture has become 
a sure way to poverty (Taylor 2004), many young Vietnamese have 
migrated from rural to urban areas looking for jobs. This is where 
they meet their future spouses who, most likely, are from different 
hometowns. Therefore, the phenomenon of translocal marriages in 
Hải Thành is not uncommon, although I believe it is exacerbated 
by this locality’s atypically high number of transnational marriages. 
As  opposed to the non-talented translocal women, transnational 
(and  local) women are considered more accomplished, according to 
Hải Thành residents, because they can go anywhere (to the islands or 
foreign countries) and still manage to make a good living, sending money 
home for their parents and the community at large.7 The difference in 
economic capacity translates into other status differences between the 
two groups. One of the translocal women from Nghệ An, Hoa, who 
married a local fisherman seven years ago, explained to me:
Woman: They have money so they are, of course, different from me. 
They are foreigners now and that is so different from us. They have 
money to show off; I don’t have money so how can I compare with 
them, like how dare I walk side by side with them. There are times 
when I talk to them and they don’t even bother to answer. They only 
talk to people with money. Even when they talk to me, it is just some 
superficial and quick stuff. They go abroad so they are high and rich 
[giàu sang] while I am low and poor [thấp hèn]. 
LKN: How do they show their differences?
7  See Thai (2014) for a study on why low-wage Vietnamese immigrants send home a large 
portion of their incomes and spend extravagantly on relatives during return trips.
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Woman: By how they walk. The way they walk is so different. I don’t 
have money so I walk like a normal person. They have money so 
they sashay like a supermodel. And they talk with airs and graces, 
lengthening the tone. Instead of saying ‘I do this’, they will say 
‘Iiiiiiiii do thiiiiiiiiiis’. You know, instead of just saying it right out, 
they have to say it like it is so special. Then they will add foreign 
words to their conversations and talk with a foreign accent, like a 
Westerner speaking Vietnamese. How strange, you know, because 
they are Vietnamese. Even their gestures are for putting on airs. For 
example, if they need to get something from their pocket, their thumb 
and index fingers will touch each other while the other three fingers 
are extended up. Of course, not all of them are like that. 
LKN: Are there any other ways you can tell that they are transnationals?
Woman: The most obvious signs are their clothes and their 
complexions. Their complexions are beautiful, lighter and pinkish 
because they do not have to work over there. And because they have 
gone abroad, they know how to dress really nicely. Their clothes look 
very different from the clothes you can buy here. We, on the other 
hand, just dress simply. 
This dialogue shows how transnational women are perceived as 
having a high social status, and consolidate their status by acting like 
they are more refined and imbuing themselves with the qualities of 
foreigners. The translocal woman’s choice of words suggests that even 
though transnational women are evaluated as fake and pretentious, 
owing to how they walk and talk, they are still envied because they 
embody certain qualities associated with life abroad (cuộc sống Việt 
Kiều) that are out of reach for translocal women: fashionable clothes, 
fairer complexion, and exemption from the dirty, hard agricultural 
work that makes women less attractive. 
The attractiveness of the foreign in a postcolonial society such as 
Vietnam is often shaped not only by money but also by arrangements 
of power such as colonialism, capitalism, and modernity. As Gupta 
(1998) and Chakrabarty (2000) argue, the former colonial power and 
capitalism become the standard against which those living in the former 
colony are measured, and always fail. My conversations with Hải Thành 
people reveal that the West stands for everything that is desirable 
and in opposition to what dissatisfies them in Vietnam: capitalist 
(vs  communist economy), industrial (vs agricultural), cosmopolitan 
(vs rural), democratic (vs totalitarian), offering opportunities to 
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make money and travel (vs the lack thereof), and clean (vs polluted). 
Even though South Korea and Taiwan do not belong to the West, they 
are accorded all of the Western characteristics listed above. Korean 
and Taiwanese people are not white, but their skin colour is still much 
lighter than that of a Vietnamese person. South Korea and Taiwan, 
the so-called Asian dragons, have therefore become the Asian role 
models for the Vietnamese in their quest to catch up with the West. 
It  is understandable then that the Vietnamese transnational women 
who have changed themselves into Koreans and Taiwanese are viewed 
as more modern, classy and wealthy than the simple rural Vietnamese 
in Hải Thành. The differences are shown in not only how translocal 
women view transnational women but also the other way around. 
A transnational woman remarked of her sister-in-law:
I cannot clearly say why but the way she dresses just makes her look 
dirty [bẩn]. It’s not that the clothes are unclean but she looks kind 
of dirty. She also does not have her nails done so her hands do not 
look nice. And she walks loudly; I can recognise her by the noise she 
makes. When we eat, I have the feeling that she just eats a lot. I don’t 
know. I just do not talk to her much. 
The body and lifestyle are once again used to delineate hierarchical 
status and class difference between translocal and transnational 
women. Besides economic differences, I believe that translocal women 
do not earn much cultural capital after moving because of the politics 
of migration, which favour the urban and the cosmopolitan. In the 
case of translocal women in Hải Thành, their marriage migration to 
a rural, internal place does not relieve them of the status of ‘rural 
women’. Despite having mobile and uprooted identities, they are still 
regarded in Hải Thành as rural and backward, and are devalued by 
their unpleasant behaviours as well as their unappealing, unhygienic 
bodies. We see repeatedly the importance of dressing, maintaining 
beautiful hands, and hygiene (dirty vs clean, the white/black binary 
transformed into fairer/darker skin) as markers of social class among 
women. In other words, the body is a site where social differences are 
articulated. 
As Jones (2001) notes, clothes are important elements of self-
presentation  and significant markers of class boundaries. In  Hải 
Thành, clothes indicate conformity with different ideals of 
femininity. To dress ‘like Koreans’ or dressing ‘simply’ are modes of 
self-presentation that visibly separate transnational and translocal 
125
3 . WOMEN AS FISH
women, and signal different class affiliations (cosmopolitan vs rural). 
Similarly, Jiang (2014) argues that hand fetish and hygiene is the 
new class indicator, distinguishing the higher class from the ‘dirty’ 
working class. In  Industrial times, the hands were associated with 
manual labour, a lower form of labour compared to the more advanced 
mechanical labour. As such, a measure of modernity is the extent to 
which the hands are freed from labour. Beautiful hands have, arguably, 
become the representation of civilisation and modernity (Jiang 2014). 
This global obsession with manicure is more than simply a question 
of women’s unattainable beauty standards and oppression, but is also 
a tool for women to negotiate their social statuses (Kang 2010). In her 
study in New York, Kang concludes that the reasons women have 
their nails done vary from having higher self-esteem, attractiveness to 
partners, stress relief, bonding with other women, career advancement, 
and increased mobility (Kang 2010). Depending on their social 
positions, defined by race, sexuality and social class, the meanings and 
rewards of manicures and beauty differ among women. For example, 
airbrushed nails, while considered to be beautiful by many African 
American women, stigmatise them as belonging to a lower social class. 
At the same time, by choosing a more ‘boring’ middle-class nail style 
(French manicures and pastel colours), a working-class woman can 
elevate her status to that of a professional. As Kang convincingly 
shows, nails ‘grow out of … bodies but also out of social relations and 
circumstances in which these bodies are embedded’ (Kang 2010:132). 
Manicure, for women in Hải Thành, is a ticket to an exclusive club 
of women who have the money and time to pay attention to beauty 
and pampering. Translocal women, who undertake agricultural and 
fisheries related work, considered both dirty and hard, and who do not 
have disposable incomes, cannot join this club. Few, if any translocal 
women in Hải Thành known to me have their nails done, yet all know 
where the nail salons are and the exact cost of each specific style. Their 
knowledge of manicures comes from listening to transnational and 
local women talking about manicures. Transnational women in Hải 
Thành, by having manicures done and criticising translocal women 
for not doing so, are essentially claiming their bodies as both special 
and normative, consequently reinforcing their class privilege. At the 
same time, translocal women’s failure to keep their hands ‘clean’ and 
nice is understood as a personal defect rather than as a re/construction 
of marginality and disadvantage. Therefore, in the same way that the 
non-white body is the marked other against which the ideal woman is 
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defined (Collins 2005; Bettie 2003), the rural woman’s body becomes a 
spectre against which a cosmopolitan, urban ideal is defined. In other 
words, transnational women’s beauty and privilege has no meaning 
without the failure of the rural translocal women to measure up 
against. The women’s hands express both a privileged distance from 
hard labour and bind the articulation of class with the articulation of 
gender. 
What is most surprising to me, however, is how the class hierarchy is 
mapped onto ethnic differences in Hải Thành. Often Hải Thành people 
told me that the in-marrying daughters-in-law of their neighbours are 
very rural (quê) because they are ‘ethnic minority people’ (‘người dân 
tộc’, commonly contracted in Hải Thành as ‘tộc’). The term ‘ethnic 
minority’ in Vietnam has such a negative meaning that it easily turns 
into racial categorisation, loaded with connotations of primitiveness 
and even savagery. Such connotations can be seen in the remarks 
made by one Hải Thành man about his daughter-in-law, who is an 
ethnic Thái woman from Thanh Hoá:
She’s very different from us here. Her true nature [bản chất] ... she 
argues all the time with her husband. If he says one sentence, she has 
to say another. If needed, she can physically fight her husband, unlike 
women here. Fight till the end! Before moving here, she lived in the 
mountains. From the road to her house on the top of the mountain, it 
takes more than an hour of walking. Their lifestyles are strange: they 
do not grow any food or raise any livestock. Instead, they just go into 
the woods and fetch whatever they can find for the day. Absolutely no 
long-term thinking. There is nothing to live on over there. It’s exactly 
like how the TV portrays the ethnic life. I don’t really understand her 
and I don’t trust what she says yet. Because of her background, it is 
very hard for me to teach her. 
The man implied that ethnic people are marginal, wild and primitive, 
both in their lifestyles and their personality. They are also dangerous 
and cannot be trusted, which makes them difficult to restrain and 
discipline. This representation is in line with the dominant discourses 
in Vietnam that fortify the binaries of majority–minority, modern–
ancient, and civilised–barbarian (Michaud 2010).
Even though there are indeed minority ethnic women marrying 
local men, the number is small, and most translocal women who 
are assumed to be of ethnic minority background actually are not. 
When I questioned Hải Thành people about why they claimed these 
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women to be ethnic minorities when they were not, they explained: 
‘We were just joking. It is because ethnic people are very honest, thus 
not very smart [ngố] even though they like money [tham tiền]. They 
also dress very rurally.’ I witnessed how often the derived contraction 
‘ethnic’ (tộc) is used in Hải Thành to talk about differences. When a 
grandmother jokingly told her five-year-old granddaughter, ‘You must 
be ethnic [tộc] because you dress so funny,’ she cried, ‘No, I am not 
ethnic. My  mum is ethnic but I am not because my Dad is not.’ 
Her  mother, a  translocal woman, is a Kinh woman, not a minority. 
In other words, the ‘bad’ and ‘backward’ qualities of translocal women 
are mapped onto ‘ethnic’ inferiority. The ethnic mapping of class 
indicates a permeating but normalised hierarchy between the Kinh 
and other minorities in Vietnam. It is so normalised that Hải Thành 
people go about branding people they deem different and inferior to 
themselves as ‘ethnic’. Here we see the categories of ethnicity and 
social class collapsed into one, which is conflated with the figure of 
the rural woman.
In Hải Thành, ideologies of race and class have combined to shape an 
ideal femininity that draws new forms of inclusion and exclusion along 
the rural/urban, local/global and majority/minority divide. Modern 
Hải Thành women fashion their identity by conforming to a Western/
white ideal of beauty (fairer skin colour, being cosmopolitan, clean 
hands, nice clothes) and create their different other in the ‘ethnic’ 
rural women (dark skin colour, being remote, ugly hands, dirty 
clothes). As such, rural women are discriminated against because they 
are perceived to embody ethnic/racial inferiorities.8
The exclusion of rural women from modern Vietnamese society at 
large can be traced in the covers of books and magazines on women, in 
particular, how women can become modern, wonderful, and seductive. 
The female models on these covers are fairly similar in terms of styles 
and beauty (white stylish clothing, careful make-up, and accessories) 
(Figure 1). Take, for example, the book titled Phụ nữ Hiện đại Thế kỷ 
XXI (Modern women of the 21st Century) published by the Lao Ðộng 
Press in 2011. The modern Vietnamese woman, shown on the cover, has 
her hair and nails done and wears jewellery and make-up. Her outfit 
8  It should be noted that the politics of race, class and gender play out quite similarly for 
Vietnamese transnational women in Taiwan and South Korea. Vietnamese transnational women are 
also rejected in East Asia because they are rural women from a less economically developed country 
(Tsai 2011; Epstein 2008; Hsia 2007, 2008; Lee 2008; Sheu 2007; Wang 2007; Lee et al. 2006).
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is a modernised version of a suit and she seems to be standing in front 
of a multistorey office building. It is noteworthy that she has a fair 
complexion and is wearing white clothing, reinforcing the Western 
beauty standards. In other words, the modern Vietnamese woman is a 
chic ‘white’ urban businesswoman rather than a plain, ‘dirty’ farmer. 
Figure 1: The cover of Modern Women of the 21st Century.
Photograph by the author . 
These perceived racial differences, along with social and economic 
differences, consolidate the hierarchy between transnational women 
and translocal women. This hierarchy reflects important differences 
between international and internal migration, demonstrating that not 
all migrations are the same and that the destinations of migration (rural 
or urban, local or global) are significant in the socioeconomic values and 
evaluation of migration. While mobility in the global world is usually 
129
3 . WOMEN AS FISH
accorded positive value, the marginal status of translocal women in 
Hải Thành challenges the simplistic and assumed relationship between 
migration and social, financial and cosmopolitan climbing. 
Fish out of Water: Migration, Immobility 
and Displacement
Apart from generating social mobility, physical mobility has also been 
celebrated for its association with freedom, liberation, and resistance. 
The romanticisation of mobility in the image of the nomad is evident 
through the works of Mackinders, Deleuze and Guattari, and Bachelard, 
all of which connect mobility with power; specifically, they perceive in 
the nomad the ability to evade power and link mobility with freedom 
and liberty (Adey 2009). However, the case of translocal women shows 
that they are not only considered inferior but are also controlled and 
marginalised in Hải Thành. The marginalisation of translocal women 
in Hải Thành is revealed, first, in their physical immobility and 
confinement in the home. Unlike those who move to the cities for jobs, 
translocal women who have migrated to Hải Thành for marriages often 
find themselves unemployed. The lack of paid work for rural women 
in Vietnam in general, and the fact that most translocal women are 
under-educated, make many of them stay-at-home housewives. They 
might do some seasonal farming if their families do not rent out their 
plots or hire people to do the work. However, the amount of land 
for cultivation available to each household in Hải Thành is so limited 
that agricultural work does not take much time. Moreover, translocal 
women often reside with their parents-in-law and are financially 
dependent because the parents-in-law control the family budget. 
Because of their ambiguous position as outsiders who are also now 
insiders, they are not trusted by local people.9 Translocal women rarely 
visit their neighbours, as local people and their parents-in-law would 
view these visits as occasions for gossip. As I was told by local people: 
9  For studies on the lack of trust and discrimination against migrants from other provinces 
and ethnicities in Vietnam, see Winkels (2012), McElwee (2008), and Hardy (2003).
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What else besides gossip will they talk about? They don’t have jobs. 
They stay at home. They don’t understand the politics and economics 
of the country or this community. What do they have to talk about 
besides gossiping?
In Vietnam, gossiping generally means speaking ill of your family and 
neighbours. In a small rural place such as Hải Thành, where everyone 
knows and is related to each other, the subject of gossip will spread 
like wildfire. Gossip is an unspoken taboo in Vietnamese face-saving 
culture (Hữu Ngọc 2004). Gossip is gendered, in the sense that men 
are said to talk about national and big ideas (đàn ông bàn việc nước và 
việc lớn) while women are considered to be only concerned with petty 
talk (phụ nữ hay buôn dưa lê).10 The fear of gossip and its association 
with women explains why translocal women, when asked why they 
did not visit their neighbours, said they did not feel welcome. The 
fishermen, on the other hand, never said to me that they were not 
received warmly when visiting their neighbours or friends. It is as 
though men can talk outside of the confines of the home but translocal 
women cannot. 
I witnessed this lack of trust in translocal women and the worry 
about gossip during my fieldwork. Most translocal women whispered 
when talking to me, for fear of their parents-in-law overhearing 
our conversations. Sometimes their parents-in-law would take over 
and answer my questions on their behalf. Even worse, many of my 
interviews and connections with translocal women were cut off 
after I happened to meet their parents-in-law in their houses. Then 
when I visited again, the parents-in-law would say to me that their 
daughter-in-law had gone elsewhere, or the translocal woman would 
text me and tell me not to contact her again. In some instances in 
which a woman had disclosed to me the details of her situation, I could 
speculate that, for example, the parents-in-law did not want me to 
know that they had lied to their daughter-in-law about having more 
money than they actually did, or that their son had been divorced 
by his first wife because he was a drunkard. In other cases, I had no 
grounds for speculation, as I was yet to know much about the woman’s 
story. Given that I never faced a similar problem talking to other 
groups in Hải Thành, this abrupt disengagement reveals quite clearly 
the translocal women’s status as outsiders who need to be controlled. 
10  This belief is strongly linked to Confucian ideology that educated men are leaders both 
in terms of social morality and the formation of society (Luong 2010).
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Besides the dreaded gossip, parents-in-law and husbands also like to 
keep translocal women inside the home for fear of infidelity due to 
the absence of their husbands for 20 or more days every month. To 
make matters worse, local women look down on translocal women and 
do not socialise with them. The reasons are various: we don’t know 
them, they dress in an ugly and dirty manner, they do not know how 
to have fun, they are not generous. As a result, translocal women end 
up being socially and physically isolated, and their social network 
consists of only their in-laws and their cousins if they have married 
local men. Local people often say that they do not see translocal 
women much and do not really know who they are. The irony is that 
while the local people, especially the parents-in-law, often boast about 
the ‘good’ lives of translocal women (they really do not have to work 
much besides a bit of farming; they only stay home and look after 
their children; compared to women in other rural places, their lives are 
10 times better), translocal women often feel constrained and inferior. 
One of the translocal women told me how much she enjoys working 
in the textile sweatshop. Even though she is poorly paid and works 
very long hours, the workplace provides her with a much-needed 
social network:
I have friends there, you know. People who I can talk to during lunch, 
people who I can hang out with. We eat together and we take a nap 
together. Sure, the hours are long and I have to stand on my feet all 
day — they are sore often. Sometimes, especially in the winter, I come 
home so late that the whole house has gone to sleep. I still have to make 
dinner for myself and eat by myself; I feel quite lonely.11 But staying 
home is even lonelier. 
The marginalisation of translocal women in Hải Thành is further 
demonstrated by their invisibility in local discourses. There is 
no term that describes translocal women as a group in Hải Thành. 
Hải  Thành people use Kiều Ðài Loan, Hàn Quốc (Taiwanese and 
Korean transnationals) to refer to transnational women, and gái Hải 
(Hải women), a shortened form of gái Hải Thành (Hải Thành women), to 
refer to local women. But translocal women are not assumed to belong 
to either of these groups. If they ever get talked about, it is usually as 
specific wives of specified fishermen, never as a group. Even though 
translocal women often distinguish themselves from local women, 
11  Her husband is a fisherman, so he is not home most of the time.
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Hải Thành people do not compare local women to translocal women, 
but to women in other places. In other words, translocal women 
rarely appear in local discourse. This linguistic absence indicates that 
translocal women have no identity outside of being defined in relation 
to men (being local men’s wives). It seems that for translocal women 
there is no public acknowledgement of their life histories, struggles 
or identity outside of marriage. They are defined by heterosexual and 
patriarchal language that designates them as subject to male authority. 
The denial of a place for translocal women in local discourse has other 
political implications. As Foucault noted, discourses are ‘practices 
that systematically form the objects of which they speak ... Discourses 
are not about objects; they do not identify objects, they constitute 
them and in the practice of doing so conceal their own intervention’ 
(Foucault 1972:49). Discourse, in creating the subject through marking 
the boundaries of exclusion, leaves behind the silenced group who, 
because of linguistic absence, have no way of articulating their 
subjecthood. Translocal women, in a Lacanian understanding, are a 
signified (a reality) without a signifier (a place in language) and are 
therefore ‘real’ but outside of the discursive reality. 
Being made invisible, indeed, is one painful form of oppression, 
as Butler illustrated: 
Indeed, one can be interpellated, put in place, given a place through 
silence, through not being addressed, and this becomes painfully clear 
when we find ourselves preferring the occasion of being derogated to 
the one of not being addressed at all. (Butler 1997:27)
The invisibility of translocal women implies being ignored, devalued, 
rejected and not being heard. It also denies the independence and 
desirability of their identity, since they are neither attractive nor 
significant enough to even be identified. The displacement of translocal 
women is twofold: they are denied a linguistic place in the community 
of speakers, as well as a physical place in public spaces where they can 
participate in community life. They are, in short, refused a place of being 
and of having possibilities for human relationships. Their displacement 
is the problem of placelessness. 
In many ways, translocal women are the fish that get caught from 
somewhere else and are out of water once in Hải Thành. The fact that 
they are young and relatively newly wedded matters much in how 
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well they are integrated in the community. They have not been able to 
gain the trust and respect from their in-law families, neighbours, and 
people in the commune. They also have not made friends and social 
connections outside of their immediate families. Given how isolated 
translocal women are, I suspect that it will take them a very long time 
to feel accepted and comfortable in Hải Thành. 
The question of belonging, writes Vijayasree, ‘acquires an additional 
edge of urgency and poignancy in the case of female migrants, because, 
for them, the issue of self-definition can hardly be isolated from larger 
questions of gender’ (Vijayasree 2000). Vijayasree talks about Indian 
writers in the West, but her comment also illuminates the predicament 
of translocal women in Hải Thành. Their migration is a re-entry into 
the northern Vietnamese patriarchal structure that excludes women 
as outsiders (ngoại tộc), by tracing descent through men, patrilocal 
residence, and an emphasis on male authority (Luong 2010). Their 
migration, instead of bringing freedom and social mobility, reinforces 
their female status as being displaced, invisible, and, ironically, 
immobile. Indeed, one does not need to migrate out of the country to 
be displaced; one can be displaced by being right at home and being 
a woman. 
By focusing on the migration of translocal women and comparing 
this with the migration of transnational women, I join other mobility 
scholars in questioning the celebration of movement as a universal 
benefit (Glick-Schiller and Salazar 2013; Mai and King 2009; Partridge 
2009; Ahmed 2004; Skeggs 2004; Tsing 2002; Tesfahuney 1998; 
Massey 1993). The displacement and confinement of translocal women 
in Hải Thành reveals that mobility can produce immobility, and that 
movement and non-movement are not fixed binaries. Instead, mobility 
and immobility are relative and interrelated. I have underlined that 
not all migrations are the same, and that the question of who moves 
where and under what conditions does matter. The focus in this study 
on diverse trajectories of migration sheds light on the hierarchy of 
mobilities that exists in Vietnam, and on the differentiations in status, 
personhood, and rurality that are implicated in these migrations. 
Only by paying attention to these complex dynamics of mobility, 
personhood, and place can we understand how marriage, migration, 
and social worth intermesh — like the often tattered and sometimes 
empty nets of the fishers of Hải Thành.  
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‘Here, Everyone is Like Everyone 
Else!’: Exile and Re-emplacement 
in a Vietnamese Leprosy Village
Yen Le
One afternoon, I was sitting with Grandpa Thiện1 in front of his house. 
He looked happy that afternoon, blissfully watching a whole new 
batch of chickens born a few weeks before. The quiet yard in front 
of his house was animated by cheerful, chirpy little chickens running 
around here and there. Grandpa Thiện was proud that his stock of 
chickens had increased remarkably with each batch of newborn 
chicks, and he was hopeful that the price of chickens remained stable, 
so that when they grew up, his wife would be able to sell them at 
a good price. 
He told me about his niece, who was blind. She studied well and was 
able to become a teacher. She used to have a boyfriend who was not 
blind, but the relationship did not go anywhere because his family 
could not accept a blind daughter-in-law. The boyfriend broke up with 
her several years later to marry someone else. Then she met a blind 
man. Even though they could not see each other, they understood 
each other well. His family adored her too. They finally got married 
and lived very happily together.
1   Pseudonyms are used throughout this chapter.
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Drawing upon his niece’s story, Grandpa Thiện stated, ‘You see, 
chickens stay with chickens, ducks stay with ducks. It should be that 
way.’ He continued, ‘Like here, people with leprosy should stay with 
people with leprosy. It’s very difficult for chickens to stay with ducks.’
Grandpa Thiện is one of around 1,000 residents of Quy Hòa Leprosy 
Village in South Central Vietnam. Quy Hòa was established as a leper 
colony in 1929 by French Catholic missionaries. Located in a valley 
by the sea in the outskirts of Quy Nhơn, Bình Ðịnh Province, the 
leprosarium provided a sanctuary for people afflicted by the disease 
and a clinic for the administration of treatments. Until the introduction 
of sulphide-based drugs in the 1960s and more effective multidrug 
therapy in the early 1980s, treatment options for leprosy were limited 
(Monnais 2008). The disease progressed through the appearance of 
numb patches and skin rashes, lesions and ulceration, and disfiguration 
of the face and hands. Owing to the absence of sensation in their limbs, 
sufferers who engaged in everyday activities such as cooking, farming 
or sport were prone to injury and amputation was frequently required 
to deal with severe injuries and chronic infection. Perhaps even more 
significant side effects of the disease were the fear and stigma provoked 
by its symptoms. Many leprosy sufferers who came to leprosaria such 
as Quy Hòa for treatment settled there permanently, seeking a refuge 
from the shame and social ostracism that accompanied the disease. 
After national unification in 1975, the leprosarium was taken over 
by the state, becoming the Quy Hòa National Leprosy-Dermatology 
Hospital. As of 2013, the leprosy village, located adjacent to the 
hospital, is home to 426 leprosy-affected people and their families, 
who subsist on small-scale livelihood activities, a modest patient 
subsidy, and charity gifts.
Since the introduction of multidrug therapy in 1983, leprosy patients 
in Vietnam have been able to be medically cured after only six months 
to a year of treatment. Moreover, in tandem with improvements 
in early diagnosis, advanced cases of leprosy in Vietnam have 
consistently decreased since 1995 (Hồng Hạnh 2010).2 Provided that 
they have been treated in a timely manner, people contracting leprosy 
have been able to avoid bodily residues and thus the social stigma 
2  The new case detection rate decreased from 3.44 new cases in every 100,000 people in 1995, 
to 0.48 new cases in every 100,000 people in 2006. The leprosy prevalence rate also went down 
from 6.71 to 0.04 cases in every 10,000 people between 1995 and 2006 (Hồng Hạnh 2010).
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attached to leprosy. New leprosy patients in Vietnam are now treated 
and monitored in their residential communities and are no longer 
isolated for treatment in segregated leprosy villages (làng phong), such 
as Quy Hòa. Nevertheless, there are still around 18,000 people living 
in leprosy villages across the country, who, although deemed to have 
been cured, are seriously disabled and unable to return to their original 
communities (Hoài Hương 2010). Most of the elderly people living 
in Quy Hòa had contracted leprosy before multidrug therapy was 
widely used in Vietnam. Although they have long been free of leprosy 
infection, most of them are afflicted with visible deformities and 
disabilities caused by advanced leprosy, and consistently expressed 
their wish to remain in the village.
‘Here, everyone is like everyone else!’ (‘Ở đây ai cũng như ai!’) is the 
response I repeatedly received from villagers after asking them why 
they wished to stay in an exclusive leprosy village such as Quy Hòa. 
Members of the Indian leprosy-afflicted community of Bethany 
studied by James Staples (2007) referred to themselves as people of 
‘one disease, one caste, one religion’. Similarly, people of Quy Hòa 
leprosy village describe themselves as ‘of the same kind’ (‘cùng một 
thứ’) and define their community by ‘sameness’. Wherever I went in 
the village, people stressed their sameness — the same disease, the 
same life history, the same body, the same pain, and the same suffering. 
I came to understand ‘sameness’ as, first and foremost, the intrinsic 
factor that ties them all together.
This chapter tells leprosy-affected people’s stories about sameness. 
It  seeks to elucidate the conceptions of sameness held by residents 
of this exclusive village of leprosy sufferers, and how sameness as a 
defining characteristic of the community has reconfigured their lived 
reality of leprosy. It draws upon a year of ethnographic fieldwork 
conducted in Quy Hòa in 2011, during which I was welcomed into 
the homes and lives of numerous leprosy-affected villagers and their 
families. Over the course of my research, I collected life narratives of 
Quy Hòa residents afflicted with leprosy, while also observing and 
taking part in community events, meetings, rituals and daily activities. 
My research also took me to other communities of leprosy-affected 
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people in southern Vietnam, and to the urban and peri-urban sites 
where people with enduring physical residues of the disease live 
and work.3
Drawing upon the villagers’ conceptions of their own community, this 
chapter seeks answers to the question of why exclusive communities 
for people with leprosy still exist now that leprosy has been 
declared medically curable, and as only mildly contagious, and when 
‘community-based’ and outpatient treatment has replaced segregated 
institutional care as the preferred public health approach to treatment. 
The chapter shows that while the medical rationale for segregation no 
longer exists, the existential problems leprosy sufferers continue to 
endure provide justification for their continuing attachment to such 
communities.
The chapter argues that community is a therapeutic antidote to the 
slights and injuries visited upon those with leprosy in the wider society. 
For people shunned and feared as threatening to the normal social 
order, such a community exists as a space of protection. For people 
displaced from their families and villages by their social invalidity 
and the emotions aroused by their physical disfigurement, the village 
provided an opportunity for social re-integration. For  those gazed 
upon obsessively for their bodily difference, exclusive living continues 
to offer the powerfully redemptive experience of sameness. Such 
collective solutions have been arrived at through turbulent personal 
processes of banishment, degradation, withdrawal, re-emplacement, 
hope and reinvention. 
The chapter illustrates these points by describing elderly Quy Hòa 
residents’ experiences of intimate exile and the denial of relatedness 
with members of their own family. It describes the expulsion of 
leprosy-affected people from their communities and the social death 
meted out to so many with this disease — traumatic experiences 
that still haunt and unite those who endured them, irrespective of 
their social background. The chapter discusses how the value of 
‘sameness’ arises out of newly discovered feelings of mutual sympathy 
3  The fieldwork was conducted as part of my PhD in anthropology at The Australian National 
University. I wish to thank Philip Taylor for his guidance on my project and for his extensive 
comments on the argument of this chapter. I also am grateful to Assa Doron and Kirin Narayan 
for providing advice and encouragement in my writing, and to the anonymous readers who 
reviewed an earlier version of this chapter.
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and love for those who are similarly social outcastes. The cases also 
demonstrate the empowerment and confidence that come from living 
in a community made up of people exclusively like oneself. I argue 
that the power of sameness, of being with identical others, and of 
living in a community where all people are alike, has a reassuring and 
healing effect that helps account for residents’ attachment to life in 
this exclusive leprosy village.
Intimate Exiles
People in Quy Hòa come from all walks of life. While a large number 
of villagers are from poor rural areas, a few inmates of the leprosy 
village came from wealthy and illustrious families. One of them is an 
old man, Grandpa Tâm, the nephew of L., who stood out as the only 
Vietnamese general in the French colonial military among the many 
French generals and officials in the colony at that time. Needless to 
say, back then, this General’s family was very well-known, highly 
respected, and powerful. Very few people, however, knew about his 
nephew, a leprosy sufferer sent into Quy Hòa. 
One day, the inmates in the then Catholic-run Quy Hòa leper colony 
heard the news that the General, Grandpa Tâm’s uncle, would be 
accompanying King Bảo Ðại to visit Ghềnh Ráng, a beautiful beach 
area not far from Quy Hòa. Grandpa Tâm was coaxed by his fellow 
inmates into going there to meet his uncle. He escaped from the 
leper colony through the fence on the cemetery side, walking along 
the narrow trail around the hill that separates Quy Hòa and Ghềnh 
Ráng beach, and finally reached Ghềnh Ráng, where the King and 
the General were visiting. Grandpa Tâm bravely asked the entourage 
to let him come over and see the General, identifying himself as the 
General’s nephew. However, the General rejected him, curtly denying 
having a nephew suffering from leprosy. As soon as this disavowal was 
uttered, members of the party severely chided the ‘leper’ and rudely 
told him to take himself someplace else.
After the trip with the King to Ghềnh Ráng, the General’s rage continued 
to fester, and he vehemently reprimanded his sister, Grandpa Tâm’s 
mother. He asked his sister to tell her leprosy-affected son to stay put 
in Quy Hòa, and never again come out and tell people that he was the 
General’s nephew. He was such a powerful man in the French colony 
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at the time; if people knew that he had a ‘leper’ nephew, it would be 
a big ‘loss of face’ (mất thể diện) and bring serious shame for not only 
him but the entire family. 
The fury of the General and his family was conveyed to the leprosy-
affected nephew, Grandpa Tâm, in a letter sent into the leper colony, 
which told him to henceforth stay within Quy Hòa. If he needed 
money, his mother would send more money for him, but he could not 
go out. Back in Quy Hòa, after the venture out of the leper colony 
and the humiliation of being disowned and sent away by his powerful 
uncle, Grandpa Tâm was very sad and felt pity for himself (tủi thân). 
Seeing him coldly rejected and expelled, his fellow inmates in Quy 
Hòa realised that even though they were born into very different 
backgrounds — he was from an extremely influential and prestigious 
family while most of them were poor peasants — once they became 
‘lepers’, they all became the same. The spirit of egalitarianism 
encapsulated in the villagers’ own words, ‘Here everyone is like 
everyone else’, has acted as salient rhetoric in this community’s life 
since its inception. Regardless of how different they had been as 
individuals, as lepers they were bound to the same destiny. As Louisa 
Howe (1964) suggests, a community can be forged by symbolic 
understanding of a common destiny. In Quy Hòa, this strong sense 
of a shared fate, reflected through such stories as the one above, and 
also as regularly mentioned in villagers’ self-description as people 
with the ‘same lot’ (đồng cảnh ngộ) or ‘same fate’ (cùng chung số phận), 
contributes to robustly sustaining the community.
Many people in Quy Hòa leprosy village shared with me their belief 
that most of the time they could only feel completely comfortable and 
open around people with the same disease. Many are very reluctant 
to enter social relationships with non-leprosy patients outside their 
exclusive network of leprosy sufferers. The family of my village friend, 
Hà, whose parents both had leprosy, is no exception. She proudly told 
me that she was very popular with boys when she was young. She had 
many followers, but she liked one man from a non-patient family in 
the upper village of Quy Hòa. 
Hà was very happy when the man asked her to marry him. However, 
her leprosy-afflicted mother strongly rejected the idea and insistently 
advised her to choose the son of a leprosy-affected person, like her. 
Her mother believed that if Hà married into a non-patient family, 
147
4 . ‘HERE, EVERYONE IS LIKE EVERYONE ELSE!’
her  spouse’s family would look down upon them. Her mother 
poignantly asked her, ‘They can hold a glass of water in one hand, 
while I have to use both hands and yet barely manage to hold a glass. 
Just think, how could I ever talk on an equal level [nói chuyện ngang 
hàng] with them?’
Eventually, listening to her mother’s advice, Hà did not marry the 
man from the upper village, but married the son of a leprosy-affected 
couple in Quy Hòa leprosy village. A few years later, the brother of the 
man from the non-patient family who used to be a love interest of Hà 
also married a daughter of leprosy sufferers in the leprosy village. 
His mother tried hard to prevent him from marrying someone from 
the leprosy village, but this was in vain, as the pair were very much 
in love and were strongly determined to get married, regardless of the 
parents’ rejection of the idea. The man told his mother that he would 
die if he could not marry his intended. Finally, the upper village 
mother had to comply with the young couple’s wish and reluctantly 
approved their marriage.
Soon after their wedding, the wife (the daughter of the leprosy-
affected family) fell pregnant and gave birth to a boy. After giving 
birth to the first child, according to local custom, the daughter-in-law 
returned to her parents’ house and the new mother and her infant 
were taken care of by her leprosy-affected mother during the first 
few months. The husband’s mother was also excited about her new 
paternal grandson, the highly valued eldest son of the eldest son 
(cháu nội đích tôn). Nonetheless, what was frowned upon by people in 
the leprosy village was that whenever she came down to Quy Hòa to 
visit her new grandson, she always brought a clean bath towel from 
her house. Whenever the baby was handed to her, she put the infant 
onto the towel, and never let the baby’s back make direct contact with 
her own arms. 
People from the leprosy sufferers’ community pointed out that this 
woman felt such aversion towards her own grandson because most of 
the time he was held by his leprosy-affected maternal grandmother 
and her daughter. That was why she never let the baby make direct 
contact with her own skin. Talking scornfully about that old lady from 
upper Quy Hòa, Hà’s mother patted her daughter on the shoulder: 
‘You see, I was right to prohibit you from marrying that lady’s son. 
She was disgusted even by her very own grandson, let alone us!’
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After getting to know me well, my village friends revealed that their 
ultimate wish was to be seen as equal, or ‘on an equal level’ (ngang 
hàng) to other normal people. The utmost pain of having leprosy, as 
lived and told by villagers, is to be seen as lesser and to be denied 
full personhood. Grandpa Bảo told me with an angry tone, ‘Once 
one gets this disease, one can never be the same as other people any 
more. People cannot treat you the same way as they treat normal 
ones.’ To illustrate, he told me about Uncle Hậu, the head of the upper 
village, who is married to the daughter of a leprosy-afflicted couple 
in Quy Hòa leprosy village. Having lived in the upper village all his 
life and being married to a leprosy sufferer’s daughter, he has long 
been used to leprosy-afflicted people. He is usually ‘natural’ around 
leprosy-affected people, Grandpa Bảo commented. Whenever Grandpa 
Bảo visited his house, Hậu was friendly and welcoming. However, 
once while Grandpa Bảo was visiting, another friend of Hậu’s, a non-
patient, dropped in to visit and his host’s face suddenly changed. 
He  looked confused and somehow embarrassed. Noticing Hậu’s 
attitude, Grandpa Bảo quickly stood up from his chair, told Hậu that 
he would come again another time, and left. Grandpa Bảo resentfully 
realised that even though Hậu behaved very ‘normally’ to people with 
leprosy, he could not treat his leprosy-affected friend equally to his 
non-patient friends.
Grandpa Thiện once confessed to me that he only needs a (non-
patient) person to look straight into his eyes and say ‘hello’ for him 
to be really happy. What people suffering from leprosy need, he 
implied, is normal treatment and respect without that stigmatising 
stare or shunning. My village friends’ stories essentially demonstrate 
their profound wish to be the same, to be normal and to be equal, to 
stand ‘on an equal level’ (ngang hàng) as everyone else. Hà’s mother, 
as described above, could not approve of Hà’s marriage into a non-
patient family, no matter how hard Hà tried to persuade her, because 
she could not accept a presumably unequal relationship with her 
daughter’s prospective in-laws. The basis of this unequal relationship, 
she assumed, would be the inevitable focus on her defective and 
malfunctioning body in stark contrast to the intact bodies of the other 
family. Only when Hà married another village boy, who was also the 
son of leprosy sufferers in Quy Hòa, did Hà’s mother feel equal to her 
counterpart. Her daughter’s marriage would be more sustainable, she 
believed, if the two families were equal.
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Some village friends emphasised to me that they only feel comfortable 
and equal within their exclusive community and interacting among 
fellow leprosy sufferers. ‘Here everyone is the same’ means that no 
one is seen as lower than anyone else. In such a ‘normalising’ social 
world (Kelleher 1988), leprosy-affected people’s intrinsic desire to 
be seen equally as full, complete people can be fulfilled, spoiled 
personhood can be replenished and recovered, and dignity returned. 
Explaining the reason for villagers’ willingness to convert and commit 
to Christianity, a senior nun of the Quy Hòa Franciscan convent said 
to me, ‘These are the people who have suffered so much from society’s 
maltreatment. First and foremost, Christianity sees them fully as 
a  person, treats them with dignity [nhân phẩm] and cares for them 
while everyone else is scared of them and no one cares for them.’
Social Levelling
Quy Hòa villagers’ description of their community — ‘Here everyone is 
like everyone else!’ — encapsulates a widely shared sense of sameness. 
This sentiment has been forged not only in the context of villagers’ 
common physical suffering and their long-term relations with each 
other within the exclusive leprosy village, but even more poignantly 
in reference to the experiences of mistreatment that each had endured 
before entering the village. Listening to the life stories of Quy Hòa 
residents, one can trace that sentiment of sameness as borne out of 
a shared experience of social exclusion. I turn to the life stories of 
Grandpa Bảo and Grandpa Chân to illustrate this point. 
Grandpa Bảo and Grandpa Chân both came from the same village 
in rural Quảng Nam, a province in Central Vietnam. Nevertheless, 
in colonial Vietnam, their lives were starkly different. While Grandpa 
Chân was the son of a wealthy and powerful landowner (địa chủ) family 
in their region, Grandpa Bảo was an impoverished landless peasant. 
Chân’s family owned a very large area of land, which they leased out 
to landless peasants such as Bảo’s family. Peasants worked on their 
rice fields, and were required to pay back a hefty amount of harvest 
to the landowner family as ‘rent’ for use of their land. Normally this 
rent was so unreasonably high that eventually the peasants were 
left with only a small portion of the rice that they had toiled hard to 
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produce, while the landowner family increasingly became richer over 
time. Chân’s elder brother was the deputy police chief of the province, 
an influential man who added to the family’s power. 
Meanwhile, Grandpa Bảo was far less fortunate. He lost both of his 
parents during his early teenage years and subsequently lost four of 
his five siblings. Eventually, there were only two members left out 
of his family of eight: himself, and the sister born right after him, 
Grandma Nga. As an orphan from a very young age, he had to struggle 
hard to survive and to support his younger sister. Despite always 
working very hard, Grandpa Bảo was an impoverished peasant.
The lives of Chân and Bảo were in such stark contrast, but they shared 
one thing in common — they both had leprosy, and their disease 
became known to villagers at around the same time. The experience 
of leprosy of an impoverished peasant and a son of a wealthy and 
illustrious landowner family significantly diverged. While Grandpa 
Bảo essentially experienced a ‘social death’ and painful humiliation 
as soon as his disease was exposed, Grandpa Chân was much better 
insulated by his family’s wealth and power. 
In rural Central Vietnam where Grandpa Bảo and Chân are from, 
agricultural work used to be based on mutual help and reciprocation. 
People in one community helped each other in labour-intensive 
farming tasks such as weeding, ploughing, and harvesting. If someone 
received help, they would be obliged to return that person’s labour. 
Such contributions were calculated in labour days (ngày công) and 
one had to return exactly how much one had received. The reciprocal 
system (đổi công or vần công) worked well for most villagers; everyone 
could complete intensive farming work that individuals or families, 
working alone, could not have undertaken. However, those who could 
not contribute labour, such as the elderly, the sick, or the handicapped, 
were left out. 
Leprosy sufferers were among those left out of the active labour-
exchange circle. Debilitated by leprosy, Grandpa Bảo could not work 
in the rice fields anymore. He recalled the process of being excluded 
from the productive community: 
Before, a lot of people came to work for me. What fun it was! When 
I needed help, men, women and children, so many came. But when 
I fell ill and could no longer work for others, no one came to help me 
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anymore. At first, a few still came, but gradually there were less and 
less people. Finally my rice field became completely empty; there was 
no one. I could not work for anyone, so of course no one came to work 
for me. 
Not only because of leprosy stigma but also due to his inability to 
reciprocate the agricultural work of others, Grandpa Bảo gradually 
became economically defunct and a social outcast in his community.
Faced with hunger, he had to wander around the village, wading in 
the flooded rice fields to catch fish, strolling along the village roads to 
pick star fruit or bananas, and looking for anything edible to satisfy 
his pressing hunger. His hands were already clawed and weak; in 
order to climb trees to pick fruit he had to press his chest hard against 
the tree bark for added grip. He did not feel that much pain owing to 
his numb skin, but his chest ended up being scratched, bruised and 
bleeding, which made him appear even scarier to other villagers.
A twist of fate saw his only surviving sibling, his sister Nga, also suffer 
from leprosy. One day while she was in the nearby market town of Hội 
An buying some herbal medicine believed to be helpful for leprosy, 
the villagers got together and destroyed her house so that she could no 
longer live in their neighbourhood. Having nowhere else to stay, she 
was forced to live in a tiny hut at the edge of the forest, far away from 
the village. Meanwhile, since Grandpa Bảo was now alone, he had to 
fetch water from the village well on his own, even as his skin injuries 
worsened. Each afternoon, he had to bathe in the river that flowed by 
their village. Grandpa Bảo had to expose himself on a daily basis to 
the villagers’ eyes in order to undertake necessary activities such as 
foraging for food, bathing, and fetching water. Moreover, he had no 
other choice but to continue using the communal resources: fetching 
water from the village public well, bathing in the river, catching fish 
from the paddy fields in the village, and picking fruit from the trees 
that lined the village roads. His daily appearance in public spaces 
and his heavy reliance on communal utilities and natural resources, 
magnified by his debilitating illness, acted to intensify villagers’ 
concern and anger at the ‘leper’.
Meanwhile, as his family was very rich, Grandpa Chân never needed 
to work, to exchange labour with community members, or find food 
or fetch water by himself. He lived in a spacious two-storey house 
surrounded by a large garden. Since Chân developed leprosy symptoms, 
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he stayed at home inside his family’s big and well-insulated house. 
His own room on the second floor was far away from the villagers’ eyes. 
Food was prepared and brought to him by the family’s servants. If he 
needed something from the outside, he could ask one of the family’s 
servants to fetch it for him. As the wealthiest family in the community, 
Chân’s family had their own private well and bathing facilities, so he 
did not have to share the public well with others or bathe in the river. 
Even though the villagers were afraid of and gossiped about Chân’s 
leprosy, he was not perceived by the community to be as intimidating 
as Grandpa Bảo.
Grandpa Chân’s social experience of leprosy was also less confronting 
and torturing because of his family’s power and influence in the region. 
While the villagers’ banishment and exclusion was overt and was 
strongly directed against Grandpa Bảo and his sister, Grandma Nga, 
villagers whose livelihood heavily depended upon Grandpa Chân’s 
family, the powerful landowner, never dared to explicitly exhort the 
banishment of Grandpa Chân. As Grandpa Bảo recalled, the villagers 
trying to expel him from the community called him ‘that wretched 
leper’ (thằng cùi) and directed their anger to him, saying, ‘Send that 
wretch Bảo away! He stays here and pollutes our village. If we let him 
stay here, he will spread leprosy to us and our children!’ Villagers 
added pressure on his relatives to send him away. However, Grandpa 
Bảo recollected that in a village meeting to discuss sending Grandpa 
Chân away, the most villagers could do was to generalise about leprosy 
patients in the area: ‘The lepers living here are a source of illness and 
a threat to all of us. They are polluting our village. We should try to 
get them to go away.’ Everyone attending that community meeting 
understood that the ‘lepers’ mentioned included Grandpa Chân, but 
no one dared to overtly name him as one of the polluting ‘lepers’ they 
wished to expel. 
When Grandpa Bảo eventually left the village for Quy Hòa, he left 
in profound pain, shame, and anxiety. After one year, when he was 
allowed to come back for a short visit, he was shocked to see that 
his house had disappeared. As soon as he had gone, he was told, the 
village men — mainly his cousins and relatives — had immediately 
destroyed his house. All that was left of his previous house was the 
roof, lying on the small plot of land where his house used to be. When 
he asked about this, his cousins reluctantly explained that they had 
dismantled the house in order to preserve the wood, lest it be eaten by 
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termites over time. However, he knew for sure that this was an excuse, 
because although they had dismantled the house they had left the roof 
out in the open where it continued to be eaten by termites. Ultimately, 
he understood that the destruction of the house was a collaborative 
expulsion plot by the villagers to ensure that he did not return to live 
in the village. 
Meanwhile, as a high-ranked police officer, Grandpa Chân’s elder 
brother was well-travelled and had a wide professional network. 
That was how he knew about the Christian-run leper colony of 
Quy Hòa. He decided to send his younger brother there. Grandpa 
Bảo still remembered the day when Chân left for the leper colony, 
around one year before he also left for the colony. He was among 
those who observed the departure of Chân and his entourage from 
afar. When Chân left, many family servants and villagers who worked 
on his family’s land had to accompany him and send him off to the 
car. The  family servants had to carry his suitcases to the police car 
that was sent to pick him up by his elder brother, while another was 
holding his hat. When he got into the car, everyone respectfully said 
farewell to him and wished him well. 
Yet the respectful attitude of the servants and villagers did not mean 
that they were not scared or did not feel disgusted, Grandpa Bảo 
added. He knew that the villagers who were servants at Grandpa 
Chân’s house, and who had to serve him, always washed themselves 
carefully after coming home. Sometimes the landowner family gave 
them some leftover rice from the family meals, wrapped in banana 
leaves. Although they felt nauseated, they never dared to reject the 
gift and always politely received the food. However, they would never 
eat the food from the leper’s family and would feed it to their dogs at 
home, even though they were very poor and rice was seen as precious.
It was not true that Grandpa Chân did not feel sad and pained because 
of leprosy. Even though his family was wealthy and he had servants 
to help him, most of the time he was confined to the second floor of 
his house in order to avoid the eyes of villagers. Yet the most profound 
hurt for him was being abandoned by his fearful wife, who ran away 
after he contracted leprosy. No one knew where she escaped to, but 
many speculated that she had travelled very far away to the south, 
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so that no one could find her. After Chân’s wife left him, he was deeply 
saddened and felt very lonely, which eventually led to his decision to 
leave the family and enter the leper colony. 
Being from the same community, Grandpa Bảo and Grandpa Chân had 
known each other since they were children. Yet at home in Quảng 
Nam, they had rarely talked to each other. At that time, Bảo was only a 
young orphan and a poor peasant, while Chân was the son of the most 
powerful and wealthy family in the region. When they happened to 
meet, knowing his superior position, Chân talked very little to Bảo, or 
domineeringly asked Bảo to do this and that for him. Being born and 
raised in an illustrious landowner family, Chân embodied superiority 
and arrogance over the other peasant villagers.
It was only since they came to Quy Hòa leper colony that they really 
became brothers (anh em), Grandpa Bảo recollected. Entering Quy Hòa, 
Grandpa Bảo was first horrified by the horrendous bodies surrounding 
him, but after some time, he realised that here everybody was the 
same. Grandpa Chân’s previous life as a treasured son of an upper-class 
wealthy landowning family, and Grandpa Bảo’s previous life as an 
orphan and an impoverished peasant, faded away. The socioeconomic 
gulf that divided them in their life outside suddenly did not matter 
anymore. 
It was at the leper colony that Grandpa Chân started talking to 
Grandpa Bảo as an equal friend. He liked to talk and share things with 
Grandpa Bảo, probably because they had been neighbours back home 
and shared a lot in common. Now, two of them could sit together at 
the same table to drink some tea or share meals together, something 
that would have been impossible if they were still living back home, 
Grandpa Bảo commented. At first, Grandpa Bảo was even surprised 
when Chân invited him to his house for a death anniversary of one 
of Chân’s ancestors (đám giỗ). But there, sitting on the same table and 
sharing the same meal, Chân openly affirmed to Bảo, ‘Now, carrying 
this disease, I am like you, you are like me’ (‘tôi cũng như anh, anh cũng 
như tôi’). He stated their sameness and equality. As such, there was no 
one superior or inferior, since what connected them was the disease 
that they shared, and the same exclusive community in which they 
both took shelter. Here at Quy Hòa, the previous social hierarchy and 
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status faded away; there was no longer landowner or peasant, since 
there were only leprosy-afflicted inmates, patients, or ‘children’ of the 
Franciscan ‘mothers’. 
Telling me this long story of his life, Grandpa Bảo expressed his 
genuine appreciation for Quy Hòa, which he called ‘home’. Many 
times in our chats he repeated his hypothesis: ‘If I hadn’t come to 
Quy Hòa, I would have already died somewhere else. I wouldn’t have 
lived for another 50 years as I have, and wouldn’t have had a wife, 
children and grandchildren as I do now.’ The nuns and their Quy 
Hòa leper colony provided him with shelter and rescued his life at a 
point when he felt most hopeless. By entering Quy Hòa, he left behind 
the social inequality of colonial Vietnam that had caused him pain 
and resentment as a landless, impoverished peasant. The previous 
social status of Quy Hòa villagers became erased and replaced by a 
homogeneous identity defined by their illness. Villagers’ common 
description of their community — ‘Here everybody is the same!’ 
—  not only speaks to their sameness but also underpins another 
important factor: their presumed equality and homogeneous identity. 
Social Detachment
The stories of Bảo, Nga, and Chân demonstrate how the village of Quy 
Hòa acted as a safe haven for people afflicted by leprosy and who, 
in addition to enduring the debilitating physical aspects of the disease, 
had also suffered the blows of social devaluation and expulsion. 
However, not all people were so cruelly cast out from their families 
and social networks. A significant number of villagers I met had 
elected to leave their former lives of their own accord. Many did so 
having internalised their social invalidity as feelings of low self-worth 
and self-stigmatisation. Out of a sense of shame, they disengaged from 
social relationships and sought sanctuary in Quy Hòa as a community 
of self-exile.
The life stories of the elderly I met during my fieldwork in Biên Hòa 
City serve as examples. In Tam Hiệp, a neighbourhood in Biên Hòa 
crowded with leprosy-afflicted people, I got to know Grandpa Tùng, 
a nurse assistant to Father Thọ who has served this community since 
the day of its inception. Grandpa Tùng is also a leprosy-afflicted man; 
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his  leg was amputated because of leprosy and replaced with a 
prosthetic limb. Besides that, however, he does not have other typical 
deformities caused by the disease, such as clawed hands. 
Yet he always feels profoundly different as a leprosy-affected person. 
Those who knew his wife described her to me as a ‘virtuous woman’ 
who stayed loyal to him and took good care of him after he contracted 
leprosy. But several years after he was first diagnosed with leprosy, he 
was determined to leave her. She was broken-hearted and insistently 
tried to convince him to let her stay, but he adamantly rejected her. 
He left behind his wife and children, and went alone into a leprosy 
village in Sóc Trăng. Years later, he met Father Thọ, the founder of the 
‘Tam Hiệp leprosy neighbourhood’ (Xóm cùi Tam Hiệp), as this area 
crowded with leprosy sufferers in Biên Hòa is known to city dwellers. 
Grandpa Tùng followed Father Thọ into Tam Hiệp, settled down and 
devotedly assisted the Father in simple day-to-day leprosy care for 
the residents, such as tending skin wounds, changing bandages, 
or sanitising ulcers and wounds. He has worked dedicatedly for 
the Father and for his community for decades. Father Thọ and this 
neighbourhood are his new family, he explained. Over the years, 
never again did he contact or go back to his wife and children.
Now that Father Thọ has become old and weak and is regarded as a 
symbolic fatherly figure to the community, rather than the proactive 
patron directly involved in daily care for the community that he used 
to be, Grandpa Tùng is planning to retire. Some of his elderly friends 
in the community tried to convince him to go back to join his family, 
who still wait for him and obtain news about him through his friends, 
but Grandpa Tùng refused. Instead, he wanted to enter a completely 
exclusive community for leprosy sufferers such as Bến Sắn, not far 
from their Tam Hiệp neighbourhood in Biên Hòa. Another elder 
commented to me that they felt pity for Tùng and his wife: 
He felt too serious about his leprosy, but he should not feel that heavy 
(nặng nề). He can easily go out and tell people he is a war invalid. 
His  limbs are all very clean and look okay. He looks just like a war 
invalid with his prosthetic limb; no way are people able to know that 
he had leprosy. But he was determined to leave his wife, and now he 
even wants to move into Bến Sắn. His family love him but he always 
rejects them. Poor things!
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Grandpa Hai, a respected elder in the Tam Hiệp community, also told 
me about his plan to move into an exclusive leprosy village such as 
Bến Sắn to spend the last years of his life and avoid ‘causing trouble’ 
(làm  phiền) for his children. He always felt bad about his son and 
daughter, regretting that having leprosy-affected parents had brought 
great shame and trouble for them. His son had dated his wife for eight 
years, from high school until marriage, but not once did he take her 
back home to introduce to his parents. When their son decided to 
get married, Grandpa Hai and his wife were extremely anxious. Their 
son’s girlfriend and her family did not know about Grandpa Hai and 
his wife. Grandpa Hai and his wife worried whether the girl and her 
parents would still want this marriage if they knew that the pair had 
leprosy. Grandpa Hai felt too ashamed of his leprosy-ruined body 
to appear at the wedding as the groom’s father. His wife had milder 
leprosy than him, and when she covers the scars with long-sleeve tops 
and pants, few people could actually recognise that she had leprosy. 
Grandpa Hai has a higher level of deformities: his hands are clawed 
and lack several fingers, and one of his legs has been amputated and 
replaced with a prosthetic limb. 
Grandpa Hai was extremely worried and could not sleep for weeks. 
Then he came up with an idea: they would lie to the bride’s family 
and say that the father had already passed away. The whole family sat 
down together to discuss his plan, but his wife rejected it, saying it 
was ominous to say that he was dead. Finally, they decided to tell the 
other family that the father had run away with his mistress, leaving 
behind his wife and children, and that they had never heard from 
him since. 
For their son’s wedding, they asked a male relative to pair up with 
Grandpa Hai’s wife to represent the groom’s family. Half sulkily, half 
regretfully, Grandpa Hai told me about the weddings of his son and 
then of his daughter: ‘Every time our children got married, my wife 
had to hurriedly pair up with a man!’ On his son’s wedding day, 
Grandpa Hai recalled, he nervously hid himself at home all day long, 
feeling pity for himself. Yet at the same time he felt happy, because his 
son could finally get married, something he had never even dared to 
dream of during his younger years when he had struggled with this 
illness. At that time, Grandpa Hai did not think he could ever get 
married, let alone have children. When their children were first born, 
he and his wife were worried about their marriage prospects. But in 
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the end, Grandpa Hai was very happy that both of his children were 
happily married, and now he has little grandchildren who he adores 
very much.
Yet Grandpa Hai’s family could not hide their secret forever. One day, 
a couple of years after his son got married, Grandpa Hai was genuinely 
astonished when his daughter-in-law’s parents suddenly appeared in 
front of his door. They came to find him, to ‘offer greetings’, and to 
tell him they were happy to see him. ‘They talked to me respectfully’, 
he recalled, ‘and told me I should not have hidden myself. They said 
we are xui gia [the parents of one’s son’s or daughter’s spouse]; we are 
all connected.’ Grandpa Hai told me he was so embarrassed that he did 
not know how to respond or what to do.
Grandpa Hai and his wife still live in Tam Hiệp neighbourhood because, 
as he said, his wife helps to take care of the grandchildren, who are 
all still very young. Thinking about the future, similar to Grandpa 
Tùng, Grandpa Hai and his wife plan to leave this neighbourhood for 
a completely exclusive life with other leprosy-affected people in Bến 
Sắn leprosy village. He is afraid that one day, no matter how much 
he tried to hide himself, his children’s colleagues and friends could 
eventually find out about him, just like his son’s parents-in-law had 
done. This would ‘cause trouble’ (làm phiền) for his children and 
disturb their careers, he believed. At the time we talked, his son had 
been promoted to the position of deputy head of his department in a 
state institution, and had just become a Party member, which would 
pave the way for his further promotion. Grandpa Hai was worried 
that his son’s promising career prospects might be hampered if his 
colleagues knew about his leprosy-afflicted parents. Even though 
Grandpa Hai is living in a neighbourhood crowded with leprosy-
afflicted people like him, he still feels somehow nervous of being 
discovered by his children’s colleagues and acquaintances: ‘You see, 
anyone can ride their motorbike into this neighbourhood. I want to 
enter a leprosy village and live there until I die, so no one can find me. 
I want them to regard me as an already dead person.’
In his research in Northern India, Ronald Barrett (2005:222) 
observes that sadness and resignation were pervasive emotions 
among the residents of the leprosy treatment centre where he did 
fieldwork. Predaswat (1992:54) cites a study on leprosy in Thailand 
(Leerapun 1989) in which the authors found that self-stigma precedes 
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negative societal reaction. In her own research conducted in Noan Pa 
village, Thailand, Predaswat also observed self-stigmatisation among 
her leprosy-affected informants (Predaswat 1992:138). She found that 
sufferers’ low self-esteem and social withdrawal stems from the cultural 
construction of leprosy in Thailand as impure and sinful. Because 
they know that leprosy results in social ostracism, they believe they 
are social outcasts (Predaswat 1992:138), which resonates well with 
Nancy Waxler’s (1981) thesis that patients’ response and adaptation to 
leprosy are primarily culturally conditioned. 
Self-stigma is similarly prevalent among the leprosy-affected people 
in Vietnam who I met. Being sad and conscious about their difference, 
many have rejected relationships with families and friends, and have 
withdrawn into communities of people like themselves, in whose 
company they could find comfort. This withdrawal has its negative 
effects for it has hampered their social relationships and their prospects 
for reintegration. Nevertheless, the process of disengagement has not 
brought about their social death, for many have rebuilt relations and 
have found a new sense of empowerment and self-worth in their new 
community. This chapter will now examine these processes of personal 
reconstruction.
Love Among One’s Own Kind
Grandpa Bảo told me about the day he arrived in Quy Hòa and was 
taken to his assigned house in the leper colony. On the village road 
he saw small groups of inmates sitting and chatting together. When 
they saw him arriving with two other patients, they blithely pointed 
at them, calling out, ‘More of the same kind!’ (‘Rồi, cùng một thứ rồi!’).
In the days after his arrival, he got to know more about the leper 
colony inmates who now became his neighbours. It was easy to mingle 
and befriend people here, the old man recalled. Seeing him strolling 
by himself on the village road, his fellow residents waved their hands 
and called to him to stop by. They asked him which province he came 
from, and how he found his way to the leper colony. 
He quickly made a lot of friends in the leper colony. It had been very 
long, Grandpa Bảo recalled, since he had a friend or was approached 
by friendly people who wanted to talk to him and get to know him. 
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His bitter memories as a lone ‘leper’ back home in Quảng Nam Province 
were still clearly imprinted in his mind — as soon as people saw him at 
the other end of the village road, they turned their backs and started 
walking quickly in the opposite direction. As soon as he appeared at 
one end of the paddy field, the farmers dispersed, moving away from 
him. Grandpa Bảo remembered the profound feelings of hopelessness 
and of being completely alone, without any caretakers or friends, when 
his limbs were already curled and weak. Sitting in his house all day 
long, he sadly kept looking at the sun’s rays moving from one corner 
of his little house to the other, from morning to afternoon, everyday. 
All he could think of at the time was — his tone lowered when he 
told me about those dark days — how to kill himself. He went out to 
the river, planning to jump into the water and let himself drown, but 
did not have the courage to do so, and ended up sitting on the bank, 
crying for himself and for his lot in life. 
In contrast, here in the leper colony, when he walked up and down the 
village main road, people called his name and stopped him for a chat. 
He woke up in the leper colony, Grandpa Bảo added, to sympathetic 
people all around him: the nuns and his fellow inmates. His fellow 
inmates often affirmed to him, ‘Here we are all the same!’
Grandpa Thiện also came to Quy Hòa after several years of being 
contained in his house and enduring the pain of leprosy by himself. 
At the time, having given up hope for a cure after desperately seeking 
help from different traditional healers, he thought that he was the 
only one in the country suffering from this strange disease. However, 
as soon as he arrived in the leper colony, he was astonished to see so 
many people with the same disease; many of them even had more severe 
physical symptoms than him. Seeing many other leprosy patients 
with abnormal bodies was intimidating at first, but in retrospect, he 
reflected, it was also somehow reassuring for him to realise there were 
many others suffering from the same disease, and that he was not alone 
in his arduous struggle with leprosy. 
Similarly, upon his arrival, Uncle Phương was surprised to see the 
leper colony already crowded with many inmates who had the same 
disease. Not only did they have the same kind of bodies — the same 
physical symptoms as him — but once he started mingling with other 
inmates, he was amazed at how similar their experiences had been 
before coming to Quy Hòa. He found that they shared the physical 
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pain caused by leprosy, and they had very similar experiences of 
being stigmatised, isolated or expelled from their communities of 
origin. Many felt deeply hurt by being shunned by their own family, 
banished by neighbours, excluded from the community, or even 
traumatised by a murder conspiracy aiming to eliminate the ‘leper’ 
peril. Here in the leper colony, people gradually found comfort and 
empathy in realising their shared pain as leprosy victims. Their ties, 
based on similar lived bodily experience and social reality of leprosy, 
were built and reinforced over time.
Uncle Phương, for instance, got to know a young lady called Sa in 
the leprosy village. At first, he was struck by her sad eyes. She had 
a very beautiful face, but her eyes were always clouded by sadness. 
When they talked, he was instantly touched by how similar their 
lives as leprosy sufferers were. She told him her life story, how she 
lost her legs because of leprosy, and mentioned many times that 
she was so despondent that she wanted only to die. He was struck 
by how her lived struggles were similar to his. Moreover, as a fellow 
amputee having to move around by wheelchair, he could understand 
profoundly the pain of losing one’s body parts. They felt close almost 
immediately and often shared their stories, despite the age gap of 
more than 20 years. They now are married and live happily together 
in Quy Hòa.
Many village men stressed that it is important to live with ‘the same’ 
people and to find a partner similar to them, particularly when it 
comes to marriage. Uncle Hùng, a former tailor, for example, was first 
admitted for a lengthy period of leprosy treatment in the Franciscan 
leper colony of Núi Sạn, Nha Trang. In 1972, after being discharged, he 
lived outside for six eventful years. During those years, he joined the 
military of the American-backed southern regime and was relocated 
to Quy Nhơn with his regiment. More than once on their off-duty 
days, he recalled, his mates asked him to go for a brief visit to Quy 
Hòa leper colony, ‘because they had heard that lepers’ daughters are 
usually very beautiful’. However, he never agreed to go with them, 
since he was afraid people with leprosy in Quy Hòa would notice the 
marks on his body, which usually went unnoticed by people without 
experience of the disease. He was anxious that if the village inmates 
realised he also had leprosy, his secret about his past illness would be 
revealed. 
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After 1975, his family were among those relocated to the New Economic 
Zones under the new government’s policy. There he happened to bump 
into two men he had previously trained as apprentice tailors. They were 
delighted to see him again, but he insistently denied having known 
them. They affirmed, ‘You really look like our teacher, Hùng! You must 
be Teacher Hùng!’, and invited him to come to their house. Yet he kept 
shaking his head, ‘No, I am not Hùng!’ Uncle Hùng wistfully told me 
that, once he had been admitted for treatment of the disease, he did not 
want to meet any old acquaintances who had known him before then. 
He was worried they would ask him where he had been during their 
separation; he would then have to tell lies. ‘So many lies! I’m tired of 
telling lies’, he explained. Uncle Hùng concluded by telling me that 
it is much better to be with ‘similar’ people, so one can have peace of 
mind, and not have to tell lies or think twice before saying something 
lest one’s secret be revealed.
The turning point that catapulted Uncle Hùng back into an exclusive 
community for leprosy sufferers was a re-encounter with his ex-
girlfriend, who had followed her family to settle down in the same 
New Economic Zone as Hùng. At first, he was happy to see her again 
and vaguely thought it might have been destiny that brought them 
back together. She was a gorgeous woman, ‘but had a cruel heart’, 
he reflected. After they had been casually dating for some time, she 
spread the news that he had leprosy among members of the youth 
association to which they both belonged. The rumours quickly spread 
through their neighbourhood. That night, as soon as he learned that 
his secret had been revealed, Hùng panicked, immediately packed 
his stuff, and ran out of the house. Now that people knew that he 
had leprosy, he dared not face anyone. The following day, he left the 
settlement well before sunrise so that no one could see him leave. 
Having nowhere to go, he decided to head for Quy Hòa, the village 
for leprosy sufferers he had known when his regiment was based in 
Quy Nhơn. 
Uncle Hùng has remained in Quy Hòa, where, soon after he entered 
the leprosy village, he met his wife. He wanted to marry someone ‘like 
him’, he said, because he believed a wife who did not have this disease 
would look down upon (coi thường) him and his family and would not 
be loyal to him, causing his children to suffer. 
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After moving into the leprosy village, he rarely returned to visit 
his family. One of the few times he went back home was when his 
mother passed away. He arrived in time to attend the funeral, but he 
felt alienated outside his new community, surrounded by non-patient 
people. As the eldest son, he took on a major role in the funeral ritual. 
He was sitting, as was customary, in front of his parents’ house to 
receive guests, but most of the guests ignored him. Few people came 
to greet him, and those who did so only briefly said, ‘Oh you came 
back?’ or ‘Has your illness condition got better?’, and then quickly 
stepped away from him. 
The other time was when he returned for a family reunion during 
Tết, the Vietnamese Lunar New Year. He went back one week before 
the New Year to help his father repair the ancestors’ grave, clean the 
house, and prepare for the rituals. Yet he eventually returned to Quy 
Hòa a few days before the New Year festival had started. Recalling 
that sad memory, he said he could not endure people’s comments and 
attitude towards him. Everywhere in the neighbourhood, people told 
each other, ‘that leper (thằng cùi) has come back!’ Wherever he went, 
people stared at him ‘in a weird way’, and when he came close to 
anyone, they walked away and avoided him. When people walked 
past his family’s house, they stared at him and whispered something 
to each other. He felt very sad and hurt, and decided to go away 
immediately, as he had done before. He had been looking forward to 
celebrating the Lunar New Year with all of his family for a long time, 
but he could not cope with people’s attitude towards him. In the end, 
he had a lonely Tết back in Quy Hòa, but as he reflected, he felt much 
better, safe and free here with ‘similar’ people.
For leprosy-afflicted people, ‘sameness’ is ontologically defined 
against difference. In other words, the importance of ‘sameness’ as 
lived and told by leprosy sufferers reflects the weight of ‘difference’ in 
their lived realities. Consistently enthusiastic emphasis of ‘sameness’ 
reveals a clear-cut dichotomy in the mind — a clearly demarcated 
territory of ‘people of the same kind’, those affected by the same 
disease, in opposition to the outside world. The notion of ‘sameness’ 
determines boundaries and clearly defines ‘patients’ (leprosy-
affected people) (người bệnh/bệnh nhân) and ‘healthy people’ (người 
lành), ‘inside here’ (ở trong này) and ‘out in life’ or ‘out in the world’ 
(ở  ngoài đời). James  Staples similarly observes strong delineation 
between the ‘inside’  and the ‘outside’ perceived by people affected 
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by leprosy and living in an exclusive community in India (Staples 
2004:77). Conversations with Quy Hòa residents are normally filled 
with anecdotes comparing and contrasting life inside and outside 
of the leprosy village. While ‘inside here’ signifies safety, security 
and familiarity, ‘out in life’ or ‘out in the world’ implies something 
intimidating, risky, and somehow other-worldly.
The Power of Sameness
Like Grandpa Thiện, Uncle Phương and Uncle Hùng, everyone I met 
in the village reported finding great spiritual strength and comfort in 
their ‘sameness’. Sameness itself has great power, as Bauman writes: 
‘Knowing that one is not alone and that one’s own personal cravings 
are shared by others has a reassuring effect’ (Bauman 2001:63). 
In addition, community-living brings about the power of a collective 
and the comforting sense of belonging to a definite group. Community 
is a strategy to cope with the repercussion of stigmatisation, which 
Goffman refers to as ‘in-group alignment’ (Goffman 1963:112).
Quy Hòa reminds us of Robert Redfield’s ‘little community’: 
a distinctive, small and self-sufficient community defined by 
homogeneity and sameness (Redfield 1960). In villagers’ words and 
perception, Quy Hòa is first and foremost a community of sameness: 
a village ‘of the like-minded and the like-behaving; a community of 
sameness’ (Bauman 2001:64). Quy Hòa is where inmates can realise 
their commonalities in their illness and in past experiences, and 
thus, to borrow the words of Barry Adam (1978), commonalities are 
translated into a community that exists and lasts based on sameness. 
For Grandpa Thiện, his body embodies shame; he always expressed 
honestly to me that he felt ashamed about his lacking body. Many 
times when we chatted, Grandpa Thiện stared fixedly at my fingers, 
thinking deeply about something. Whenever he happened to talk 
about fingers in our conversations, he always said ‘fingers, like yours’, 
as if he had never had them. For decades, it has been extremely rare 
for him to go out of Quy Hòa village. ‘I felt too ashamed to go. How 
could I wish to go out with limbs like this?’, he asked me, while 
slightly raising his deformed hands and glancing down at his toeless 
feet. He also never went back to his hometown because of fear that he 
would cause humiliation for his nieces and nephews: 
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Because they are my nieces and nephews, maybe they have no choice 
but to recognise me and call me their uncle no matter how they feel. 
But what would their husbands and wives think about me and our 
family? They would think this family has a leper uncle! They would 
despise [khinh] us, they would see my family as cheap [coi rẻ]. I would 
feel pity [tội nghiệp] for my nieces and nephews if their spouses look 
down on them because of me. So I never want to go back anymore.
Aunt Khanh, too, was immensely saddened by the changes to her 
body caused by leprosy. Around one year after abandoning treatment 
because of her mother’s death, she was contacted by a nurse in the 
hospital who sent her a letter and advised her to come back in order 
to continue treatment, since there was a new type of therapy that 
had recently become available. In the period 1982–83, multi-drug 
therapy (MDT) was introduced to Vietnam, and leprosy patients were 
not only treated by a single type of antibiotics but by a combination 
of medicines, typically Dapsone, Rifampicine, and Clofazimine 
(World Health Organization 1998). With her family’s encouragement, 
Aunt Khanh returned to Huế for treatment.
As a side effect of MDT, patients’ skin can dramatically change colour 
to black or red during the period of treatment, and return to normal 
after stopping MDT. Aunt Khanh’s skin tone radically changed to 
a deep shade of black after taking Clofazimine (most often called 
‘Lampren’ by leprosy patients). When her father came to see her, he 
was surprised, too, teasing her: ‘This dirty girl! Why are you as black 
as a smoked boiling pot?’
Multi-drug therapy was much more effective than the previous mono-
drug therapy. Aunt Khanh was clinically free of leprosy bacteria 
after around one year of regular treatment. She now had the option 
of going back home or staying on to complete treatment until she 
fully recovered from the consequences of side effects. Looking at her 
body in the mirror, she found herself strange. Explaining her decision 
to remain in the hospital, she said:
It looks very weird to be as black as an African. I thought I would 
be as dark as this forever because of the medicine’s effect. I thought 
if I returned home, everyone would see that my face was as dark as a 
thickly burned pot [đen như lọ nghẹ] and the neighbours would gossip 
about my skin. I looked so strange, like no one else [không giống ai]! 
So at last, I made up my mind to stay. 
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At the time, the leprosy section in the Huế dermatological department 
was cramped with too many patients. The hospital decided to relocate 
a number of patients to Quy Hòa, which was supposed to have more 
space and a better natural environment — fresh air, cool breeze and 
pristine beach, very suitable for medical treatment. Aunt Khanh was 
among those who were moved from Huế to Quy Hòa in the mid-1980s, 
and she has remained there until now. 
There was a point in time in the early 1990s when Aunt Khanh and her 
husband came very close to leaving the exclusive village and moving 
out to reunite with his sister. Aunt Khanh had met and fallen in love 
with her husband in Huế hospital. They married very soon after she 
arrived in Quy Hòa, where he lived. His sister, who was living and 
working in a state-run plantation (nông trường), insisted that the couple 
should come and join her, since at the time the plantation needed more 
people and they would be able to do farming on the plantation’s huge 
area of land. The sister thought that it would be an ideal opportunity 
for them to reunite, because the plantation could offer land, work, and 
housing.
It was indeed a reasonable plan and Aunt Khanh seriously considered 
joining the plantation. By that time, she had already finished treatment; 
her skin tone had returned to normal and she did not have any 
explicit leprosy residues. However, her husband was very reluctant. 
He had an amputated leg, but, as they discussed, people might just 
think that he was a war invalid who had lost his leg during the war. 
What made him hesitate were some ulcers on his hands, which had 
deteriorated due to his work as a carpenter, making wooden furniture 
for the leprosy hospital and villagers. The hard work with saw, knife, 
hammer, and nails had affected his numb hands and exacerbated his 
hand injuries. Moreover, he felt uneasy and anxious about co-living in 
a shared house (nhà tập thể), the only accommodation option provided 
by the plantation, where they would live in very close proximity 
with and share common facilities with other workers’ families. He was 
scared that the injuries would sooner or later reveal their secret; the 
neighbours would notice his wounds and realise he was a leprosy 
sufferer, and they would have to escape in humiliation. Eventually, he 
decided to reject his sister’s offer and stayed on in Quy Hòa, rather than 
going out into the world with the risk of becoming known as ‘lepers’. 
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Although their decisions to remain in an exclusive environment for 
leprosy sufferers took place at different points in time, both Aunt 
Khanh and her husband decided to do so because of their concern 
about bodily difference. For Aunt Khanh, her husband, and many 
village residents, the multiplicity of similarly defective bodies inside 
the community has a deeply reassuring effect. ‘Community means 
sameness, while “sameness” means the absence of the Other’, writes 
Bauman (2001:115). Inside their own world of sameness, community 
members do not have to worry about their difference or being seen as 
abnormal. Discussing life in leprosaria for Japanese leprosy-afflicted 
inmates, Susan Burns writes, ‘for leprosy sufferers themselves, sites 
such as Yu no Zawa, offered up the hope of a “normal” life within 
the culture of exclusion, a life in which work, family and community 
might be possible’ (Burns 2003:117). Within this distinct territory, 
and amid hundreds of ‘people of the same kind’, abnormalities are 
evened out and can be normalised; lacking bodies become normal, 
and illness becomes a matter-of-fact, albeit an important one. Village 
residents can enjoy the benefit of such a ‘normalising’ environment, 
as termed by Kelleher (1988). 
For instance, the village men told me it is only in Quy Hòa where they 
could walk around freely without tops, as Vietnamese men usually 
do, particularly under the sweltering tropical sun. Outside the village, 
they would never be able to do so; when some villagers go back home 
for a visit, they do not even want to be seen by neighbours, let alone 
reveal their scarred and lacking bodies. Uncle Nghị told me that while 
he was still living with his family, his neighbours did not explicitly 
shun him. He remained mainly in the house without stepping outside. 
Yet he felt the occasional intrusive gazes, and the concerned stares 
from his neighbours through the small window were intrusive and 
unsettling enough for him to decide to leave his family for Quy 
Hòa. ‘It is free [tự do] here. I don’t have to worry about such things’, 
he commented. Now in the leprosy village, he can bare his torso and 
limbs marred with scars to work all day under the sun at his little 
bicycle repair shop in front of his house. 
My own introduction to the practical meanings for villagers of physical 
sameness and the tacit value they attach to being among people like 
themselves came when I first went to pay respects to Grandpa Thiện, 
who was to become one of my main interlocutors. He was among the 
first villagers I met in Quy Hòa because his house was the first near the 
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village gate on the main road connecting the hospital and the village. 
Every day when I walked into the village, I had to pass by his little 
house.
When he first came to Quy Hòa, Grandpa Thiện was hopeful that his 
treatment would be finished soon so he could go back home. Yet it was 
when his body became deformed because of leprosy that he painfully 
realised that he could never return home. Moreover, during the tough 
years after 1975, his limbs were ruined further because of the hard 
labour of collecting firewood and burning it into charcoal on the 
mountain near Quy Hòa. Grandpa Thiện felt profoundly humiliated 
because of his deformities, the leprosy ‘marks’ fixedly remaining on 
his body would signal his disease wherever he went. 
Grandpa Thiện’s limbs, indeed, are badly deformed from leprosy and 
the hard labour that took its toll on his already damaged body. Many 
of his fingers and toes had already been amputated either completely 
or by half, while the remaining half fingers and toes became hard and 
crooked. Most of the time his truncated hands were black with soil 
and dirt, since every day he fed the chickens and went out to search 
for fallen coconut fronds on the ground, cut them into small pieces, 
and dragged them back home for his wife to burn for cooking. 
On one of my first afternoons at Grandpa Thiện’s house, I brought 
him a cup of sweetened iced coffee, bought from a café in front of the 
hospital. It was a takeaway coffee in a thin, transparent plastic cup 
that could be thrown away after use. To my embarrassment, Grandpa 
Thiện confusedly tried different ways to hold the plastic cup with his 
half-amputated fingers. The plastic cups used for takeaway by this café 
were not good ones; they were too thin and soft. After trying to pick 
it up for a while with no results, Grandpa Thiện stopped and left the 
coffee cup where it was on the table. He seemed embarrassed and there 
was an awkward moment during which neither of us said anything. 
Fortunately, we found a way to recover from my gaffe and restart the 
conversation. To this day, I recall the gulf that my gift had suddenly 
opened up between me and my elderly respondent. Thinking back to 
the proverb Grandpa Thiện once shared with me, at that moment I 
was indeed a duck out of place among the chickens.
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After that intensely awkward beginning, I went on to develop a warm 
and sustained relationship with Grandpa Thiện. I would frequently go 
and sit with him in the slanting sun of the late afternoon on the porch 
of his little house. We talked about his life as he tended his chirpy 
chicks. I still brought him some snacks or drinks, such as soy milk 
packets, which, as I worked out, he could handle with his fingers. 
Ferdinand Tonnies, cited in Zygmunt Bauman (2001), observes that 
modern community is defined by ‘an understanding shared by all its 
members’: 
The community-style, matter-of-fact … understanding does not 
need to be sought, let alone laboriously built or fought for: that 
understanding ‘is there’, ready-made and ready to use — so that 
we understand each other ‘without words’ and never need to ask, 
apprehensively, ‘what do you mean?’ (Bauman, 2001:10). 
The sense of physical ease and naturalness provided by this condition 
of mutual acceptance and tacit understanding is all the more palpable in 
the context of Quy Hòa village as a congregation of people with bodies 
that inevitably attract attention in the wider society as abnormal or 
defective. In the atmosphere of the village, one can be oneself, for it is 
there that such bodily differences are tacitly understood to be normal.
Conclusion
While leprosy stigma in the wider society is slow to change and medical 
science can offer an only incomplete cure —a biomedical therapy that 
is highly effective but unable to reverse disfiguration or remove social 
pain — leprosy-afflicted people continue to fashion a therapeutic life 
world for themselves in the form of exclusive residential communities 
such as Quy Hòa. Such leprosy villages constitute a healing 
environment defined by sameness and equality. Into this world come 
those experiencing the pain and sadness of ‘social death’ and a ‘spoiled 
identity’ (Goffman 1963), and those who wish to withdraw socially or 
become invisible to the world of physically intact people. Yet within 
this life-reinforcing exclusive territory for ‘lepers’, they are reborn, 
re-empowered, and revitalised; they are able to express themselves 
freely as human beings, dignified and equal with everyone else. 
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Heide Poestges (2011) observes that in the exclusive leper colony 
in India where she conducted research, members use stigma as a 
mechanism to create and maintain community membership, and as a 
strategy to mitigate various social problems induced by their disease. 
In a related vein, this chapter holds that, ultimately, leprosy-affected 
people’s profound desire for equality and dignity lies at the core of 
their need for an exclusive social world. The outside society may deny 
them complete personhood and full dignity as equal human beings; 
yet they can find comfort and a ‘normal’ life with a community of 
people ‘of the same kind’. Whereas their leprosy-ruined bodies are 
feared and reviled outside the village, inside this exclusive territory 
they return to being normal and equal to other villagers. Sameness in 
its physical and social aspects constitutes the main healing effect of 
this community, which offers a comforting and reassuring environment 
that nurtures social interactions, relationships, and mutual support.
Crossing the border between their village and the outside world, 
people affected by leprosy continue to realise palpably the difference 
in their social standing in the two spheres. The curiosity, fear and 
discomfort occasioned by their presence ‘out in life’ hurts, but it 
also reinforces the abundant appreciation for their place ‘inside 
here’. For many, the discomfort engendered by such forays into the 
world overlays the traumatic memories of exclusion experienced 
when they first contracted the disease and corroborates the potent 
sense of their community as a unique sanctuary. It is for these reasons 
that leprosy villages such as Quy Hòa still exist with great vitality. 
Residents genuinely cherish the exclusiveness, which also means 
sameness, of their communities. Susan Burns has similarly noted that 
Japanese leprosy sufferers embrace the culture of their own exclusion 
(Burns  2003:116). Writing about leprosy in India, James Staples 
reflected: ‘While ill health might unmake the sufferer’s world, in 
certain contexts — like this one — it also remakes it’ (Staples 2003:308). 
Quy Hòa is intimately appreciated as ‘home’, as a shelter, and as a 
place of rebirth and revitalisation where people can hope to find again 
things taken away from them by this cruel illness: dignity, faith, hope, 
care, love, peace, friends, family, and future. Exclusive communities 
offer a social cure that brings back what sustains a meaningful and 
fulfilled life. Leprosy villages such as Quy Hòa can heal because they 
cure the most intrinsic pain of leprosy. 
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‘The Red Seedlings of the Central 
Highlands’: Social Relatedness and 
Political Integration of Select Ethnic 
Minority Groups in Post-War Vietnam
Nguyen Thu Huong
Kon Tum City. Early morning in May 2012. Start of the rainy season. 
I was on my way to a Bahnar village located in the heart of the city. 
The  road was wide and clean, lined with tall trees and modern 
buildings that house the People’s Committee and various local services 
— the very nerve centre of the provincial government. Flags and 
banners in red and gold fluttered in the wind, commemorating the 
centenary anniversary of the foundation of the province (1913–2013). 
Further down the road, I saw a dozen men, some squatting on the 
sidewalk, some standing idly by. Their weather-beaten faces were 
gloomy, their clothes shabby. These were indigenous Bahnar, not too 
young or too old, able-bodied males gathering daily at this makeshift 
‘labour exchange’ (chợ người), hoping to sell their labour for a meagre 
wage at some construction sites or plantations in the region. The scene 
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was emblematic of the marginalisation of indigenous individuals in 
their own territory where their ancestors had settled for centuries, 
long before the arrival of the Kinh, the French, and the Americans.1 
In the context of Vietnam, nearly 12 million people, accounting for 
less than 15 per cent of the total population (General Statistics Office 
of Vietnam 2010), are classified as ethnic minorities, and, in 2010, they 
accounted for 47 per cent of the poor (World Bank 2012). Poverty 
has been decreasing among minority groups in Vietnam’s Central 
Highlands as market-driven opportunities for off-farm labour continue 
to expand. However, indigenous groups such as the Bahnar, Jarai, 
and Sedang remain dogged by lower than average literacy and school 
enrolment rates, poor housing and sanitation, and over-representation 
in unskilled, poorly paid and unstable agricultural work (Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam 2013). Despondent scenes such as the improvised 
Bahnar labour market in Kon Tum are set against a highlands 
landscape that has been reconfigured by explosive capitalistic resource 
extraction, the coffee frontier, mining and rubber. Vietnam’s central 
highlanders have been marginalised by world capitalism with frontier 
characteristics in the wake of dổi mới, a process rewarding those with 
favourable social capital, knowledge of markets, political connections 
and ties to lowland markets (McElwee 2004). 
One set of explanations for this situation points to factors negatively 
affecting minorities such as the lack of education, of proximity, 
of  cultural familiarity with the dominant Kinh culture,  of political 
capital, and of modern outlook and awareness  that tend to deprive 
them of favourable positions within the state apparatus (Baulch 
et al. 2010; Rambo and Jamieson 2003). Empirical research in the 
northern uplands has revealed that the Mường ethnic group is often 
commended for its ease of assimilation into modern society given its 
many proximities — linguistic and cultural — with the Kinh ethnic 
majority (Wangsgard 2009). However, various authors have pointed 
to the popular discourses about backwardness, deficiency and 
superstition pertaining to mostly ethnic minorities who reside in the 
mountains of northern Vietnam and the Central Highlands of southern 
1  The preparation of this chapter was made possible with financial and organisational 
support from the larger project ‘Women’s Leadership: Empowerment of Women in the Period of 
International Integration’ of the United Nations Development Programme and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Vietnam, and the 2014 ANU Vietnam Update organisers. The author wishes to thank 
Philip Taylor, Cao Xuân Tứ, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on this chapter.
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Vietnam (Ngô Thanh Tâm 2015; Turner et al. 2015; Nguyễn Thu Hương 
2013; Salemink 2003). Such depictions lend weight to the view that 
the lowland majority group is upheld as the centre, cultural standard, 
and model for all ethnic groups (Taylor 2008). Not surprisingly, many 
upland groups tend to judge themselves by lowland standards and 
internalise their inferiority (Wangsgard 2009). Nevertheless, it should 
be borne in mind that members of minorities are not passive subjects; 
they may not be keen to embrace the workings of the social structure 
of the dominant group, which have already had a great impact on 
every aspect of their daily lives. 
For its part, the Vietnamese state has played a major role in structuring 
the avenues for social mobility and inclusion, cultural expression and 
political participation in the highlands. In general, the state places 
emphasis on control and assimilation and its equity rhetoric seems 
secondary to strategic considerations. This approach is reflected 
in its policy of promoting cultural diversity in Vietnam. In Decree 
No. 05/2011/NÐ-CP, issued on 14 January 2011, outlining its Action 
Program for Ethnic Minorities,2 the government declared that all 
ethnic people (groups) have the responsibility to respect one another’s 
customs and traditions, and to contribute to building the culture of 
Vietnam that is progressive and imbued with the nation’s identity. 
It is understood that ‘diversity should not compromise national unity’ 
(Lavoie 2011:157), and national minorities have a right to maintain 
their traditions only as long as they do not pose a threat to the socialist 
progress of the country. Nevertheless, one may wonder what criteria 
will be used to determine which traditions and customs of each ethnic 
group are to be preserved. Along these lines, this chapter will explore 
how some ethnic groups might be included or excluded from state 
apparatus in Kon Tum Province because of their past activities during 
the ‘American war’. It should be mentioned that during the đổi mới era, 
2  Programs considered to be ‘national targets’ are part of the government budget which 
must be submitted to and approved by the National Assembly, whereas Action Programs are 
carried out according to availability of funds, proposed by the Finance Ministry and approved 
by the Prime Minister, mainly from local sources. Centrally directed, national target programs 
have to be presented to the National Assembly six months beforehand for consideration. 
The Action Program on Ethnic Minority Affairs somehow reflects the current level of attention 
the government attaches to ethnic minority issues. More urgent issues are handled under the 
high-priority National Target Programs which may include poverty alleviation schemes in ethnic 
minority areas.
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the state has been seriously concerned about the spread of evangelical 
Christianity in the Central Highlands, seeing this as a threat to the 
country’s security (Salemink 2003). 
Another set of factors impinging on the experiences of minority 
peoples in the highlands are the prejudices, attitudes of mistrust, 
and subtle exclusion strategies of some Kinh people themselves. 
In other words, minority peoples may be excluded from sociocultural 
development opportunities through the agency of Kinh people, who 
may act assertively according to their perceptions and interests in a 
way that is not in accord with the letter of state policy. For example, 
undertaking research on the impact of education policies on inter-
ethnic and intra-ethnic inequalities in school, Trương Huyền Chi 
(2011) observes that Kinh teachers’ lack of knowledge of their pupils’ 
cultural traditions are due to selective preservation of patterns by the 
state as well as their own modernist thinking. Teachers in the upland 
areas often claim that Kinh pupils have a better ability to learn than 
their minority counterparts (World Bank 2009). Furthermore, the 
lowland teachers seem to generally attribute the poor performance 
of ethnic minority pupils to the lack of support from their parents 
and their inherent poverty (Trương Huyền Chi 2011). Likewise, 
in state health care service programs in ethnic minority areas, a lack of 
cultural sensitivity and language barriers among health care workers 
contribute to misunderstanding and a poor ability to communicate 
health issues (Bonnin 2013). The historically complex and not always 
smooth relations between upland ethnic minorities and the majority 
Kinh contrast with optimistic official framings of these encounters as 
imbued with sibling-like sentiments of solidarity (McElwee 2008). 
Arising in a context of internal colonialism, which involves one group 
dominating another within a single nation state (Evans 1992), majority 
group attitudes may have the capacity to significantly shape the ways 
that minority groups apprehend opportunities for social advancement. 
A different explanation, and one that I aim to explore in this chapter, 
is that uplanders might adopt agentive strategies to minimise their 
involvement in state structures. Here, I am inspired by James Scott’s 
bold reconceptualisation of the politics of minority ethnicity in the 
entire Southeast Asian massif (Scott 2009). Scott argues that the 
social structure, livelihood strategies and identifications adopted 
by highlands actors in the vast region he refers to as ‘Zomia’ were 
shaped historically around the desire to avoid being totally and 
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irrevocably absorbed within the lowland state’s project. Such an 
approach has been observed among religiously organised Khmer and 
Cham communities in the deltaic swamplands of southern Vietnam, 
whose members often deliberately avoid taking part in activities in 
the morally profane state and market spheres lest they be negatively 
judged by their consociates (Taylor 2007, 2014). During wartime, the 
indigenous ethno-nationalist Barajaka movement among the Central 
Highlanders was formed in the context of state development policies 
of forced assimilation, inter-ethnic frictions and social inequities 
in the highlands (Hickey  2002). Looking at the period after 1975, 
Salemink (2003) regards the mass conversion to Christianity among 
Central Highlanders as an attempt to create autonomous space and an 
attempt to recapture agency. This religious resistance strategy, much 
like that taken up by the Hmong in uppermost northern Vietnam (Ngô 
Thanh Tâm 2015), allows marginalised upland actors to determine 
their immediate living environment at the local and private levels — 
in particular within the village and within the family. 
Accordingly, this chapter shifts the usual focus on uplands–lowlands 
relations to explore practices of tactical or selective (dis)engagement by 
the Bahnar people as a modality of agency that differs from those that 
already have been described in the Central Highlands. Of particular 
concern is how experiences dating to the ‘Vietnam War’ of the 1960s 
and 1970s continue to impact the daily interactions between ethnic 
groups in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. The chapter examines 
how the level of participation of some minority groups in social and 
political activities of the state — mainly run by the Kinh — is related to 
their wartime experiences. An examination of the relationship between 
wartime and peacetime experiences offers interesting insights into 
the complexities in the relations between the minority and majority 
groups. Related to this, the marginalisation of minority groups can 
be traced to persisting prejudices and continuing contradictions 
in majority–minority relations — culturally and historically. 
By  deconstructing these continuing contradictions this chapter 
engages recent debates surrounding recognition of uplanders’ agency 
(Salemink 2015; Friederichsen 2012; Michaud 2012; Taylor  2008). 
In particular, it focuses on the agency of these minority groups who, 
in the face of the overwhelming influence of the majority’s culture and 
state interventionist policies, engage in subtle practices of selective 
participation. Their practices of tactical withdrawal from positions of 
CONNECTED & DISCONNECTED IN VIET NAM
178
responsibility are both historically contingent and gendered, adding 
further layers to our understanding of the patterning of state power 
and participation of ethnic minorities in the state project. 
In order to elucidate these issues, the chapter is made up of three 
parts. The first part is based on an ethnographic study of the practices 
of members of minority groups in accessing education and job 
opportunities, and on how family relations and other acquaintances 
affect these practices. The implication explored is that without these 
relations, access to education and jobs will be extremely difficult. 
The second part discusses social discourses about differences between 
the majority Kinh people and minority ethnic groups regarding 
the lack of representation of members of ethnic minority groups in 
leadership and management positions in public administration. This is, 
in part, due to the lack of education opportunity in upland areas, 
resulting in few minority people being qualified for the jobs available. 
However, even minority people with revolutionary credentials and 
good education can still find themselves marginalised if they fail to 
adapt to the work culture of the dominant group, namely the Kinh. 
The third part stresses the fact that minority ethnic people are not 
subservient, passive and inept in making personal choices, as they are 
so often perceived in Kinh-dominated social discourses. In contrast, 
they show a high degree of agency in turning these negative 
discourses to serve their own interests. In particular, by attending to 
the intricately gendered dynamics of minority self-representation in 
official governance arenas, it is possible to add sociological texture to 
the strategic non-participation thesis that has come to engage scholars 
of state-minority relations in Southeast Asian contexts. 
Background
This chapter draws on empirical data collected during three months 
of fieldwork in Kon Tum Province in 2012. Located in the north of the 
Central Highlands, Kon Tum consists of one provincial municipality, 
eight districts and 97 administrative communes/wards. Kon Tum 
had a population of 432,865 in mid-2009 (General Statistics Office 
of Vietnam 2009). Over 50 per cent of the population is composed 
of ethnic minority groups. Of the 25 ethnic groups in Kon Tum, 
six minority groups are considered as indigenous, including Sedang 
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(mainly inhabiting the districts of Tu Mơ Rông, Ðăk Tô, and Kon 
Plông), Bahnar (mostly living in the city of Kon Tum, and districts of 
Kon Rẫy and Ðăk Hà), and Giẻ-Triêng (concentrated in two districts of 
Ðăk Glei and Ngọc Hồi). The Jarai are based primarily in the district of 
Sa Thầy, and are also found scattered in some communes of Kon Tum 
City. Additionally, there are two very small ethnic groups: B’râu in 
Ðăk Mế village of Ngọc Hồi District, and Rơ Măm in Le village of Sa 
Thầy District. Other ethnic groups settled in Kon Tum under several 
different migration programs at different periods (Hardy 2003). For the 
purposes of this study I conducted three months of fieldwork in six 
selected villages of Bahnar ethnic people in Kon Tum City, and six 
villages of Jarai ethnic people located along the Vietnam–Cambodia 
border in Sa Thầy District. 
The Bahnar — the largest Mon-Khmer–speaking ethnic group in the 
Central Highlands — account for about 13 per cent of the overall 
population in Kon Tum Province. The Bahnar are divided into what 
are usually regarded as four subgroups: Kon Tum, Rơngao, Jơlơng and 
Gơlar. The Bahnar Jơlơng group is found mainly in the city of Kon 
Tum, and in three communes of Kon Rẫy District; the Bahnar Rơngao 
are found scattered in 29 villages of five communes of Kon Tum City, as 
well in two communes of Ðăk Hà District, and Pô Cô commune of Ðăk 
Tô District; the Bahnar Kon Tum concentrate in four administrative 
wards and nine communes of Kon Tum City, while the Bahnar Gơlar 
live mainly in Gia Lai Province. The majority of the Bahnar population 
in Kon Tum Province is Catholic, a religion first introduced to the 
Bahnar community in 1848.3
The Malayo Polynesian–speaking Jarai are the largest of the upland 
ethnic groups in the Central Highlands with a population of 411,275 
(General Statistics Office of Vietnam 2010). Like their Bahnar 
counterparts, the Jarai are divided into subgroups known as Chor, 
Hơdrong, Chưti, M’thur, Aráp, and Tbuăn. Whereas the Jarai live 
primarily in Gia Lai Province, a small proportion of the Jarai Arap 
group can be found in the border district of Sa Thầy of Kon Tum 
3  Charles Keith records that in the 1930s, Kon Tum was created as a separate mission of the 
French MEP missionary organisation, with its own seminary and bishop. By 1938, Kon Tum was 
home to 80 Vietnamese Catholic priests (Keith 2012:116–117). There are no available statistics on 
the present-day Bahnar Catholic population. 
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Province, and in two communes of Kon Tum City. By 2009, the Jarai 
population of 20,606 accounted for about 5 per cent of the overall 
population in the province.
Being quite recent settlers of Kon Tum, the lowland Kinh made up 
nearly 46 per cent of the overall population of the province in 2009 
(General Statistics Office of Vietnam 2010). This figure reflects the 
general situation in the Central Highlands as a result of various major 
immigration movements, both as part of official resettlement programs 
and as independent migrants over different historical eras. As Andrew 
Hardy notes, the Central Highlands was long perceived as an ‘empty’ 
frontier area, destined to absorb population surpluses from the 
northern provinces (Hardy 2003). This immigration stream accounts 
for the majority of the region’s population increase from 1 million 
in 1975 to nearly 5.3 million by 2011 (General Statistics Office of 
Vietnam 2011). Research has shown that the rapid population growth 
has placed excessive pressure on an already degraded environment 
(Rambo and Jamieson 2003) and the process of consolidation of ethnic 
minority lands into state farms have left ethnic minority farmers with 
insufficient land resources (USAID 2008). The competition for resources 
and administrative bias towards ethnic Kinh leave indigenous ethnic 
minorities in the highlands to search for livelihoods in more marginal 
areas, where they are more exposed to climatic variations and poorer 
soils (Rambo and Jamieson 2003). Statistics show that ethnic minority 
households represent 54 per cent of households below the poverty 
line in Kon Tum (USAID 2008), a province with the highest poverty 
incidence rate in the Central Highlands region (General Statistics 
Office of Vietnam 2010). 
From a cultural and social perspective, different intensities of migration 
are associated with different modes of adaptation to the conditions 
of the Central Highlands. As Andrew Hardy (2003) observes, in the 
past, people who settled as individuals or families in the highlands of 
Vietnam tended to adapt to local customs and habits of the majority 
populations there. However, in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, new economic zone settlers arrived in large groups. ‘They 
did not have to adapt, and their presence there was intended to bring 
progress to the highlands to encourage adaptation on the part of the 
highlanders’ (Hardy 2003:229). This approach, together with massive 
changes in land tenure and population density, are likely to have been 
contributing factors to widely publicised episodes of unrest in the 
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Central Highlands in 2001 and 2004 (World Bank 2009:16). A decade 
later, while doing fieldwork in Kon Tum, I noticed the presence of 
special military units stationed near communes with high ethnic 
minority populations that were considered to be ‘problematic’.4 
Also the practice of chào cờ (flag saluting) on Monday mornings was 
obligatory for ethnic minority residents. These measures were seen 
as government efforts to exert social and political control over ethnic 
groups at the commune level. How these groups react to these measures 
will be discussed at the end of this chapter. In the following part, 
I shall discuss the participation of ethnic minorities in the state sector.
Ethnic Minority Participation in the 
State Sector
In Kon Tum Province, it was reported that in December 2011 
the  percentage of ethnic minority cán bộ (cadres) and công chức 
(civil servants) was approximately 7 per cent, whereas the percentage 
of ethnic minority viên chức (public employees) was about 11 per cent.5 
These quantitative data indicate that representation of ethnic 
minorities in the state sector is extremely low. Their representation 
gradually falls at lower administrative levels.
It is worth noting that in a recent survey by UNDP and Vietnam 
Fatherland  Front for the Provincial Governance and Public 
Administration Performance Index (PAPI) among 30 selected 
provinces, Kon Tum scored substantially lower than the other 29 
provinces (Acuña-Alfaro et al. 2013). The same survey also indicated 
that Kon Tum performed much lower than other provinces with 
similar economic status (i.e. Ðiện Biên, Cao Bằng, Hà Tĩnh). The PAPI 
survey is based on the experiences and feedback of citizens from 
various provinces on the performance of governance and public 
administration. Thus the findings for Kon Tum seem to reflect citizens’ 
negative attitude toward public administration performance. This 
becomes more evident when we examine the level of ethnic minority 
4  From information received via locally conducted interviews, the degree of ‘problematic’ 
was based on the number of individuals previously known to be involved in incidents occurring 
in 2001 and 2004.
5 Provincial personnel data provided to the author by Kon Tum Department of Home Affairs, 
May 2012.
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participation in local authorities at commune level. Take the case of 
Blang ward, for example. Even in a ward where the Bahnar predominate 
overwhelmingly, in Blang — with a population of 9,723 — the number 
of minority people in state administrative units is quite low: seven 
out of 22, or just 30 per cent. This finding is consistent with research 
elsewhere, which finds that the representation of ethnic minority 
cadres in the government workforce in the uplands is low (Rambo and 
Jamieson 2003). This situation would appear to exacerbate existing 
tensions among local residents, as evident in the comments made by 
one Bahnar official in the city:
The ward chairman is a Kinh, cadres in various local services are 
90  per cent Kinh. There are just two cadres from ethnic people … 
I  feel a bit sad. Maybe they think ethnic people cannot do the job, 
they let the Kinh do it … They already picked their people. No use 
talking about it, it makes no sense. We want to take in someone, but 
they said it’s not OK; to get our children in there is difficult, they think 
we are not qualified.
It is worth noting that most respondents in the research site expressed 
the wish to get a job in the state sector, since opportunities to get work 
in the town are very limited. As one research participant commented 
to the author:
This village is part of the city. It has little land, young people hire out 
their labour mainly as porters. Ready anytime. If they could get work 
[in the rubber plantations or planting trees in the forests] then they 
could earn money. Here there’s nothing.
Moreover, ethnic minority locals often perceive jobs in the state 
sector as superior ‘mandarin jobs’ (làm quan), for, compared with 
lowly agricultural work in the fields, a state sector job provides 
health insurance and a pension after retirement. These jobs are 
secure, permanent and much sought after. Trương Huyền Chi (2010) 
notes that work in the public administration sector is high on the 
job preference list of the Mnong in Ðăk Nông. The desire to have a 
‘mandarin job’ is also prevalent among ethnic minority groups in 
mountainous areas of Northern Vietnam (Nguyễn Thu Hương and 
Nguyễn Trường Giang 2011). David Wangsgard (2009) similarly 
contends that the Nùng Fan Slinh in the northeast of Vietnam tend 
to believe that the means to achieving popular Vietnamese notions of 
modernity and development are through wage employment, or other 
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cash-generating activities, becoming Party members or otherwise 
participating in local governance, and expanding one’s social network 
to include the influential Kinh ethnic majority. From statistical data as 
well as via conversations with local residents, I found that the number 
of ethnic minority people who are qualified to apply for state positions 
are few and far between.
‘It is in the Genes [Gien]’
On the first day of my visit to a village in the city of Kon Tum, through 
the introduction of the official in charge of cultural affairs of Kon 
Tum, I met a lady in her 50s named Moan6 who the official referred 
to as a ‘main correspondent’. She provided me with a list of villagers 
working in the public sector and arranged for me to meet them later. 
It turned out that these persons were all related to her and her family. 
Miss Moan’s daughter-in-law laughed and explained to me that those 
who worked as state employees in the village ‘are all related, as if it 
is in the genes’. The same pattern occurred in other villages that we 
visited later. How do we explain this phenomenon and what is meant 
by ‘genes’? On the one hand, family education background serves as a 
motivation for ethnic minority youth to pursue their studies, as some 
respondents explained their desire to follow in their parents’ footsteps, 
and to be on the same level, if not do better than them. But we also 
met state employees of a wholly peasant background who were keen 
on reaping the benefits of education to improve their social position 
and the well-being of their families. Another ‘gene’ no less important 
is the sociopolitical connectedness enjoyed by a number of local 
residents owing to their contributions, or those of their families, to 
the war efforts of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This particular 
factor plays an important role in getting access to education and job 
opportunities. 
From a policy perspective, targets for recruiting local cadres in the 
‘National project on promoting human resources in ethnic minority 
and mountainous areas towards 2020’ have not been met owing to a 
lack of students (CEMA 2011:4). Of particular relevance here is the 
6  Except for the names of administrative units appearing in official documents, all names of 
persons and locations (under the district level) are pseudonyms in order to protect the anonymity 
of participants taking part in this research project.
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proposed selection policy (cử tuyển),7 whereby the local authority can 
nominate qualified ethnic minority students to universities, colleges 
and professional schools without having to pass an entrance exam. 
These nominees are expected to return to their home districts to 
work in the public service for a number of years. This is how ethnic 
minority cadres working at various levels have been trained (Nguyễn 
Thị Thu Phương and Baulch 2007:24–25). However, it is reported 
that provinces have rarely met the recruiting target for the proposed 
selection policy. For instance, provinces reached only 77 per cent of 
the annual target in 2009 (CEMA 2011).
Findings from this current study reveal that local ethnic communities 
were rarely informed in a timely manner of the official announcements 
pertaining to the nomination policy. I was told that it was not unusual 
for the minorities to receive a call for applications only one day before 
the official deadline. In such situations, those interested (and qualified) 
were unable to prepare the required paperwork for their application. 
Only a few people working at the offices in the commune or district 
know about the information. They keep it for their children or 
relatives. If these fail to meet the criteria, they don’t bother to circulate 
it; they keep it in the drawer or just throw it away.
Information of this kind is often passed around via social networks 
and not through official channels:
A friend of my brother in Kon Tum City told me it’s time to apply. 
I brought the forms to the commune’s committee to be certified, they 
asked me how did I know about it.
Current evidence indicates that some provinces nominate a small 
number of Kinh students, while others limit the number of students 
from relatively well-off groups (such as the Thái, Tày, Mường, and 
Nùng) who can receive nominations (Nguyễn Thị Thu Phương and 
Baulch 2007). This practice seems to exist in Kon Tum as in the words 
of a state cadre:
7  The two key legal documents governing the nomination policy are Joint Circular 04 in 
2001 (Ministry of Education and Training, Ministry of Home Affairs and National Committee for 
Ethnic Minority Affairs) and Decree 134 in 2006 (Government of Vietnam).
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In recent years some people — children of Kinh big shots [các ông 
Kinh] — have changed their names and their officially registered 
addresses [hộ khẩu]. They come to these places and take the jobs 
available. Because  the number of children of ethnic people who 
qualify for these jobs are few, the Kinh children just fill the slots to 
meet [recruiting] targets.
Phenomena such as red tape, power abuse, and administrative 
harassment can be readily observed among the ranks of public 
servants (United Nations 2004:18). The relationship between civil 
servants and citizens is not really the relationship between those who 
serve and those being served, but rather like the kind of ‘beg and 
give’ relationship of the old pre-revolutionary days. The situation 
seems to be worse when it comes to ethnic minorities in mountainous 
areas. As Terry Rambo and Neil Jamieson observe:
Many of them [cadres in the uplands] are lowland Kinh assigned 
against their wishes to remote areas, people who have little motivation 
to do their jobs well. Not surprisingly problems of corruption and 
bureaucratic inertia are widely evident. (Rambo and Jamieson 
2003:159)
Local people generally concentrate their efforts to get jobs in the fields 
of education and health care since this is where job opportunities 
exist due to government policy focused on provision of education and 
health services to meet the essential needs of local people. Since the 
livelihood of local people is dependent on agricultural production and 
related activities, few have the financial means or social connections 
to branch out to other fields in terms of learning and job prospects. 
Thus, education and health care are two fields of work that can offer 
them state jobs. Few parents or young people dream of subjects such 
as engineering, information sciences, or banking. Only a few students 
have been selected to follow courses in development economics. 
For most people, following ‘advanced education’ outside the province 
is a far-fetched dream, as one interlocutor observed:
If we send them to the district or provincial town to study, it’s still 
cheaper than sending them to the big cities. If you want to study 
economics or banking you have to travel far. There’s nothing in 
the province. And where do you find the money for tuition, room, 
food? And when you finish you don’t know anybody in the banking 
business to ask for a job.
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This apparently negative attitude is rooted in the realistic assessment 
of the economic situation of the household and the lack of extra-local 
social connections among local residents. It only reinforces the popular 
discourse that minority people are only fit for jobs in the health or 
education sectors — all local jobs — implying that they are not suited 
for jobs that ‘require greater intelligence’ or are more competitive. 
The success of efforts aimed at developing human resources among 
ethnic minority groups will thus be closely related to the existing 
social capital of specific communities, groups or individuals in such 
communities. 
Access to local training and work opportunities is constrained by 
limited social capital, a phenomenon common to some uplands 
societies in Vietnam. Due to this scarcity of social capital, state efforts 
to decentralise resource management by returning control over assets 
into the hands of local communities may be ineffective (Rambo and 
Jamieson 2003:161–162). From our findings on the ground, most local 
women currently engaged in the public sector more or less owe their 
jobs to family or kin relations. More specifically, they are related to 
local cadres or families who ‘have contributed to the revolution’: those 
who supported the war efforts of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
against the United States and their Republic of Vietnam allies. These 
two factors — social and political capital — play an important role in 
enabling access to training and job opportunities available for local 
ethnic peoples. This preliminary study shows that the social capital 
related to education and training for ethnic groups is quite limited, 
and the few opportunities available are reserved for the families of 
those who served on the side of the northern forces during the war 
against the Americans. This limited social capital is tied up with 
intricate interpersonal and inter-ethnic relations between the majority 
Kinh and the minority groups concerned. 
Against the multi-ethnic background of the Central Highlands, inter-
ethnic relations have been strongly influenced by geo-political and 
historical factors. Looking at the population distribution of ethnic 
groups in Kon Tum Province, one can see that the Jarai — most of 
whom live in Gia Lai Province — are concentrated in the southern-
most district of Sa Thầy, while the Bahnar reside mainly around Ðăk 
Bla River in the city of Kon Tum. In line with social discourses about 
the relative advantages of ‘urban’ versus ‘remote’ residence, one may 
think the ‘urban’ Bahnar of the city of Kon Tum would fare better 
187
5 . ‘THE RED SEEDLINGS OF THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS’
in terms of opportunities for social advancement than the ‘rural’ 
Jarai in remote Sa Thầy District. But the realities on the ground are 
quite different. In the case of the Bahnar community in Kon Tum 
City, they attribute their inferior access to state jobs to their wartime 
experiences. This explanation implies that those who do not enjoy 
privileged relationships to power-holders have little chance to benefit 
from present-day job opportunities. But how have these relationships 
been shaped? Again, these experiences date back to the time of the 
‘Vietnam War’ when members of some ethnic minorities were allied to 
the forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Now they and their 
children enjoy the fruits of this collaboration. By contrast, members 
of the Bahnar group living in the city of Kon Tum, where the United 
States and Republic of Vietnam forces were stationed before 1975, 
were treated with suspicion by the state after reunification. And, since 
many of them are Roman Catholic, with their own autonomous history 
of organisation and education and links to co-religionists abroad, they 
are not trusted by the state apparatus. As a Bahnar female doctor 
told us: ‘Since they know about my past they deny my [professional] 
endeavours.’
Similar to observations made by Anne Leshkowich (2008) on the 
experiences of small traders in Hồ Chí Minh City, past relations still 
have a bearing on the current life of Bahnar individuals. This reflects 
what Jayne Werner (2006) has identified as a genealogy of current 
tensions. Local people told me that in mountainous areas such as 
Sa Thầy, most people (mainly Jarai) supported the revolutionary 
cause during the war, whereas the people living in the city of Kon 
Tum near American and Republic of Vietnam military camps had 
‘few experiences of support for the revolution’. The general trend is 
that people currently deployed in leadership positions in the province 
are from the Sedang, the Jarai, the Giẻ Triêng, and the small Bahnar 
group from mountainous districts, leaving out members of the larger 
population of Bahnar people living around the city of Kon Tum.
A Need for Kinh-ness
The study also indicates a primary reason for the absence of members 
of minority groups in the higher echelons of management positions. 
Due  to the lack of education and training opportunities in uplands 
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areas, few ethnic minority individuals can meet the requirements for 
those jobs. Their marginalisation is further aggravated by pervasive 
discourses about sociocultural differences between the majority group 
(Kinh) and minority groups. It is as though they have internalised 
a sense of inferiority by persistently measuring themselves, and 
failing, against ‘lowlands’ standards. However, even those people 
who have access to these jobs due to family connections (having 
made a contribution to the revolution) must still adapt themselves to 
‘how things work’ in the Kinh-dominated bureaucracy and patronage 
system if they wish to advance their careers. To illustrate this point 
further, I relate the case of a Bahnar man who I call Mr X. In my 
fieldwork, I met and talked at length with Mr X, who belonged to the 
Bahnar group (from a mountainous district), had joined the revolution, 
and had held various management positions in the public sector:
At that time it’s not that I was awakened to the revolution, I belong 
to a family participating in the revolution; we hid and nurtured 
revolutionary partisans. When I was a child, I was an informer … the 
revolution chose me. When I got some information I would pass it on 
to the local cadre [in the occupied zone], I just hung around the village 
… I was a member of the secret youth team. The party, the people, the 
revolution sent the best children, those of families who contributed 
to the revolution, to the north to be educated, I was one of them. 
There were 19 of us. It took nine months for us to reach Vĩnh Linh. 
We kept walking across the Trường Sơn range. The others led the way, 
I was behind. We were forbidden to break branches, or make the least 
noise for fear of being discovered. I studied at the Central School for 
ethnic people. At the beginning I couldn’t speak the Kinh language … 
At that time there were more than 2,000 people, from Bình Thuận and 
other provinces, the Khmer, the Mường, the Tày.
For this Bahnar boy, participation in the revolution began by doing 
liaison work for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam side. This was 
a turning point in his turbulent life:
I was fortunate to have been picked by the party and the revolution 
to have an education … Before my hair was very long, no one was 
allowed to cut it. I had to tie it like a chignon. When orders came down 
for me to cut my hair, we had to offer a pig [to God]. According to local 
customs to keep one’s hair is to preserve the human soul, if you cut 
it, you’re nothing. If you want to cut it you have to sacrifice a cock or 
a pig and ask for the permission of God [Yang].
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Mr X’s account echoes the notion of the modern benefits of communism 
(Goscha 2004) that Vietnamese cadres actively promoted in western 
Indo-China to win over local support during the war against the 
French (1945–1954):
Cadres taught locals how to purify water, cook meat, procure salt, use 
modern agricultural tools, sew and develop local handicraft industries, 
even to build their houses differently. The Vietnamese opened up 
literacy campaigns to transmit the benefits of this new revolutionary 
civilisation. The Vietnamese taught upland people the importance of 
hygiene, washing themselves, taking care of their animals and moving 
them away from their houses. (Goscha 2004:156–157)
All of these methods indicate Vietnamese cadres’ discourse of 
modernity (Goscha 2004) which aimed to bring modernity to these 
backward peoples by changing their habits and customs in favour of 
what they saw as superior ones. Mr X continued his narrative about 
what happened in the post-war years:
I came and lived here [the city of Kon Tum] since 1994. I was 
appointed vice director of the boarding school for ethnic people. 
[Former Prime Minister] Võ Văn Kiệt wanted me to take the director’s 
job but I refused, only wanted to be vice director … He said none of 
the boarding schools for ethnic peoples has a director belonging to 
an ethnic [minority] group. At that time I was studying economics at 
Ðà Nẵng, they just put my name up for the director’s position. But I 
said this is a sensitive issue, the local people [ethnic minority people] 
don’t want to get involved, I want to do my best for the country, there 
should be no distinction between Kinh and ethnic people. The ethnic 
people don’t care much about material things. If the Kinh invite them 
out to eat or drink, they just go without an afterthought. The Kinh 
people are calculating, the ethnic people are not like that, they work 
for the common good.
Other respondents shared similar feelings about the differences in 
behaviours and attitudes between the Kinh and members of ethnic 
minority groups in the Central Highlands. Most of them expressed 
concern regarding the ways that they have to deal with colleagues and 
superiors — mainly Kinh — noting that, ‘if you are straightforward 
and honest, you cannot move up the career ladder’. How some members 
of minority groups render the Kinh as ‘other’ can be discerned in the 
following remarks made by another former government official:
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Local people like us do not want to get involved in competition 
… [we  are] straightforward, we do not want to misuse privilege. 
The  Kinh  are different. They calculate every move. The school 
principal and the treasurer divide [the financial resources] between 
them … I myself don’t care, I just want to do my job properly. Before 
I was head of the education service [of the district], there were Kinh 
people there too. When I came to this school, there were more Kinh 
people … To avoid this problem, I declined the position of school 
principal [offered to me]. 
This interview excerpt further illustrates that relations between Kinh 
migrants and indigenous locals are fraught with prejudice, tension 
and inequality (McElwee 2008). Far from erasing ethnic prejudices, 
often such interactions accentuate mistrust of others, as long-term 
residents see the newcomers as stingy and deceptive, while newcomers 
view the locals as simple-minded and ignorant (cf. Taylor 2008:12). 
This othering of Kinh migrants as ‘calculating’ and self-serving seems 
to give rise to an unflattering view of the Kinh-run local government. 
A Bahnar female doctor explained: 
Formerly the cadres often appropriated land from [local] people. Since 
they were important officials, people were scared of them. However 
people haven’t changed their opinion. Once you are a cadre you are 
bound to engage in corrupt activity, they think. Around 1982 some 
local [ethnic minority] people served as government cadres. Some 
cadres like the hamlet head appropriated [public] land as much as they 
pleased. They argued that it was public land but they made it their 
own anyway. After that [the government] appoints no more cadres 
from local [ethnic minority] people.
In the eyes of local residents those ethnic minority individuals taking 
part in the government apparatus seem to be ‘polluted’ by the ‘strange’ 
practices of the Kinh people, and the local government representing 
the Kinh-dominated central government is often negatively regarded, 
considered to be highly bureaucratic and inefficient as indicated in 
the PAPI survey (Acuña-Alfaro et al. 2013) mentioned earlier. It is no 
surprise that government jobs are not keenly sought after by some 
ethnic minority people in this study. 
Furthermore, meeting the criteria of ‘having made a contribution 
to the revolution’ (or being related to someone who did) as well as 
being suitably qualified, does not guarantee a smooth ride for ethnic 
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minority individuals. They also have to show their capacity for 
‘cultural adaptation’ (thích ứng văn hóa). As a Kinh administrator who 
has spent a long time in Kon Tum remarked:
In the present system you need patronage. If you have no sponsor, 
there is little chance of moving upwards. Since local people do not 
join a clique, they are dropped from the system. However, there are 
those whose [political] background and qualifications are not up to the 
mark yet still they know how to go along with the system and find 
a support base to move up the bureaucracy. Once they have secured 
a solid position, they would bring in family members and friends. 
Generally speaking, through contacts with the Kinh, they become 
wiser, they learn the ways the Kinh operate and develop from then on.
From this one can infer that local ethnic people must adapt to the ways 
things are run by the majority group or be left outside of the power 
structure. This is similar to the case of Malay Muslims in southern 
Thailand who do not meet the informally understood criteria for full 
Thai citizenship (McCargo 2011). As Duncan McCargo argues, being 
Thai involves a willingness to subsume your ethnicity, language and 
religious identity to a dominant discourse and mindset of Thai-ness. 
Malay Muslims fail to pass this basic test, and thus are ‘not Thai’, 
despite the fact that they are born in Thailand, hold Thai citizenship, 
and increasingly speak Thai as a first language (McCargo 2011:14). 
When identity is linked to demands for political authority and power, 
ethnicity becomes even more problematic. 
In line with McCargo’s analysis of the situation in Thailand, 
Vietnamese  citizenship accorded to members of ethnic minorities 
seems to preclude full social and political participation if they do not 
embrace major tenets of the Kinh culture. However, the story of Mr X 
and comments by local residents about cultural differences can also 
be seen as a form of resistance to the overwhelming influence of the 
Kinh by way of a method of strategic non-integration. The Kinh, for 
their part, look at such choices as signs of weakness, or a ‘lack of 
competitive spirit’ on the part of ethnic minorities. This finding is 
consistent with recent studies (Friederichsen 2012; Friederichsen and 
Neef 2010; Taylor 2008) on the contested interplay between the state 
and upland peoples in the ongoing processes of marginalisation and 
integration in Vietnam. This research indicates that while some ethnic 
minority groups are likely to be excluded from the modern, civilised 
nation, some of them would like to participate in it. However, the study 
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evidence seems to suggest that ‘non-integration can be a reflection 
of local agency, choice and strategising’ (Friederichsen 2012:59). 
To  illustrate the complexity of this process, the following section 
focuses on the case of women’s participation in public activities in 
selected ethnic minority communes in Kon Tum.
An Interplay of Gender, Ethnicity and 
Local Politics
During my field trip in Kon Tum, I observed that those attending the 
weekly community meeting on Mondays under the guise of the flag-
raising ceremony were mostly women representing their families. 
Local cadres used these meetings to propagate government policies 
on law, education, health, and production. But the high number of 
women at these meetings does not necessarily correspond to the role 
or position of these women in the family. Kinh officials explained 
to me that this active participation reflected the cultural aspects of 
matrilineal and matriarchal systems among the Jarai, or the bilineal 
system among the Bahnar. But when I asked these women why their 
husbands did not attend these meetings, they said the men just did 
not want to go. The flag-raising ceremony taking place among ethnic 
minority communities in Kon Tum Province is considered as a good 
occasion to get women involved in local affairs. However, on looking 
more closely, we learned that the rather active participation of women 
in community activities does not necessarily signal an improvement 
in gender equality. This observation is also made in the World Bank’s 
country report on gender conditions in Vietnam (World Bank 2011). 
The question is what makes the men stay away from these meetings 
and how may this be related to notions of masculinity and femininity, 
of honour, and of power relations among the local community? 
A villager explained further:
Only women attend these flag raising meetings. The men don’t bother 
to go. In the ethnic minority villages, the flag raising ceremony is 
not considered as important, so the women go there. They go home 
and tell their husbands what happens. They [the men] don’t want 
to hear reports of children’s quarrels among the poor households. 
These things do not concern them. If something concerns their own 
interests, then they go.
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The fact that it is almost exclusively women who attend these meetings 
reflects a clear gender differentiation in household participation in 
community activities. Our findings about women’s participation 
in flag-raising ceremonies differ slightly from those concerning 
women’s attendance of meetings organised by the Women’s Union or 
concerning population and family planning as discussed in the World 
Bank’s gender assessment (World Bank 2011). The subjects discussed 
at these flag-raising meetings not only cover ‘women’s concerns’, such 
as population control or family planning, but also social, economic 
and religious issues affecting the whole community. From what we 
heard from local residents, the near-exclusive presence of women 
at these civic functions can be traced to an intricate web of social, 
cultural and economic relations that go beyond the household and 
the community. These meetings ‘bring them nothing’ in the sense 
that they attain no material benefit by attending. From a gender 
perspective, it is significant that these activities that do not create 
‘benefit’ (material gain), in which women predominantly take part, 
are considered as ‘not important’ activities. Men, on the other hand, 
are understood to engage in matters that are ‘important’ or ‘vital’, 
depending on local perceptions and standards. This has to do with 
income-generating activities that sustain the household; men have 
to deal with the outside world and must speak the Kinh language 
in their daily dealings. It should be noted that subjects relating to 
the domestic sphere, such as child care and household concerns, 
occupy a considerable part of the agenda of these meetings, which 
are conducted in the local language. This language factor is crucial in 
facilitating the attendance of women at these meetings, where they 
can communicate readily and feel relatively at ease. As pointed out 
elsewhere, the main reason preventing ethnic minority women from 
taking part in activities outside the home is their lack of confidence in 
interpersonal relations (World Bank 2011).
These meetings are occasions for local officials to reprimand residents 
or their children — calling them by name — for acts of public disorder 
such as drunkenness or fighting, school absenteeism, tax evasion, etc. 
Men consider these public ‘denouncements’ as humiliating and prefer 
to stay at home, letting women bear the brunt of official scolding. 
Some point out that children of local officials who are guilty of similar 
offences are never reprimanded publicly. I witnessed in another setting 
this attitude of avoiding ‘difficult’ or ‘awkward’ situations on the part 
CONNECTED & DISCONNECTED IN VIET NAM
194
of men in some situations and the role played by women. During the 
last days of our field research, a fight broke out in the village which 
involved the son of the family who provided us with temporary 
lodgings. The local police had to intervene and took those involved 
to the station for questioning. Of course the lady of the house, our 
‘landlady’, had to go to the station to ask for his release and we offered 
to come along to give her ‘moral support’. But she turned down our 
offer, saying: ‘You teachers look like rich people; that won’t do. I am 
dressed like a poor woman, it will work.’ And she was right, her son 
was allowed to go home soon after. It was explained to me later:
In the village when you have to go to the ward office when something 
goes wrong, only women go there. Men don’t go. They say women 
do this better, the ward people pity them, and will drop the matter. 
If you look poor, if you are dressed shabbily, it’s better. Men usually 
drink, they easily lose their temper. If they go there it will cause more 
problems.
Participation by women in activities outside the home in certain areas 
of the Central Highlands is not adequately explained by simplistic 
culturalist interpretations that view such trends as conforming to 
traditional matrilineal or bilinear family structures. As I have earlier 
remarked on gender relations among ethnic minority groups in 
northern Vietnam (cf. Phạm Quỳnh Phương 2012),8 the participation 
of men in activities outside the home and their decisions in these 
matters can be seen as women ‘ceding their rights’ (nhường quyền) to 
men, out of common sense, to overcome barriers that women face such 
as language, means of transport and social skills. In the social and 
cultural context of the Central Highlands, particularly in the case of 
the Jarai and Bahnar, such acts of ‘ceding rights’ — in this case men 
ceding their rights to women — to get out of difficult situations or 
gain temporary advantages can be seen as a clever way of exploiting 
existing discourses on ethnic minorities by playing the underdog 
(being poor, ignorant, unkempt). However, these extra tasks beyond 
the usual household chores put the additional burden on women 
of living up to their presumably important and traditional roles in 
matrilineal and bilinear societies.
8  I was involved as research adviser in the project on gender-related issues among ethnic 
minority groups in Bắc Kạn in 2011 for the Hà Nội-based Institute for Studies of Society, 
Economy, and Environment.
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From an inter-ethnic relations perspective, these examples are 
emblematic of the agency displayed by ethnic minority people in 
the sense that they are not subservient, passive, or lacking in logical 
thinking as often perceived by the majority Kinh. And even if they 
may have internalised a sense of inferiority in the face of dominant 
Kinh culture/civilisation as discussed earlier, they somehow manage to 
turn negative images about them around to serve their own interests. 
This sample of Bahnar resistance is consistent with research evidence 
elsewhere that ethnic minorities have responded to discriminatory 
policies in numerous — often covert — ways (Michaud 2012:14). 
For instance, Jean Michaud observes that Hmong individuals in rural 
communities of Lào Cai province view themselves neither as resisting 
nor as the submissive victims of domination. Rather, they respond to 
the official policy of ‘selective cultural preservation’ with their own 
strategy of selective acceptance of modernity (Michaud 2009:32), 
suggesting a certain reservation towards standardisation and a 
globalising process (Michaud 2012). A study on recent Protestant 
conversion among Hmong groups in Lào Cai describes the ways in 
which many Hmong individuals embrace a ‘resistant spirit’ and resent 
Kinh contempt for Hmong traditional practices of polygamy and early 
marriage (Ngô Thanh Tâm 2015). The resilience of Hmong in Vietnam 
is credited to centuries of neighbourly relations, quarrels, political 
and economic exploitation, rebellions, invasions, wars, genocides, 
and flight (Turner et al. 2015). Taylor (2007) notes that Cham Muslim 
strategies for evading parochial incorporation by the state involve 
flexible diversification, evident in their ever-shifting household 
economy mix, discerning local and extra-local mobility, and pluralist 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious identifications.
By Way of Conclusion
The opening image of a group of Bahnar men — descendants of one 
of the earliest settlers of Kon Tum — selling their labour in the heart 
of Kon  Tum City can be seen as emblematic of a wider picture of 
marginality  for ethnic minorities in Vietnam. Popular assumptions 
(held by the majority group) contend that ethnic minorities are less 
adept at learning. They are also provided with far fewer and narrower 
higher education and training opportunities. Taken together, 
this results  in ethnic minorities being confined to lower-paid and 
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lower-status local jobs, rather than jobs of a more competitive and 
rewarding nature. All of this occurs against a backdrop of rapid 
economic, social, and cultural transformation that has drastically 
reduced the traditional habitat of minority groups due to massive in-
migration of Kinh people and utilisation of the forest for production 
of commodities to serve the global market. A quarter of a century 
after đổi mới was launched, there is little evidence of the inclusive 
social and cultural growth for the multi-ethnic nation that was meant 
to be promoted by state policy. This preliminary study shows that the 
social capital required for education, training, and job placement for 
ethnic minority groups is limited, and the few available opportunities 
for public sector work are reserved for families of those who served on 
the side of the northern forces during the war against the Americans. 
It would seem that those who lack access to these privileged 
relationships have little chance of gaining access to these valued job 
opportunities. This is evident in explanations by Bahnar people of 
their current inferior position, with regard to job opportunities and 
participation in the state sector, which is still strongly shaped by 
war experiences more than 40 years ago. Particularly with regard to 
the social and political integration of ethnic minorities in the Central 
Highlands, entrenched inequalities between the majority group and 
other minorities have become even wider and the few individuals from 
minority groups who have somehow climbed out of their own ethnic 
niches to succeed socially and economically are those who chose to 
adopt aspects of Kinh-ness. 
From the individual accounts in this study, uplanders’ non-integration 
into the mainstream society at times can be perceived as an expression 
of their rational agency. In fact, members of some ethnic groups might 
prefer to withdraw or separate from and minimise their involvement 
in state structures, in order to preserve their sense of honour or 
masculinity, or perhaps to avoid being shunned by their own peers 
for seeming too grasping and calculating. This points to a strategy of 
selective non-participation, which might be explained by a history 
of mistreatment by and mistrust towards national governments. Some 
people wish to avoid contamination by the morally profane state 
and market spheres, and the risk of being negatively evaluated by 
their consociates for becoming too involved in such activities. They 
actively try to resist becoming Kinh. Such findings align broadly 
with what James Scott has termed ‘the art of not being governed’ 
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(Scott  2009), while at the same time illuminating the intricately 
gendered and historically contingent dimensions of such political 
practices. However, contemporary tactics of selective disengagement 
also need to be understood as a mode by which minorities actively 
engage the state, considering that the very categories of difference 
through which they shape their resistance come to them through a 
history of state-making and subjectification. These ambivalent and 
complex dimensions of state-uplander relations have implications 
for the argument put forward here that the national integration of 
Vietnam’s uplands has been a contested process with deep historical 
roots. In other words, past experiences of relatedness seem to explain 
current instances of intentional disconnectedness by some ethnic 
minority individuals. 
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The Struggle to be Poor in 
Vietnam’s Northern Borderlands: 
Political Metis and Biopower in 
the Local State Arena
Peter Chaudhry
The state is a pervasive presence in the everyday lives of the people 
of Vĩnh Thủy commune, a remote and mountainous commune in 
Vietnam’s northern Lào Cai Province.1 State-owned companies 
dominate business, the state underwrites agricultural production, and 
state rituals and state cadre regulate social life in a way unimaginable 
in urban and lowland areas of the country. But the state’s presence is 
perhaps felt most keenly through the provision of poverty reduction 
and welfare support to the people of the commune. This support 
1  The names of the commune, the district and people in this chapter are pseudonyms. 
This chapter draws on field research conducted in Lào Cai between 2013 and 2015 as part of 
my doctoral program at The Australian National University. An international non-governmental 
organisation kindly supported my application to the provincial authorities to spend time in 
the commune and I lived there for four months in the second half of 2013. Prior to this, I had 
spent two months regularly visiting the commune and neighbouring communes in the district. 
Additional material was collected during visits to other communes in the province and in 
consultation with key policymakers. I am indebted to Philip Taylor for his extensive comments 
and suggestions on this chapter and for numerous discussions through which he has helped me 
to clarify my ideas. I am also grateful to Andrew Walker, and to the two anonymous referees who 
provided insightful and constructive comments on the chapter.
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increased enormously throughout the 1990s and is now a defining 
feature of the relationship between the state and the people of the 
northern borderlands.
The increased welfare role of the state has, in turn, led to an increasing 
bureaucratisation of everyday life. Consequently, local people in the 
borderlands have necessarily become more knowledgeable about 
the state and have an increased level of confidence in engaging with 
officials. As a senior member of the state’s ethnic minority affairs 
committee in Hà Nội remarked to me: ‘ethnic minority people are 
changing, they’re making more demands and it’s harder to keep them 
satisfied than it used to be’. Both the ubiquitousness of the state and 
its changed role in relation to the citizenry has in turn spawned a 
particular kind of politics, as local people increasingly seek to engage 
productively with the state for the resources on offer. Inverting James 
Scott’s classic conception of the role of the state and its engagement with 
the citizenry, Andrew Walker describes this as a shift ‘from legibility 
to eligibility’ (Walker 2015).
In Vi ̃nh Thu ̉y commune, this manifests itself most visibly in the way 
local people struggle to be recognised by the state as ‘poor’, and 
thus eligible for critical government resources. There is a notable 
lack of stigma attached to being called poor, in contrast to lowland 
and more urban areas of Vietnam where the term ‘poor’ (nghèo) has 
more pejorative connotations. This is perhaps because many people in 
the commune are classified as either poor or ‘near-poor’ (cận nghèo).2 
The status is not exceptional and being ‘poor’ is a classification that 
is actively sought, as it signals recognition from the state of a right to 
access resources.3 
2  For the period 2011–15, the rural poor were classified as those with an income below 
400,000 VND per person per month (about $20 USD). The rural near-poor were classified as 
those with an income of between 401,000 and 520,000 VND per person per month ($20–26 USD)
(Government decision no. 09/2011/QÐ-TTg).
3  I use the term ‘state’ here and throughout the chapter to refer to the ensemble of Communist 
Party and Government of Vietnam organisations, ministries, departments and officials that are 
responsible for ruling the country today. I make a critical distinction between higher-level 
state organisations and officials (at the national, provincial and district levels), which I call the 
centre state, and the ‘local state’ commune and village-level officials who are the focus of this 
chapter. I appreciate, though, that the centre state too is not a unitary entity, and that there is 
significant contestation and conflict between branches of the Party, government ministries and 
departments, and between different levels of administration (see MacLean 2013 for a thorough 
discussion on these dynamics). I witnessed this contestation at close quarters as an embedded 
adviser in two government ministries in Hà Nội from 2008–12. 
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Increasing integration with market forces is taking place in the northern 
borderlands, and socioeconomic differentiation and stratification is 
slowly but increasingly evident in the commune. But it is still fair to 
say that the vast majority of the people of Vĩnh Thu ̉y have very little, 
and can rightfully lay claim to being called poor. Indeed, a common 
observation made in the commune during my fieldwork for this study 
was that it was only those households that had someone employed as a 
commune or village official (about 10 per cent of the households in the 
commune), and who consequently earned a regular government salary, 
that were categorically not poor. Everyone else could credibly claim 
to be poor according to the prevailing moral norms of the commune. 
Vĩnh Thu ̉y is overwhelmingly populated by ethnic minority people, 
a common situation in the border areas of northern Vietnam. 
The commune population is evenly split between Hmông and Nùng 
ethnic minority households, with each group constituting about 
40 per cent of the population overall. The next largest group is the 
Dao, with 10 per cent, and the remaining households are made up 
of smaller ethnic groups, such as the Tu’Si, the Pa’Si (also called the 
Bố Y), and a few Kinh and Tày people. There are 12 villages in the 
commune and each village is primarily ethnically based, with five of 
the villages Hmông, four Nùng, and two Dao. Only the central village 
is ethnically mixed.4 
The ethnic demographics of the commune are reflected in the formal 
division of local state power. The allocation of official positions in 
the local state structure is carefully calibrated through long-standing 
conventions that are supported by district party and government 
officials, in order to ensure an equal division of power between the 
dominant Hmông and Nùng groups. Each of the other ethnic groups 
receives one position in the local Party-state machinery, but the vast 
majority of the Party and commune people’s committee positions in 
the local administration are divided between these two ethnic groups. 
In particular, the two most important positions of Party Secretary 
and Commune Chairman are always divided between the Hmông and 
Nùng in the commune.5 Two family lineages within each group in turn 
4  The central village is also the most prosperous, with all of the Kinh households living there. 
The largest village is a Nùng village but with a significant Dao population (about 20 per cent).
5  I discuss this ethnic division of power in more detail in my PhD dissertation and in 
a forthcoming journal article. 
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dominate these official positions. They have done so for generations, 
with power handed on from father to son, uncle to nephew, cousin 
to cousin.6 These two networks of power directly encompass a large 
number of people through kinship and clan ties, but also through 
relationships of debt, reciprocity, and friendship. 
Existing developmental and conceptual approaches to framing poverty 
reduction processes and ethnic minority agency provide significant 
insight into understanding the politics of poverty in northern Vietnam, 
as we shall see. This chapter synthesises and adapts elements of these 
approaches to offer a hybrid view of post-socialist development in the 
uplands, a view which emphasises the iterative, practical, and locally 
embedded ways in which people in Vi ̃nh Thu ̉y commune exercise 
political agency. Contrary to the view that ethnic minority people 
seek to evade or bypass the state, I see evidence that ethnic minority 
people are actively engaged with the state in complex and varied 
ways, and are adept at pursuing what Sherry Ortner describes as their 
own projects ‘on the margins of power’ (Ortner 2006:142). 
This chapter ethnographically explores the manifestation of this 
political agency through the coming together of two important 
political processes in the commune. Firstly, the domination by ethnic 
minority elites, as local officials, of local state power and poverty 
reduction processes. Secondly, local people laying claim to state 
resources through the connections they make to these local state 
officials. Through this engagement, apolitical and technocratic state 
designs for poverty reduction are adapted and reworked in line with 
local structures of power as local elites and local people exercise what 
I describe as a local ‘biopower’ project, albeit one that feeds off the 
wider biopolitical project for poverty reduction of the centre state. 
This local biopolitical project ensures poverty reduction resources are 
used to foster life in a relatively equitable and harmonious way for 
those who are connected to power, though with negative consequences 
for the unconnected. Local people (officials and citizens both) deploy 
the governmental language of poverty reduction and the associated 
technologies and classificatory categories of the government in pursuit 
6  Within the local state apparatus, at the time of my fieldwork, the dominant Hmông 
lineage directly controlled six of the most important positions in the commune, while the most 
powerful Nùng lineage controlled seven key positions. There are 22 official positions listed in the 
commune’s manifest of Party-state officers.
207
6 . THE STRuGGLE TO BE POOR IN VIETNAM’S NORTHERN BORDERLANDS
of their own projects of power. They are consequently engaged in 
both shaping, but also being shaped by, the very state categories 
and governmental processes they are seeking to subvert, or access. 
What results then is neither a totalising governmentality, nor fully 
free agency, but a complex, hybrid political entanglement which takes 
place on the unevenly contoured landscape of power in Vi ̃nh Thu ̉y 
commune.
In the next section, I consider the existing literature on the 
relationship between people, poverty and the state in the ethnic 
minority periphery, in order to situate my conceptual approach. I then 
briefly discuss the state’s historical project of power in the northern 
uplands and locate the poverty reduction efforts of the state within 
this continuum. The importance of these state resources to household 
efforts at accumulation is highlighted here. The following section 
discusses the annual poor household census as the principal means for 
deciding who is classified as poor in Vĩnh Thủy. The section after this 
considers household strategies for registering eligibility to government 
poverty reduction resources, followed by a discussion of the condition 
of ‘stasis’ that results for those who are left behind in the struggle to 
be poor. The final section of the chapter draws conclusions from the 
preceding discussion. 
People, Poverty and the State in the Ethnic 
Minority Periphery
Before engaging in my ethnographic account of the struggle to be poor 
in Vi ̃nh Thu ̉y, I wish to reflect upon some of the existing literature on 
the nature of state development processes and people’s agency in the 
Vietnamese uplands, in order to better situate my critical perspective. 
I discern three prevalent perspectives in this literature and will discuss 
each in turn before outlining a hybrid approach through which 
I intend to present my ethnographic material on the local politics of 
poverty reduction. 
The first prevalent perspective is a state-centric ‘developmentalist’ 
view, apparent in the discourse and programming of the government 
and of international agencies working for poverty reduction in 
Vietnam. It is apparent in state policy documents for poverty 
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reduction and the projects and programs of international agencies 
such as the World Bank.7 According to this view, poverty is an abject 
condition, objectively measureable and scientifically definable, which 
results from clearly discernible deficiencies either in the physical 
and geographical environment, such as the topography, climate, or 
remoteness of settlements, or of people themselves. In this view, the 
ethnic minority people of the uplands are hamstrung by elements 
of their culture and living conditions which roots them in an inert 
state, and which they can only be liberated from by development and 
poverty reduction interventions (see Taylor 2008 for a comprehensive 
critique of this view). Such a view of poverty reduction is critically 
unreflexive and ethnographically uninformed, resulting from an 
abstracted and stereotyped construction of the poor. Critically, it fails 
to recognise how the category of ‘the poor’ is itself an effect of the 
very state-prescribed welfare flows intended to address the condition 
of poverty. 
This is not to say that upland people are unaware of living in a state of 
deprivation, or of inequality. Quite the opposite in fact. Deprivation is 
well understood and intensely felt, for example, in having insufficient 
food to last the whole year, in being unable to meet ceremonial and 
ritual commitments, or in being beholden to others in the community 
through debt or labour obligations. But state-directed efforts at 
poverty reduction create a produced status of being ‘poor’, and this 
status appears integral to governmental attempts to bring development 
to the northern uplands, as it enables this development. This will 
become apparent through the following ethnography. Suffice it to say 
at this stage that ‘poverty’ as prescribed by the state is not necessarily 
abject, as no one particularly wants it to disappear: state officials, 
government departments, the Party, and international donors are all 
ennobled through being seen to combat poverty, and those who are 
prescribed as poor benefit from the resources that are offered. Poverty 
as prescribed in narrow technocratic and governmental terms appears 
then to be integral to extending the reach of the state in the northern 
borderlands of Vietnam.
7  This view is perhaps best embodied in the landmark 2000 Vietnam Development Report 
‘Attacking Poverty’ issued by the Government of Vietnam and international donor supporters. 
This report set the path for poverty reduction in Vietnam for more than a decade. 
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The second perspective I wish to consider critically informs the critique 
of state-centric developmentalism described above. According to this 
view, which I shall call the ‘overbearing state’ view, state formation at 
the periphery should be viewed in essentially pessimistic terms, with 
state agents enacting a colonising process and structuring the space 
available to local ethnic minority people, restricting the degree to 
which local agency can be exercised (Leepreecha et al. 2008; Duncan 
2004; McCaskill and Kampe 1997). Scholars in the ‘overbearing state’ 
tradition observe how governmental schemes are often characterised by 
inflexible and bureaucratic procedures, and bureaucratic abstraction. 
Power is concentrated in the hands of bureaucrats and state officials, 
and the result is the production of indifference, arbitrariness, and 
unintended consequences for those who live at the periphery of state 
power (Gupta 2012; Herzfeld 1992; Ferguson 1990). 
Writers such as Ferguson and Gupta are at pains to stress the contingent 
nature of bureaucratic power and emphasise how governmentality can 
never be totalising and hegemonic. Nevertheless, the outcomes they 
describe usually involve the indiscriminate destruction of viable local 
understandings, statuses, and strategies at the periphery. James Scott’s 
early work is notable for the contribution it makes to this view. In his 
classic work, Seeing Like a State, he presents a bleak view of the 
prospects for human progress under ‘high modernist’ and totalising 
state development schemes, socialist ones in particular (Scott 1998). 
Interestingly, writers on the state in Vietnam have challenged Scott’s 
early dystopian view of the possibilities of agency in the face of state 
power, showing its limits: Ben Kerkvliet highlighted challenges to the 
state ‘from below’ during the state socialist period, through ordinary 
cadre, and local farmers (Kerkvliet 2005); Ken MacLean wrote about 
the often ad hoc and contingent way that state socialism evolved 
(MacLean 2007); and Rupert Friederichsen discussed the incomplete 
nature of much policy implementation and the local adaptation of 
policies by northern ethnic minorities (Friederichsen 2012; see also 
McElwee 2004). 
This brings us to the third approach that I wish to consider, which 
I  shall call the ‘agentive periphery’ view. In Vietnam, this tradition 
is embodied in strong ethnographic work, which finds that local and 
‘peripheral’ ethnic and grassroots actors have their own standards, 
resources, dignity, and power. People of the periphery do not wait to 
be uplifted by state aid, and are not passive, colonised, and reproduced 
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in straightforward ways by state processes and categories. Notable 
work in this regard includes Turner (2012), Michaud (2012), and Hanh 
(2008) on the Hmông, Anderson (2007) on the Nùng, and Taylor (2007) 
on the Khmer. These scholars recognise that the state is a colonising 
and productive entity, but are sceptical about the determining power 
of the state in realising statist developmental visions. 
James Scott’s recent work (Scott 2009) embodies this approach and 
perhaps takes the agentive periphery view to its furthest extreme, 
as he characterises the people of the Southeast Asian uplands as state 
evaders, demonstrating a capacity to avoid colonisation through 
deploying agentive strategies independent of an overbearing 
state. But Scott’s position is open to critique on the grounds that it 
romanticises ethnic minorities, and ignores the degree to which 
local agency itself takes place within and is shaped by governmental 
categories and processes of state governmentality. Scott’s ‘state evasion’ 
premise also underplays the degree to which governance is actually 
desired on the periphery, a critique which is also applicable to other 
agentive periphery advocates (Turner 2012; Bonnin and Turner 2012). 
This notion of state avoidance has been effectively challenged 
regionally by Andrew Walker’s work on northern Thai peasants’ 
engagement with the state, wherein he effectively conflates the stand-
off between state and society which is notable in some of the agentive 
periphery literature (Walker 2012). Holly High too examines the 
complex and ambivalent ways that rural Lao people engage with the 
state and poverty reduction programs, highlighting in particular how 
the state is the focus for rural people’s desire, an entity they both fear 
and long for (High 2014). Walker and High highlight how engaging 
with the state is not only increasingly unavoidable, but also often 
desirable in the pursuit of development, broadly understood.
It seems then that drawing a sharp distinction between local and 
state political cultures is unhelpful in understanding the dynamic 
and at times contradictory processes at work in the state periphery 
of northern Vietnam. In particular, our framing needs to reflect the 
practical and everyday approaches of people situated at the state 
margins: the way in which they accumulate knowledge and experience 
in an iterative way to engage with and rework the governmental 
categories and technologies that are applied in the uplands. 
James Scott describes this capacity for improvisation and adaptation 
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as ‘metis’: ‘a wide array of practical skills and acquired intelligence in 
responding to a constantly changing natural and human environment’ 
(Scott 1998:313). But whereas Scott contends that state power crushes 
metis, I wish to show that in fact in the northwest uplands of Vietnam, 
metis flourishes within the governmental processes of the state, and 
indeed feeds off these very processes. 
Ordering the Periphery as a Continuing 
Project of State Power 
The ethnic minority people of the northern upland region have 
been misrepresented and misunderstood by both lowland officials 
and lowland people from colonial times through to the present 
(Taylor 2008; McElwee 2004). Attempts to impose order upon 
this mysterious periphery, and render inhabitants ‘legible’ to the 
state are correspondingly long-standing, with McLeod describing 
lowland engagement with the uplands as a succession of ‘Confucian, 
Christian and Communist “civilizing projects”’ (McLeod 1999:354). 
French planners of the colonial era ascribed technocratic categories 
of governance to the upland peoples they attempted to pacify and 
incorporate into the colonial state, through narratives of ‘civilisation’ 
(văn minh) in particular. Modern day state planners have supplemented 
this with ideas of ‘progress’ (tiến bộ) and ‘development’ (phát triển) 
— powerful narratives that were also prevalent during the state 
socialist era in Vietnam (MacLean 2013). In the post-socialist uplands, 
poverty reduction (giám nghèo) has increasingly become both a key 
organising and mobilising discourse, and an important technology 
of rule. Local people are increasingly bound into the state through 
the receipt of state largesse in the form of poverty reduction support. 
The modern project for poverty reduction then is part of the long-
standing historical continuum of attempting to subdue, civilise and 
domesticate the people of the periphery and render them productive 
as modern citizens.
Co-opting influential family groups and their kinfolk into the state-
building project has also always been an integral part of the attempt 
to impose central control over the periphery. French colonial planners 
attempted to assert their authority through perpetuating a system of 
domination by local Thai ethnic minority elites in the northwest, in an 
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attempt to rule the uplands through compliant proxies. But whilst 
a degree of order was imposed in the northern uplands as a result, 
rule through proxy did not work out wholly as intended for colonial 
planners, largely as a result of the agency and projects of power of 
local Thai elites themselves (Le Failler 2011; Lentz 2011). The Việt 
Minh and the early Democratic Republic of Vietnam, nevertheless, 
also worked through ethnic elites as they quickly realised that they 
too needed them in order to extend their writ of rule in the northern 
uplands. Consequently, Thai domination of other ethnic groups in the 
northwest continued long after liberation from the French colonial 
power (Lentz 2011), and rule through ethnic minority elites remains 
critical to governance in the northern uplands today.
From around 2000, state planners in Hà Nội have been able to mobilise 
significant amounts of financial capital to invest in the borderlands of 
the country, principally for poverty reduction. These resources have 
come from both internal sources and foreign or multilateral donors.8 
Support to perceived ‘underdeveloped’ areas of the country is of 
course not new. During the attempts to impose collectivisation in the 
countryside from the late 1950s until the mid-1980s, the state also 
sought to provide resources to these areas. This was also the case in the 
early years of đổi mới following the decision to abandon state socialism. 
Critically, though, state planners in the past were seldom able to follow 
through on the rhetoric of policy with material support. What is new 
today is the state’s improved capacity to provide the promised poverty 
reduction resources. Who does and does not get ascribed the status of 
being ‘poor’ therefore matters a great deal.
Vi ̃nh Thủy commune is broadly representative of upland ethnic 
minority communes in the north of Vietnam generally and receives a 
large number of government programs for poverty reduction support. 
In fact, the large number of programs and the complexity of central 
government provision for poor areas mean that few local Party-state 
officials in the commune can authoritatively list all of the programs 
available without first checking commune records. The picture is 
further complicated by the existence of a number of international 
donor-supported projects, primarily provided through the World 
8  This trend of state investment to outlying and ‘underdeveloped’ regions is not particular 
to Vietnam alone, and can be seen throughout East and Southeast Asia. See Anderson and 
Martin (2008). 
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Bank’s Northern Mountains Poverty Reduction Project, and through 
the international non-governmental organisation that supported my 
fieldwork, which has provided project support to the commune for 
more than 10 years. 
During the period 2012–13, government programs of support to poor 
and near-poor households in Vĩnh Thủy encompassed the following: 
free hybrid corn seed and fertiliser; free rice for the very poor; free 
roofing and construction materials to build animal stalls (for buffalo 
and pigs); financial support for education for poor households 
(with 100 per cent educational support for smaller ethnic groups in the 
commune, the Pa’ Si and Tu’ Si); support for paying electricity bills; 
provision of 50 free chickens along with feeders and associated chicken 
breeding equipment; free ducks; free pigs as part of a revolving fund 
scheme; subsidised credit for poor and ‘near-poor’ households; free 
roof slates to replace those destroyed by hailstones; a Tết (New Year) 
holiday payment; and free health insurance and subsidised support 
to key farmers as part of the agricultural campaigns to promote tea 
and vegetable production in the commune. There were also a number 
of schemes to support infrastructure improvements from both central 
government and donor funds. 
The proliferation of state support for poverty reduction means 
that local people are increasingly reliant upon the resources of the 
government for their projects of household accumulation. Government 
resources for poverty reduction, such as seed, fertiliser, credit, and 
livestock, are one of the only significant forms of capital available in 
remote rural areas, and thus represent a critical means through which 
households can structurally transform their well-being and enhance 
their life chances.9 The household of Mr Khang in An Trí 2 village 
illustrates what a difference these poverty reduction resources can 
make. He has been classified as a poor household in three of the last 
four years (in  the other year, his household was classified as ‘near-
poor’). Every year he receives several bags of hybrid corn seed and 
9  The increased provision of state resources to upland areas must, however, be seen in 
historical context. Increased state provision has occurred at the same time as state policies have 
closed off many of the livelihood opportunities which upland ethnic minority people have 
traditionally relied upon. This is most notably the case with forestry and shifting cultivation 
practices.
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fertiliser, sufficient to ensure he is able to grow hybrid corn on almost 
all of his family land. As a result, he estimates that over the past four 
years his household has been able to triple its previous income. 
He has reinvested much of the money he has made in his children’s 
education, sending his son to one of the district high schools as a 
boarder. The household also receives an educational support grant 
which further offsets the cost of his son’s education. His wife is involved 
in the women’s group of a successful project run by the international 
non-governmental organisation to improve the breeding of traditional 
Hmông black pigs. She has successfully increased the number of pigs 
they have from a single pig to a litter of six, and she is now able to 
sell piglets in the commune market twice a year. The family plans 
to buy a second-hand motorcycle in the next year, with Mr Khang 
hoping to use the motorbike to travel to the border gate outside the 
district town to look for labouring work during the agricultural off-
season. All of the changes experienced by the household he attributes 
to being classified as poor: ‘Without the support of the government 
to us as a poor household it would have been impossible to do any of 
these things.’ 
The Annual Poor Household Census 
The state’s presence in the lives of the people of the northern 
borderlands today appears to be manifested in large part through the 
programs for poverty reduction support described above. The process 
of determining who poor households are at the local level is therefore 
critical. In Vi ̃nh Thu ̉y commune, this process revolves around a poor 
household census undertaken annually in October. 
In order to carry out the census, commune officers are issued with a 
dense 107-page guidance manual (tài liệu hướng dẫn) by the People’s 
Committee of Lào Cai Province (Ủy Ban Nhân Dân Tỉnh Lào Cai). 
The manual in operation during the time I was doing fieldwork 
was issued in September 2013. The front cover states the intended 
purpose as being ‘instructions for the investigation of poor and near-
poor households in 2013 and health insurance for poor and near-poor 
people for 2014’ (‘Ðiều tra hộ nghèo, hộ cận nghèo năm 2013 và lập 
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danh sách BHYT ngừoi nghèo, câ ̣n nghèo năm 2014’). It is an exhaustive, 
highly comprehensive and technical set of instructions for objectively 
identifying those people the centre state wishes to classify as poor.
The manual contains pages and pages of pro forma tables and 
corresponding guidance instructions for the completion of 
information about poor households in the commune. There are 
two official resolutions (quyét định) at the beginning of the manual, 
establishing the ‘Direction Committee’ (thành lâ ̣p ban chi ̉) along with 
‘plans’ (ké hoạch) for the poverty census process and nine different 
sets of guidance instructions (hướng dẫn) to complete the 43 different 
tables of information contained in the manual. For example, on page 
27, guidance sheet B instructs officials in how to go about estimating a 
household’s income (phiéu khảo sát thu nhập hộ gia đình). There are four 
pages of detailed instructions on how to do this, along with references 
for other instruction documents, resolutions of the Party-state, and the 
formula for determining which poverty band the household should be 
placed in, according to income. The manual recognises the difficulties 
inherent in profiling households in such a detailed way and prescribes 
a checklist of household assets that local officials should value in 
order to estimate the income of the poor. This checklist of assets is 
the primary means through which local officials undertake the annual 
poverty survey, as we shall see.
The manual also contains detailed lists of provincial- and district-level 
officials and their allocated tasks and advisory roles in the poverty 
identification process, and lists the communes in each district of the 
province which have been classified as ‘disadvantaged’ or ‘advantaged’ 
areas — the overwhelming majority being defined as disadvantaged. 
The manual serves an important ritual purpose, through sanctioning 
both the process and the classification of ‘poverty’ by the state as 
objective, legitimate, and beyond challenge or reproach. It spatially 
orders and segments areas in order to project the state’s authority and 
validate the classificatory categories prescribed by state planners. 
The manual thus imbues the classification process with a higher 
order sanctity and prescribes ‘experts’ whose status stems from their 
position as custodians of this technocratic process of deciding who 
is poor.
CONNECTED & DISCONNECTED IN VIET NAM
216
Contradictions Inherent in the State’s Poverty 
Reduction Project
Narratives of poverty and poverty reduction are critical to the 
centre state’s project of power in the uplands. However, the need to 
project the idea of ever increasing well-being opens up spaces for the 
agency of local state actors. If district- and provincial-level officials 
are to be believed, the process of collecting data on the poor and 
identifying poor households is a rigorously technical process, with 
each step prescribed in the provincial manual followed exactly and 
precisely. As the deputy chairman of the District People’s Committee 
confidently asserted to me, there is no higher-level interference with 
the process and data is simply collated and transmitted upwards in the 
administrative chain. 
But commune officials are in fact given very particular quotas for 
how many poor people they are expected to take off the poverty 
list each year. This prescription is not apparent anywhere in the 
poverty mapping manual, but commune officials disclosed that they 
do indeed receive specific targets from the district for how many 
people in poverty they are allowed to have each year, and I have seen 
such written instructions — confirming this to be the case. These 
targets drive the poverty identification process much more than the 
manual itself. Thus, in 2013 the poverty target for the commune was 
65.13 per cent, a reduction of 8 per cent from the previous year. 
Once this annual poverty reduction target has been received, the 
percentage reduction is distributed between the 12 villages of the 
commune, according to population size. Larger villages in the commune 
therefore have more poor households removed from their quota. 
Commune officers usually have to identify two to four households in 
each village which they can remove from the list, and these targets 
are rigidly enforced by the commune government. Rates of poverty 
reduction therefore are only loosely correlated (if  at all) with the 
material state of deprivation, rendering the poverty assessment and 
reporting process meaningless, as the commune reports numbers for 
poverty reduction only according to the quota they have been set. 
In a remarkable contortion, one commune officer sought to explain 
to me the exact match between the target set by the district, and the 
‘result’ of the poverty census process, by asserting that the district 
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understood the poverty situation so well that the target they set 
corresponded exactly to the ‘reality’ that was discovered through the 
poverty census process.
The poverty mapping manual is a symbolic prop of state power: all 
actors pay lip-service to the manual and the technocratic process it 
embodies, but also know that collecting all the data required in the 
way that the manual stipulates would invalidate the poverty reduction 
target set by government planners, with which they must comply. 
There is a public ritual of adherence to the manual by both higher- 
and lower-level state officials, whereby the manual’s symbolic power is 
recognised and respected, but where the process it stipulates has little 
bearing on the nitty-gritty localised work of deciding who accesses 
state resources. Many state actors are complicit in this performance, 
with higher-level officials content so long as the target is adhered 
to, and local officials careful to revere the manual and the associated 
higher-level instructions whilst simultaneously effectively ignoring 
(or bypassing) them. Both lower- and higher-level officials are thus 
engaged in a process of (mis)representing statistics in particular ways 
to suit their needs. 
The Process of Administering the Poverty Census
Returning to the poverty census process itself, as we have seen, on a 
practical level, completing a detailed inventory of each household’s 
income and assets would be an enormous and time-consuming 
operation. What the commune uses instead is a simplified, one-page 
assessment sheet. The sheet is extremely brief, with no narrative 
explanation, and simply lists 11 areas for the assessment of a household’s 
assets, with points allocated according to whether the assets exist, and 
what their value is. At the top of the page there is a space in which the 
name of the household should be entered, along with the household’s 
registration number. At the bottom of the sheet is a space which the 
head of the household is expected to sign, to validate the assessment 
process undertaken by the commune officer. 
The 11 assets against which the household’s poverty status is assessed 
are as follows: the total area of the house (in metres squared); the value 
of the motorbike; the type and value of the bed; whether they have a 
cupboard, wardrobe, table and chairs and their respective values; the 
value of any video player and mobile phones; the presence and value 
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of a colour television; ownership of a buffalo, cow or horse; number 
of pigs owned; presence of a milling machine or thresher; the amount 
of corn seed available for the next harvest; and the amount of rice 
seed. In October every year, commune officials undertake the census 
using this sheet and divide households into one of four categories: 
poor, near-poor, average, or better-off. The household is supposed to 
be given a score according to each criterion in the list, and designated 
one of these four categories. 
Only two or three households in the whole commune are considered 
‘better-off’, and only two or three households in each village are 
given the ‘average’ status. These households are generally well known 
and are not surveyed in the poverty census process. All the other 
households are visited, usually at night when residents are typically 
at home, and an inventory taken of their assets according to the 
poverty checklist. I  was resident in Vi ̃nh Thu ̉y during the months 
in which the commune poverty census took place and accompanied 
local Party-state officers in their census work over the course of many 
nights, in different villages in the commune. I observed first-hand the 
use of the simplified sheet, and the ambiguity it allowed in the process 
of interpreting and recording assets seemingly ‘objectively’. It is this 
ambiguity that is critical in the local re-working of the state’s poverty 
classification project and the exercise of discretionary power by local 
powerholders. 
Local Party-State Officials and the 
Census Process 
In Vi ̃nh Thu ̉y commune a handful of chronically destitute households 
are recognised as being ‘poor’. For the remainder of commune 
residents,  though, the official government-assigned classification 
of being a poor household (hô ̣ nghèo) has little to do with an actual 
state of material deprivation. Rather, being poor or living in poverty 
is a state-constructed and assigned category. Consequently, intense 
competition exists amongst commune households to be recognised 
and officially designated as ‘poor’ and therefore able to lay claim to the 
government welfare resources that are so important in transforming 
household well-being and prospects for the accumulation of capital. 
Those who end up being classified as poor are not exclusively the 
most needy, as the poverty classification process is shot through 
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with Ortner’s ‘projects of power’ of commune Party-state officers 
(Ortner  2006). They  shepherd government poverty reduction 
resources towards family, kin, friends and allies — a very wide and 
fairly inclusive network. 
The key commune Party-state officers involved in the poverty census 
process are the village head (trưởng thôn) and the village mentor (cán bộ 
đỡ đầu thôn). They work as a team to visit each household in the village 
and undertake the census process, using the one-page inventory form 
of household assets. Village mentors enjoy a powerful position in the 
commune system. They are senior commune officers whose role is to 
supervise and advise the village heads and oversee all aspects of village 
management and administration. They therefore exert considerable 
power and influence over village politics and administration. Most 
village mentors in Vĩnh Thu ̉y are long-standing residents of the 
commune with powerful family networks behind them, and are deeply 
embedded as elites in the local system of commune politics.
For their part, village heads have complex motivations for taking up 
their role. Some village heads are also deeply engaged in commune 
and village politics, with their own extensive networks of patronage 
and control. A younger generation of recently appointed village 
heads have numeracy, Vietnamese literacy, and some training in the 
government system — skills usually gained through army service. 
It  is these village heads who are most likely to at least attempt to 
follow the prescribed process for the household poverty census, and 
who consequently often face difficulties and conflict with entrenched 
interests within the village and commune. 
For those Party-state officials who attempt to follow the prescribed 
process, the first problem they face is that household livelihoods 
seldom fit snugly into the centre state–designated income categories. 
Poverty is not the static state that policy architects envisaged. Rather, 
household wellbeing is continually in flux. As a newly appointed 
village head despairingly commented to me during his first year 
of attempting to do the survey: 
It’s very hard to know a household’s exact income because it changes 
all the time. A near-poor household might lose cattle to disease and 
then they quickly become poor, and similarly a poor household may 
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get piglets and thus quickly become much better-off. The form asks us 
to record the household’s income at the time we take the survey, but 
their circumstances can change very quickly, often from day to day. 
While a handful of village heads (particularly the newer ones) try hard 
to complete the process with some form of ritual diligence, others see 
it as an opportunity to build political capital in the commune and 
demonstrate their effectiveness to their superiors. One long-standing 
and entrepreneurial village head explained to me how he had been 
highly strategic that year in meeting his quota for the number of poor 
households to be removed from the poor list. He boasted how he had 
kept a few households ‘in reserve’ to take off next year’s list, so that he 
would not have to bother too much with the process next year and could 
demonstrate to the commune leaders that he was quick and effective 
in carrying out the task. This particular village head is closely aligned 
through marriage to the dominant Nùng family group in the commune 
administration, and is also from the largest and wealthiest kin group 
in his village. He is adept at using the poverty reduction resources of 
the government to lubricate his village patronage network, with most 
of his close family and associates officially designated as poor and thus 
in receipt of the full portfolio of government assistance. 
Removing households from the poor list in response to the poverty 
reduction targets set by the commune is a source of considerable angst 
to some village heads. They complained that it was extremely difficult 
to find households to remove from the list. One common strategy is to 
rotate households off and on the list every year. This was the case with 
the household of Ms Sèng Thi ̣ Sáng in Bình Yên village. She explained 
that the previous year her neighbour had been on the list and she 
had not, but that this year she was informed that it would be her 
turn. Her neighbour had received some asbestos sheeting for her roof 
during her time on the poor list, but Ms Sáng gleefully related how 
upset her neighbour was this year when Ms Sáng herself had received 
50 chickens as part of a poverty reduction program. 
Rotating people off and on the list is a popular strategy for village heads 
as it ensures their networks can be maintained or even expanded on 
the promise that a household will receive government support in the 
future. It is also a means for minimising conflict in the village through 
ensuring that every household receives government support at some 
time, irrespective of whether they are ‘poor’ according to the official 
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classification in any one particular year. Villagers have the belief that 
their representatives have a responsibility to look after them, should 
be able to bring outside resources into the village, and will distribute 
these resources so that every household receives something. These 
perceptions appear to have deep roots in highland sociality and 
continue to be important today (see the following discussion of the 
Hải brothers in Ninh Căn village).
Conflict between the village head and mentor frequently occurs over 
who should and should not be included or removed from the list. 
One long-standing village head related to me how he had withdrawn 
from the census process last year, in protest at the difficulty in 
deciding who should be taken off the list. He left the decision to the 
village mentor, at the same time ensuring that he could not be blamed 
by those who would no longer receive government support. Conflict 
also occurs when the political projects of local powerholders come up 
against either the central state’s ‘technical’ project or local conceptions 
of justice and redistribution, which still persist. 
This was the case in one village where I followed the census process 
closely. The village head withdrew after a dispute with the mentor 
over a particular household. The village head had wanted to remove 
the household from the poor list because he claimed they made his life 
difficult and ‘didn’t follow village regulations’. The mentor, however, 
felt the household deserved to stay on the list as they were markedly 
poorer than many other households in the village. The mentor felt that 
the village head was being ‘too emotional’ about the process. In this 
particular case, the mentor responsible for the census process was 
also the commune officer responsible for the overall process. He had a 
reputation for being thorough and trustworthy, and crucially had no 
family allegiances in the particular village for which he was responsible. 
This village was also the central village in the commune, and was most 
open to critical scrutiny. In this case, then, the attempt by the village 
head to assert his power and authority was unsuccessful, and an 
alternative conception of redistribution and justice prevailed instead. 
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The Poverty Census Process as an ‘Exercise 
of Paper Only’
In four of the 12 villages in the commune there was little evidence of 
the poverty census process actually having taken place at all, though 
the documentation was completed by the end of October and was 
filed in the commune office. In terms of physical infrastructure and 
the relative well-being of village residents, these villages were among 
the most remote and poorest in the commune. Two of these villages 
were also Dao villages, with the Dao being political outsiders in the 
commune, having little representation in the formal power structure, 
and little ability to demand government resources. The village mentors 
and village heads in these villages would give vague answers in 
response to my questions over the progress of the census, and would 
always defer my requests to join them on their household visits. When 
I questioned residents of these villages about the poverty census, they 
had little knowledge of the process. There was no village meeting to 
discuss and endorse the outcome of the census process as prescribed 
in the official manual (though this also did not occur often in the other 
villages of the commune). Shrouding the process in secrecy is therefore 
an effective strategy deployed by local powerholders to ensure that 
they can allocate government resources as they please, and frees them 
from investing time in an otherwise lengthy process, enabling their 
pursuit of other projects. 
Most village mentors have little time for the formal census process, 
describing it as an exercise ‘of paper only’.10 After one long evening 
spent visiting households to complete the survey form with the village 
head and mentor, we relaxed in the village head’s house and, after 
drinking several cups of corn wine, they explained what they really 
thought of the process: 
In fact we already know who the poor households are in the village. 
We visit the households only to complete the documentation properly 
and in particular to get the signature of household heads so that there 
10  This echoes David Dery’s notion of ‘papereality’, which describes the widening gap in 
bureaucratic organisations between what is reported and what actually occurs (Dery 1998). 
MacLean (2013) discusses how this ‘papereality’ has been central to the operation of the 
Vietnamese state since collectivisation. The gap between what local officials report and what 
actually happens contributes to the illegibility of the countryside to central-level officials and 
manifests distrust between levels of government.
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won’t be any complaints afterwards. If we don’t get the signature then 
people will always complain that they don’t agree with the assessment 
or that they weren’t consulted. 
For some village mentors, particularly the most powerful in the 
commune, the household assessment process is only a formality. One 
day late in October, I was discussing the poverty census process in 
the commune office with Mr Nam, the village mentor for Tha ̣ch Liêm 
village and a highly experienced commune officer. There were only 
a few days left until the process had to be completed, but he had 
yet to visit a single household in the village. When I asked him how 
he hoped to finish before the end of the month he replied that he 
had already identified the households that would be beneficiaries and 
those that would not. All that he had to do now was visit the village 
to get the forms signed. Securing the signature of the household head 
on the poverty census form meant the process was endorsed and valid 
in the eyes of the state, irrespective of whether the process had been 
completed as intended. The symbolic and ritual importance of the 
form thus imbues the process with an authenticity which disguises 
the operation of particular political forms of long-standing local 
patronage and reciprocity quite at odds with the ‘official’ purpose of 
the census process as prescribed by the higher state.
The Struggle to be Poor: The Politics 
of Eligibility to State Resources
Complaints over the allocation of government resources provide a 
constant source of gossip and intrigue in the commune. Countless 
examples were related to me during conversations with households 
about who received what, and on what basis they were entitled. 
For  example, Mrs Hồ Ngân Giang, a poor resident of Ninh Ðiển B 
village, could not understand why her household did not receive 
an educational allowance intended for very poor households when 
a household in a neighbouring village did receive it, despite the 
household in question not being poor (at least in her view). Mrs Giang’s 
concern reflects the important reality in Vĩnh Thủy commune that 
state resources nominally intended for the genuinely poor often find 
their way to those who are substantially better-off. 
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Local Party-state officials play a critical role in determining the 
allocation of these government poverty reduction resources, as we 
have seen, principally through deciding who will be on the poor 
list. But local people are also actively engaged in the politics of the 
process, lobbying these local officials aggressively and doing all 
they can to render themselves ‘legible’ (or visible) to state decision-
makers. Once legible, they can go about establishing their claims for 
entitlement to government resources through being classified as poor. 
Partha Chatterjee has described how this form of engagement with 
the state requires political literacy on the part of the citizenry: an 
understanding of how the distribution process works and the rules 
of the game that surround entitlement and laying claim to resources 
(Chatterjee 2004).
Securing entitlement also requires a level of political capital in being 
able to establish connections to powerholders. In their struggle to be 
called poor, Vĩnh Thủy residents exploit all kinds of connections, 
including those of kinship and marriage, obligations, business 
connections, and friendship. As one village head observed: 
I get many visitors to my house once people know that the [poverty 
census] survey is going to start soon. People come and tell me all about 
their problems and their hardships. They also remind me of the times 
that they’ve helped me or my family in the past. They really put me 
under a lot of pressure. 
This pressure comes from both above and below, as he went on to explain: 
‘I also have to think about people in the commune government too, 
and what they think. They watch the [survey] process very carefully, 
particularly if they’ve got some interests in the village.’ During the 
poverty census process in Vĩnh Thủy, I observed a range of strategies 
that households used in attempting to establish their credentials as 
being poor. These can be categorised as follows: concealing resources; 
leveraging utility, position and status; manipulating government 
categories; and exploiting the ambiguity of government eligibility 
criteria. Local Party-state officials are intimately complicit in these 
strategies and, in the process, ensure that the state remains relevant 
to the Hmông and Nùng in the commune, and that long-standing 
practices of inclusion and expectations of mutuality and obligation 
are met. In what follows, I provide some vignettes from the commune 
which illustrate how each of these strategies are used.
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Concealing Resources
Concealing resources in the intimate environment of a village, where 
everybody knows everybody else’s business, is very difficult. It is 
particularly difficult to conceal assets from village heads, who make 
it their business to know what is going on in the village and who has 
what. Concealment therefore requires a degree of complicity on the 
part of village officials, either through fear, through a vested interest 
in benefiting from the concealment, or through a sense of doing right 
according to prevailing norms of fairness, obligation, and community 
cohesion. 
One night during the census process I accompanied the village head 
and village mentor to visit a household along the main street of Ninh 
Ðiển B village, in the centre of the commune. One of the questions 
in the checklist required the household respondent to estimate the 
amount of hybrid corn seed in their possession. The household head 
reported a minimal amount, in spite of the presence of a large number 
of corn sacks stacked in the front room which he claimed to be storing 
for a neighbour. Once we left the house I asked the village head 
about these sacks and he reported matter-of-factly that the household 
was engaged in corn trading, a highly lucrative endeavour in the 
commune. But he had written down the minimal figure as reported by 
the household head, despite knowing that it was not true. ‘What can 
I do?’ he said with a shrug. The household, as I later discovered, was 
closely related to a senior commune official. 
On another occasion I was visiting village Cao Thành A during the 
census process. I visited the household of a close relative of the 
village head, Mr Nhã, in the company of the village head and the 
village mentor. Cao Thành A is one of the more remote villages and 
the people here are poorer than those in the central villages of the 
commune. But this house was of sturdier construction and the beds 
were relatively new, with a cabinet, table and chairs and even floor 
tiles overlaying the mud floor in the main room, which was unusual 
in this village. Despite this, the household was marked as poor in the 
census, as minimal corn seed and household assets were recorded. 
I returned to the village several days later and wandered past the 
house, noting a new motorbike in the front yard, along with a number 
of bags of fertiliser inside the front door, which had not been present 
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at the time of my previous visit. Casually discussing the household 
with a neighbour, she wryly noted that two of the sons were currently 
working in a timber mill in a commune close to the Chinese border, 
and that they sent back significant remittances every month. These 
were not recorded during the census process, though the village head 
(and presumably the mentor) would have been well aware of these 
contributions to the household income. 
On yet another occasion I was participating in the survey process in 
Ninh Căn village when we arrived at the house of the Hải brothers. 
Situated on a small plot beside the main path through the village, 
their house was extremely run-down, almost derelict. There was 
only an old bed and cupboard in the room in which the boys lived, 
which was littered with dried corn cobs used to feed the cooking 
fire. The commune officers related approvingly how the two brothers 
aged 18 and 15 were both extremely hard workers, working their 
small piece of land to produce local corn. Their father had died seven 
years ago and their mother abandoned them soon after in order to 
remarry in a neighbouring commune. As a result, the older brother 
had dropped out of school to work the land and care for his younger 
brother. The attitude of the commune officers towards these boys was 
paternalistic and caring. They were perceived to be worthy recipients 
of state support because of their tragic circumstances. 
Whilst the boys were clearly ‘poor’ under any definition of poverty, 
local or otherwise, the officials were clearly intent on maximising the 
boys’ entitlement as they carefully recorded all of their assets on the 
census sheet and cajoled them with encouraging questions to ensure 
they fully reported the hardships they faced, even under-reporting 
the amount of corn seed stored, as I saw the village mentor write 
down a far lower figure than the boys themselves had mentioned. 
The officials waited patiently while the boys tried to find the household 
registration card, which they eventually located in a dusty drawer, 
stained and creased. Other villagers would have been reprimanded by 
the officials for allowing such an important document to deteriorate 
in such a way, but the officials said nothing, clearly moved by the 
difficult circumstances in which the two boys were living. In this 
case, the officials felt obligated to conceal resources and used the 
process to ensure that the boys were highly legible to the state, in line 
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with widely held moral perceptions in the commune that there is an 
obligation to look after those who are the victims of circumstances 
outside of their control.
Leveraging Utility, Position and Status
An example of leveraging position occurred in An Trí 1 village where 
we visited the household of a teacher at the intermediate school, 
who had recently moved to the village from another commune. 
This  household held a certificate from the commune office in their 
previous village, stating that they were a near-poor household. Having 
recently moved, the household had no agricultural land, which is an 
important determinant of wealth in the poverty census process, which 
measures crop production. But both husband and wife were teachers 
and earned a stable income far greater than the majority of households 
in the commune. The household had a large refrigerator and ran a 
well-provisioned store from the front of the house. They also had two 
motorbikes, one of which was a late model, almost brand-new Honda 
costing several thousand US dollars. Despite this, the commune officer 
recorded them as being near-poor. He explained at the time that they 
had been near-poor in their previous commune and it was difficult to 
change their status, but there were clearly other factors at work that 
influenced his decision. 
A few nights later, I was drinking corn wine with the village head and 
mentor after a night of visiting households in the same village and the 
discussion returned once more to the teachers’ household. The mentor 
was slightly drunk and explained the decision as follows: 
It’s really difficult to get teachers to stay in this commune. It’s far from 
Cao Xuyên [the district town] and even further from Lào Cai City. If 
you’re educated, why would you want to live here? We have to make 
it attractive to make sure that the teachers want to stay.11 
Although the officials did not reveal the details of what had actually 
transpired, the implication from our discussion was that the household 
had successfully leveraged their important position to ensure their 
categorisation as ‘near-poor’. At the same time, the officials involved 
11  He went on to say, ‘In their case both of them are teachers.’ By this final statement, 
I understood him to be saying that this household’s utility to the commune was double, as there 
were two teachers, so it was even more important to keep them happy. 
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had been willingly complicit, and may have even suggested the 
classification scenario in order to ensure the teachers stayed in the 
village to the benefit of the whole commune.
Manipulating State Categories 
Another popular strategy deployed by villagers is to manipulate 
state categories to ensure that the household is recognised as poor.12 
One prevalent way of doing this appears to be ‘splitting’ the household. 
While examining completed forms from my household survey I was 
struck by the number of new households registered just prior to 
commencement of the poverty census process in October. When 
I cross-checked with the survey returns for the households in which 
the newly separate households had previously resided, they invariably 
recorded a drop in their registered status — i.e. from near-poor to poor, 
or from average to near-poor or poor. The ‘splitting’ process always 
involved a young couple leaving the parental home to establish their 
own household. However, in practice the newly established household 
usually took up residence in a simply constructed house located a few 
metres from the parental home, as new land for house construction in 
the commune is not easily acquired. In all of the instances of household 
splitting that I came across, the two households continued to share 
resources, indeed they often still lived together in the one parental 
house, with the second house usually of rudimentary construction 
and remaining unoccupied.13 
The Hoàng family in Bình Yên village is a case in point. 
The  grandfather  explained that the family had decided to split in 
August of the previous year, with his youngest son and daughter-in-
law establishing their own home on the edge of the family compound. 
The grandfather explained that he had divided his land between his 
two sons, that he had given them each a buffalo (he had two) and that 
the three families were now ‘separate’. As such, they each qualified 
12  This was also apparent during the land reform period in Vietnam, with households engaging 
in this strategy in order to avoid being called ‘landlords’ or wealthy peasants, and was also 
apparent during the collectivisation period, during which households manoeuvred to maintain 
the 5 per cent of land available for individual production. During the decollectivisation period, 
households also deployed this strategy to maximise the land they could prioritise for production 
(MacLean 2013).
13  This process of household fissioning may also have been a traditional form of risk 
management in upland areas.
229
6 . THE STRuGGLE TO BE POOR IN VIETNAM’S NORTHERN BORDERLANDS
as ‘near-poor’ when their assets were registered in the poverty census 
process. However, all of the corn and rice grown on their land was 
stored in the loft space of the grandfather’s house, he cared for the 
two buffalos, which continued to be housed in the pens next to his 
house, and he spent the day babysitting the youngest child of his 
son while the family worked the land. The recently split family of 
his youngest son continued to eat their meals in the paternal house, 
and all of the assets and resources of the family appeared to be pooled 
in the grandfather’s house. If assessed collectively as one household, 
however, they would have been registered as ‘average’ and thus not 
entitled to poverty reduction support. 
While the decision to split the household was no doubt genuine and 
based upon a sincere wish on the part of the younger son to make his 
own way, in practice they continued to live in one multi-generational 
household, as the government’s concept of a single generation 
household is anathema to the way the Hmông, Nùng, and other ethnic 
groups in the commune choose to live. The Hoàng household appeared 
to recognise the opportunity that ‘splitting’ provided and went 
through the process of registering the household as separate, thereby 
rendering themselves eligible for support as a near-poor household.14 
On their part, local officials do not appear to question this process and 
simply record the new household and the assets of each household as 
separate. Local officials appear to flexibly apply local norms to this 
process of household fissioning, using the government’s assumption 
of discreet and segmented ‘nuclear’ family clusters against itself. 
At the same time, through flexibly interpreting the eligibility criteria, 
government officials appear intent on ensuring that the Hmông 
(and other groups in the commune) remain engaged and onside with 
the state, and that the state in turn remains relevant to them. 
Exploiting Ambiguities in State Eligibility Criteria
Closely related to the manipulation of government categories is the 
strategy of exploiting any ambiguity in regulations pertaining to who 
is eligible to benefit from poverty reduction projects. This ambiguity 
stems from the fact that some projects and programs do not explicitly 
14  In order to be recognised, a new household must register with the commune authorities and 
apply for a new household registration book, which is the most important state document held 
by people in the commune. 
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establish who the beneficiaries should be, stating only that the resources 
should be used for ‘poverty reduction’. Local officials thus have the 
discretionary power to decide upon the allocation of resources. In the 
case of a project to provide 50 free ducks to households for poverty 
reduction, local people in Tràng Tôn village successfully exploited 
the lack of clarity over entitlement to the resources and lobbied the 
village head to distribute the ducks to every household in half of the 
village instead. The half of the village that did not receive the ducks 
subsequently received free chickens under another project in the 
following year. 
In this case, eligibility exploded out from the category of the poor, 
with state resources that were supposed to be carefully targeted 
instead going to everyone. In a context where many in the village are 
indeed poor, this is perhaps a better outcome in the eyes of local state 
officials, given that it ensures cohesion and adherence to perceptions 
of what is appropriate and ‘just’. It also cements the sense of relevance 
of the state to those who benefit — an important long-term political 
goal in the borderlands. The state’s targeting of poor households is 
thus allowed to be subverted by a more locally embedded conception 
of entitlement, albeit one that reinforces existing hierarchies in the 
village and bolsters the political projects of the powerful. 
‘Stasis’ and Bypassed Development 
for the Unconnected
In Vi ̃nh Thu ̉y commune, important state resources for poverty 
reduction which the centre state intends to direct to those most in 
need often end up with those at the local level who are the most 
politically literate and therefore best able to establish claims upon 
them. Local commune officials appear to actively facilitate lapses in 
the official process of identifying the poor for three reasons. Firstly, 
because many of the beneficiaries are network clients of these officials, 
by including them in the poor list they bolster their political capital 
and pool of obligations and indebtedness. Secondly, officials are keenly 
aware of the need to adhere to long-standing traditions of general 
sharing, mutuality and cooperation which underpin the operation 
of harmonious social relations in the commune. Delivering poverty 
reduction support fulfils the expectations of them as leaders of the 
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two dominant ethnic groups (Hmông and Nùng) to provide for their 
own. And lastly, dispensing government poverty reduction support is 
a way of keeping a large number of people engaged with the state, an 
important expectation placed upon them as local officials by higher up 
officials in the state hierarchy. This, in turn, ensures that the commune 
remains peaceful and harmonious and, as an effect if not a goal of 
state policy, that alternative centres of power and mobilisation around 
ethnicity — or religion in the case of the Hmông — do not develop.
What ensues is the perpetuation of entrenched hierarchies of power 
in the commune. This ensures a desired degree of stability and 
predictability in the commune but has consequences for those who 
are politically unimportant and often desperately lacking in material 
resources as a result. These people are largely left behind in the struggle 
for state resources that I have described. They lack the political skills to 
render themselves legible and eligible for the state support that would 
structurally change their lives, such as loans for buffalo (reserved for 
the ‘productive’ near-poor), substantial production inputs (they have 
little land and so are not deemed eligible for this kind of assistance), or 
a role in pioneering new agro-industrial crops in which the government 
invests heavily to encourage production. 
Paradoxically, a significant shift has taken place in the northern 
borderlands over the past 10 to 15 years, whereby the state is now 
able to ensure a minimum level of subsistence and food security for 
destitute and chronically deprived households. Nobody starves 
anymore because the state ensures a minimum provision of subsistence 
for everyone. This was often cited to me as perhaps the most important 
change to have occurred in the commune over the past 15 years, 
according to both local Party-state officials and local people. 
The household of Mrs Dương Thị Mát from Thạch Liêm village 
illustrates this well. Her household is one of the poorest in the 
commune, and she claimed ‘if the government didn’t support us 
we’d probably die with nothing to eat’. Over the past few years, 
the government has provided her with the essentials of food and 
shelter. She has received timber for reinforcing her ramshackle house, 
asbestos sheeting to waterproof the roof, and 10 kilograms of rice for 
each person in her household, which they sell in order to buy enough 
corn to see them through the hungry season when their own meagre 
corn supply is finished. The household lacks sufficient land, which is a 
CONNECTED & DISCONNECTED IN VIET NAM
232
feature of most chronically poor households in the commune, and this 
lack of land is also the reason given by local officers for not allocating 
hybrid corn seed and fertiliser to them. The lack of land also precludes 
the chronically poor from engaging in the lucrative projects of the 
commune to plant high-value agro-industrial crops, such as tea and 
tobacco. The chronically poor are politically unconnected and thus 
locked in a condition of stasis. They are assured of the basics of food 
and shelter, but do not have access to state largesse and opportunities 
which could potentially transform their lives. Instead, these resources 
go to better off, politically well-connected and politically literate 
others, which in turn ensures that the political equilibrium of the 
commune is maintained, along with the social status quo. 
The chronically poor appear to fall through the gap between two 
conceptions of entitlement. They are virtually invisible in the ‘moral 
economy’ schema of ensuring social harmony and reciprocity, as 
they are outside of the important kin lineages and clan networks, 
and, with little status or influence, they are unimportant to local 
powerholders. At the same time, the subversion of the government’s 
technocratic poverty survey system, which might have privileged 
them as key beneficiaries of the full suite of state support, closes off to 
them the only other possible avenue for the accumulation of resources 
necessary to structurally transform their livelihoods. Stasis is hard to 
escape for these chronically poor outsiders who include smaller ethnic 
groups in the commune (particularly the Dao) which lack political 
representation in the commune government, and those households 
amongst the dominant Hmông and Nùng groups who primarily live in 
the more remote villages of the commune and are outside of privileged 
networks or family lineages.
This lack of connectedness and inability to render themselves 
legible means that the powerless are often exploited by commune 
powerholders. In Cao Thành B village, for example, the very poorest 
households are eligible for an educational support fee that is supposed 
to offset the additional costs that households face in sending their 
children to school. In practice, the very poor never receive the 
support fee, reinforcing their sense of powerlessness and exclusion. 
As one woman explained: ‘We have to sign every month that we have 
received the money but in fact the money goes straight to the teachers 
at the school and we never see it. Even though we sign for it, it’s never 
given to us.’ Her friend went on to explain:
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In this village the rich families get more things from the government 
than the poor families. Here they just choose some families who they 
want to give things to. If they like someone they give things to them. 
We go along to all of the village meetings but we’re not invited to 
speak. It’s always the same people who speak. And we’re never told 
about what things the commune has given the village, and when they 
will be handed out, and to whom. The village head just tells us that 
we need to work hard and be nice and if the government has anything 
he will bring it to us. 
Despite facing structural obstacles and serial marginalisation through 
this lack of connectedness, these disadvantaged and chronically 
destitute households still aspire to ‘play the game’ and struggle to 
render themselves legible to local powerholders. They live within, 
and are confined by, the prevailing governmental categories that 
are constructed locally, even though these categories and associated 
practices are responsible for their continued immiseration. Without 
social or political capital they have little opportunity to successfully 
influence these structures to improve their prospects and, as 
a consequence, state development processes largely pass them by.
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that state discourses of ‘poverty’ and the 
practices of ‘poverty reduction’ that are prevalent in Vi ̃nh Thu ̉y 
commune today are contemporary manifestations of the historical 
project of power of the Party-state in the borderlands: to categorise 
and regulate ethnic minority people and upland landscapes in a way 
that renders them amenable to rule. In pursuing this project, state 
planners today continue the long-standing practice of governance in 
the uplands, of attempting to co-opt and work through local ethnic 
elites.15 In Vĩnh Thủy commune these local political elites exercise 
power in two registers: they are embedded in the state bureaucracy 
and act as the local executors of centre state power, but also sustain 
and grow their own local networks of power and influence in order to 
meet their local obligations and the expectations of their communities. 
15  Historically, the Hmông appeared to be one of the groups most subject to domination by 
ruling elites in the northwest highlands, principally by Thai elites who acted as local brokers 
for the colonial state. It is also worth noting that the Nùng are classified in Vietnamese state 
ethnography as a sub-group of the Thai (see Vạn et al. 2000). 
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State poverty reduction support to the borderlands serves to bind 
these politically important elites and a large number of upland people 
to the state, while also allowing them significant local autonomy to 
exercise power.
The standardised, technocratic construction of the category of ‘the 
poor’ that I have discussed in this chapter is the product of the 
prevalent ‘developmentalism’ of state planners and their international 
partners. The narrow policies and practices that they put in place 
are central technologies of government in Vi ̃nh Thu ̉y commune, for 
they permeate everyday life and bureaucratic practice in pervasive 
ways. At the same time, though, these categories are resolutely local 
in that they are interpreted, applied and manipulated through the 
active agency of local state officials and local people. They are deeply 
embedded in local social and political relations and in prevailing ‘moral 
economy’ perceptions, and both shape and are shaped by local values, 
strategies and statuses — what Bourdieu aptly describes as a process 
of ‘regulated improvisation’ (Bourdieu 1977:79). Both the ‘overbearing 
state’ and ‘agentive periphery’ views that I outlined earlier thus 
appear equally apposite. In fact, processes embodying these different 
tendencies are entangled and inseparable, laying to rest any notion of 
a clear separation between distinct state and local political cultures. In 
a manner evocative of Scott’s political metis (1998), local officials and 
local people deploy their accumulated knowledge and experience to 
dexterously negotiate the governmental categories to which they are 
subject, with varying degrees of success. 
In Vĩnh Thủy commune, the modern state’s biopolitical project of 
fostering life and a productive population through providing poverty 
reduction support has been reworked by local elites and those in their 
networks to deploy a local form of biopower of their own. They have 
colonised the centre state’s technocratic and generalised categories, 
and instead deploy highly personalistic and localised criteria for 
inclusion. As we have seen, this is made possible through the internal 
inconsistencies in the centre state’s own process which opens spaces for 
local officials to decide what best constitutes human development for 
the populace, and who in particular should benefit. Local elites thus 
exemplify political metis, for the ability to act as they do is dependent 
upon the poverty reduction project of the central state from which 
they draw sustenance and inspiration. This form of biopower gives 
local expression to the modern state’s standardising, normalising, 
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and regularising logics, but it does so in a way that is simultaneously 
embedded in and rigorously disciplined by the obligations, standards, 
and expectations prevalent in local moral economy relations. 
Local elites assume primary responsibility for supporting life in the 
commune through their control of state poverty reduction processes 
and associated material resources, and commune residents in turn do 
all they can to ensure that they are connected to and enveloped in this 
local biopolitical schema. But it is not all encompassing. Those who 
lack the social and political capital necessary to establish connections 
to local state powerholders lose out. They lack the political literacy or 
performative competency to render themselves legible and connected 
to these powerholders. Consequently, the very system intended to 
reduce inequality and structurally transform the livelihoods of the 
chronically deprived — the system for poverty reduction — serves 
instead only to reinforce their local subordination and perpetuate 
their continued disconnection.
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Thai Entourage Politics in the 
Socialist State of Vietnam
Ha Viet Quan
Introduction
We arrived at Lò Vi An’s house in Châu La Biên,1 a northwest province, 
quite late from Hà Nội because the lunch-stop at Châu Quỳnh town 
took much longer than we had planned. Lò Vi An seemed a bit tired 
from the rice wine during lunch but he was satisfied with the warm 
hospitality provided by Cầm Chung, a Thai leader of Châu Quỳnh 
District, and his entourage. Lò Vi An’s house impressed me with 
its luxurious interior: a big garage, digital security camera system, 
elevator, and other modern appointments. However, as soon as 
I crossed the living room with its Western-style furniture, such as a 
leather sofa, crystal glasses, and gold-plated tea set, I was surprised 
by the kitchen with its traditional Thai cooking utensils, including 
several rice baskets (cam khao), wooden rice steamers (mo nuung khao), 
and bamboo vegetable steamer (mo nuung phac). In a corner of the 
kitchen, I saw Toàn, an adopted son of Lò Vi An, roasting a piece 
of dried buffalo skin in a wood-fired stove. As I already knew Toàn, 
I greeted him and the others in the kitchen by saying how impressed 
I was by one of the dishes they were preparing: ‘Wow! It looks like 
1  Châu La Biên is a pseudonym. All place names relating to Châu La Biên and the names 
of Thai cadres and their associates in this chapter are pseudonyms.
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we are going to have nom nang quai [a Thai-style buffalo skin salad]. 
It’s my Dad’s favourite.’ Toàn handed up a piece of dried buffalo skin 
and asked me in Thai: ‘Australians don’t eat this special stuff, do they?’ 
‘No, they don’t. It is too luxurious for them!’ I responded jokingly, 
and while we were all chuckling, Toàn introduced me briefly to his 
companions as a student studying in Australia. He then turned the 
topic to how traditional Thai foods and Thai restaurants are becoming 
popular with the Kinh people (Vietnamese) in Hà Nội. 
The appearance of Lò Vi An in the kitchen interrupted the story Ly 
was telling about her business trip to Hà Nội the previous week. 
Ly is Toàn’s wife, who I had met once at Lò Vi An’s house in Hà Nội. 
She  looks quite young for the position of Deputy Head of Châu La 
Biên Rural Development Department. Dressed like a Kinh, and 
speaking Vietnamese, it is nevertheless not difficult to tell that Ly is 
a Thai woman because of her strong Thai accent. Lò Vi An sat down 
next to me while I was helping Toàn to slice buffalo skin. He took the 
kitchen knife from me to demonstrate how to slice it properly. Lò Vi 
An then asked Ly, without looking at her, in a mixture of Thai and 
Vietnamese: ‘Does Trung still drink, Ly? Call him to come here to have 
a couple of drinks’ (‘Ba Trung kin lau day bo Ly? Gọi nó đến kin lau đi’). 
Ly responded that her brother, Mr Trung, who I came to know later as 
her eldest brother and an officer of the Provincial Communist Party of 
Châu La Biên, would come for dinner because he too wanted to see Lò 
Vi An. Putting his hands on his knees, Lò Vi An slowly stood up, and 
scanning around the kitchen and looking at his watch, he announced 
as if giving an order, ‘Let’s make the dinner ready around 6:30pm 
guys!’, then left.
Lò Vi An was a leading official of Châu La Biên Province, which 
is situated in one of the traditional Thai homelands in Vietnam.2 
He moved to Hà Nội in 2003 to work as head of a national agency. 
Like most provincial leaders who are promoted to work at the national 
level, his wife and children also moved to live in the capital city. 
However, An kept mentioning that he would be going back to Châu 
La Biên as soon as he retired from work: ‘I don’t have any thought that 
I could permanently live in Hà Nội. It is too crowded and polluted.’ 
2  The muang — glossed here as homeland — is the traditional socio-spatial and political unit 
of the Tai in the uplands of mainland South East Asia (Condominas 1990). Historically, within 
Vietnam there have been 12 muang, known as Sip Song Chau Thai. 
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That explained why he had spent a lot of money recently renovating 
his house in Châu La Biên. Even though he works in Hà Nội, Lò Vi An 
was very well respected in his home town. Talking about his adoptive 
father’s influence in Châu La Biên, Toàn assured me:
You don’t have to worry about your interviews, they all know my Dad 
so just tell whoever you want to talk with that my Dad [Lò Vi An] says 
it’s OK. If you want to see Thai cadres, I know many of them. They are 
either our relatives or my Dad’s followers [đệ tử], therefore, you will 
not only be welcome to interview them but also invited to drink!
Indeed, most of the Thai cadres whom I met through Toàn and Lò Vi 
An during my fieldwork in Châu La Biên are, in one way or another, 
tightly connected with Lò Vi An. This was the case of Cầm Chung. 
He told me: ‘Without the support of big brother [đại ca] An, I would 
not be able to achieve what I have today.’ Cầm Chung used to work as a 
planning expert of Châu La Biên Provincial Office before being selected 
by Lò Vi An to be his private secretary for three years. He was then 
promoted (with support from Lò Vi An) to be Vice Chairman of Châu 
La Biên Provincial People’s Committee Office, then Chairman of the 
District People’s Committee of Châu Quỳnh District. He is apparently 
linked with Lò Vi An by a classic patron–client relationship.
However, it seems that Thai cadres such as Cầm Chung, Toàn, Ly, 
Trung and others in Châu La Biên are not simply tied to Lò Vi An 
by the traditional patron–client dyadic which, according to Scott’s 
research in Southeast Asia, involves ‘a largely instrumental friendship’ 
(Scott 1972:92). They are also connected with him and with each other 
by primordial bonds such as kinship, ethnicity and language. These 
ties have been used as a means for Thai cadres to press advantage 
and maintain autonomy in dealing with the centralised nation-state’s 
administrative structures. The presence of this tight-knit network of 
Thai cadres in Châu La Biên challenges a prevailing view of Vietnam’s 
socialist state as dominating, monolithic, and assimilatory in its 
treatment of minority groups (Evans 1992; McLeod 1999; McElwee 
2004; Lentz 2011). It also confronts the view that the agency available 
to Vietnam’s ethnic minorities is confined to responses such as ethno-
nationalism, religious conversion, passive resistance, and flight 
(Hickey 1982; Salemink 2003; Taylor 2008; Scott 2009). Instead, 
the Thai cadres grouping around Lò Vi An comprises an alternative 
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way to advance Thai interests by participating in the state, taking 
advantage of their positions within the state system, and using the 
state’s resources to achieve their goals and realise positive outcomes.
Studying minority projects in the borderlands, Horstmann and 
Wadley (2006:19) argue that if anthropologists focus on the concrete 
interactions between minorities and state power and on the local 
reworking of national and global scripts, it becomes possible to see 
how people on the periphery give meaning to and shape their own 
marginal spaces, and deal with state power. Marginal communities 
may be able to employ certain existing linkages or develop networks 
in order to maintain their relative cultural autonomy and to influence 
state plans in their localities. In another example, the Chinese in 
Thailand, and in many other countries, are a minority group; however, 
they continued to dominate the Thai economy through their extensive 
networks. As  Chayan Vaddhanaphuti says: ‘Identifying themselves 
as Thai, having adopted Thai names, embracing Buddhism, they, 
nonetheless, still retained their Chinese traditions’ (Vaddhanaphuti 
2005:154).
In Vietnam and in adjacent border areas, some research has been 
conducted on the vernacular networks of ethnic minorities through 
religion and trade, such as the translocal networks of minority Cham 
Muslims in central and southern Vietnam (Farouk and Yamamoto 2008), 
Hmong women’s trade networks in the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands 
(Turner 2007), and Hmong girls’ tourism networks in Sa Pa (Hanh 2008). 
The scale and vibrancy of these networks contradict the view that 
ethnic minorities are localised and autarchic, and challenge the image 
of ethnic minorities as impotent, dependent, or incompetent (Hardy 
2005; Taylor 2008). These networks do not necessarily undermine the 
state’s attempts to achieve unification and development, nor do they 
replicate them; instead, they allow minorities to build up resources 
and develop their own culture, institutions, and the values that define 
them. In this research, I do not aim to judge either the national political 
system or the Thai people in Châu La Biên. Instead, I will recount 
how the minority Thais in the northwest of Vietnam consolidate their 
own position, institutions, and values by participating in the state 
of Vietnam. Since this research is based on the case of a single senior 
cadre and his entourage, it does not claim to be representative of the 
behaviour and networks of all Thai elites throughout the northwest of 
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Vietnam. However, the case does shed light on previously unexamined 
aspects of the political life of northwest Thai elites that challenge the 
way the Thai–central relationship has been construed.
This chapter initially looks at the conceptualisation of a Thai leader 
among Thai cadres in the northwest of Vietnam. It then provides 
information about his network by asking who its members are, 
how they are connected, and in what circumstances. The third 
part analyses the nature of this Thai network and explores how the 
northwest Thai people domesticate state power to obtain autonomy, 
dignity, and enrichment within the state of Vietnam. In this section, 
I explore a mode  of entourage politics adopted by northwest Thai 
cadres, who use their respective positions, powers and responsibilities 
in the Vietnamese state to support other members and build and 
preserve influence. The conclusion provides a concise argument 
about the relationship between the minority Thai group and the state 
of Vietnam.3 
Taking Advantage of the State: 
Conceptions of a Thai Leader
The dinner held at Lò Vi An’s house was a great chance for me to 
approach Thai cadres in Châu La Biên. Among the guests, most of 
whom were Thai officers working for different provincial departments 
of Châu La Biên, were two Kinh contractors, who accompanied Lường 
Trung (Ly’s brother) to the feast. Despite the Western-style dining 
table, the dinner was very traditional, as most of the food was Thai. 
Lò  Vi An invited his brother-in-law Cầm Tuấn, the eldest brother 
of his wife, to sit at the centre of the dining table with him. After 
pouring rice wine into two extra cups as wine for ancestors (lau then), 
he tipped wine into Cầm Tuấn’s cup and his own, then handed the 
bottle to Toàn to pour wine for everyone else. Lò Vi An put his little 
finger into his cup, flicked wine over both his right and left shoulders 
then said in a mixture of Thai and Vietnamese language: ‘Going out 
to eat fish, going home to drink wine. All are brothers and sisters in 
3  The fieldwork on which this chapter is based was conducted over the course of 2013 as part 
of my doctoral research at The Australian National University, funded by an Australia Awards 
scholarship. I wish to thank Philip Taylor, Nicholas Tapp, Andy Kipnis, Kim Wells, and the two 
anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback and assistance with this chapter.
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the family, no one is an outsider so don’t be formal: let’s finish the first 
round!’ (‘Pay — kin pa, ma — kin lau. Toàn anh em trong nhà cả thôi, 
không có ai la người ngoài cả, đừng khách sáo. Au heng!’). He bottomed 
up his cup after Cầm Tuấn, then showed his empty cup for everyone 
to follow.
Lò Vi An is the eldest son of an intellectual Thai family (con nhà nòi) 
in Châu Quỳnh, Châu La Biên. His grandfather was a village noble 
(phìa) who had supported the Việt Minh during the war against the 
French,4 and his father was a high profile Thai leader of the former 
Administrative Committee of the Northwest Autonomous Zone. 
Thanks to his father’s position in the local state, An and his brothers 
and sisters had associated with Kinh people from a very early age, 
so he could speak Vietnamese even before going to school. 
In reality, since the early 1960s, as the state of Vietnam implemented 
its drive towards being a model socialist country, many Kinh teachers 
were sent up to the northern mountainous areas to build up the general 
education system for ethnic minority children. Most of them could 
not speak the local language, and were also unfamiliar with traditional 
customs and culture, and the highland lifestyle. Hence, the Kinh 
teachers had to more or less rely on the locals for building schools and 
mobilising support from local people in the form of foodstuff, labour, 
and materials for building the schools. 
4  In scholarship on the northwest Thai region, a common perspective is that Thai nobles 
tended to follow the colonial French, and were subsequently eliminated as a class or exiled after 
the revolution. Some scholars of the northwest during the colonial era focus on the role that 
Thai elites played in sustaining French rule (Le Failler 2011; Michaud 2009; Michaud 2013:66–
70). Others see the revolution as essentially a form of Kinh internal colonialism (McLeod 1999). 
I did not have enough time to investigate this aspect of regional history in depth, but during 
fieldwork, in addition to Lò Vi An, I met at least three senior Thai officials who also came from 
noble families and who similarly claimed that their families were Việt Minh followers. Lò Vi 
An’s family history is not necessarily typical, but I would not see it as an isolated case in the 
northwest region. In reality, many notable northwest Thai leaders from noble families lent their 
support to the Việt Minh movement, then became senior officials, including Cầm Văn Thịnh, 
Cầm Văn Dung, Xa Văn Minh, and Cầm Ngoan (for more examples, see Lentz 2011). According 
to Cam Trong (1978:511–517), there had been a clear strategy on the part of the Việt Minh 
from 1941–45 to mobilise the noble Thais to participate in the anticolonial movement in Sơn 
La Province. I would argue that the Thai elites who rallied to the revolution played a vital role 
in the story of how the lowland-based and Kinh-dominated Việt Minh gained a foothold in the 
mountainous northwest of Vietnam. 
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Lò Vi An’s Kinh teachers remembered him as a versatile and adept Thai 
student (khéo tay, biết làm nhiều việc) who knew how to build bamboo 
classrooms, houses, bamboo beds, and other school facilities from 
local materials. Trần Văn Thuấn, one of Lò Vi An’s Kinh high school 
teachers in Thuận Châu, recalled: ‘He was a Thai so he knew how to 
do things in Thai ways, which we young Kinh teachers couldn’t do.’ 
Trần Văn Thuấn also said that he and his colleagues were charged 
with setting up their own school in Châu La Biên, but they could not 
speak much Thai language, and most of the Thai people did not speak 
Vietnamese either. Lò Vi An and a couple of senior students were 
conscripted into helping the teachers work with the local Thai people 
in mobilising local kids to go to school, helping kitchen staff to buy 
foodstuffs from local people, calling for help from local authorities in 
building classrooms, and so on. It seemed that his local knowledge 
allowed Lò Vi An to play a much more important role for his Kinh 
teachers than simply being a Thai student.
In his Thai friends’ eyes, Lò Vi An was highly appreciated as a friendly 
(hòa đồng) schoolboy who did not depend on his father’s influence 
(không ỷ lại/dựa hơi bố). However, they believed that he had benefited 
significantly as the son of a man who had been a high profile leader of 
Châu La Biên since Lò Vi An was a child. He was one of a very few local 
Thai kids who could speak Vietnamese before going to school. With 
this language advantage, Lò Vi An was not only a good student himself 
but was also assigned by his teachers to help other Thai students in his 
classes. According to his high school friends in Châu La Biên, Lò Vi 
An was an active Youth Union leader (cán bộ Ðoàn năng nổ). ‘He was 
also a sporty guy, a good volleyball player. I  remembered he used 
to play volleyball with teachers after classes’, a  high school friend 
recalled. Generally, Lò Vi An was remembered by his school friends 
as a prominent Thai student who came from a noble lineage, spoke 
Vietnamese well (thạo tiếng phổ thông), and had been closely associated 
with the Vietnamese teachers.
Lò Vi An was sent to study for a bachelor degree at Bắc Thái Pedagogy 
University after graduating from the Northwest Ethnic Minorities 
Youth School in Thuận Châu, Sơn La. The path to becoming a cadre 
of the central planned economy state during the late 1970s and 1980s 
seemed smooth for An. Firstly, because of educational policies for 
ethnic minorities in Vietnam (chính sách cử tuyển), he did not have 
to attend the admission exams to go to university like his Kinh 
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schoolmates. It was very common in Vietnam for most ethnic minority 
students to be sent by their provinces to study at different universities 
and colleges in line with the fixed quotas set by the central state 
agencies. Secondly, because of the huge demand for general education 
teachers in the northwest provinces, Lò Vi An was promptly posted as 
a lecturer in the newly formed Northwest Pedagogy College in Châu La 
Biên upon graduation from university.
In the role of lecturer to many local general teachers at the Northwest 
Pedagogy College, Lò Vi An was widely seen as a young Thai intellectual 
who not only came from a noble lineage (con quan), but also as a well-
trained (được đào tạo bài bản) Thai cadre of Châu La Biên. He quickly 
began his political career by taking up the position of Director of the 
Provincial Education Department of Châu La Biên from the late 1990s. 
From there onwards, he occupied different positions in the local state 
of Châu La Biên, such as Chairman of a District People’s Committee, 
Vice Chairman of the Provincial People’s Committee, and as one of 
the top leaders of Châu La Biên Province, before moving to Hà Nội to 
work at the central level.5
There was a rumour in Châu La Biên that Lò Vi An was in fact ‘kicked 
upstairs’ to the central level in Hà Nội by his political opponents 
because of his corrupt activities when he had been a provincial 
leader. There is also a popular saying in Vietnam about ranking in the 
government system: ‘Better to be the head of a chicken than the cheek 
of a pig’ (‘Ðầu gà hơn má lợn’).6 However, because of the complexity 
of the political system in Vietnam — namely, relations between the 
Communist Party, People Council, and the government agencies at 
different levels — one cannot really ascertain if the rumour is true or 
not. However, in the eyes of the Thai cadres, Lò Vi An was obviously 
an influential provincial leader.
Having risen from college teacher to Thai politician, Lò Vi An was a 
well-respected intellectual Thai leader. Among popular comments that 
I heard about Lò Vi An, terms such as ‘formally educated cadre’ (được 
đào tạo bài bản), ‘capable official’ (có năng lực), and ‘knowledgeable Thai 
leader’ (hiểu biết) were common. Similarly, as a descendant from a Thai 
5  In order to protect the identity of my key informants, I have listed the positions in which 
Lò Vi An has occupied in a different order.
6  In English this would be more akin to ‘Better to be the head of a dog than the tail of a lion’.
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cadre family, Lò Vi An was greatly appreciated for his familiarity with 
the state of Vietnam. This appears to have been one of his strongest 
assets as a Thai leader from several viewpoints. Firstly, Lò Vi An was 
trusted by the state because of his family tradition, his father having 
been a former leader of the Northwest Autonomous Zone. Lò Vi An 
was perceived as a Thai leader who had close relationships not only 
with the top national leaders, but also with the central agencies. 
Secondly, with his family’s contribution to nation-building, his 
opinions — according to the Thai people — were carefully heard by 
the central state. Last, but not least, his understanding of the working 
of the Vietnamese state made him — in the view of local Thai cadres 
— a capable and worldly-wise Thai official. This helped him take 
advantage of being a state cadre to fulfil the needs of the local people.
Even though he had been working in Hà Nội for years, An appeared 
to follow a traditional Thai lifestyle: eating mostly sticky rice and 
traditional Thai foods, and preferring to speak Thai at home. In Châu 
La Biên, he was described by local Thai cadres as a leader who cared 
for both economic and cultural aspects of the province’s development. 
Many Thai cadres compared Lò Vi An to a captain, who had steered 
Châu La Biên to become the capital province of the northwest territory 
of Vietnam. He was also very proud of Châu La Biên’s cultural and 
social achievements promoted by the Northwest Culture Fest, which 
has been held every two years since 2003. He stated: 
I was the one who initiated the Northwest Culture Fest. Without it 
Châu La Biên Province would not be remembered nationwide and in 
the minds of national leaders. It is the Culture Fest which promotes 
the image of Châu La Biên to the country. Being a leader, you have got 
to know what are the advantages and disadvantages of your province. 
You have to know that a mountainous province like Châu La Biên, 
in comparison to other lowland provinces like Bắc Ninh, Hải Phòng 
and Hòa Bình, can’t be famous for its economical potential but for its 
typical cultural values.
Interestingly, from his own point of view, Lò Vi An considered the 
Culture Fest as not simply a cultural activity. He seemed to be more 
proud of his use of the Fest as a political means to attract the attention 
of outsiders, especially national leaders, to his province. 
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Lò Vi An’s relationship with the central leaders was one of relative 
strength. In response to my question as to what made Lò Vi An a good 
leader, the majority of the Thai cadres I met in Châu La Biên believed 
that Lò Vi An’s ability to work with the central agencies was an asset. 
This aspect was highly valued by the local Thai cadres. They mentioned 
to me several times that during An’s presidency many national leaders 
had visited Châu La Biên. Lường Trung complained: ‘Unlike when 
the big boss (sếp) Lò Vi An worked here, no top national leaders visit 
Châu La Biên these days.’ According to the local Thai cadres, Lò Vi 
An’s good relations with the administrative centre (quan hệ tốt với 
trung ương) allowed him to channel state resources to the Thai people. 
‘He was able to call for many investments from central agencies into 
Châu La Biên’, said Lường Trung. Similarly, Cầm Chung overstated 
at the lunch-stop at Châu Quỳnh that Châu La Biên should build a 
statue to Lò Vi An, considering all that he had contributed to the 
province. He said: ‘Very few people know it but I do. He [Lò Vi An] 
took the advantage of the construction of a major hydropower project 
to develop massively the infrastructure of Châu La Biên.’7 
Studying leadership perceptions and attribution of charisma to the 
leader, Lord and Maher (2002) argue that the power of leaders is 
fundamentally related to how they are perceived by others, and leaders’ 
characteristics are based on outcomes of salient events. According 
to Ensaria and Murphy (2003:61), ‘a high outcome produces greater 
attribution of charisma to the leader’. Apparently, the leadership of 
Lò Vi An was closely associated with the outcomes of the promotion 
of Thai culture, and infrastructure development in Châu La Biên 
(when he was working there). His influence was perceived by local 
Thai cadres as stemming from his good relations with the Vietnamese 
state, somewhat similar to his school friends’ recollection of him 
as a prominent Thai student who was closely associated with their 
Vietnamese teachers. 
Standing between the Vietnamese state and the Thai people, Lò Vi An 
appeared as a cultural intermediary or cultural broker who, according 
to Wolf (1956), Bonacich (1973), Moerman (1969:546), and Szasz 
7  Sơn La Dam is a concrete gravity dam on the Black River (sông Ðà) in Ít Ong, Mường La 
District, Sơn La Province, Vietnam. It is the largest hydroelectric power station in Southeast 
Asia. It has a total capacity of 2,400 MW with an expected annual generation of 10,246 GWh. 
The total cost of the project was $2 billion USD (Bui, Schreinemachers and Berger 2013:537).
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(2001), played the role of a middleman. He used his Thai ethnicity 
to build up his relationships with the Vietnamese state which always 
needed Thai support for its multicultural project (Ngo 1997:139–141; 
Nguyễn 1975:9). By acting as a Thai ‘foreign minister’, symbolising 
the Thai people to the national state, An was designated authority and 
power by the Vietnamese state to secure and maintain his leadership 
among local Thai people. Importantly, his association with the 
majority Vietnamese did not make Lò Vi An a ‘Vietnamised’ Thai cadre 
in their eyes. Instead, by virtue of his notable work achievements such 
as the Northwest Culture Fest, the province university, and other 
infrastructure projects, the Thai people in Châu La Biên perceived Lò 
Vi An as a charismatic leader because he had the ability to deal with 
and take advantage of the state of Vietnam to fulfil their needs.
Brothers in a Family: The Nature of a Thai 
Cadre Grouping in Northwest Vietnam
In a car with the engine running, waiting at the clubhouse of a 
golf course outside Hà Nội, Huy — Lò Vi An’s private driver, who 
is also a distant relative of Lò Vi An’s wife — seemed a bit anxious. 
He mumbled: ‘My goodness, what are they talking about that takes so 
long over there? We can’t stop here much longer.’ Huy was anxious 
because he was parked in the pick-up and drop-off area in front of 
the clubhouse entrance. Lò Vi An had finished playing, but he had 
met some friends on the way out and had stopped to talk with them. 
I chatted to while away the time with Huy, who had been driving for 
Lò Vi An for more than 15 years since he had been posted to Châu 
La Biên. I heard some interesting observations from Huy during our 
short conversation:
Me: How often do you and the boss go to Châu La Biên?
Huy: Quite often. Whenever he has free time he returns home [về quê]
[Châu La Biên]. When he was renovating his house a couple of 
months ago, we travelled to Hà Nội — Châu La Biên — Hà Nội almost 
every week.
Me: Oh. It seems that the boss can’t wait to enjoy being in his new 
house. He must love living in Châu La Biên very much, right?
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Huy: Of course, Châu La Biên is his territory. His life is as good as a 
king in Châu La Biên, because his family, relatives [anh em, họ hàng] 
are all still there. Policemen up there never pull my car over.
Me: Really? I thought he had moved to Hà Nội already so he was no 
longer in power there.
Huy: Oh. Don’t be fooled by the boss [đừng có đùa với sếp]. He has 
had a long-term strategic view about personnel arrangements in Châu 
La Biên since he was a leader there. Up there, provincial officials are 
mostly like brothers in a family [toàn anh em trong nhà].
Huy’s comment made me take notice. The Châu La Biên Thai cadres 
grouped around Lò Vi An were indeed connected to him mostly by 
either kinship or adoptive relations. Commonly, they referred to 
themselves as brothers in a family (anh em trong nhà) in speaking both 
with Lò Vi An and among themselves. Moreover, looking at the daily 
activities of those Thai cadres, one could also agree with Huy that Lò 
Vi An, as a Thai leader, had a long-term vision to maintain not only 
his influence, but also Thai culture in the local state system of Châu La 
Biên via his entourage. I had a chance to experience these arguments, 
right at the dinner at Lò Vi An’s house, especially when they were 
discussing implementation of some infrastructure development 
projects. 
Over almost three decades since the economic reform named đổi mới, 
Vietnam has experienced dramatic economic growth, which has led to 
considerable poverty reduction programmes and policies nationwide 
(Salomon and Ket 2007; Baulch et al. 2010; Blackburn et al. 2006). 
Châu La Biên, like most other mountainous provinces in Vietnam, 
has enjoyed sizable state investments for infrastructure development 
(Baulch et al. 2012). As a result, the relationship between construction 
contractors and the local authorities is very dynamic because 
construction is one of the most profitable businesses in Vietnam 
(Nguyen and van Dijk 2012). I was told by some private construction 
contractors that they sometimes accrued a 50 per cent profit out of 
the total investment budget from infrastructure building contracts. 
Apparently, infrastructure development is one of the most attractive 
businesses in the north of Vietnam not only for contractors but also 
for government officials.
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In fact, one of the main topics discussed during dinner at Lò Vi An’s 
house was the government infrastructure development program 
in Châu La Biên. Lường Trung brought along two contractors to 
introduce them to Lò Vi An as capable and potential building partners. 
He wanted Lò Vi An to help them get infrastructure development 
contracts by using his influence at both central and provincial level. 
Giving the man sitting next to him a slap on his shoulder, he delivered 
an endorsement to Lò Vi An:
Tú [one of the two men he brought to dinner] is the husband of my 
wife’s cousin, and his company has many construction contracts 
in Laos so they are a very capable construction contractor. More 
importantly, they are my brothers so they can’t escape anywhere. 
We don’t have to worry for anything. 
Lường Trung cleverly used the phrase ‘they can’t escape anywhere’, 
to assure Lò Vi An that the contractors would be responsible for 
what they do with their contracts. However, it also contained a deep 
implication that because they are brothers, they would be responsible 
for sharing any commission derived from the contracts. Lường 
Trung mentioned several situations in which some contractors had 
run away after finishing their contracted work. In other words, they 
did not share the commission with those who had helped them get 
the contracts. Lường Trung described them as ‘unfaithful’ people. 
He said, ‘There are many contractors, but many of them are unfaithful. 
They often kick the bowl that feeds them [ăn cháo đá bát].’ Signalling 
Toàn to pour wine for everyone, Lường Trung continued: ‘It is very 
hard to trust outsiders nowadays.’ He then proposed that all present 
share a drink as ‘brothers of one family’ (em mời tất cả các anh em trong 
nhà một chén), emphasising the contractors’ familial relationship to the 
others in his toast.
Lường Trung and Lò Vi An share an affinal relationship — the 
former being a brother of Lường Ly, who is Toàn’s wife. While Lường 
Trung was well respected by most of the group’s members, Lò Lam, 
youngest brother of Lò Vi An, described him as an opportunistic man 
who took advantage of his brother’s influence to make money out 
of many corrupt activities. However, Lường Trung seemed to have 
gained the trust of Lò Vi An, mostly as a middleman, in carrying out 
infrastructure development projects in Châu La Biên, where he had no 
formal position of power.
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I had the chance to visit Lường Trung at his well-decorated townhouse 
in a central street of Châu La Biên City, but I did not have much time 
to talk with him. I managed to visit Lường Trung again in his Châu 
La Biên Communist Party office on a cold winter morning around Tết 
(Vietnamese New Year festival). In contrast with his house, Lường 
Trung’s office was rather simple, with several souvenir pennants from 
badminton tournaments, a couple of personal merit certificates and 
other awards hanging on the wall. In an old documents cabinet, there 
was nothing but some thin books and a jar of herbal wine. 
Showing me a warm welcome, Lường Trung poured wine into two 
teacups, gave one to me and said, ‘Tea is useless in this kind of weather; 
this drink will keep you warm’. I took the cup and sought more 
information about his relation with Lò Vi An by saying: ‘You seem to 
be very much favoured by the big boss [Lò Vi An]. When we spoke, he 
appreciated you highly.’ Lường Trung responded modestly, ‘Oh! We 
are brothers in a family [anh em trong một nhà cả]. But he appreciates 
you highly too.’ We spent more than an hour chatting about his 
relationship with Lò Vi An and other Thai people in Châu La Biên. 
Lường Trung appeared to know a lot about the history of Thai people 
in Châu La Biên as well as in the northwest region of Vietnam, which 
is rare among the current generation of Thai people. He was very keen 
to share with me how Lò Vi An was a good Thai leader not only to 
him, but also to many other Thai cadres. He stressed the fact that, 
thanks to the leadership of Lò Vi An, Châu La Biên had developed 
infrastructure — particularly many road improvements. Lường Trung 
listed Lò Vi An’s vision for the expansion of Châu La Biên City, his 
ideas to build a university and different colleges, turning Châu La Biên 
into a centre of the northwest area, and a number of other initiatives 
as valuable achievements. These were all common claims about Lò Vi 
An’s achievements that I had heard before. He closed the conversation 
by reiterating that, ‘Lò Vi An’s greatest asset is his strategic view. He is 
a real big brother to us, who not only supports us, but also connects 
us together [quy tụ anh em].’ 
Lường Trung was busy during the late morning. A couple of guests 
came in to say happy New Year and give him some Tết presents. 
In  addition, several calls came in on his landline and cell phone to 
invite him for lunch. Lường Trung explained to me that he had to 
deny them all because, ‘I promised to drink with a group of Châu 
Quỳnh District officials at Cầm Chung’s house. We are brothers in a 
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family [là chỗ anh em với nhau] so I cannot cancel it.’ He invited me 
to join the lunch with them, by focusing on the ‘family connection’ 
again, ‘there are no outsiders; all are brothers in a family [toàn anh em 
trong nhà]’. I told him that I needed to inform Toàn and Ly, because 
they might wait for me for lunch at home (I was staying at Lò Vi An’s 
house). ‘Don’t worry, I will call them to join us there [Cầm Chung’s 
house] too.’ Lường Trung showed his power over Toàn and Ly as their 
brother by giving them an order to come to the lunch at Cầm Chung’s 
house. 
I realised that among the members of the Thai grouping around Lò Vi 
An, a complex hierarchy enabled some members to wield influence 
over others. Sometimes the status of a member is based on his or her 
position in the Vietnamese official hierarchy, but most of the time it 
is based on their family relations. Ly’s relation with Lường Trung is 
a case in point. As deputy head of a provincial department of Châu 
La Biên, her position was apparently higher than her brother’s in the 
local state system. However, she had very little power or influence 
over her brother Lường Trung. Similarly, her husband Toàn had a 
high position as Vice Director of the Social Policy Bank of Châu La 
Biên. However, since Toàn is an adoptive son of Lò Vi An, he appeared 
to have very low status in relation to other members in the group, who 
he had to address as uncle, aunty, older brother, and so on.
We arrived at Cầm Chung’s house in a small street of Châu La Biên 
City. It was an old house located on a relatively large piece of land. 
The house even had a little fish pool, a small drying ground in the 
front, and a separate kitchen house at the back. Because Cầm Chung 
had been working in Châu Quỳnh District more than 100 kilometres 
away from his house in Châu La Biên, he did not come home very 
often. I was told by Lò Vi An that he was expecting to be moved back 
to the provincial level in early 2014.8 
Cầm Chung was decanting rice wine into small bottles in the living 
room, while people were still steaming sticky rice and preparing food 
in the kitchen. Unlike in the Kinh area in Hà Nội, in Châu La Biên, 
Thai men are the main cooks when it comes to a big feast or a party. 
8  According to the latest news I have received from Vietnam, Cầm Chung could not return 
to the provincial level because of political reasons and had already moved to work for a central 
agency in Hà Nội with the support of Lò Vi An.
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Even  powerful leaders in the state system such as Lò Vi An, Cầm 
Chung, or Lường Trung are likely to be found in the kitchen cooking 
and preparing Thai dishes. Cầm Chung was delighted to see Lường 
Trung and I joining the lunch. As I already knew Cầm Chung, I went 
directly over to give him a hand decanting wine while Lường Trung 
entered the kitchen with the cooks.
Similar to other feasts in which I participated in Châu La Biên, the 
lunch at Cầm Chung’s house started with a short speech by the host 
to say that he had not invited outsiders: all the diners were close 
brothers. I was invited to sit as an honoured guest next to Cầm Chung 
and Lường Trung, who were the oldest people present. Generally, Thai 
people in the northwest of Vietnam still observe a hierarchy system, 
based on age and family relations, to determine the positions of people 
at a dining table.
Among the group of Thai cadres I met around Lò Vi An, Cầm Chung 
was one of very few Thais not connected to Lò Vi An through a real 
family relation. His connection with Lò Vi An began as a patron–
client relationship when selected by Lò Vi An to work as his private 
secretary. Nevertheless, Cầm Chung eventually became like a brother 
of Lò Vi An since he identified himself as a ‘lifetime client’ in relation 
to Lò Vi An. In fact, Cầm Chung was well-cherished not only by Lò 
Vi An, but his family members as well. In an informal discussion 
with Lò Vi An’s wife in Hà Nội, I remember that she appreciated the 
connection between Cầm Chung and Lò Vi An because ‘it had been 
tested over the course of time’. She mentioned that even though Cầm 
Chung’s family was in Châu La Biên and he was working as a leader of 
Châu Quỳnh, he participated in most of the important events at Lò Vi 
An’s house, regardless of whether it was in Hà Nội or Châu La Biên. 
Lò Vi An said of his bond with Cầm Chung: ‘This is a real brothers 
[pi-nong] relationship of the Thai people’, and quoted a Thai saying: 
‘Brothers are like water, they cannot be cut by a knife; aren’t divided 
even in nine different markets’ (‘Pi nong tat cong lin, bau khat; toc cau 
lat bau xia’).9 
9  This implies broad geographical dispersion in distant and unfamiliar places, ‘markets’ 
referring to higher-level centres or towns that serve a network of villages.
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Similar to Cầm Chung, Nguyễn Toàn is connected with Lò Vi An by 
proven ties of trust. However, familial intimacy and mutual obligation 
colour the relation between Nguyễn Toàn and Lò Vi An, because 
he is also a relative of Lò Vi An’s wife. Initially, Nguyễn Toàn was 
adopted into Lò Vi An’s family in Châu La Biên basically to help them 
do housework. In return, he was sent to Châu La Biên High School 
to continue his education. Having spent most of his younger life 
living with Lò Vi An’s family, Nguyễn Toàn pursued his full family 
member status as an ‘adoptive son’ (in Thai: luc leeng) of Lò Vi An.10 
The  influence of his adoptive father acted to smooth his path to 
becoming a provincial official. 
Lò Vi An has two brothers and two sisters. I know them all personally. 
Three of them are state cadres, including one vice chairman of a 
district people’s council, one deputy head of division of a local branch 
of the state bank of Vietnam, and one general director (giám đốc sở) 
of a provincial department. In addition his siblings, Lò Vi An and 
Nguyễn Toàn wrote down an incomplete interview list comprising 14 
other relatives who were provincial and district officials. According to 
Lò Vi An, the Thai people have culturally a strong connection among 
relatives. He quoted a Thai saying to describe the connections with 
his entourage: ‘If they are not brothers, they would be sisters; if they 
aren’t consanguineal relatives, they would be affinal relatives; if not 
cousins on the mother’s side, they would be aunties on the father’s 
side’ (‘bau ai co noong, bau lung co ta, bau nhinh co sao’). I could not 
interview all of those 14 Thai cadres during my fieldwork. However, 
the list of the Thai interviewees impressed me greatly by presenting a 
picture of how dominant this Thai extended family could be over the 
local state of Châu La Biên. In total, they have representatives in leading 
positions spread out over seven different provincial departments and 
four districts.
10  Similar to the Thai-Lao language term which has been analysed by Keyes (1975), the term 
‘luc leeng’ means ‘child to feed and take care of’. It is somewhat similar to ‘con nuôi’ in Vietnamese 
or ‘adoptive son’ in English. In accordance with Keyes’s analysis, Toàn could also be described 
as a ‘foster child’ of Lò Vi An. However, in this research, I prefer to use the term ‘adoptive’ to 
describe the process of recruiting and developing members into the grouping of Thai cadres 
around Lò Vi An.
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Contentious Connections
It was not hard to hear comments from local cadres in Châu La Biên 
that Lò Vi An had arranged for his family members and his followers to 
hold important positions in Châu La Biên’s local state system. A retired 
provincial leader, one of Lò Vi An’s previous political opponents in 
Châu La Biên, criticised him strongly as ‘a corrupted nepotistic 
leader’. He said, ‘Within only the two first years of his presidency, he 
[Lò Vi An] promoted more than 20 family members and his followers 
to be provincial department and district leaders. It was unacceptable 
because this province is not his own kingdom.’ Nevertheless, Lò Vi 
An responded calmly when I discussed those complaints with him. 
He believed he did not do anything wrong because he simply needed 
capable staff, who he could trust, to work with. He explained: ‘They 
[his political opponents] complained about it because they know 
nothing about ê kíp [being a team player]. And see, they [persons 
he promoted] have been working well and are deserving of their 
positions.’
Discussing his family members’ promotion, Lò Vi An contended that 
‘all decisions were made by a collective board of provincial leaders. 
I did not sign solely on any of those promotion decisions’. Similarly, 
Lò Vi Loan — a sister of Lò Vi An — who was general director of 
a provincial department in Châu La Biên, referred to the saying, 
‘a hand cannot cover the sun’ (‘một tay làm sao có thể che được mặt 
trời’), when she asserted that her position was proposed by the 
Provincial Standing Committee and approved by the Provincial 
People’s Council. In fact, the use of ‘collective decisions’ is common in 
politics in Vietnam. It is one of the most popular political tricks used 
by state officials, making it difficult to find the particular individuals 
responsible for any given issue. Even at the highest level of Vietnam’s 
political system, Mr Nguyễn Sinh Hùng — the Chairman of the 
National Assembly — recently raised a very debatable argument that 
no one, including himself as chairman or any other National Assembly 
members, can be held responsible for wrong decisions made by the 
National Assembly. He explained this by asserting that ‘the Vietnam 
National Assembly represents the people so it is the people who are 
responsible’ (‘Quốc hội là dân, mà dân quyết sai thì dân chịu chứ ai?’)
(Linh 2014). Even though Lò Vi An’s family members’ occupation of 
positions in the local state of Châu La Biên was criticised strongly, his 
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political opponents could hardly do anything about it, because Lò Vi 
An had cleverly used the ‘collective mechanism’ (cơ chế tập thể) of the 
Vietnamese state in forming and strengthening his entourage network. 
In general, Lò Vi An was proud of his siblings, especially Lò Vi Loan, 
who rose up to become a provincial department leader. In conversation 
among Lò Vi An’s family, I heard that Lò Vi Loan had great potential to 
be promoted as Vice President of the Provincial People’s Committee for 
the next term. To be fair to Lò Vi Loan, who I have known for a long 
time, she is certainly a smart female Thai leader. Lò Vi An believed 
that Lò Vi Loan inherited her decisive and determined character — 
‘like a man’ — from their father. Indeed, straightforward as she is, 
Lò Vi Loan told me clearly via phone when I contacted her for an 
interview: ‘If you want to ask about my work, come here to my office. 
Otherwise, I will see you at home.’ I decided to see her at her office, 
not simply because of her work, but also because I was curious to 
know about her work setting. Since she appeared to me as a traditional 
Thai lady who normally dresses in Thai costume and speaks Thai at 
home with her family members, I was a bit surprised to find that Lò 
Vi Loan’s office exhibited no trappings of Thai culture except her own 
personal outfit; as usual, she was dressed in a Thai skirt. Speaking to 
me in Thai, she said, ‘I am going to have a meeting in an hour so you 
don’t have to stand on ceremony like an outsider’.
Since we did not have much time, our conversation went straight to 
the topic of Thai cadres in Châu La Biên. I asked for her opinion about 
the criticism of Lò Vi An as corrupt owing to his promotion of so many 
of his family members to leading positions in the local state. Lò Vi 
Loan defended him, saying: 
It is politics: opponents criticise you for anything you do regardless of 
whether it is right or wrong. My brother was in fact too strict with our 
family members when he was president here. Look at Lò Trang [Lò Vi 
An’s other sister]: she has been deputy head of a division for years. 
If he had intended to do such a thing [promoting family members], 
she [Lò Trang] wouldn’t still be there now.
However, Lò Vi Loan later confirmed indirectly that Lò Vi An had 
promoted several family members and followers during the time he 
had been working as President of Châu La Biên. She argued that the 
majority of the Châu La Biên Province population is Thai (60 per cent), 
yet the percentage of Thai cadres in the local government is much 
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lower than that of the population.11 Hence, ‘There was nothing wrong 
with Lò Vi An’s decisions to promote Thai cadres into management 
positions. Many provincial leaders do the same thing with their 
families.’ I asked her for an example of this and she promptly listed 
several cases in which the provincial leaders of Châu La Biên used 
their power to promote their relatives. She even told me the story of an 
informal negotiation that happened between Lò Vi An and the former 
Secretary of the Châu La Biên Communist Party for the purpose of 
promoting and arranging provincial personnel. It sounded as if a lot 
of informal negotiations had been going on in Châu La Biên between 
different powerful leaders and/or different clans. For example, she said:
I am surprised that he [the mentioned retired provincial leader of 
Châu La Biên] dared tell you about it [Lò Vi An’s support to his family 
members and followers]. His sister-in-law was my deputy [at district 
level], so he negotiated with my brother that if I moved to provincial 
level, his sister-in-law should be the one to replace me ... and indeed, 
she did. 
Lò Vi Loan’s conversation with me seemed to be more open after we 
chatted about studying in Australia, as she was planning to send her 
son to study overseas. She tried to convince me that having family 
members in the system is very normal and common. According to 
her, everyone would support their family members, including the 
nation’s top leaders. If they don’t have their family members working 
in the state system, they will support their family members who are 
working in the private sector to form different business connections. 
‘Then they might be even more corrupt’, she said.
Interestingly, she might have forgotten her youngest brother, Lò Lam, 
when making this argument. Lò Lam is a case in point, because he was 
not working for any state agency. He was connected with the group 
of Thai cadres, including his brothers and sisters, not only by kinship 
relations but also business relationships. In his early 40s, Lò Lam, 
according to himself, is literally a ‘jobless man’, because he does not 
work for either a state agency or any private company. In Lò Vi An’s 
11  There are currently 21 ethnic groups in the northwest provinces of Vietnam. However, since 
the Thai people comprise one of the majority indigenous groups of the region, this northwest 
region was named the Thai-Meo Autonomous Zone from 1955 until 1963. As a consequence, the 
Thai cadres remain one of the most dominant groups in the local state system in the northwest 
provinces.
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eyes, ‘He was over-indulged by my parents. He was spoiled because 
he got whatever he wanted since he was a boy.’ Lò Vi An normally 
depicted Lò Lam as a failed member of his family because ‘he does not 
belong to any organisation’. Nonetheless, I was curious about what 
Lò Vi An told me about his youngest brother, and why he kept saying 
that Lò Lam is a spoiled man.
Having once worked for a local branch of Electric Power of Vietnam, 
Lò Lam had quit his job in 2002 to work in an infrastructure building 
firm with his friends. He spoke candidly with me while he was showing 
me around the town of Châu La Biên, saying: ‘Everyone has their own 
way of life. My ultimate purpose is earning money to raise my family.’ 
Without a doubt, Lò Lam is a wealthy Thai man. He has a big house, 
drives an expensive car, and was able to send both his children to 
China to study. His ‘money-earning’ career seems very successful, in 
contrast to how he was described by his brother. 
I observed that Lò Lam was very well connected, not only with Lò 
Vi An, but also with other group members. In reality, Lò Lam was 
working informally for a friend who runs a big construction company. 
During my second trip to Châu La Biên, Lò Lam even invited me, as his 
driving companion, to join him and Cầm Chung in travelling to Châu 
Quỳnh to prepare for a construction bid there. Although he is not a 
state official like his brothers and sisters, Lò Lam is a practical man 
who has greatly benefited from the network of Thai cadres grouped 
around his brother. Similar to what Lường Trung had been doing, 
Lò Lam basically acted as a broker between state investment officials 
and private construction companies. In particular, he takes advantage 
of his family relationships to influence Thai cadres in Châu La Biên to 
give building contracts to the company. In return, the company had 
to share its profit with him, and perhaps also to other local authorities 
via Lò Lam, even though he had nothing to do with implementing 
those contracts. In short, Lò Lam is an infrastructure construction 
middleman in Châu La Biên.
In fact, such a ‘middleman’ — or trung gian, môi giới or even cò in 
Vietnamese — is quite common. According to Kerkvliet, a problem in 
village–state relations in Vietnam since the time of de-collectivisation 
has been that, ‘due to insufficient resources and other inadequacies, 
the actual administrative capacity of the state to coordinate programs 
and implement policies is considerably less than it would require’ 
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(Kerkvliet 1995:399). Lò Lam’s work as a construction middleman 
in Châu La Biên indicates that the Vietnamese government is still 
ill-equipped when it comes to running a market-oriented economy. 
It allows Lò Lam to make himself useful to state officials such as his 
brothers and sisters, who do not want to be directly involved in a 
‘sensitive’ area like infrastructure development investment, and to 
private contractors, who cannot otherwise establish their credentials 
with powerful state leaders. In other words, Lò Lam plays the role of 
middleman among the Thai people, which, according to the theory of 
middleman, plugs the status gap between the state and private sector 
at the local level, acting as broker between them (Bonacich 1973).
Most Thai leaders I met in Châu La Biên, such as Cầm Chung, Lường 
Trung, Lò Vi Loan, Nguyễn Toàn and Lường Ly, would make a lively 
endorsement of Huy’s statement that ‘provincial officials are mostly 
like brothers in a family’. It is true that most of them are connected 
with Lò Vi An via a classic patron-client relationship: 
In which an individual of higher socioeconomic status [patron] uses his 
own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, 
for a person of lower status [client] who, for his part, reciprocates by 
offering general support and assistance, including personal services, 
to the patron (Scott 1972:72).
However, these persons are also tied to each other within the local state 
as members of an extended family, which enables them to manipulate 
the local state and maintain their family influence in Châu La Biên. 
I found that this grouping of Thai cadres has been effectively using the 
state of Vietnam as their base, and government policies and programs 
as their means to strengthen their family connections. By networking 
with each other, they have been able to practice, maintain, and develop 
Thai forms of relatedness within the state of Vietnam. 
The Thai Cadre Entourage as a ‘Fishing 
Net’ of Relations 
A formalist depiction of the nature of Vietnamese state authority 
might easily conclude that it conforms to what Weber has described as 
legal or bureaucratic authority (Weber 2009:56–65). In principle, the 
Vietnamese state has long been following the model of a law-based state 
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(nhà nước pháp quyền), which is based on a legal authority type with a 
bureaucratic administrative system (Gillespie 2013:676). In addition, 
the Vietnamese state is also commonly considered in the literature as 
an authoritarian regime (Wischermann 2011:7; Joseph 2007), with 
uniform national institutions that enable the ruling party to project 
its power homogeneously throughout society in a manner that has 
been described as ‘mono-organizational socialism’ (Thayer 2009:3). 
Koh notes that ‘the view that the Vietnamese party-state dominates, 
leaving very little space for society’, has prevailed for some time (Koh 
2001:369). 
Nevertheless, the network of Thai cadres in northwest Châu La 
Biên who gather around Lò Vi An reveals greater complexity in the 
nature of Vietnamese state authority. The connections built up by 
the cadres, grouped around a senior Thai leader, enable them to exert 
influence and wield power in a mode that could be called northwest 
Thai entourage politics. By practising it at the local state level in 
Châu La Biên, northwest Thai cadres have been flexibly assimilating 
the Vietnamese state in their locale to a traditional mode of authority 
that is, according to Weber (2009), generally patrimonial in form, and 
derived from traditional customs and established norms. 
Indeed, Lò Vi An, who was commonly addressed as ‘big brother’ 
of the group, used his skill, political influence, and access to state 
power to shape and connect his family members and followers into an 
entourage of Thai cadres. With him as the central node person, other 
members, consisting of about 15 people working in different agencies, 
were interlinked with each other around Lò Vi An. This Thai grouping 
consists of a ‘meshwork’ (Ingold 2011) of related members connected 
to each other in relations of kinship, adoption, patron–client ties and 
mutual obligation. Each of them has his or her own ties with the top 
person, as well as other contiguous members, bringing into form a 
distinctive constellation of power within the state of Vietnam that is 
as strong and resilient as a Thai-style fishing net. The nature of this 
network has several prominent elements, as elaborated below. 
One of the most obvious characteristics of this Thai ‘fishing net’ 
cadre network in Châu La Biên is the hierarchical relations among 
its interlinked members. Several factors help identify the status of 
members, such as age, gender, and position in the state. However, the 
most dominant factor, which controls their hierarchical positions in 
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the network, is proximity to the leader. For example, Lường Ly, as 
a younger sister of Lường Trung, basically has a lower status than 
Lường Trung, even though her position in the local state system is 
higher. Lò Lam has no official position, but is high in the network. 
In general, I found through different parties and feasts in Châu La Biên 
that one of the easiest ways to see the hierarchy among Thai grouping 
members is by observing their sitting positions around dining tables. 
It is not much different to traditional Thai seating rules in so-called 
‘feudal’ times, described by Cam Trong several decades ago (Cam Trong 
1978:247–248).12 Accordingly, the closer a person sits to the highest 
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1. Lò Vi An  8. Lường Trung
2. Cầm Tuấn  9. Toàn
3. Cầm Kiên  10. Guest 1 (Kinh contractor)
4. Lò Vi An’s wife  11. Lường Ly (Toàn’s wife)
5. Lò Vi Loan  12. Guest 2 (Kinh contractor)
6. Researcher  A. Dining room door
7. Lò Vi Loan’s husband B. Kitchen
Diagram 1: Dining positions at Lò Vi An’s house.
A second important feature of this Thai entourage is the obligation 
among members. All members share mutual obligations with both Lò 
Vi An and other members, including Nguyễn Toàn and Cầm Chung, 
12  In Cam Trong’s (1978) book about Thai people in northwest Vietnam, the author generalises 
that the term ‘feudal time’ (thời phong kiến) refers to the Chau-Muong administrative system 
of the Thai people in relation to Vietnam’s pre-colonial state and the French colonial state of 
Indochina before the Vietnamese revolution in 1945.
13  The seat of the highest-status person is normally located opposite the door of the dining 
room.
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whose connections with Lò Vi An had originated in patron–client 
relations. Here we can find elements of what Scott discerns in his 
overview of patron–client politics: 
There is an imbalance in exchange between the two partners which 
expresses and reflects the disparity in their relative wealth, power, 
and status. A client, in this sense, is someone who has entered an 
unequal exchange relation in which he is unable to reciprocate fully. 
A debt of obligation binds him to the patron. (Scott 1972: 93)
In this entourage group, Nguyễn Toàn, Cầm Chung, and Lò Vi An 
have developed their connections beyond such relations of debt and 
obligation into kin-like relations infused with sentiment and trust. 
The ‘patron’ — Lò Vi An — has assumed the same responsibilities 
of taking care of Cầm Chung and Nguyễn Toàn as he would his real 
family members. Obligation weighs most heavily upon the shoulders 
of the entourage leader, for it is to him that other members of the 
group look to advance the fortunes of the whole group. 
The presence of adoptive members in this group also points to the 
open, synthetic, and generative nature of this network whose 
membership criteria are not confined to tradition, inheritance, or 
ascription alone. Membership and rank in this Thai cadre entourage 
are earned, consolidated, and reinforced, most notably through 
displays of loyalty from its subordinate members and of performance 
from its superordinate leader. As I was to discover, new members can 
be incorporated into the entourage through invitations to partake in 
shared meals and drinking sessions, and through inclusive modes of 
address and collective self-reference, by which means the network can 
be flexibly extended. Displays of deference, mutuality, and loyalty, as 
well as facility in the familial idioms of the network, can consolidate 
one’s position in the network, while rank can be enhanced through 
loyalty and displays of efficacy in navigating the world beyond the 
entourage and attracting resources to the group. Perhaps the most 
obvious arena for attaining and symbolising rank in this Thai cadre 
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entourage is the hosting of communal meals, whose size, lavishness, 
and conspicuously traditional nature earn significant prestige for the 
entourage leader and bind network members to him.14 
Of particular note are the strong sentiments of esteem that exist 
among network members, channelling the loyalties of even far-flung 
entourage members towards the central node person. For instance, 
the sincere appreciation by Lường Chung for what Lò Vi An had 
done in developing Châu La Biên would be more or less comparable 
to the charismatic type of authority defined by Max Weber as a 
‘certain quality of an individual personality, by virtue of which 
he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with 
supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers 
or qualities’ (Weber 2009:329). It would appear that, for many Thais 
in his region, Lò Vi An embodies qualities of a Southeast Asian-style 
‘man of prowess’ (Wolters 1999) owing to his perceived efficacy as 
a leader in attracting state investment and enabling careers in his 
region. Additionally, he embodied in his person the ‘magic of the 
state’ (Taussig 1997). By virtue of his father’s revolutionary pedigree, 
his intensive Vietnamese schooling, and his close association with 
Vietnamese state agents such as Vietnamese teachers and national 
leaders, he was imbued with the aura of national state power.
A sense of belonging binds the members of the Thai cadres group 
around Lò Vi An to each other. This sentiment could be considered as 
one of the prime bases for building trust between network members. 
This is the gist of Lò Vi An’s justification for his decisions to recruit 
and promote his followers into different important leading positions in 
Châu La Biên Province. Another example of how belonging is significant 
to being connected was Lường Trung’s insistence on describing two 
infrastructure development contractors as his ‘brothers’ during 
dinner at Lò Vi An’s house. Such modes of address and self-reference 
14  Because of the difference in the density of his social relationships between Hà Nội and Châu 
La Biên, Lò Vi An felt disappointed in the working environment with his colleagues in Hà Nội 
during the first years of his posting. Having once been a provincial leader in Châu La Biên, where 
he had a crowded entourage around not only at work but also at home, Lò Vi An was initially 
shocked by the fact that he had none of his followers in Hà Nội. According to him, ‘there is no 
feeling (không có tình cảm) among his office mates, and people are cold and too competitive with 
each other’. One example that Lo Vi An kept mentioning was the difference between his family 
meals in Hà Nội and in Châu La Biên: ‘Whenever I have dinner at home up there [Châu La Biên], 
we set at least two dining tables for guests. Look at what we have here [Hà Nội], only us [he and 
his wife] two old people eating together.’
265
7 . THAI ENTOuRAGE POLITICS IN THE SOCIALIST STATE OF VIETNAM
construct a boundary between group members as ‘brothers in the one 
family’, and those who are ‘outsiders’. Commensal acts of dining and 
drinking together, and ritual declarations of kinship that accompany 
such acts further consolidate a sense of togetherness and belonging. 
The identity of the dishes they consume, often prepared and referred 
to self-consciously as ‘real’ or ‘traditional’ Thai food, also reinforces 
this sense of belonging. Through these acts, the entourage is given 
substance as a corporate or inter-corporeal group, whose members 
routinely provide sustenance for each other and become one of the 
same substance. 
A final feature of this entourage, which was only faintly visible when 
I conducted my fieldwork, is its apparent portability. In late October 
2014, I realised that I had missed three calls from Nguyễn Toàn, who 
was phoning from Vietnam. A short email from him on the same day, 
with his working address at the bottom, informed me that he had now 
started working for a central agency in Hà Nội. During our subsequent 
phone conversation, I was informed that Lò Vi Loan and her husband 
would be the next people to move to work in Hà Nội after Nguyễn 
Toàn and Cầm Chung. Even though both Nguyễn Toàn and Cầm 
Chung received support from Lò Vi An to move to work in Hà Nội, it 
is too early to say that Lò Vi An is reforming his Thai entourage right 
in the heart of a central agency of the Vietnamese state. Nevertheless, 
these initial moves illustrate the tendency of this northwest Thai 
entourage to converge around a central node person. This tendency 
can be observed in the expectations expressed by Lò Vi Loan, during 
my interview at her office, who was anticipating that Lò Vi An would 
help to support Cầm Chung to return to the provincial state of Châu La 
Biên from his position at the district level in Châu Quỳnh.
This description of the elements that make up the Thai cadre network 
around Lò Vi An provides a sense of the main generative principles 
underlying Thai entourage politics in the northwest of Vietnam. This 
grouping of influential Thai cadres is aligned in a ranked meshwork 
of relations, obligations, and sentiments around a charismatic 
leader. The entourage around him is characteristically open, flexibly 
accommodating, markedly performative, and, potentially, has the 
capacity to extend itself geographically in the wake of its leader’s 
movements. 
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Conclusion
The strength and resilience of this network of Thai cadres in the 
heartland of northwest Vietnam leads us to question characterisations 
of modern Vietnamese state power as homogeneous or monolithic in 
nature. Researching the Cham and Khmer peoples in southwestern 
Vietnam, Philip Taylor finds that religious institutions such as Islamic 
mosques and Theravada Buddhist temples are a compelling nexus 
of communal authority for these groups that rival the authority 
commanded by the central state. Many Khmer localities have a 
historically autonomous quality, with the wats functioning as multi-
faceted communal institutions and as pivotal nodes between the state 
and local society (Taylor 2014:17). In this chapter, I use a network 
of northwest Thai cadres grouped around a powerful Thai leader 
to illustrate another mode of governance within the Vietnamese 
state system, one which I call northwest Thai entourage politics. 
Accordingly, I argue that Vietnam is not a uniform state with a single 
form of authority, but that the state is a politically aggregate entity 
comprised of heterogeneous forms of authority. 
What I am calling northwest Thai entourage politics comprises several 
key elements including hierarchy, mutual obligation, openness, 
performativity, sentiment, belonging, and a tendency of convergence 
to a central ‘node’ person. Contemporary Thai people of the northwest 
also have a relationship with central state power located in Hà Nội 
which is strikingly similar to that of pre-revolutionary times. In the 
precolonial era, in spite of offering loyalty to Vietnam’s court and 
engaging in relations with influential centres in neighbouring 
Thailand, Yunnan, and Laos, the Thai people of Vietnam’s northwest 
for many centuries experienced autonomy under the rule of their 
local chiefs (McAlister 1967; Cam Trong 1978; Le Failler 2011). 
From the late nineteenth century when the French seized power from 
the Vietnamese feudal state, the northwest Thai region came under 
the rule of the Ðèo family, who acted as delegates in the region for 
French colonial authority, and who even accrued enough power to 
form their own Tai Federation from 1948 to 1953 ‘by exploiting the 
French administrative framework’ (Le Failler 2011:63; see also Lentz 
2011). In other words, the current situation of northwest Thais has 
precedents in the past practices of northwest Thai elites who were 
able to accommodate with the lowland state in Vietnam and act as its 
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delegates to substantively maintain their local power. These research 
findings suggest that the state of Vietnam is not all powerful in its 
relations with ethnic minority groups, and that Koh is right when he 
concludes, ‘there is much space in which society can manoeuvre and 
rework the state’s boundaries to society’s benefit’ (Koh 2001:370).
We have seen that the northwest Thai cadre network cannot be 
trivialised or explained away as an expression of reactive traditionalism, 
localism, or disconnection from contemporary state initiatives. It has 
supple social effects, with the capacity to cast its members into the 
heart of the Vietnamese state system, and to capture state resources and 
draw them back to the advantage of network members. The fishing net 
metaphor used to describe the contours of Thai entourage politics aptly 
describes these dual processes. The political influence wielded by the 
Thai cadre network is such that some have alleged it to be corrupt or 
nepotistic. While potentially such ‘special interests’ (nhóm lợi ích) can 
be construed as threatening to the modernist principles of rationality, 
equity, merit, and transparency espoused by the contemporary 
Vietnamese state, we can question whether political sovereignty 
is eroded by Thai entourage politics or is, in fact, consolidated by 
them. Not only does the entourage benefit from the state, but the 
state benefits from the entourage, which provides a means for the 
state to articulate with local Thai society, invest in the locality, ensure 
compliance, and reward performance. Before raising alarm about the 
erosion of the bureaucratic polity by the operation of this distinctive 
non-normative network of power, we ought to pose one question: has 
Vietnamese state power ever been exercised in the northwest uplands 
in any other way?
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Searching for a Khmer 
Monastic Higher Education 
in Post-Socialist Vietnam
Philip Taylor
In 2015 I met a 32-year-old man from a small village in Trà Vinh, 
a province of the Mekong Delta which is home to many of Vietnam’s 
ethnic minority Khmer. He had grown up in a family of landless 
farmers in a village that only recently had been connected to a sealed 
road. Like many Khmer students in this remote and impoverished 
province, he had dropped out of state school after only five years, and 
his Vietnamese was not good. He had, however, studied for several 
years in temple schools in his district where, while ordained as a monk, 
he had learnt to read and write Khmer. The Buddhist temples in his 
home province are linked in an educational network comprising 144 
campuses that provide schooling in numerous subjects up to Grade 12. 
Despite its size and sophistication, this autonomous, religious-based 
education network is relatively obscure, even among Vietnamese 
people, for the education it provides is entirely in Khmer. 
After we had exchanged preliminary greetings in Khmer, he astonished 
me by breaking into fluent English. Details of an unusual biography 
emerged. In 2000 he had graduated from the top level of the monastic 
system but, unsatisfied with the narrowness of the curriculum, 
he  had crossed the border illegally to Cambodia to continue his 
studies. He wanted to learn more about history, he said. At that time, 
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Vietnam  did not have a university for Khmers and his elderly Pali 
teacher had advised him to go to Cambodia, saying that he would learn 
nothing about his Khmer heritage in Vietnamese state schools. While 
still ordained as a monk he studied Khmer literature and English for 
Buddhism for his BA in the main Buddhist university in Phnom Penh. 
Four years later, a laywoman sponsored him to do further studies in 
Thailand. He learnt Thai and did his MBA in the English language. 
Then he returned to Phnom Penh where he disrobed, married, and 
started work as an office manager in an English-speaking foreign firm. 
He now owns a car and a house in Phnom Penh and does charity 
by raising money for scholarships for poor Khmer Krom students. 
His  biggest regret is not being able to work in his home province, 
owing to the fact that he had left his birth country illegally.
The story of this young man illustrates the capacity of higher 
education to promote mobility into the urban middle class. By 2015, 
it was becoming common for Khmer people from disadvantaged rural 
areas of the Mekong Delta who had been through state schooling to 
establish themselves in large Vietnamese cities, although it was still 
rare to meet people from such a background working as a manager in 
an English-speaking office, let alone owning a house and car. The most 
intriguing feature of this man’s impressive story of social mobility was 
that he had not studied beyond the primary level of state school, had 
never resided in a Vietnamese urban area, and was scarcely literate in 
the national language. Yet he had two post-secondary degrees, had 
studied in two capital cities, and was fluent in two foreign languages. 
His remarkable passage out of rural obscurity had proceeded via a 
vernacular education network that connects the Khmer-speaking 
margins of the Mekong Delta to the metropolitan centres of Theravada 
Asia. For 16 years he had studied and resided in the temples of this 
transnational network, his living and study costs provided by Khmer 
Buddhist laypeople. Tellingly, however, his story also can be read as 
a failure to progress in Vietnamese-speaking educational and social 
spheres. Not only had he failed to exit the ethnic bubble in which 
Vietnam’s Khmer minority are enclosed, his illicit educational voyages 
had eroded his employment prospects in his home village, resulting in 
a demotion in his status even in narrowly local terms. 
The vernacular Buddhist education systems of the Theravada world 
are defined by this tension between parochialising and cosmopolitan 
characteristics. In Thailand, monastic education played a key 
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role in the ‘integrative revolution’ (Geertz 1963) and was used by 
a centralising Thai state to promote identification with a transcendent 
national polity and supplant alternative local, religious or ethnic 
identifications (Keyes 1971; Tambiah 1976). Similar concerns informed 
the French colonial effort in Cambodia to propagate a standardised 
notion of Khmer identity in the curriculum used in Buddhist temple 
schools. The purpose of such efforts was to inculcate in students a 
sense of loyalty to the French protectorate of Cambodge and replace 
attachments to Siam as a civilisational centre. Such a project was 
conceived and coordinated through the auspices of the Buddhist 
Institute in Phnom Penh, which served as the headquarters for 
formulating the curriculum, training teachers, and disseminating 
curricular materials (Edwards 2007).1 These activities shed light on the 
paradoxical uses of Buddhist education institutions as centres for the 
inculcation of transcendent subjectivities that, contradictorily, serve 
to parochialise their subjects and foreclose alternative transcendent 
attachments.
Often the impetus to construct such institutions has been a moment of 
cultural crisis. For instance, Anne Hansen traces the inception of the 
modern system of Buddhist learning in mid-nineteenth-century Siam 
to King Mongkut’s doubts about the validity of his own ordination, 
which set him to amassing the knowledge and expertise that would 
enable him to authenticate his status as a Buddhist cleric. Similarly, 
the nineteenth-century monastic pioneers of the Khmer Buddhist 
higher education system who repatriated the new Siamese learning to 
Cambodia did so out of the dire sentiment that their tradition had been 
denuded and debased after decades of war and occupation (Hansen 
2007:49–50, 84–96). Key Khmer contributors to the Buddhist Institute 
were beset by a premonition that their cultural and religious tradition 
was about to be extinguished by mass conversions to the new Cao Ðài 
faith centred in Vietnam (Edwards 2007:197–209). These institutions 
that set Buddhist education on new foundations crystallised the 
solutions forged by a founder figure to a crisis of cultural reproduction 
and renewal. They emerged in an era when the legitimacy of the old 
was threatened by the new, in zones such as former royal capitals and 
1  Justin McDaniel has described concurrent initiatives in the French protectorate of Laos to 
redesign monastic learning so as to neutralise the appeal of Siamese Buddhist education among 
Lao student monks and promote identification with the cultural and spatial construct of French 
Indochina (McDaniel 2008:38–52). 
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urban centres where cultures were in collision, and they issued from 
the cultural elites of the old order for whom the need to find new 
modes of legitimacy was at its most urgent. 
If we adopt the perspective of students, we see such institutions in 
a different light. Scholars have noted that the monastic educational 
networks that centred on Bangkok and Phnom Penh were used by 
youths from peripheral rural regions as an avenue of social mobility 
(Wyatt 1966; Kalab 1976). The Buddhist universities of Bangkok served 
as stepping stones for disadvantaged rural students to gain access to the 
wealth of specialised knowledge and employment opportunities that 
exist in the metropolitan centre (Kabilsingh 1986). From the vantage 
point of late nineteenth-century Cambodia, the Siamese metropolis 
obtained a very different significance as a charismatic centre that 
exerted a magnetic pull over students as a symbol of modernity, the 
pure source of culture, magical texts, and enlightened teachers (Hansen 
2007:79–96). The central node of these monastic educational networks 
thus served an exemplary centre that offered students the experience 
of authentic self-knowledge, transcendence, or salvation. Drawing a 
leaf from the experience of Muslim Southeast Asians who travelled to 
Mecca on educational journeys, we can postulate that for Theravada 
Buddhists, pilgrimages to their own metropolitan institutions of higher 
learning conferred distinction, power, and an aura of the sacred upon 
those who returned from such sites.2 In short, these institutions derive 
their vitality from the periphery itself for which they serve, in one 
guise or another, as the charismatic centre.
The situation is more fragmented for the Khmer Krom, an ethnic and 
religious minority in Vietnam with complex historical relations to 
several states (Taylor 2014). As in other Theravada Buddhist contexts, 
the Khmer Krom have a vernacular education system centred on 
a network of Buddhist wats, which, among other purposes, serve 
as local schools and as a pathway to advancement in wider society. 
Despite long-standing linkages to religious centres in South and 
Southeast Asia, the Khmer Krom live in a country where Theravada 
Buddhism is a minority creed and has never attracted significant state 
patronage. As former subjects of the Khmer kingdom, they identify 
culturally with Khmers in Cambodia, while they are divided from 
2  On the Hajj pilgrimage from Southeast Asia, see Tagliacozzo (2013).
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modern Cambodia by a political border. As citizens of Vietnam, they 
are compelled to enrol in state education whose focus has been to 
inculcate a sense of belonging to a nation whose centre lies in faraway 
Hà Nội. With religious, cultural and political affiliations that seemingly 
pull in different directions, it is of interest to know what significance 
the Khmer Krom attach to these disparate civilisational projects, and 
what role has been played by their vernacular educational institutions 
in connecting or disconnecting them from the plurality of centres 
under whose sway they come.
In the second quarter of the twentieth century, a concerted effort 
was made by the French to draw the hundreds of Khmer temple 
schools in the Mekong Delta into the orbit of the Buddhist Institute 
in Phnom Penh, which both disseminated ideas of their membership 
in a Khmer cultural tradition and served as a peak destination for 
their educational journeys. With the demise of colonialism in the 
mid-1950s, the institutional link to Cambodia was severed. However, 
during the decades of nation-building and war in Vietnam, numerous 
Khmer Krom students and monks continued to undertake educational 
pilgrimages to Cambodia. With the rise of communist states in 
Indochina in 1975, monastic education in both countries was plunged 
into a severe crisis. In Cambodia, it disappeared. In Vietnam, repressed 
by the government, and with a curriculum that offered students no 
prospects for advancement in the broader society, the Khmer monastic 
education system faced extinction.3 After a crisis lasting 30 years, 
several initiatives were launched by Khmer monastics in Vietnam to 
fight their way out of parochialisation and irrelevance, relink Khmer 
temple schools in Vietnam to peak educational destinations in the 
Theravada Buddhist world, and stimulate a flow of students.
Coming to a head in the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
such initiatives gave rise in quick succession to no less than three 
alternative higher education destinations: in Thailand, Cambodia, 
and within Vietnam itself. This sudden multiplication of higher 
education pathways after three decades in which none had existed 
offers revealing insights into the numerous actors and contradictory 
pressures that shape the Khmer monastic field in Vietnam. Each of 
these pathways attracts a significant number of students, which signals 
3  The situation of monastic education in socialist Laos after 1975 is discussed by Justin 
McDaniel (2008:52–68) and Martin Stuart-Fox (1996). 
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the thirst that exists among Khmers in Vietnam for higher education, 
and the willingness of Khmer students to try different ways to achieve 
it. Examining the relative popularity of these different routes offers 
a sense of the competing desires that shape these educational quests. 
The fact that the most-trodden route is illegal and that the officially 
sponsored route is the least favoured suggests that the government’s 
ability to steer monastic education from the top down is limited. 
Similarly, Khmer monastic authorities’ attempts to craft an entirely 
new educational pathway have attracted only limited support from 
state authorities and individual students. By tracing the educational 
journeys taken by Khmer Krom students, one can understand the 
ambitions and frustrations that shape from below the institutional 
contours of Khmer monastic higher education in Vietnam.
This chapter describes the search for a viable monastic higher education 
pathway for the Khmers of Vietnam’s Mekong Delta. Charting the 
decline and partial rehabilitation of Cambodia as their peak educational 
destination, it also documents the alternative destinations that have 
emerged over the course of the last decade. By focusing on the agency 
of state authorities, monastic leaders, and students, the chapter 
shows how the field of monastic higher education has been shaped 
in a negotiation between multiple actors with competing priorities. 
Having once been oriented towards Cambodia as the peak destination 
of their vernacular tradition, Khmer Krom students now enjoy tenuous 
access to a variety of educational centres, none of which satisfies the 
aspirations nursed by them, or by religious or state elites, for Khmer 
higher education in Vietnam.4
4  This chapter draws on research conducted in Vietnam and Cambodia over multiple visits 
between 1999 and 2015 funded by the Australian Research Council and ANU College of Asia 
and the Pacific. I thank David Chandler, John Marston, Roger Casas, and Sango Mahanty for 
their comments and assistance with this chapter. Conversations with numerous Khmer Krom 
intellectuals, monks, abbots, and political leaders provided me with valuable insights into 
the concerns that have informed a long history of monastic educational reform. Collected life 
histories of students spanning 70 years of educational travel to Cambodia and observation of 
activities in many learning institutions gave me a sense of the aspirations and frustrations that 
have informed student’s selection of educational options.
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Closing the Educational Route to Cambodia
The Khmer Krom, or ethnic Khmer people of Vietnam, number over a 
million and live primarily in the Mekong Delta of southern Vietnam 
(Taylor 2014). They have a deep-seated historical connection to 
Cambodia, dating to when the Mekong Delta was part of the Khmer 
kingdom. Even after the Mekong Delta came under Vietnamese and 
French administrative control, Khmers of this region continued to be 
integrated culturally with Khmers in Cambodia. One feature of this 
integration was an education system based in Theravada monasteries 
that was identical to that found in Cambodia. A French report in 1903 
observed that in every Khmer Buddhist temple in the province of Trà 
Vinh, a monk was in charge of educating local children to read and 
write Khmer and to do basic maths. In the early 1880s, a system of 
public schools had been set up by the colonial authorities ‘to propagate 
the French language and serve as an instrument of civilisation’, but 
these schools were mostly attended by ‘Annamite’ (ethnic Vietnamese) 
children. The report notes that the task of getting Khmers into state 
schooling was ‘delicate, owing to the fact that Khmer fathers preferred 
their children to study under a monk in the local temple’ (Société des 
Etudes Indochinoises 1903:41–42). 
Despite this apparent conservatism, major changes to the monastic 
education system occurred during the colonial period. Around 
1930, the French began to introduce in selected temple schools 
in Cochinchina the renovated temple school model that had been 
introduced in Cambodia. According to Louis Mallaret, by 1944, there 
were 209 schools of this type in Cochinchina, with a total of 7,274 
students, of whom 1,093 were girls (Malleret 1946:29). As Penny 
Edwards notes, the curriculum in these schools included textbooks 
on Khmer history, geography, language, and other secular subjects 
that had been developed under the auspices of the Buddhist Institute 
in Phnom Penh (Edwards 2007:177–182). This curriculum promoted 
ideas about Cambodian history, culture, and geography that were to 
become foundational to nationalist ideas about Cambodian identity. 
Between 1929 and 1933, noted Phnom Penh-based monastic leaders 
Ven. Huot Tath and Ven. Chuon Nath travelled to Cochinchina on 
tours of inspection, establishing schools and distributing books 
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(Edwards  2007:188–190; Harris 2009:107–108). For the next half 
century, Khmer monastery schools of the Mekong Delta had the same 
curriculum and used the same textbooks as those in Cambodia. 
By the 1930s, Khmer monks from the Mekong Delta were travelling to 
Cambodia to undertake teacher training and higher studies. Malleret 
notes that monks who taught in the renovated temple schools in 
Cochinchina would go to Phnom Penh, Trà Vinh, and Sóc Trăng to 
undertake vocational teacher training (Malleret 1946:29). Harris 
mentions that, in 1931, some 30 Khmer Krom monks spent a year in 
Cambodia to undertake teacher training for the reformed Buddhist 
schools (Harris 2009:108). Khmers from Cochinchina also studied 
for longer periods of time in the protectorate’s two elite educational 
institutions, the École Supérieure de Pali (Pali high school, established 
in 1922), and the Buddhist Institute (established in 1930). A well-
known instance of this was the founding member of Cambodia’s 
communist movement, Tou Samouth. Born in Trà Vinh in 1915, he was 
educated as a Buddhist monk at the Buddhist Institute in Unnalom 
Monastery, Phnom Penh, where he also taught Pali until the mid-1940s 
(Kiernan 1981:163).5 In the course of my own research in Vietnam, 
I met an elderly man from Sóc Trăng who had ordained and studied 
Pali and French in the École Supérieure in Phnom Penh for 30 years, 
from the 1940s to the 1970s. One man born in Trà Vinh in 1925 had 
studied French and Khmer in Trà Vinh for seven years, after which he 
was ordained and went to Phnom Penh, where he studied for another 
four years in Wat Unnalom. Another man born in Kiȇn Lương in 1940 
had studied Sanskrit, Pali, French, and English in Phnom Penh for 
four years, from 1959–63.
Of the 25 Khmer Krom people whose biographies of educational travel 
to mid-twentieth-century Cambodia I collected, around half had gone 
to study in state schools. Cambodia was attractive to the Khmer Krom 
as an educational destination because instruction was in Khmer and 
French rather than in Vietnamese. By the end of the Second World 
War, there were only 19 official Franco-Khmer elementary schools 
in the whole of Cochinchina (Malleret 1946:29), and just one lower 
secondary school, in Cần Thơ. Meanwhile, Cambodia had several 
5  Another Trà Vinh-born founding member of Cambodia’s communist movement, Achar 
Mean, later known as Son Ngoc Minh (b. 1920), also taught in Unnalom Monastery in the early 
1940s (Kiernan 1981:163).
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secondary and higher-level studies institutions, such as the College 
Preah Sihanouk in Kompong Cham, the Lycée Sisowath in Phnom 
Penh,6 and the Teachers’ College in Phnom Penh.7 In the 1940s and 
1950s, several of my elderly interlocutors had gone on to higher-level 
studies in Cambodia after completing elementary or lower secondary 
Franco-Khmer schooling in Cochinchina. Others went directly to 
Cambodia to study at elementary level. These state school students 
tended to come from moderately wealthy to wealthy families. I also 
met many Khmer Krom who, after South Vietnam was founded as 
a republic in 1955, had studied in state schools at the primary and 
secondary level in the provinces of Kompong Thom, Kampot, Takeo, 
Kompong Cham, and Phnom Penh. 
Cambodia was attractive to Khmer Krom students because of the 
vibrancy of its Khmer-language public sphere, the breadth and 
depth of its labour market, and, after 1960, the haven it offered from 
conscription and war in Vietnam. Having completed their studies in 
the monastic or secular streams, many Khmer Krom students remained 
in Cambodia to work and assume social leadership positions. The best-
known exemplars of this trend are the Cambodian political leaders 
Son Ngoc Thanh (b. 1908), Tou Samouth (b. 1915), Son Ngoc Minh 
(b. 1920), Ieng Sary (b. 1929), and Son Sen (b. 1930), all of whom were 
born in Trà Vinh then lived and worked for the rest of their careers 
in Cambodia. I met several elderly Khmer Krom who had commenced 
their education in temple schools in the Mekong Delta, and spent the 
1960s and 1970s teaching in Cambodia. Some became distinguished 
teachers and abbots in Buddhist temples. Others taught foreign 
languages in state schools in Phnom Penh, Battambang, Takeo, and 
other places. Obtaining skilled work of this kind in the urban centres 
of Cambodia was an exceptional accomplishment for the children of 
farming families from a marginalised minority in the Mekong Delta. 
We see here a good example of the role of the monkhood in Khmer 
society as an avenue of social mobility (Kalab 1976). The opportunity 
for social advancement provided by monastic education undoubtedly 
was one of the factors that made ordination attractive to rural youths.
6  One of its alumni was Khmer Rouge leader Ieng Sary, born in Trà Vinh in 1929. 
He commenced his studies in 1945.
7  Khmer Rouge leader Son Sen, born in Trà Vinh in 1930, commenced studying there in 1946.
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Not all of these students stayed in Cambodia. When they graduated 
from higher studies, many returned to Vietnam to work, teach, marry, 
and assume leadership positions in the monastic system and wider 
society. Those who had studied in Cambodia returned with their 
prestige and position in the Khmer community considerably enhanced. 
Of the 15 returnees whose biographies I collected, two went on to 
lead the monastic resistance against the South Vietnamese regime in 
the 1960s, two became special forces commanders, and three assumed 
high-level positions in the new regime after 1975, while others 
became respected abbots, meditation teachers, and ritual specialists. 
Two disrobed, married, and returned to farming. They also made a 
critical contribution to reproducing the monastic education system. 
All but one of the returnees contributed to teaching subjects such as 
Pali and Khmer literacy and foreign languages to the monks and lay 
children in their local temples.
Such educational passages came to an abrupt end in 1975 when 
Communist regimes came to power throughout Indochina. 
In Democratic Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge emptied the cities and 
terminated diplomatic relations with many countries. Their peasant 
troops closed down schools, destroyed books, banned the speaking of 
foreign languages, and put to death many intellectuals. The monkhood 
was terminated, temples were used as storehouses and granaries, and 
former monks and teachers were disrobed and put to work along with 
urban and educated people, planting rice and undertaking agrarian 
earthworks in collective farms. People identified as Khmer Krom were 
persecuted and eliminated (Kiernan 1996; Chandler 2008; Harris 
2012). I was told about several Khmer Krom teachers and abbots who 
had stayed on in Democratic Kampuchea and later perished under the 
Khmer Rouge.
Vietnam’s communist resistance movement had worked closely with 
Khmer Krom monastic leaders during the Vietnam War. This alliance 
had helped keep Khmer monastic education functioning in Trà Vinh 
and other provinces in the face of repression by the South Vietnamese 
state. However, once the communist government assumed formal 
power in southern Vietnam in 1975, efforts were made to reduce the 
hold of monasteries in Khmer life. Khmer monks were required to 
undertake heavy agrarian labour, and the alms round was suppressed. 
A systematic attempt was made to terminate the monastic education 
program by confiscating books, forbidding classes, and imprisoning 
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monks who continued to teach. Through determined covert actions 
and tight solidarity, and under the leadership of communist-affiliated 
clerics and officials, Khmers managed obstinately to continue their 
classes for up to 10 years after liberation. However, in the mid-1980s, 
the Vietnamese government cracked down, arresting teachers, abbots, 
and the educational resistance movement’s leading figures, several 
of whom died mysteriously in jail. The monasteries were raided and 
surrounded, and all teaching came to a halt, for up to 10 years in some 
localities.8
In the late 1980s, classes in the Khmer monastic education program 
reopened in attenuated form. The initial classes were small and low-
key and were conducted in select monasteries in remote parts of Trà 
Vinh Province where Khmer Krom members of Vietnam’s communist 
party were concentrated. The new curriculum consisted of 12 religious 
and Khmer-language subjects.9 Gone were the subjects of Cambodian 
geography, history, and civic morality and citizenship, as well as French 
and English. Students had to contend with the complete absence of 
Khmer-language texts and classroom study materials, which had been 
confiscated and destroyed in the period before 1985. Initially, teachers 
transcribed study materials into notebooks from memory or surviving 
texts, which were then repeatedly copied by hand. By the late 1990s, 
study texts for all 12 grades of the syllabus were being smuggled 
furtively from Cambodia and endlessly re-photocopied, replenishing 
monasteries in Vietnam with a reservoir of faint and sometimes illegible 
facsimiles of the original Cambodian texts.
When classes recommenced, they drew critically on the resources 
of Khmer intellectuals who had survived the crackdown and had 
remained in the country. Hundreds of members of the Khmer Krom 
intelligentsia who had participated in the resistance movement had 
fled the country. Many survivors were too cowed to resume a life of 
educational service. Initially, classes were taught from memory by 
weather-beaten lay teachers who returned to classrooms from the rice 
fields. In this culturally sparse environment, the cultural knowledge 
8  Brief references to this resistance movement and crackdown can be found in Harris (2009). 
This compressed summary draws on interviews conducted with numerous participants in the 
movement, which I hope to be able to write up on another occasion. 
9  These included Khmer literacy, grammar, reading, dictation, composition and maths; 
Buddhist doctrine, history and monastic law; Pali literacy and grammar; and Pali–Khmer 
translation.
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possessed by those who had once studied or spent time in Cambodia 
was prized and became a crucial element in the regeneration of Khmer 
monastic education in Vietnam. However, these were people who had 
been in Cambodia long ago, and thus the bridge to that country they 
represented was vestigial. 
In post-Khmer Rouge Cambodia, the monkhood had been reconstituted 
in the early 1980s (Keyes 1994; Marston 2014), but ordinations were 
tightly restricted for the remainder of that decade and only in 1989 
was the first Buddhist primary school in Cambodia officially reopened 
(Sovanratana 2008:258–259). Buddhist education in Cambodia began 
its renaissance in the 1990s, with the opening of a high school in 1992 
and the reopening of Preah Sihanouk Raja Buddhist University in 
1999. By 2005, Cambodia could count 555 Buddhist primary schools, 
23 Buddhist secondary schools, and two Buddhist universities 
(Sovanratana 2008:259–264). Secular higher education institutions 
in Cambodia were revived and restructured in the 1990s under the 
country’s internationally sponsored reconstruction. In the next decade, 
the number of universities and colleges mushroomed with the entry of 
numerous private education providers. By 2007, there were 62 higher 
education institutions in Cambodia, of which 40 were private. Three 
decades after the Khmer Rouge had almost wiped out the country’s 
intellectual elite, higher education in Cambodia was again booming, 
with 45,000 students enrolled in a great array of degree programs in 
public, private, and religious institutions (Chealy 2009:154–160).
The cultural and educational renaissance underway in Cambodia did 
not go unnoticed among the Khmers of the Mekong Delta. Senior 
abbots and Khmer government officials making approved official trips 
brought home news of Cambodia’s reconstruction. Via relatives and 
news media, Khmers in the Mekong Delta were able to follow the news 
of the rebuilding of temples, the resurgence of education, Cambodia’s 
vibrant cultural and festive life, the explosion of publications, media 
and arts, the growth of international tourism, and reconstruction 
of museums and ancient monuments. By the late 1990s, monks who 
had completed the monastic high school level in Vietnam were also 
contemplating the prospects of further education. With the opening 
of Buddhist universities in Phnom Penh, Cambodia again beckoned as 
an appealing higher education destination.
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However, at that time Khmer Krom monks were prohibited from 
travelling to Cambodia to study. Applications for passports and travel 
permits were denied or inexplicably held up indefinitely. Monks who 
applied were told that it was impossible to travel to Cambodia; their 
lives would be endangered, for Cambodia lacked laws and security. 
Monks who went to Cambodia to study would be breaking the law. 
When I began conducting research in Trà Vinh in the late 1990s, the 
bans on Khmer Krom monks travelling to Cambodia was one of the 
most heated topics of conversation. I was often told of monks who 
had tried to go illicitly but had been arrested at the border. Some 
had made it into Cambodia but had been arrested and defrocked on 
their return. Those who returned from an illegal sojourn in Cambodia 
were punished in other ways, invited by the police for questioning, 
surveilled, denied permission to take up residence again in their home 
temple as a monk, or denied work or promotion. 
As one monk told me in 1999, being a Khmer monk is what made it 
hard to go to Cambodia, rather than being Khmer per se:
The government now tolerates trade, or the movement of people with 
business or investment projects: anything which is of purely economic 
benefit to Vietnam. However, they never give permission to Khmer 
monks. 
They are worried that because monks have the time to study their 
culture and their country’s history, meet with other monks and discuss 
their situation, they are more likely to engage in politics. They might 
meet up with the Cambodian government and opposition and take 
part in resistance to Vietnamese rule. Since traders and small business 
people haven’t the time or the education to develop a broad picture 
of their people’s plight they don’t represent the same threat. These 
restrictions are what the government calls ‘precautionary’ measures. 
In fact monks here are too afraid to take part in such activities. 
Only in the mid-2000s were Khmer Krom monks permitted to travel to 
Cambodia, on a tourist visa, but the period of time they were allowed 
to stay there was short. Travelling for the purpose of study remained 
out of bounds. As one group of student monks from Trà Vinh told me 
in 2005, the reason Vietnam prevents Khmer monks from travelling 
to Cambodia to study is that the government probably does not want 
them to be influenced by the environment of anti-Vietnamese politics 
in Cambodia. 
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Consequences of Closing the Cambodian 
Study Route
The ban on monks continuing their studies in Cambodia aroused 
in Khmer Krom students an intense sense of being denied access to 
crucial aspects of their cultural heritage. Aware that the curriculum 
they had studied had been shorn of several important subjects, many 
suspected that they lacked adequate knowledge of Khmer culture 
and society and about the history of the localities they called home. 
Thus many had cause to doubt that they truly knew who they were, 
let alone being able to claim status as well-educated people. Having 
had access to only a handful of photocopied school textbooks during 
their years of monastic study, many students yearned for exposure 
to a fuller spectrum of Khmer-language texts in the disciplines they 
had studied. All were aware that in Cambodia, the Khmer language 
was the medium of a diverse and dynamic public sphere and media, 
popular culture, and the arts. As opposed to Vietnam, where Khmer 
script had no purpose other than as a subject for study by Khmers in 
their temples, in Cambodia the written word was living, functional 
and highly developed and central in many walks of life. Many 
student monks I spoke to expressed regret that by being denied the 
opportunity to study in Cambodia, they were deprived of complete 
and authentic experience of their own culture. 
At the same time, closure of the border prevented monks who wished 
to specialise intensively in the study of Buddhism from accessing 
high-quality education in that field. In late 2006, monks in Trà Vinh 
who aspired to deepen their understanding of Buddhism told me:
The monastic schools in Cambodia are better than those in Vietnam 
because they concentrate on Pali, Sanskrit, Buddhism, Buddhist 
history, and Pali–Khmer translations. Here, Khmer language and 
culture subjects take up a large part of the curriculum because these 
subjects are not taught at all outside of our temples. Plus Cambodia 
has two Buddhist universities that allow one to specialise more deeply 
in Buddhist subjects.
A number of Khmer Krom monks have enrolled to study in the 
Buddhist university in Hồ Chí Minh City, which reopened in the 
1980s, following its closure in 1975, and now offers undergraduate and 
post-graduate level courses. However, this option was not considered 
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satisfactory by the Khmers with whom I spoke, since the instruction 
and curricular study materials are entirely in Vietnamese. They noted 
that emphasis in the curriculum is on the development of Mahayana 
Buddhism as a Vietnamese national tradition, and on Buddhism 
in Vietnamese history and culture. Khmer students identified this 
institution as concentrating on Vietnam’s religious and cultural 
heritage at the expense of their Khmer traditions, without necessarily 
providing them with an adequate Buddhist studies education.
The closure of the monastic route to Cambodia also closed down the 
most convenient option available to Khmer people wishing to advance 
their education in non-religious subjects. In 2003, I spoke to a monk 
in Wat Chantarangsay in Hồ Chí Minh City who was undertaking 
studies in computer science and English in an urban university. 
To gain entry to the university, he had to study in the Vietnamese state 
system for 12 years, in addition to the many years he had studied as 
a monk in the Khmer and Buddhist system. Around that time, scores 
of Khmer monks were accessing secular Vietnamese higher education 
in this way. However, the temple where he was staying — one of only 
two Khmer wats in the city — was small and crowded, and he found 
learning the Vietnamese language difficult. He told me it would have 
been much easier for him to study in Cambodia, whose proximity, 
shared language and culture, and large number of temples, colleges 
and alms-providing laypersons in its urban centres made it an ideal 
place for Khmer youths to further their studies.
The closure of the educational path to Cambodia deprived the Khmer 
Krom monastic education system of well-trained teachers. Although 
individual monks can and do make their way to Cambodia, it is very 
hard for them to return home. If they do return, they must disrobe 
and are not allowed to teach. Similarly, teachers and monks from 
Cambodia are not allowed to teach in Khmer monasteries in Vietnam. 
Hence in the 1990s to the late 2000s, monastic educators were drawn 
exclusively from people who had studied in Cambodia prior to 1975, 
or those who had studied in Khmer temple schools in Vietnam — 
at  most to high school level. As a result, Khmers in Vietnam were 
denied the opportunity to interact with teachers with advanced 
religious or secular knowledge or functional literacy in their own 
language. Increasingly, Khmer students in Vietnam were taught by 
teachers whose only knowledge of written Khmer came from the small 
set of textbooks used in the monastic classroom. 
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Many people I spoke to bemoaned the deterioration in the intellectual 
capacity of the Khmers in Vietnam that these policies have brought 
about. A senior monk in Hồ Chí Minh City with whom I spoke in 2010 
was despairing about his people’s low educational level:
Khmer Krom students are far from meeting international standards 
and from gaining admission to study overseas. Hardly any Khmer 
Krom students have MAs or PhDs. 
Their level of Pali and religion is also very low. All of the talented, 
knowledgeable teachers have died. Some have gone overseas. No one 
is left to pass on knowledge to the next generation. Because there are 
so few knowledgeable monks and achars left — educated achars are 
working in the rice fields — there are few people who could teach 
the next generation or guide the development of a better educational 
system.
Trà Vinh alone has a strong Pali and Buddhist studies program. In the 
provinces of Cà Mau, Kiên Giang, and An Giang, such a program is 
practically non-existent. But Trà Vinh is strong only in knowledge of 
the Pali sutras and monastic law. In these respects they are as strong 
as or even stronger than monks in Cambodia. Yet no new research is 
being done there or deeper investigation into the religion, language, 
and law. Quite likely there is not a single Khmer monk in Vietnam 
who could prepare an original composition in Pali — for example, 
describing the layout and activities of a typical Khmer temple. On the 
other hand, Thailand has scores of people who have done in-depth 
PhD research into Buddhism. 
By contrast too, Vietnamese Mahayana students study to a high level, 
have PhDs, do research, hold conferences, study abroad, and they 
have good access to and do well in secular subjects as well.
Ultimately, the closure of the route to Cambodia threatened to have 
an impact on ordinations. Until the mid-1970s, ordination in Vietnam 
provided monks with knowledge that had utility in neighbouring 
Cambodia. It provided rural youths with a way to loop through 
Cambodia’s urban centres, where they could deploy their knowledge 
to their advantage or accumulate more to repatriate to their home 
communities. Denial of these opportunities led to the marginalisation 
of ordination in Vietnam as a means for Khmer social and economic 
advancement. Related to this was students’ lack of any sense of 
where their education might take them, or how it might relate to a 
world beyond their villages, given that the border to Cambodia was 
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closed after 1975. Lacking these elements, Khmer monastic education 
in Vietnam risked becoming a closed system that failed to bring in 
any new ideas. Unable to engage with the outside world or change 
with the times, Khmer monastic education was in danger of becoming 
sterile and defunct.
The Search for a Peak Educational 
Destination
The closure of the border to Cambodia had major implications for the 
survival of the monastic education system and for Khmer cultural 
reproduction in Vietnam. It denied Khmer intellectuals in Vietnam 
access to the perceived source and centre of their culture. It terminated 
a well-trodden educational route that Khmer students in the Mekong 
Delta had taken to the peak destinations of their vernacular tradition. 
It denied Khmer communities in Vietnam access to a means by which 
their members had long been able to gain local distinction and attain 
leadership, thus closing down a traditional avenue of social distinction 
within the Khmer-speaking world of Vietnam. It also undermined the 
entire Khmer monastic system in Vietnam, threatening to make it 
obsolete as the vestigial launch pad for a leap into higher learning and 
social position.
The closure of the monastic route to Cambodia created serious 
problems for Vietnam as well. Although the government had 
permitted the reopening of monastic schools and turned a blind 
eye to the illicit importation of Khmer-language textbooks, the ban 
on monastic educational travel to Cambodia became a focal point of 
ethnic Khmer dissatisfaction with the government. Ever since I began 
my research in 1999, complaints about this measure have been intense, 
bitter, and consistent. The bans were cited widely as proof that the 
Vietnamese government lacked interest in Khmer culture, educational 
self-improvement, freedom of religion and mobility, local tradition, 
and the sanctity of monks. The removal of a peak destination for 
education was taken as evidence that the government’s plan for its 
Khmers was to keep them ignorant and to stifle the emergence of self-
aware, conscious, and enlightened Khmer individuals, thereby making 
it easier to assimilate the Khmers. 
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In 2006, in apparent response to these concerns, the Vietnamese 
government moved to set up a high-level Khmer Buddhist Studies 
Institute in Vietnam that would teach Buddhist and Khmer studies 
subjects at the university level. Several high-ranking Khmer abbots 
in provinces of the western Mekong Delta are credited by their peers 
with pushing forward this initiative. The site selected for the institute 
was in Ô Môn District of Cần Thơ Province, a rural fruit-growing area 
of formerly dense Khmer settlement not far from the Bassac River 
whose Khmer population had largely been dispersed by the wars from 
the 1940s to the 1970s. Its main campus was in Wat Polthisomrong, 
a temple beside the Ô Môn market with very small grounds, where a 
dormitory of 23 bedrooms and some small classrooms were constructed 
in 2007. A second campus was designated in Wat Sanvoar, just a 
kilometre or so away, in a rural area whose lower population density 
and available land would allow the school to expand in size.
The institute was officially opened in mid-2007 when the first intake 
of 63 monks began their four-year higher-level Khmer and Buddhist 
studies course. The students came from many provinces; over a third 
were from Trà Vinh. All of them were ordained monks. They  had 
already studied for at least five years in monastic schools and had a 
strong foundation in Pali, Khmer, and religious subjects.10 The eight 
or so teachers came from several provinces, mostly from Sóc Trăng. 
Two of the teachers from Trà Vinh had undertaken MA-level Buddhist 
studies overseas.11 The curriculum comprised 25 subjects. They 
included a variety of religious subjects, no less than six language 
subjects, some computing, history, and social science subjects, and 
subjects on Khmer culture, arts, and literature.12 The students told me 
that English and Sanskrit were the most difficult subjects for they had 
little prior exposure to them. The students in the first intake finished 
their degree in 2010 with exams and a mini thesis. 
Abbots in the Ô Môn area played a leading role in mobilising funds and 
labour for construction of the school buildings in Wat Polthisomrong. 
Much of the labour to build the dormitory and classrooms was 
10  According to the students with whom I spoke at the institute in July 2010, the numbers 
of students by province were: 24 Trà Vinh; 12 Sóc Trăng; 9 Kiên Giang; 9 Vĩnh Long; 3 Cần Thơ; 
2 Bạc Liêu; 2 An Giang; 1 Hậu Giang; 1 Cà Mau.
11  One teacher did his MA in Buddhism in Sri Lanka, the other did his MA in Buddhism 
in Maha Chulalongkorn, Thailand.
12  The languages studied were Thai, English, Vietnamese, Sanskrit, Pali, and Khmer.
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contributed by local laypeople, with fees paid to building contractors 
only for specialised tasks. A contribution of $1,000 AUD was made by 
a Khmer family in Australia. Contributions were also made by Khmer 
Krom now living in America and Canada. Locals also chipped in. 
The Abbot of Wat Polthisomrong told me that some single donations 
of $100–200 AUD made by local families were major contributions, 
given local families’ limited means. He said the government also had 
promised to match those funds obtained from Buddhist laypersons. 
If followed through, he said, the contribution from the government 
would be 50 per cent. The state also granted some 10 or 12 hectares of 
land to the school at the Wat Sanvoar campus to construct a larger and 
permanent facility.
There was some pride and optimism among Khmer Krom abbots 
and monks at the founding of this institute, which bore the name 
‘The Khmer Buddhist Studies Institute of Southern Vietnam’ (in Khmer, 
Wicia Stan Butisasana Khmer Vietnam Khang Thbon). One leading 
abbot said it was one of just four Buddhist institutes in Vietnam, the 
others being in Hà Nội, Huế, and Sài Gòn. It was the first university-
level institute for Khmers in Vietnam. Before it was founded, Khmer 
monks who wanted to study to a higher level had to attend the 
Vietnamese Buddhist University in Hồ Chí Minh City. The  leading 
Khmer abbots of the three largest Khmer-populated provinces were on 
its governing board. One of them, who said he was the deputy head 
of the institute, told me with emotion that its founding showed how 
much the Communist Party of Vietnam cared for Khmers.
Nevertheless, the institute has also attracted widespread criticism from 
Khmer Krom monastic leaders and educators. Most lamented the small 
size of the school, cramped in the grounds of one of the region’s smallest 
temples, which greatly restricted the scope of the school, leaving no 
space for it to develop. Several also commented to me on the length 
of time it was taking to establish a larger and more permanent facility 
on a second campus, giving rise to a view that official commitment to 
the institute was diffident. Many suggested that the government had 
skimped in its support for the project by selecting an obscure location 
where the land was cheap and relying on co-contributions from poor 
Khmer laypeople. Development of the new campus was delayed by 
lack of government funding. Also indicative of official disinterest was 
the lack of people with higher-level degrees to teach at the institute. 
If better teachers were to be found, Khmer  people would have to 
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come up with the money themselves to send people overseas to gain 
an appropriate education. Meanwhile, the institute is not given the 
money it needs to recruit adequately trained teachers. 
The main criticism of the institute was its location in a remote rural 
area, which was a matter of universal disappointment and occasional 
despair. Those I spoke with considered it strange and inappropriate for 
such a high-level institute to be based in such a location. Acceptable 
facilities or services are not available locally to support university-
level studies. All of the teachers have to be brought in from outside, 
and few quality teachers could be attracted to reside long-term in 
such a remote location. Just as importantly, no other colleges are 
available locally that could extend students’ range of study options. 
The present campus is deep in the countryside, away from anywhere 
that high-level Khmer students want to be. They already have spent 
their whole lives in the countryside and the present location does not 
allow them to expand their knowledge in line with the challenges 
and imperatives of a modern society. The site is not even in a Khmer 
neighbourhood, which limits its integration into Khmer social and 
cultural networks, and it is situated far from the demographic centre 
of the Khmer population in Vietnam. 
All of the leading Khmer monastics I consulted thought that the 
institute should be in the centre of a major city where there is better 
access to books, services, and teachers appropriate to the range 
of courses taught at this high level. All thought Hồ Chí Minh City 
(Prey Nokor) was the most appropriate place. This was what originally 
had been proposed. The leading abbot of one province told me that 
after conferring among Khmer monks and abbots, the South Vietnamese 
Khmer Buddhist monks association proposed to Vietnam’s Religious 
Affairs board (Ban Ton Giao) to establish the Khmer Buddhist Studies 
Institute in Hồ Chí Minh City. However, he said:
The board rejected the proposal, as did the People’s Committee of Hồ 
Chí Minh City. They said the proposal would cost too much. Sài Gòn 
lacked space and the land for the institute would be too expensive. 
Instead, they suggested that the institute should be better located 
in Cần Thơ, which is the economic and cultural hub of the Mekong 
Delta and in the middle of all the provinces where Khmer people live. 
Eventually, however, the site selected was not in Cần Thơ City but in 
the countryside, 20 kilometres away from Cần Thơ. Ô Môn is not in 
any way a hub for the region. Why put it in Ô Môn rather than closer 
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to the centre of Cần Thơ where far better teachers and services would 
be available and monks would be able to study other subjects like 
computing, English, and the like in urban college campuses? 
Several senior monks vented their frustration at the government’s 
response to their suggestions for the location of the high-level Khmer 
institute. Leading abbots told me that they had put the suggestion 
to the Committee for Ethnic Affairs (Ban Dan Toc) to locate the 
university in a major city, but they were not heeded. This committee 
and the religious affairs committee were the responsible authorities. 
The National Buddhist Association was not helpful either, nor were 
the metropolitan governments. One monk assured me that ‘10 out 
of  10’ abbots will tell you that they are sad about this outcome. 
Many abbots continue to insist that the Vietnamese government can 
and should find the money to build a campus in either Hồ Chí Minh 
City or Cần Thơ. Perhaps the best indication of the unpopularity of 
the government’s initiative is that the second intake of students at 
the Institute in Ô Môn, in 2011, consisted of just 30 students.
The Thai Connection
Khmers are not permitted to travel abroad to study. If they are desperate 
to do so, they can sneak across the border with Cambodia. But then 
they have to sneak back as well. Either way, if the police catch them, 
they will be thrown in jail for a very long time. The government says 
that those Khmer travelling abroad are seeking to engage in ‘politics’. 
But Vietnamese are free to do so. 
This criticism was delivered to me in 1999 by a monk in one of the 
biggest monasteries in Trà Vinh Province. In this and following 
years, I frequently heard Khmer monks speak of the serious lack of 
educational opportunities that Khmers in Vietnam confronted both 
in their traditional monastery system and the state system. Many 
people I met, old and young, conveyed to me their sentiments of 
intense anger at the oppression and mistreatment to which Khmers 
were subject, and their despair about the imminent demise of Khmer 
identity and culture. Abbots and monks sketched a claustrophobic 
scenario of being entombed within a Vietnamese-dominated world in 
which, slowly but surely, they were being suffocated.
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However, this monk offered a ray of hope. He showed me the picture 
of one local monk who had managed to make it to Thailand. He was 
depicted studying Buddhism in a class of Thai monks. My host said 
indeed this individual had made it to Thailand, but he was not able 
to return. 
In the early 2000s, I began to hear stories about Khmer monks who 
were studying Buddhism in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and 
even further afield. Persistent stories were told of one monk from 
Trà Vinh who was studying Buddhism in Sri Lanka. The abbot of 
another monastery was studying Buddhism in Myanmar. The legal 
status of these educational journeys was unknown. However, people 
speculated that the Vietnamese government would allow Khmer 
students to study in Myanmar because, like Vietnam, Myanmar had 
an authoritarian government that restricted freedom of expression and 
therefore Khmers residing there could not learn or say anything that 
was critical of the situation of the Khmers in Vietnam. Sri Lanka was 
so far away that monks who were studying there posed virtually no 
threat to the government. 
The exploits of these monks were the subject of much discussion 
and admiration. One was described as a genius. He was noted for his 
exceptional intelligence, knowing five to six languages, some of which 
he had been able to master in a matter of months. In one week he had 
been able to learn the contents of an entire three-month course in 
computing. Another story, told to me in 2003 by student monks in 
Wat Somroang Ek, seemed to muddle the details of another monk’s 
educational itinerary. The abbot of their monastery, they said, had 
been studying overseas in Canada for three years. He had completed 
the 12 years of Pali education in Trà Vinh, graduated from Year 12 
of the state system, spent several years studying in Sài Gòn and in 
Hà Nội, studied for three years in Myanmar, and, they thought, he 
also had studied for a few years in Australia. ‘His life is devoted to 
education alone.’ They estimated that he had spent 30 years of his life 
studying.
The stories engendered an outpouring of hope. They outlined a 
potential pathway of educational mobility. They suggested that, by 
ordaining and studying Buddhism, it was possible to make it overseas; 
foreign locations were accessible, and they were attainable to those 
with the aptitude and dedication. The stories of these successful 
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overseas educational journeys alleviated many Khmer people’s sense 
that their lives, consciousness, and futures were to be confined 
exclusively to what Vietnam had in store for them. The possibility 
of studying abroad, however remote it may have been, captured the 
imagination of a great many monks and inspired in them the ambition 
to eventually make it overseas to study Buddhism. So many times did 
I hear monks express the aspiration to study overseas that it cannot 
be discounted as a significant factor behind the decision of many to 
ordain and to persist in the program of monastic studies.
In the mid-2000s, I began to see signs that the dream of overseas study 
was being realised. The new focus was Thailand. In 2006, I spoke with 
a group of monks in a monastery in Trà Vinh town. The monks wanted 
to practice English with me. One from Trà Cú had been ordained for 
ten years. His English was very good. He was also learning Thai and 
told me that he was planning to go to Thailand to study Buddhism 
for three years. When I returned to the temple the following year 
I was told that two of the monks I had met last time had departed for 
Thailand. Three of the monks were now speaking quite good English. 
They would also go to Thailand. ‘This is a new place to study’, they 
said. ‘Five years ago, no Khmer monks were studying in Thailand.’
Increasingly, I heard stories of monks from a range of temples in Trà 
Vinh who had gone to study Buddhism in Thailand, or were preparing 
to do so. In 2006, monks told me that 12 Khmer Krom monks were 
currently studying Buddhism in Thailand. In September 2008, 
I was told that altogether 50 monks from Vietnam were studying in 
Thailand. In January 2013, the leading abbot of Trà Vinh Province 
reported that so far, over 100 students from Trà Vinh had studied in 
Thailand. The most popular destination is the Buddhist University 
Maha Chulalongkorn, in Bangkok, although Khmer Krom monks have 
also studied in universities in Chiang Mai and Surin.
The attraction of Thailand as a higher education study destination lies 
in the perception that Theravada Buddhism has reached a uniquely 
high level of development in that country. Monks told me that 
Thailand is a good place to study Buddhism because Buddhism is 
the state religion of Thailand and Buddhist education thus receives 
strong patronage from the state. New research is being done there, for 
example, transcription of the Pali sutras which are held in abundance 
in Buddhist monasteries, and deeper investigation into the religion, 
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language, and law. Thailand has many people who have done PhD 
research into Buddhism. The country also appeals as a global centre 
or hub for Buddhism. One monk who was planning to study in Maha 
Chulalongkorn told me that this university teaches monks from 
Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka.
Nonetheless, it is clear that what is sought in these educational 
pilgrimages is broad-spectrum knowledge in secular subjects as much 
as of Buddhism itself. The opportunities it presented to study English 
and other non-traditional subjects at a high level was an important 
reason for Thailand’s appeal. Monks in their early 20s in Wat Kompong 
Nikrodh said that the advantage of studying in Thailand or Myanmar 
over Cambodia is that the language of instruction is English. As the 
senior Pali teacher of another important Trà Vinh monastery told me:
Four of my former students are now studying in Thailand. They 
have sought permission to study there for four years. They live in a 
monastery, still ordained as monks, and study English in a college in 
Bangkok. That is what they are there for. They want only to study 
‘outside’ subjects like English, especially, and computing. 
Thailand is considered a modern, sophisticated country where the 
quality of teaching is high. In 2010, I met a monk in rural Trà Vinh who 
had studied in Thailand for four years. He spent two years in Chiang 
Mai and two years in Maha Chulalongkorn. He studied English, Thai 
literature, and Buddhism. ‘In Thailand, Buddhism is very advanced. 
The quality of teaching is high.’ He had many foreign teachers in 
Chiang Mai, spoke English remarkably well, and was now teaching 
it in his home temple.
Another factor that works to the advantage of Thailand is the pressure 
the Vietnamese government is under from Khmer Krom people to 
provide them with reasonable educational options. As one monk noted, 
many monks yearn to study in Cambodia, where they can study in 
Khmer and take both Buddhist and non-Buddhist subjects. However, 
Cambodia is closed off as a path for higher studies because of political 
conditions. Internally, the government has been far from successful in 
providing an option of equivalent quality for higher-level education 
in Khmer studies or Buddhism. And few Khmer Krom monks are 
attracted to studying in Vietnam’s own Buddhist universities, because 
of the markedly Vietnamese flavour of the curriculum, and Khmer 
monks’ perceptions about discrimination within Vietnamese Buddhism 
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against Khmer Theravada monks and practices. As student monks in 
a Trà Vinh monastery noted, the Vietnamese government is forced to 
allow monks to study in Thailand since it has failed to provide any 
other alternatives for their higher education.
Also having an effect on monks’ study destinations are shifts in 
Cambodian official policy. Monks in Phnom Penh told me that, prior 
to 2007, monks from Trà Vinh frequently snuck across the border 
to Cambodia to continue their Buddhist education at high school 
and university levels. This illicit movement was tolerated by the 
Cambodian government, and the Cambodian Sangha abetted the 
flow by recognising the monastic studies program in Trà Vinh as a 
prerequisite for entering Cambodia’s Buddhist universities. The peak 
was around 2007, when there were perhaps as many as 300 Khmer 
Krom students in monastic schools in Phnom Penh. However, 
demonstrations by Khmer Krom student monks in both Vietnam and 
Cambodia in that year led the Cambodian government to restrict the 
flow. The Cambodian Sangha withdrew its recognition of the Khmer 
monastic studies program in Trà Vinh as a prerequisite for higher-level 
studies in Cambodia. Monks told me that this had an immediate effect 
on the flow of Khmer Krom monks to Cambodia to undertake higher-
level Buddhist studies. Now it is only Thailand that recognises the 
Vitchear Alai (high school) qualification in Trà Vinh, so many monks 
from Trà Vinh go straight into Buddhist university in Thailand.
A leading abbot of Trà Vinh Province told me that Thailand is the 
route preferred by the Vietnamese government for Khmer Krom monks 
to pursue university education. The state issues permits and passports 
to students, and it is easy for them to return to Vietnam to teach 
and work since this route is officially sponsored. It is also the path 
promoted by Vietnam’s Khmer Buddhist association as the best option 
available at the present time. One of the reasons for the association to 
promote this route is to build up a cadre of teachers who will be able 
to teach in the temple schools. 
The principal factor that puts a limit on studying in Thailand is 
the cost. Since the youths who take this route are exclusively from 
impoverished rural families, usually with only a fraction of a hectare 
of ricelands to their name, they have to rely on outside sources of 
funding. The first Khmer Krom monk to study overseas in the post-war 
years was sponsored by laypeople in the United States. He did his 
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English-language MA in Buddhist philosophy at the Buddhist and Pali 
University of Sri Lanka (established in 1981) in Colombo, and lived 
in Sri Lanka for nine years. He was ordained as a monk the entire 
time, staying in a monastery in Colombo. Many of the students who 
travel to Thailand similarly must rely on sponsorship from a wealthy 
layperson. Student monks from one famous temple in Trà Vinh told 
me that the abbot has paid for students to study in Thailand. But they 
are under bond. After returning from Thailand, the monks must 
teach in the temple for an equivalent length of time to repay the debt. 
Some excellent students also receive sponsorship from the Theravada 
Buddhist monks association. 
However, as monks who contemplate the alternatives frequently 
observe, the problem with Buddhist higher education overseas is 
that one has to be wealthy to pursue it. If one is not among the few 
supported by the association, one has to pay transport costs, which 
are very expensive. Local institutions may allow monks to stay in the 
temple for free and one can rely on the alms round for meals, however, 
a host of additional expenses exist, such as for supplementary food 
and drinks, study materials, fees for additional study, and water and 
electricity fees. To prepare for study in Thailand, a monk has to study 
English and Thai for several years and arrange his own papers. Unless 
he finds a generous sponsor, a typical rural youth cannot afford these 
studies. 
Nonetheless, the opening of a path to higher education in Thailand 
has had notable revitalising effects on the Khmer monastic program in 
Trà Vinh. It charged the whole enterprise with newfound purpose for 
monks to know that their studies in local monasteries had currency in 
the world beyond. Ordination provided them with the means to attain 
distinction according to criteria which had universal significance, and 
gave them hopes of gaining access to an arena of prestigious modernity. 
For a people who consider themselves imperilled by the Vietnamese 
institutions that envelop them, Thailand offers an escape route, an 
alternative path for development and self-realisation that is felt to 
be autonomous from the designs of the Vietnamese state. It also has 
unleashed unexpectedly a boom in the study of the English and Thai 
languages in temples deep in the countryside. And it gave new rigour 
to the study of Buddhist subjects, for these were to be emphasised in 
the Thai monastic curriculum.
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This new pathway also has significant limitations. As already noted, 
such travels are not subsidised by the state, and the high cost of getting 
to Thailand means that only a few community-supported positions are 
available each year. Additionally, the investment in money and time 
in studying English and Thai are considerable, and put the option 
beyond the reach of the vast majority. All said, the Thai option is 
significantly more costly and less accessible than the traditional path 
to higher education in Cambodia, which is closer and does not require 
additional linguistic preparation. However, the major disadvantage of 
studying in Thailand is that it does not provide any opportunities 
for studying Khmer at a higher level, learning more about Khmer 
culture and history, or gaining practical experience in Khmer as 
a sophisticated functional language. One leading abbot who was 
instrumental in forging the option of studying in Thailand confided to 
me his regrets that the emphasis in Thailand is on studying Buddhism, 
while there is no emphasis on historical and Khmer cultural heritage 
subjects. Such a pathway therefore runs the risk of turning the Khmer 
monastic education system in Trà Vinh into a foundational religious 
studies course, rendering as extraneous the Khmer cultural literacy 
subjects that many believe to be the most crucial elements of the 
monastic studies program.
Pilgrimages to the Cultural Centre
Considering the inadequacies of these options for higher monastic 
education, it is not surprising that many student monks in Trà Vinh 
continue to regard Cambodia as the best destination for undertaking 
higher-level studies. Despite the illicit nature of such journeys, the 
likelihood of being arrested or surveilled on one’s return, and the risks 
to employment opportunities and one’s status as a monk, many student 
monks choose to make the journey. It is widely known in Trà Vinh 
that many monks have left for Cambodia to undertake higher-level 
studies. One of the top abbots in the province, who holds an important 
official position, described it as the ‘private route’ (pleu aecachun), 
deliberately refusing to call it illegal, but distinguishing it from the 
officially sanctioned route to Thailand. He had no doubt that more 
monks from Trà Vinh were studying in Cambodia than in Thailand 
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or elsewhere, and he told me calmly that this was understandable, 
since Cambodia was the traditional destination for monks from this 
province to pursue their higher-level studies.
Over a period of years of visiting Phnom Penh, I met many Khmer 
monks from Vietnam who were studying in the capital city’s higher 
education institutions. Most came from Trà Vinh, although monks 
from Vĩnh Long and Sóc Trăng were also well represented. I could not 
obtain official statistics, but in 2012 the consensus was that several 
hundred Khmer Krom monks were currently enrolled in educational 
institutions in Phnom Penh. They resided in many monasteries, 
some of the largest concentrations being in Wat Maha Muntrey, 
Wat Potum Wattey, Wat Somraong Andeth, Wat Unnalom, Wat Tuol 
Sangke, Wat Uttara Wattey, Wat Langka, and one unregistered Khmer 
Krom temple. Like the many thousands of student monks from rural 
Cambodia residing in Phnom Penh monasteries, the monks observed 
standard monastic routines while also studying full time. Some were 
repeating Buddhist secondary school years in the temples, while 
others were undertaking educational programs outside the wat. They 
were enrolled in a remarkable range of undergraduate and graduate 
programs, including in Phnom Penh’s two Buddhist universities, and 
in numerous secular state and private colleges and universities where 
they studied a great variety of subjects.
Every one of these intelligent and serious people, the cream of Trà 
Vinh Khmer society, had crossed the border into Cambodia illegally. 
Their stories of cross-border travel were frequently adventurous. 
The story of Luk Sone provides an example. 
Luk Sone resides in one of Phnom Penh’s famous inner city temples. 
He comes from Trà Cú District in Trà Vinh. He is the oldest of seven 
children. His younger brother, a lay student, is in the temple with 
him. The rest of his family is back at home. He came to Cambodia in 
2002 because he wanted to study at a university. The quality, level, 
and resources for Khmer education in Vietnam were too low for him 
to study further than the fourth year of the Butikah Saksa program. 
When he crossed the border, he went with a travel organiser, to whom 
he paid 900,000 VND to arrange his travel. He went in a group by bus. 
When he got to the border, he removed his upper torso robe and put 
on a shirt, coat, pants, and a hat to conceal his monastic appearance, 
keeping on only his lower body robe — by keeping that on he 
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remained ordained. He did not carry travel papers. Some of the money 
he paid was used to facilitate informal cross-border passage arranged 
by the tour operator. 
All of the Khmer student monks I met in Phnom Penh had crossed 
the border furtively, avoiding the border posts by detouring around 
them or by disguising their monastic identity. They were reluctant 
to describe the specifics of their journeys when other monks were 
present, either explaining that it was very difficult to talk about the 
topic, or falling silent when I probed for details.
The Khmer Krom student monks I met in Phnom Penh in 2009–13 were 
products of the monastic education program in Trà Vinh. Most had 
been monks for over 15 years, having first ordained in the mid-1990s. 
The  typical biography was of a man from a poor rural family who 
ordained in his early to mid-teens, having already studied Khmer 
literacy in the temple in the evenings or summer breaks, or while 
engaged as a temple boy (khmeng wat). After a year’s probationary 
ordination, they had entered the monastic program, completing both 
the intermediate and high school stages, or seven years in total, in 
the period between 1995 and 2005. Some then continued teaching 
literacy or higher-level subjects in their home temples. They were 
good students and were ambitious to study further, but had reached 
the upper limits of the Khmer-language monastic education available 
in Vietnam.
Like Luk Sone, many told me that they had come to Cambodia in order 
to continue Buddhist studies at the university level. Members of this 
cohort had completed their monastic schooling in Vietnam prior to 
the founding of the Khmer Buddhist studies institute in Ô Môn or the 
opening of the path to Thailand as a viable destination for university-
level studies. Several of them had enrolled in one of the two Buddhist 
studies universities in Phnom Penh — Preah Sihanouk Reach, run 
by the Mahanikay order, and Preah Sihamoni Reach, run by the 
Thommayut order — both located close to the Royal Palace. Each had 
a four-year undergraduate program which taught standard subjects 
such as the monastic code, Pali–Khmer translation, and Buddhist 
history — at a deeper level than was taught in Trà Vinh — along with 
subjects such as philosophy, Sanskrit, comparative world religions, 
and Buddhism in Khmer literature, which, prior to 2007, were not 
taught in Vietnam. They each also offered graduate level studies 
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which required students to complete a thesis under supervision. 
Hence these students’ reason for coming to Cambodia was to progress 
to a higher level of study than was locally available, in a place, format 
and language accessible to poor rural youths, and in a locality that for 
generations had been a peak destination for Khmer-language monastic 
education.
Also prominent among the reasons given for travelling to Cambodia 
was to undertake studies in secular subjects. I met Khmer Krom 
monks in Phnom Penh who were enrolled in English, accounting, 
computing, tourism, agricultural development, and educational 
management courses at the undergraduate and graduate levels. 
Their opportunities for studying such subjects in Vietnam were 
practically non-existent. Coming from Khmer-dominated rural areas 
of the Mekong Delta, where state schooling at all levels was weakly 
developed and of poor quality, most had only elementary-level 
Vietnamese schooling, and their Vietnamese language was very basic. 
The tough entry requirements, costs, and distance and unfamiliarity 
of Vietnamese colleges and universities posed intimidating barriers to 
gaining a high-level secular education. By contrast, such options were 
within reach in Cambodia, where student monks were supported by 
laypeople and resided free of charge in temples close to a range of 
educational institutions which used their mother tongue as a language 
of instruction. As in Thailand, the monkhood served as an avenue 
of social mobility for poor rural youths who would otherwise lack 
opportunities for worldly advancement (Wyatt 1966; Tambiah 1976). 
Such instrumentalist reasons were not inconsistent with monastic 
vocations for, as one monk put it, the essential purpose of ordination 
is to gain knowledge.
For many Khmer Krom students, Cambodia beckons as a cosmopolitan 
centre, a place where foreigners brush shoulders with Khmers, where 
international languages are widely spoken and can be learned easily. 
One monk from the backwater village of O To Tung in Kompong Spien 
had been in Phnom Penh for six years. When I met him in 2012 he 
had been studying English for four years. He told me that his primary 
reason for coming to Cambodia was to study English, and explained 
how he had come to this decision: ‘When I was ordained, some monks 
from my home temple came home from Cambodia to visit and they 
were speaking in fluent English. It created a strong impression in me 
and I wanted to speak this language as well as them.’
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A significant underlying reason for monks wanting to undertake higher 
education in Cambodia in either the ‘religious’ or ‘secular’ streams is 
the unique opportunity it provides to improve their capacity in their 
native language. Courses and assignments at this level push students 
to a very high standard of written and spoken Khmer, take them into 
specialised realms of expression and vocabulary not commonplace in 
rural communities, give them knowledge of the etymological roots of 
their language, and expose them to new expressions. In addition to 
the huge range of texts used in the classroom is the plethora of media, 
popular books, and signage all around them in this Khmer cultural 
metropolis. This is a highly significant factor for students for whom 
the only examples of Khmer writing are the handful of photocopied 
texts from Cambodia used in temple schools. Khmer people in 
Vietnam live in a social environment devoid of written Khmer, where 
Khmer is a pedagogic language rather than a language of functional 
cultural citizenship, and where all debates, laws, and discussions 
are conducted in Vietnamese. Students value the depth, breadth and 
dynamism of this rich and immersive linguistic experience and access 
to the metropolitan centre of their language.
More important still, and common to all students, is the nature of 
study in Cambodia as a quest for cultural identity. Many of them 
expressed doubts about the integrity of the Khmer monastic education 
program they had been through in Vietnam. A monk who had come to 
Cambodia to study in the secondary level of the monastic curriculum 
told me:
The most important subject for me is Khmer. It is the main reason 
I came here to study. In the monastic studies program in my province, 
Vietnamese language and content are mixed in with the Khmer 
curriculum. Few books in Khmer language are available for study 
or deeper research. And one cannot study subjects such as Khmer 
geography or history. Thus Khmer people cannot learn about their 
origins [daem kamnaat], their identity. Also, Khmer morality and 
culture are not taught unlike in the monastic curriculum in Cambodia. 
The quality of monastic education is higher in Cambodia. Classes in 
the monastic curriculum are broader [bauk tu lie chien].
Another monk had completed 12 years of the Khmer Buddhist monastic 
curriculum in Trà Cú District Trà Vinh, epicentre of the Khmer studies 
program. He then taught what he had learnt to novices and young 
Bhikku in his temple. After three years he wanted to study further, 
CONNECTED & DISCONNECTED IN VIET NAM
304
so he asked his abbot for permission to travel to Cambodia, and the 
abbot agreed. He did not ask permission from the authorities, because 
they would not grant it. So he crossed the border illegally:
I wanted to study in Cambodia because the Vietnamese government 
tightly restricts what can be learnt in Khmer schools. In fact, only 
seven subjects can be taught in the monastic high school in Vietnam, 
half as many as in Cambodia. Several subjects are forbidden, such as 
history and geography. And the content of the allowable subjects is 
greatly restricted. The depth and breadth of subjects in Cambodian 
schools is much greater. I know this because I have studied in both 
places. The Vietnamese government does not want the Khmer Krom 
to know about their history because if they do they will feel anger, 
sorrow, pity and will demand to do something about it. They will join 
together to ask for their country back.
I spoke with several abbots and university lecturers in Phnom Penh 
temples who agreed Khmer Krom monks had a mixture of motivations 
for studying further. However, the most pressing one is to learn more 
about their culture, their language.
One senior monk who lectures at Preah Sihanouk Reach Buddhist 
University said that there are many Khmer Krom students at his 
university. ‘They are more accomplished [boukae] than student monks 
from Kampuchea. They work very hard. Most monks from Kampuchea 
Krom want to study in Cambodia.’ The Khmer Krom students at his 
university come from all provinces of Kampuchea Krom. Those from 
Trà Vinh (Preah Trapeang) are highly represented. He commented:
The monks in Preah Trapeang are very strong [khlang]. They are like 
Buddhist soldiers. Their desire to protect their culture is very strong. 
They have a sense that they alone can prevent the loss of Khmer 
culture. Girls too study in the Buddhist program for the same reason. It 
is quite rare for girls in rural areas of Cambodia to attend the Buddhist 
studies program.
We can see that Cambodia continues to act as a powerful magnet for 
Khmer Krom monks who see it in multiple respects as a highly desirable 
educational destination. The knowledge that can be obtained in 
Cambodia is judged to be broader, deeper, and more reliable and pure 
than what can be gained in Vietnam. The educational pilgrimage to 
Cambodia provides self-knowledge about one’s origins and language, 
and an immersive experience in modern Khmer cultural trends that 
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cannot be obtained elsewhere, be it in Vietnam or Thailand. It provides 
exposure to contemporary and practical forms of knowledge that 
otherwise are inaccessible.
Impossible Returns, Lasting Divides
Having made the journey to Phnom Penh for an education, many 
Khmer Krom see no reason to return to Vietnam. For instance, one 
person from Bạc Liêu came to Cambodia because he wanted to study 
English. He told me that the quality of English teaching and learning 
in Cambodia is much better than in Vietnam. He came as a layperson 
and ordained for eight years while studying, because he wanted to be 
a monk. Ordination also allowed him access to free accommodation 
in a conveniently located urban temple, as well as donations from 
laypersons. Then, when he graduated, he left the monkhood, married 
and bought a house in the suburbs of Phnom Penh. He now works 
selling medicinal oil (prieng ktchol) in various places in the capital.
A monk from Vĩnh Long, residing in a central city temple, told me 
that the quality of secular education in Cambodia is better than in 
Vietnam. That, in addition to the paucity of Khmer-language books 
and the lack of a robust university-level Buddhist studies course in 
Vietnam, is why he came to Phnom Penh to study, crossing the border 
illegally to do so: 
For Khmer Krom, it is easier to get a good education in English and 
other subjects in Cambodia than in Vietnam. Plus for Khmers there are 
many more work opportunities in Cambodia. For an educated Khmer 
person, it is very difficult to get good quality jobs in Vietnam.
He told me that he definitely will not return to live or work in Vietnam, 
even to retire, although he misses his family. One reason for this 
thinking was the lack of work opportunities in Vietnam. However, 
in addition, as a monk who has studied in Cambodia, he would be 
impeded in making a living in Vietnam — he would be suspected and 
restricted in obtaining work for the government, as a teacher, or in the 
business sector. 
As this comment indicates, gaining access to this centre of knowledge 
has high costs. Having broken the law in crossing the border without 
official permission, student monks are unable to return to Vietnam. 
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Monks say they would be arrested or persecuted by the police if they 
attempted to return. In all probability, it is not the small infraction of 
an illegal border crossing that makes them vulnerable to prosecution, 
but the threat they pose to the Vietnamese order. Having amassed 
new knowledge about their culture, history, and origins, they have 
made themselves into a resource that has the potential to threaten the 
prevailing regime of truth in their homeland. For them to display their 
cultural competencies in Vietnam would challenge the Vietnamese 
pedagogic order, for it would demonstrate that officially prescribed 
channels of educational mobility are not necessarily the best way for 
the citizens of the Mekong Delta to gain an education.
One of the unexpected consequences of this educational movement 
to Cambodia is that nearly all the monks who have followed this path 
have renounced Vietnamese citizenship, and have sought and obtained 
Cambodian citizenship and passports. They have charted plans for 
permanent residence in Cambodia, and have no intention to return to 
live or work in Vietnam. Superficially, this switch in citizenship might 
seem like a sign of their blind devotion to Cambodia, or to their own 
educational careers, and could be read as their abandonment of their 
Khmer compatriots who live in Vietnam. In actuality, the reverse is 
true. Ironically, it is the desire to return home to visit family, attend 
ceremonies, and maintain relations with their former teachers and 
peers that has led them to take out Cambodian citizenship. The only 
way they can return home and avoid persecution by the Vietnamese 
authorities is as the citizen of another country, under the protection of 
its embassy and of international law. 
The ability for Khmer Krom monks to obtain Cambodian passports 
for travel to Vietnam appears to be a relatively new development. 
It possibly dates to around 2010, for I did not hear about it before then, 
and before 2010 I had never met a Khmer student monk in Vietnam 
on a return trip from Cambodia. However, in the years 2011–14, I met 
several Khmer Krom student monks who had travelled home on short 
visits using a Cambodian passport. They went to visit family, attend 
funerals, pick up funds, or attend the Khmer New Year, Pchum Ben, 
and Oc Omboc festivals. One told me he goes back once a year for 
about 10 days at a time. The experience is never comfortable:
I have been back to my village several times but only because I have 
a Cambodian passport. If I did not have it, I would be in big trouble 
with the police. Even so, when I visit, the police always approach me 
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and ask all sorts of questions. The local police are contacted by the 
higher authorities and told that I am a bad person who committed a 
crime by leaving the country illegally. As a result, they always follow 
me and question me. You mightn’t realise you are being observed 
when sitting, talking and laughing with a group of monks. But after 
you leave them, they are questioned by the police. As a result people 
are very reticent about what they say to me when I visit.
This was confirmed by another student monk: ‘Now we have 
Cambodian passports, we can visit home, but are followed by police 
everywhere we go. This happened to me when I visited my home town 
for a week. I was followed every single day.’
While short, heavily policed home visits are allowed, student 
monks are deterred from making longer visits. None of them thinks 
it would be possible to return home to work as a teacher or in any 
other capacity. This assessment was echoed by a leading Cambodian 
Buddhist university lecturer who had worked with scores of such 
students: 
Khmer monks from Vietnam who study in Phnom Penh never return 
to Vietnam to live and work. They can go back to visit for a few days 
but if they try to stay longer they are followed and questioned. They 
are suspected of being involved in politics and spreading information 
about history and forming a network with nationalists in Cambodia. 
One monk told me that he would like to go back to Vietnam and teach, 
but the police would not allow anyone who has studied in Cambodia 
to do so, because such people know too much. 
And what they know would cause their students to rise up and protest 
against the government. The government wants people to forget their 
history. It would be very difficult for him to return.
He knows of just one person who returned, but that person disrobed. 
As a result of these acute sensitivities, a significant number of the 
most talented, ambitious, and knowledgeable Khmer Krom people 
have left Vietnam and are unable or unwilling to return. Pending a 
shift in Vietnamese government policy, which seems unlikely, those 
monks who travel to study in Cambodia are destined to remain there 
for the rest of their lives. In consequence, they are unable to repatriate 
their knowledge and experience, be that in Khmer culture, Buddhism, 
or other areas of expertise. This situation has led to the pooling on 
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one side of the border of numerous culturally competent Khmer Krom 
people who are able to contribute to Cambodia’s cultural and political 
life. On the other side of the border, Khmers in Vietnam lack a viable 
means to reproduce their cultural tradition and hence are deprived 
of the means to achieve cultural equivalence with respect to their 
counterparts in both Cambodia and Vietnam.
This comes as a significant cost to Vietnam, in the form of a brain drain 
affecting one of the country’s largest minority groups, which loses the 
benefits of the social reinvestments that would flow from the return of 
these students and their repatriation of a variety of forms of valuable 
knowledge. In response, the Vietnamese government has had to build 
up an alternative infrastructure of secular educational institutions in 
order to replace what it has dismantled. At the same time, in order 
to counter the accusation that the closure of the educational route to 
Cambodia is designed to assimilate the Khmers, the government has 
had to keep in place a Khmer-language education system that mirrors 
the Cambodian national system. Ironically, the price to be paid for 
detaching the Khmer Krom from Cambodia’s cultural sphere is tending 
to the faithful reproduction of Cambodian-style cultural institutions 
within Vietnam itself. It is difficult for the Vietnamese government 
to compete respectably on this terrain, and thus it is permanently 
vulnerable to the criticism that denying the Khmer Krom educational 
access to Cambodia has deprived them of access to social mobility, 
traditional and modern knowledge, religious expertise, and the ability 
to reproduce themselves socially and culturally. 
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Described, Inscribed, Written Off: 
Heritagisation as (Dis)connection 
Oscar Salemink
Preamble
In 2011, UNESCO inscribed the fourteenth-century Citadel of  the 
Hồ  Dynasty in Vietnam’s Thanh Hòa Province on the World 
Heritage List, thereby both recognising and rewarding Vietnam’s 
efforts in conserving the archaeological site, as well as obliging it to 
meet UNESCO’s official conservation standards. In an article titled 
‘Hồ  Citadel the Site of a Modern Conflict’ in the English-language 
newspaper Việt Nam News of 8 June 2014, Deputy Director of the 
Centre for Conservation of the Hồ Dynasty Citadel World Heritage, 
Nguyễn Xuân Toán, lamented that local people continued to ‘build 
houses and other civil works’ in the area, in violation of conservation 
regulations, and in spite of awareness-raising meetings. The district 
authorities do not wish to forbid construction of houses within certain 
limits, but have a plan for the gradual removal of cultivation fields 
from the site, and according to journalist Hồng Thúy, local people 
would be happy to move if they receive adequate compensation. The 
conflict referred to in the title is, therefore, not just a conflict between 
the Conservation Centre and local people, but between the centre and 
the district authorities, with Mr Toán complaining that ‘the Centre 
for Conservation of the Hồ  Dynasty Citadel World Heritage does 
not have the authority to mete out punishments on violators when 
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they detect infringement of the site’. Mr Toán is supported by the 
Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism in Hanoi: ‘Management and 
preservation at the site will not improve unless the centre’s power is 
enhanced, said Deputy Director of the Ministry of Culture, Sports 
and Tourism’s Cutural Heritage Department, Nguyễn Quốc Hùng’.1 
The news report construes this as a conflict between two government 
agencies — district authorities and heritage management authorities 
— but the conflict is over the power to evict local inhabitants whose 
livelihood practices are, since 2011, branded ‘an infringement of the 
site’; local people are enemies of conservation.
Introduction
The ‘heritage conflict’ reported above suggests that the proclamation 
of heritage affects people living with or close to that heritage in 
various ways; it might result in their dispossession of land, objects, or 
the product of their labour. Since the 1993 inscription of the former 
imperial capital of Huế on the World Heritage List, Vietnam has made 
great efforts to have its cultural heritage recognised by UNESCO as 
world heritage. Belatedly, beginning with its monumental heritage 
(Huế town, Hội An town, Mỹ Sơn temple complex, the Imperial 
Citadel of Thăng Long, Citadel of the Hồ Dynasty), natural heritage 
(Hạ Long Bay, and Phong Nha Kẻ Bàng National Park), and mixed 
heritage (Tràng An Landscape Complex), Vietnam has more recently 
focused on its ‘Intangible Cultural Heritage’ (abbreviated by UNESCO 
as ‘ICH’). In 1994, Vietnam hosted UNESCO’s first ICH ‘expert 
meeting’, on the cultures of ethnic minorities and of Huế. Even before 
the ICH lists were formalised, in 2003, the year of the ICH Convention, 
nhã nhạc court music from Huế was recognised as a cultural treasure, 
and in 2005 the gong music (không gian văn hóa cồng chiêng) of ethnic 
minorities in Vietnam’s Central Highlands. In addition, since 2009, 
Quan họ, Ca trù, Xoan and Ðơn ca tài tử, Ví and Giặm singing, and the 
Gióng Festival of Phù Ðổng and Sóc temples, and the Worship of the 
Hùng Kings in Phú Thọ have been inscribed. 
1  vietnamnews.vn/in-bai/255933/ho-citadel-the-site-of-a-modern-conflict.htm, accessed 
16 November 2014.
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In this chapter, I propose to look at Vietnam’s rapid heritagisation 
since 1993 in terms of connection and disconnection with reference 
to the inspirational ideas about spectacularisation in Guy Debord’s 
pamphlet The Society of the Spectacle (1994). For Debord: ‘The spectacle 
is not a collection of images; it is a social relation between people 
that is mediated by images’ (Debord 1994:4).2 For Debord, modern 
industrial society is ‘fundamentally spectaclist’ in the sense that the 
spectacle has become autonomous in two senses. On the one hand, 
spectacularisation is based on the separation between spheres of 
production and consumption, which is akin to Marx’s alienation 
of workers from the product of their labour, leading Debord to argue 
that the spectacle is a visual reflection of the social order. On the other 
hand, spectacle refers to the separation between reality and image, 
between thing and sign, where the image becomes the end-product 
of the ‘dominant system of production’, and where the spectacle 
is ‘the visual reflection of the ruling economic order’, and ‘aims at 
nothing other than itself’ (Debord 2002:§14). But at the same time the 
separation gets blurred, because ‘when the real world is transformed 
into mere images, mere images become real beings’, and ‘wherever 
representation becomes independent, the spectacle regenerates itself’ 
(Debord 2002:§18, original italics) as the visualisation, self-indulgence 
and enjoyment of power.
For Debord:
Separation is the alpha and omega of the spectacle. The 
institutionalization of the social division of labor in the form of class 
divisions had given rise to an earlier, religious form of contemplation: 
the mythical order with which every power has always camouflaged 
itself. Religion justified the cosmic and ontological order that 
corresponded to the interests of the masters, expounding and 
embellishing everything their societies could not deliver. In this sense, 
all separate power has been spectacular … The general separation 
of worker and product tends to eliminate any direct personal 
communication between the producers and any comprehensive sense 
of what they are producing. With the increasing accumulation of 
separate products and the increasing concentration of the productive 
2  Debord’s book contains 221 numbered paragraphs of varying length — from one sentence 
to half a page — and it is to these paragraphs that I refer. There exist many different English 
translations of this book, which is notoriously difficult to translate. I use two different 
translations (Debord 1994, 2002). 
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process, communication and comprehension are monopolized by 
the managers of the system. The triumph of this separation-based 
economic system proletarianizes the whole world … In the spectacle, 
a part of the world presents itself to the world and is superior to it. The 
spectacle is simply the common language of this separation [which] is 
experienced by the producers as an abundance of dispossession (Debord 
2002: §25, 26, 29, 31).
Heritage is arguably a Debordian spectacle, in the sense that something 
that was an object to use, a place to live, a place of worship or an object 
to worship, or a ritualised event, becomes an image of such cultural 
sites, objects or practices representing the past. Temporally speaking, 
part of the attraction of heritage lies in its claim to represent the past 
and to point the way towards the future. In a recent essay, I suggested 
that heritagisation constitutes an appropriation of the past and thus 
an attempt to control the future by certain elites that alienate other 
groups in the process, as well as an attempt to control the economic 
value of the commoditised heritage, in the world’s biggest economic 
industry, tourism (Salemink 2014). Thus, heritagisation does not only 
involve a connection with the nation, but simultaneously instigates 
a twin movement of separation, namely between the cultural sites, 
objects and/or practices, and their spectacular image; and between the 
sites, objects or practices, and their producers, makers, authors and/
or performers. Thus, heritagisation as a formally ritualised connection 
with the nation paradoxically comes at a price of local disconnection 
from the cultural site, object, or practice that is officially labelled 
cultural heritage. In this chapter, I argue that the heritagisation of 
cultural sites, objects, and practices effectively disenfranchises the 
cultural communities involved from the legacy that they formed 
over years of cultural and ritual labour, as other players — cultural 
experts and scientists, state agencies, tourist companies — effectively 
take over the management and organisation of the heritage for their 
own benefit. In other words, as particular cultural sites, objects 
and practices are connected nationally and internationally through 
a process of heritagisation, their constituencies paradoxically become 
disconnected from that part of their legacy as outsiders take over. Thus, 
movements of connection and disconnection operate simultaneously 
or consecutively at different levels. In other words, the description 
and inscription of heritage sites, objects and practices result in the 
writing off of the constituent communities as viable and reliable 
cultural agents.
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I unfold my argument about simultaneous and subsequent connection 
and disconnection through heritagisation in the following sections. 
The next section discusses the concept of heritagisation as it 
emerged during the global heritage ‘boom’. The subsequent section, 
‘Intangible Cultural Heritage in Vietnam’, briefly describes the history 
of  UNESCO-certified heritage in Vietnam. This will be followed by 
three sections looking more closely into one specific intangible cultural 
heritage, namely the ‘Space of Gong Culture’ and its cultural subjects 
situated in the still contentious Central Highlands as well as their role 
in the ‘Worship of the Hùng Kings’ in Phú Thọ Province. In a final 
section, I offer some reflections on heritagisation in Vietnam in terms 
of connection and disconnection, of incorporation and separation, 
of instrumentalisation and dispossession.
Heritagisation as a Global Process
In 1996, David Lowenthal published his influential book, Possessed by 
the Past: The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History, in which he 
tried to come to terms with the overnight ascendancy of heritage, and 
offered partial answers to the question of why heritage labels, claims, 
and practices had become so pervasive, so ubiquitous — how all sorts 
of different legacies have become heritage; how heritage is connected up 
with a particular understanding and use of the past through history; 
and how it generates rivalry, competition, and conflict. Lowenthal 
placed emphasis on the partisan use of heritage claims for presentist 
purposes, and on what I would probably call aspects of faith in and 
sacralisation of specific historical narratives about the past. 
In his recent Heritage: Critical Approaches, Rodney Harrison (2013) 
also speaks of the ubiquity of heritage and of the heritage boom in 
‘late modernity’, but rather than as a fixation on the past, Harrison 
interprets this heritage boom ‘as a creative engagement with the past 
in the present’ which helps us shape our future (Harrison 2013:4). 
Heritage, then, is a ‘relationship between people, objects, places and 
practices’, and ‘is concerned with the various ways in which humans 
and non-humans are linked by chains of connectivity and work together 
to keep the past alive in the present for the future’ Harrison (2013:4–
5, original italics). In a chapter on ‘Late-Modernity and the Heritage 
Boom’, Harrison points to globalisation, migration, and demographic 
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changes; deindustrialisation in the West and the rise of the ‘knowledge 
economy’; the emergence of travel, leisure, and ‘experience’ as 
marketable commodities; and the commercialisation of the past as 
factors in the emergence of a ‘heritage boom’ after the Second World 
War, but especially since 1970. This heritage boom went hand in 
hand with a pervasive process of heritagisation, by which ‘objects 
and places are transformed from functional “things” into objects 
of display and exhibition’ (Harrison 2013:69). Although Harrison 
seeks to contextualise the ‘heritage boom’ in a particular condition 
of  ‘late modernity’, he fails to draw attention to the simultaneity of 
the  global heritagisation process with the neoliberalisation of the 
global economy, starting in the United States under Reagan and the 
United Kingdom under Thatcher. I will return to this connection later.
The concept of heritagisation was coined by Robert Hewison in his 
book The Heritage Industry: Britain in a Climate of Decline (1987), 
in which he refers to the heritagisation of certain sites. This spatial 
meaning was picked up by Nikki Macleod (2006), Melanie Smith 
(2009), and since then a host of other scholars, who use the concept of 
heritagisation with reference to certain sites and places — i.e. tangible 
cultural heritage — usually in Europe. But in a 2007 article in 
Current Anthropology, Breidenbach and Nyíri draw attention to the 
differential effects of the process of ‘global heritagisation’ of certain 
heritage sites (Breidenbach and Nyíri 2007:322) in terms of affecting 
the ‘consumption’ of nature and heritage in post-socialist Russia and 
China. They assert that the globalising narrative of World Heritage 
must be read in the context of distinctive national contexts — a valid 
observation for Vietnam as well. But heritage is not just about pedagogy 
(about how to preserve, how to be a proper citizen) and consumption 
(of heritage sites and practices). 
Beyond the notions of instrumentality that the notion of heritagisation 
calls forth, Yaniv Poria (2010) draws attention to the effect heritagisation 
produces among visitors, who may or may not have a (tenuous) link 
with the community linked to, or owning, the heritage site. He does 
so while analysing visual displays of heritage sites, and the ‘stories 
behind the picture’ that are conveyed through such visual displays. 
A different meaning of heritagisation was suggested by Kevin Walsh 
(1992) in his The Representation of the Past: Museums and Heritage in 
the Postmodern World, in which he speaks not only of a transformation 
of certain spaces (in terms of aestheticisation), but also of the past. 
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Heritagisation involves an ahistoric aestheticisation of the past, which 
as a result has only ‘few local associations or affiliations’. Still referring 
to heritagisation in spatial terms, he also includes temporal (‘past’), 
representational (‘aesthetics’), and constituency (‘community’) 
dimensions in his discussion.
To my knowledge, the spatial connotation of heritagisation in terms 
of heritage sites remained dominant — if poorly elaborated — until 
Regina Bendix published ‘Heritage Between Economy and Politics: 
An  Assessment from the Perspective of Cultural Anthropology’ 
(Bendix  2009). Although refraining from a strict definition, Bendix 
offered the most comprehensive treatment of heritagisation to 
date, based on the intuitive notion that it refers to the elevation of 
particular objects (art, monuments, landscapes, memorial sites) and 
practices (performances, music, rituals, and related cultural practices 
and memories) to the status of heritage as something to be consciously 
preserved for present and future generations. This process is necessarily 
selective, as not all cultural memory will gain this status. Her work is 
not only interesting in that she explicitly includes intangible cultural 
heritage in her discussion, but also because she points to some of 
the necessary transformations brought about by the canonisation 
of certain places and practices as heritage: the strategic invocation of 
tradition and authenticity; the projection of identity and cultivation 
of symbolic capital; the contestation of heritage values; and the 
symbolic work of marketing. Bendix also notes that the temporal and 
social axes of heritagisation move closer together. Along the temporal 
axis, whereas in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries only 
historical sites referring to a distant past were seen as heritage, these 
days contemporary phenomena such as industrial heritage, digital 
archives, and, indeed, intangible cultural heritage are seen as worthy 
of heritage recognition. Along the social axis, whereas past heritage 
practice focused on elite structures (temples, royal compounds), now 
labour class and ethnic minority cultural practices could officially be 
labelled heritage. As cultural heritage becomes an object inviting or 
requiring action from society, the economy and politics, heritagisation 
involves not only a process of canonisation (or ‘ennobling’) of cultural 
practice, but also of its instrumentalisation. Bendix specifically 
mentions competition and quality control through evaluation 
(Bendix 2009). 
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In this connection I would like to mention two other recent essays 
that are relevant for this topic. In ‘World Heritage and Cultural 
Economics’, Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (2006) discusses some of 
the paradoxes underlying the global ‘world heritage’ programme, 
in the sense that especially intangible cultural heritage is on the one 
hand unique — and uniquely tied to a particular group or community 
of people — and on the other hand universal — in the sense of a 
heritage for humanity, to be mediated and managed by the nation. 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett does not use the term heritagisation, but rather 
the term metacultural operation, which similarly involves codification 
practices and the development of ‘universal standards [that] obscure 
the historically and culturally specific character of heritage policy and 
practices’ (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2006:19). Distinguishing between 
tangible cultural heritage dealing with objects, and intangible 
cultural heritage dealing with living subjects, often ethnic minorities, 
she then asserts that such cultural subjects — the ‘culture carriers’ of 
UNESCO — are bearers of cultural rights, as a subset of the universal 
human rights. But  where culture becomes evaluated, valued and 
valuable, these rights are in jeopardy, as their valuation — the value 
that these people attach to their heritage — becomes entangled with 
the cultural, historical or artistic valorisation by outside experts 
and, ultimately, the (potential) economic value in terms of cultural 
economics, especially tourism.
In ‘Indigenous Cultural Heritage in Development and Trade: 
Perspectives from the Dynamics of Cultural Heritage Law and Policy’, 
Rosemary Coombe and Joseph Turcotte discuss the ICH regime 
from the vantage point of international law, trade and property. 
They assert that:
The new emphasis on inventorising ICH, reifying it, assigning 
appropriate caretakers for it, and investing in capacity-building to 
develop local expertise, arguably constitutes a new regime of power 
which poses both promise and peril for the local communities and 
indigenous peoples deemed to bear the distinctive culture that these 
new regimes seek to value. (Coombe and Turcotte 2012:304)
In other words, because of the entanglement of different systems of 
valuation — by practitioners, cultural experts, state officials, and 
markets — at different levels (local, national, transnational, and 
international), ICH recognition can be a mixed blessing for those 
communities that are ‘bearers’ — but perhaps no longer ‘owners’ — 
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of the cultural practice deemed intangible heritage. These connections 
between culture — including cultural heritage — and possessive 
(individual, collective and/or indigenous) subjects who claim rights 
over or property of cultural ‘objects’ have been studied critically and 
comprehensively by Rosemary Coombe in a series of books and articles 
(Coombe 1998, 2005, 2009, 2011a, 2011b, 2013). The combined effect 
of these studies is to denaturalise both (cultural) subject and (cultural) 
object by treating these as constituted by their mutual connection; the 
discursive, practical and performative aspects of these connections — 
as claims, rights, identifications, etc. — allow Coombe to persistently 
question and politicise such relations.
Summing up, we can see that during the last decade the concept 
of heritagisation made headway, amongst others in critical heritage 
studies (for example, Smith 2006) and in the burgeoning anthropology 
of heritage (for example, Bendix 2009). In French scholarship, the 
notion of patrimonialisation is more common than heritagisation in 
English (Isnart 2012; Mauz 2012), which in its most bare-bones meaning 
refers to the making of heritage where such claims have been absent 
in the past, with reference to natural or cultural landscapes, objects 
like monuments, or particular practices and forms of knowledge. Such 
places, objects, practices, and knowledge may have been considered 
as part of a particular legacy by a group of people, carried over from 
one generation to the other, but the label of heritage does something 
different. Heritage involves claims by others for recognition of such 
legacy having extraordinary value which may be local, national or 
global — or, more often, all at the same time. In other words, the label 
of heritage assigns certain value to places, things, and practices. In the 
contemporary world, heritage claims invariably bring in cultural experts 
outside and beyond the local population to assess and evaluate the 
heritage values of the places, things, or practices under consideration. 
And heritage claims invariably bring in the state as the arbiter, 
guarantor, and protector of heritage. The global model for heritage 
practices is given by UNESCO, which assigns special responsibilities 
to the state, even though such heritage is often not always seen as 
representative of that state, but of particular localised ‘communities’. 
As pointed out in countless studies, heritagisation brings in not just 
the state, but also the market, as the label of heritage — especially, but 
not exclusively, World Heritage — functions as a certification label and 
hence as a brand name in domestic and international tourist markets. 
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In fact, states — both national governments and local authorities — 
are often motivated by ideas of prestige but also of economic gain 
by capitalising on the heritage label. In other words, the value of 
heritage is not simply cultural or intangible, but financial as well, 
suggesting a process of commoditisation in spite of all professions of 
disinterestedness (cf. Coombe 2005, 2009, 2013). In the next section, 
I investigate the emergence of the concept, discourse, and practice of 
intangible cultural heritage in Vietnam.
Intangible Cultural Heritage in Vietnam
The term ‘Intangible Cultural Heritage’3 was introduced in Vietnam 
by UNESCO, which in 1994 sponsored two back-to-back ‘expert 
meetings’ in Vietnam on the intangible cultural heritage of ethnic 
minorities and the culture of the imperial city of Huế. I was invited to 
participate in an ‘International Expert Meeting for the Safeguarding 
and Promotion of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Minority Groups 
in Việt Nam’ (Hà Nội, March 1994), and became the rapporteur for 
the meeting and editor of the resulting volume (Salemink 2001).4 
ICH was then a new concept within UNESCO, and was very much in 
line with the Lévi-Straussian concept of culture long dominant within 
UNESCO (Eriksen 2001; see also Arizpe 1998).5 A new subdivision for 
3  According to the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 
the intangible cultural heritage — or living heritage — is the mainspring of our cultural diversity 
and its maintenance a guarantee for continuing creativity. The convention states that the ICH is 
manifested, among others, in the following domains: oral traditions and expressions (including 
language as a vehicle of the intangible cultural heritage); performing arts (such as traditional 
music, dance and theatre); social practices, rituals and festive events; knowledge and practices 
concerning nature and the universe; and traditional craftsmanship. The 2003 convention defines 
ICH as the practices, representations and expressions, as well as the knowledge and skills, that 
communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognise as part of their cultural heritage 
(see www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?pg=00002, accessed 11 August 2008).
4  Subsequently, I was involved in cultural heritage work as editor of a UNESCO volume 
on Vietnam’s minorities; as grantmaker on behalf of the Ford Foundation; as participant in 
international workshops on the ‘Gong cultural space’ intangible heritage in Pleiku (2009) and on 
the Hung Kings in Phú Thọ (2011); and as advisor for the UNESCO-sponsored research project 
on ‘Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage and Development in Vietnam’ carried out by GS 
Lê Hồng Lý, TS Nguyễn Thị Hiền, TS Ðào Thế Ðức, and TS Hòang Cầm under the auspices of GS 
Nguyễn Chí Bền of VICAS (2012). 
5  Claude Lévi-Strauss (b. 1908) was a very influential French anthropologist whose work 
on cultural diversity formed the philosophical basis for much subsequent ‘urgent’ or ‘salvage’ 
anthropology which aimed to record and, if possible, save ‘cultures’ before they became ‘extinct’ 
(i.e. changed), a practice for which the concept of intangible cultural heritage was intended to 
give legitimacy.
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intangible cultural heritage was established in Paris, largely funded 
by Japan and staffed by Japanese officials (Ms Noriko Aikawa was the 
Director of the Intangible Cultural Heritage section of UNESCO during 
those years). At the time, the (linguistic/anthropological) notion of 
intangible cultural heritage constituted an experimental departure 
from the established (historical/archaeological) practice of heritage 
conservation focusing on material objects.6
The interest in ICH in Vietnam only caught on, however, after the 
official UNESCO recognition of a growing number of world heritage sites 
resulted in a phenomenal boost in tourist visits and in national pride.7 
From 2003 onward, nine ‘elements’ — in the terms of UNESCO — 
from Vietnam were inscribed on the Intangible Cultural Heritage List. 
I have argued elsewhere that the process of claiming and recognising 
heritage status in Vietnam is a political process at various overlapping 
and interacting ‘levels’, involving local political ambitions within a 
national context, as well as national political and cultural interests in 
an international arena. This process invokes the artistic and academic 
authority of national and transnational ‘experts’, and results in the 
appropriation and the uses of ‘intangible cultural heritage’ in the 
Vietnamese context, with reference to local, national-level, regional, 
and international political discourses (Salemink 2007 and 2013a; 
see also Smith 2006; Thaveeporn 2003). Locally, heritage claims can 
be interpreted as a way to respond to certain political demands or 
— alternatively — to seek the promotion of a region. Nationally, the 
politics of heritage help establish political legitimacy for Vietnam’s 
capitalist orientation under a Communist Party. Internationally, 
UNESCO recognition puts Vietnam on the global radar screen as 
an old civilisation and venerable culture. In this policy process, 
the Vietnamese state does not act as a monolithic entity but rather 
constitutes an arena of contestation in which conflicting interests 
are played out and resolved; still, the outcome of these contestations 
inevitably integrates perceived national interests into one discursive 
frame, namely that of an ‘authorised heritage discourse’ (cf. Smith 
2006; see below) which frames (local) heritage as national. 
6  I do not discuss natural heritage in this chapter, because the effects of nature conservation on 
local populations (relegated to ‘bufferzones’) have been analysed abundantly (see, for example, 
Büscher 2013).
7  In 2010, the Imperial Citadel of Thăng Long was added to the list, and in 2011 the 
Hồ Dynasty Citadel. In 2014, the Tràng An karst landscape was inscribed.
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A recent report commissioned by UNESCO Vietnam suggested that 
the label of heritage is a double-edged sword; based on field research 
in four heritage sites in Vietnam, the authors speak about selective 
preservation, invention of tradition (with reference to the saying 
‘bỏ cũ, xây mới’ (‘abandon the old, build new’)), and theatricalisation 
of cultural practice — something that is connected to the spectacular 
quality of heritage. Sometimes heritage status does bring good results 
in terms of preservation, ownership, management, and benefit sharing 
— as reported for Hội An — but often it leads to the disenfranchisement 
of local communities. And the concept of heritagisation shows that this 
latter aspect is perhaps inevitable, as the label of heritage — certainly 
of UNESCO World Heritage — turns what was once simply a  local 
cultural practice into a site of outside intervention and policing: 
once their cultural practice is canonised as heritage, local people are 
no longer in exclusive control of that cultural practice which they 
largely organised and managed on their own in the past. Instead, local 
and national authorities, UNESCO officials, cultural experts, tourism 
developers, and larger, outside publics become ‘stakeholders’ in the 
process of evaluation, validation, and valorisation (Lê Hồng Lý et al. 
2012; see also Lê Hồng Lý and Nguyễn Thị Phương Châm 2014). In the 
next sections I will focus on the ‘Space of Gong Culture’ in the Central 
Highlands as ICH.
The ‘Space of Gong Culture’
In 2005, the ‘Space of Gong Culture’ (không gian văn hóa cồng chiêng) 
of ethnic minorities of Vietnam’s Central Highlands was proclaimed a 
‘Masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity’, and 
after the ratification of the International Convention on Intangible 
Cultural Heritage in 2008 it was transferred to the new ICH List of 
‘Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding’. 
The gong music that accompanies ritual events such as funerals and 
other life cycle rituals, as well as agricultural rituals and feasts among 
the ethnic minority groups in Vietnam’s Central Highlands (and among 
similar ethnic groups across Vietnam’s borders and ethnic groups 
in mountainous parts of coastal provinces), is undeniably special. 
The  clear ringing sounds of the gongs, the beautiful melodies, and 
the intricate shifting rhythms act to mesmerise, bringing the listener 
or dancer into a state of trance. The comparison with Indonesia’s rich 
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local — both folk and court — traditions of gamelan music has often 
been made, but in Vietnam each gong in the carefully tuned set is 
held up and struck by a separate person, in tune and in rhythm with 
each other. 
Although beautiful and entrancing, this ritual music is deemed to be 
under threat. It is slowly disappearing from everyday ritual life in 
Vietnam’s Central Highlands. The older generation does not always 
pass on the skill to the younger generation, who may have lost their 
interest in the music, turning to modern music instead. Children go 
to school and learn to read, write and calculate in a future-oriented 
expectation to become modern citizens rather than peasants living by 
the rhythm of the passing seasons, attuned to the spirits surrounding 
them, and following in the footsteps of their ancestors before them. 
Children might no longer pass their evenings sitting around the 
hearth and listening to the old folks telling their stories — perhaps 
one of the famous epics of their group — but they might be sitting 
around the television, looking at Korean soap operas and Vietnamese 
or Western pop music. The rapid disappearance of gong ritual music 
from everyday life in the Central Highlands constituted the motivation 
for UNESCO to adopt this practice as one of the first projects in its 
intangible cultural heritage campaign (cf. Salemink 2001).
But gong music is also on the way out because the precious gong sets 
are disappearing, like so many other cultural or artistic objects that 
were once prized and used in the Central Highlands — and among 
highland minorities and Kinh people too. Since the first time I came 
to the Central Highlands in 1991, I have been offered gong sets for 
sale, as well as antique jars or other prize items. I have never taken up 
these offers, but I do know that many collectors, traders, and tourists 
— both Vietnamese and foreign — are eager to buy such items at low 
prices. I have noticed that upon returning to the Highlands after an 
absence of years, people no longer had possession of such items, even 
if these were family heirlooms. Sometimes sold, sometimes extorted 
during times of hardship in return for some money or rice, sometimes 
even stolen: outside various Highlands villages I have been shown 
graveyards from where famous grave statues had been stolen, to 
end up in boutiques in Hà Nội or Hồ Chí Minh City and eventually 
in overseas ‘exotic art’ and ethnographica shops and collections. 
Here, the UNESCO validation of the cultural or artistic value of gong 
music for humankind translates ironically into enhanced commercial 
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value of the cultural objects (musical instruments, statues, traditional 
woven fabrics) connected with the gong culture and a consequent 
dispossession of these artefacts.
In other words, gong ritual music — or more broadly, ‘gong culture’, 
in UNESCO jargon — does not exist in a vacuum. There is always 
a wider ecological, economic, social, political, cultural and religious 
context in which such music is being practiced, performed, and 
passed on to younger generations, and in which this music obtains its 
meaning for players and audiences. This broader context is captured 
in the word ‘space’ in the ‘Space of Gong Culture’ which UNESCO aims 
to safeguard through its inscription in the World Intangible Cultural 
Heritage List. Thus, with the UNESCO proclamation of the Space of 
Gong Culture as part of the world’s intangible cultural heritage, two 
wide-ranging and diffuse concepts are combined to be safeguarded: 
‘space’ and ‘culture’. Both these terms, however, are not self-evident, 
not immediately clear, and highly contested in artistic, academic, 
and public debates. Moreover, depending on how it is defined, 
safeguarding the Space of Gong Culture seems like a formidable, 
perhaps impossible task, amid the rapid change enveloping Vietnam, 
especially the Central Highlands. In the following paragraphs, I seek 
to unpack both terms, ‘culture’ and ‘space’.
When investigating the Space of Gong Culture, it is necessary to 
have a clear concept of what we mean by ‘culture’. The work of 
‘safeguarding’ implies keeping things — objects, spaces, practices, 
meanings, environments – as they are, for use, display or performance 
in the future. The backdrop to this endeavour is the assumption that 
the work of time changes these ‘things’, and this change threatens 
to make these things disappear, or at least to reduce or dilute them. 
Thus, the work of safeguarding presupposes an opposition between 
tradition and modernity, whereby the traditional cultures of ethnic 
groups are thought to be replaced by a modern, more or less global 
culture. According to this analysis, traditional culture is gradually 
or rapidly disappearing, and the responsibility of scientists such 
as professional anthropologists and other scholars would be to 
describe and create a record of what belongs to this culture and what 
is characteristic of this culture. But once a ‘traditional culture’ has 
been described and authenticated through this kind of ethnographic 
research, any social and cultural change can only be conceived of as a 
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dilution of this authentic, traditional culture. Thus, safeguarding the 
threatened cultural heritage of minority groups becomes an essentially 
conservative operation of trying to stop the work of time.
The problem with this view of culture is that it reifies and essentialises 
culture. Culture is seen as a collection of ‘things’ or attributes containing 
essential characteristics of a particular ethnic group. The classic 
definitions of culture by early anthropologists, such as Edward Tylor 
(1871), describe culture as a sum of things that pertain to a particular 
group of people — a ‘tribe’, nation, or ethnic group. This view of culture 
corresponds with the style of the ‘holistic’ ethnographic monograph 
that was predominant for a long time. Usually, such monographs 
contained chapters on environment, livelihood and material culture, 
on kinship, on religion and rituals, and on leadership and (non-state) 
politics, in an attempt to speak exhaustively and authoritatively about 
the ‘whole’ culture. Based on research in one or a few villages of a 
‘whole’ group, the author would claim the authority to speak not just 
of the culture of village ‘X’ but of the culture of group (tribe, clan, 
ethnie) ‘Y’. In the past, such an author would exclude references to the 
incorporation of such groups into wider networks of state and market 
which emerged in the colonial and postcolonial contexts, and which 
made such anthropological research possible and imperative at the 
same time. And although the field research would usually be limited 
to one or two years, the style of ethnographic description would cut 
out the work of time by employing the ‘ethnographic present’, as if 
the practices observed and described were unchanging and timeless. 
Hence, safeguarding ‘culture’ would almost imply the stopping of 
time, or at least the reification and ossification of certain cultural 
objects and practices as museum pieces, to be shielded from the work 
of time. 
In other words, although research provides only a local and temporal 
snapshot, in his or her reports and publications the researcher would 
implicitly claim that the locally specific observations represented a 
whole group, and that the temporally specific observations stood for 
an unchanging tradition — both in combination denoting the culture 
of group ‘Y’. It is this notion of culture which seems to dominate the 
conceptualisation of culture by UNESCO — the embodiment of global 
cultural politics — which since the 1980s has consistently celebrated 
and endeavoured to protect the world’s cultural diversity. This is 
clearly illustrated by the debates surrounding the authoritative 1995 
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UNESCO report entitled ‘Our Creative Diversity’ which had been 
prepared by the World Commission on Culture and Development. 
This report triggered condemnation from anthropologists, who 
criticised the inconsistent but often essentialist definition of culture 
underpinning the report and its recommendations (Wright 1998; 
Arizpe 1998; Eriksen 2001). In contrast with UNESCO’s static and 
essentialist view of culture, most present-day anthropologists and 
cultural scholars worldwide see ‘culture’ not as a bounded collection 
of ‘things’ connected with a clearly delineated ethnic group, but as an 
ever-changing process with fuzzy boundaries. Thomas Hylland Eriksen 
(2001) traced the Lévi-Straussian notion of cultures (plural) as isolated 
islands in the UNESCO Commission’s discourse. Eriksen observed 
the tendency to link ‘culture’ to ‘indigeneity’, and emphasised the 
problematic tension between universal concepts of individual rights 
and communitarian notions of rights implied in culture as necessarily 
collective, localised, and hence exclusive. This tension can also be 
seen in the history of cultural claims and rights in Vietnam’s Central 
Highlands — the designated space for gong culture — as I argued in 
2006 (Salemink 2006). 
But for gong music in the Central Highlands, the concept of ‘space’ 
was wedded to ‘culture’, thus making the arena of safeguarding and 
intervention even more fuzzy. The concept of ‘space’ may refer to the 
‘cultural space’ in which ritual gong music and dance is enacted and 
is meaningful because it refers to the larger context from and in which 
gong ritual music obtains its meaning for the diverse local communities 
where it developed. Throughout the Central Highlands, Gong 
ensembles play a role in various rituals and public ceremonies that 
were closely linked to daily life and the cycle of the seasons. Thus the 
Space of Gong Culture, the variety of ethnic groups represented within 
that culture, and the continued participation of community members 
in gong ensembles is very different from, say, the more restricted 
contexts and audiences of Huếst nhã nhạc court music. The Space of 
Gong Culture thus encompasses a musical genre, born in the ritual life 
of highland communities, usually tied to seasonal (agricultural) and 
life cycles. Developed in a diversity of customs and ritual contexts, 
gong culture is congruent with the linguistic and ethnic diversity 
of the region. The instruments themselves, made from a mixture of 
bronze and silver, are not cast by highland people but purchased from 
long-distance traders and produced in far-away regions. 
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Writing about the UNESCO concept of ‘cultural landscape’, which 
combines a spatial category with the adjective ‘cultural’, Rosemary 
Coombe states: 
the addition of the category of cultural landscape to the World 
Heritage List in 1992 was crucial for legitimating the heritage of local 
communities and indigenous peoples … that later became formalised 
in the ICH Convention and that has arguably spread as a norm of 
customary international law into international heritage protection 
policy more generally. (Coombe 2013:377) 
It may have been the intention of some UNESCO staff at the time 
to contextualise gong ritual music in its wider cultural and spatial 
settings,8 but this worked out differently in the Central Highlands. 
After all, ‘space’ may have different meanings from ‘cultural space’ 
alone. For starters, ‘space’ has a clear geographic connotation, as it 
circumscribes the places where the cultural practices are supposed 
to take place. This spatial circumscription refers to the Tây Nguyên 
region, currently made up of the five provinces of Kontum, Gialai, Ðắk 
Lắk, Ðắk Nông, and Lâm Ðồng. In that sense, it is also a political space, 
denoting the five administrative units now making up the Tây Nguyên 
region of Vietnam. It leaves out the upland districts in surrounding 
coastal provinces where the same or similar ethnic minorities live with 
similar gong musical practices, and it leaves out regions in Cambodia 
and Laos with ethnic groups that are equally similar or the same, 
but living across the Vietnamese border. The political character of 
the ‘gong space’ is also brought out by the fact that Tây Nguyên is 
an integral part of Vietnam’s national territory, with the Vietnamese 
Government filing the dossier for UNESCO inscription and ultimately 
responsible for safeguarding this heritage. 
But ‘space’ refers also to the ecological, economic, and social space 
that forms the context for gong culture, along with myriad other 
cultural practices, and as a subtext and context to the cultural space of 
gong culture, the ecological, economic, political, and social space 
are changing extremely quickly. In other words, the Space of Gong 
Culture is predicated on the changing landscape of Tây Nguyên. 
Rather than being bounded, both ‘space’ and ‘culture’ in the ‘Space 
of Gong Culture’ are fluid categories, reminiscent of the changing and 
8  Personal communication, Dr Frank Proschan.
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changeable ‘scapes’ (technoscape, financescape, ideoscape, ethnoscape, 
mediascape) by which Arjun Appadurai (1996) denoted the processes 
of change, interaction, migration, blurring, and hybridisation that 
influence lifeworlds as a consequence of global flows. In the next 
section, I briefly indicate — rather than describe and analyse — the 
social and economic changes that contextualise and influence gong 
culture in Tây Nguyên.
Changing the Tây Nguyên Cultural 
Landscape 
While ‘space’ refers to the multifaceted landscape where gong 
culture is located, efforts at safeguarding are taking place against 
a background of displacement, loss, and dispossession that have 
drastically affected the lifeworlds of these communities. Cultural 
transmission was severely disrupted during almost four decades of 
intermittent warfare (1942–79), resettlement and defoliation. These 
disruptions continued into the period of socialist modernisation, 
which brought further resettlement in the name of modernity, but 
have accelerated as the Central Highlands have been rapidly drawn 
into global economic and cultural circuits. For example, Vietnam’s 
Tây Nguyên almost overnight became a hotspot of globalisation, 
producing much of the world’s coffee, tea, pepper, cashew, and rubber 
in smaller or larger commercial farms. While this changed the physical 
(ecological, economic, infrastructure) landscape, the demographic, 
social, and cultural landscape was changed almost beyond recognition. 
Lacking the space to venture into much ethnographic detail here, 
I propose an analysis of the current situation with emphasis on the 
post-1975 period, in particular, on the market reform period known 
as đổi mới, or ‘renovation’. After a period of socialist collectivism, the 
market reforms have resulted in rapid capitalist development and high 
economic growth in much of Vietnam, including Vietnam’s Central 
Highlands. Simultaneously, the introduction of market reforms in 
the late 1980s often had dire consequences for the indigenous ethnic 
minority groups who regard the region as their ‘ancestral domain’ and 
who embody the gong culture. In this section, then, I shall briefly 
indicate recent developments in Vietnam’s Central Highlands in 
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terms of a process of multidimensional transformation of the physical 
environment, of the economic system, of the religious beliefs and 
practices, and of subjectivities.9
From a marginal region in 1975, with a majority of the (indigenous) 
population engaging in subsistence farming through clan- or village-
based rotational swidden cultivation and some trade, in the first 
decade of the second millennium the Central Highlands became fully 
integrated into the world market as a major cash-crop producing region. 
In just 10 years it became the world’s second-largest coffee producing 
region, saturating the global coffee market with robusta coffee and 
causing a temporary worldwide slump in coffee prices. Vietnam’s 
Central Highlands are also among the world’s top three producers 
of rubber, pepper, and cashews. These cash-crop plantations and 
gardens were set up mostly by ethnic Việt lowlanders who migrated en 
masse to clear land and set up coffee gardens (now being diversified to 
include tea, pepper, rubber, cocoa, and cashews) in tracts of forest and 
savannah, or in old swidden fields. At the same time, rivers valleys are 
used for hydropower projects, while remaining forests with economic 
or ecological value are designated as national parks, nature reserves, 
or protected forests. More recent developments promise even more 
sudden, incisive and disruptive transformations to the Space of Gong 
Culture as part of the Central Highlands are presently transformed 
into a ‘bauxite space’ of strip mining, which is highly detrimental to 
the local ethnic groups and hence to the ‘safeguarding’ of the Space 
of Gong Culture. In other words, from a situation of low population 
density and more or less environmentally balanced rotational swidden 
cultivation embedded in managed forests, a massive environmental 
transformation has changed the face of the landscape and the nature of 
the natural resources through deforestation, zoning and exploitation 
of natural resources.
This environmental transformation is linked with a complete 
economic transformation predicated on concepts of private land 
ownership, on capital inputs, on technical know-how and on market 
access and individual calculation which are at odds with traditional 
subsistence-oriented agricultural and ritual practices predicated on 
collective — or at least communal — arrangements among indigenous 
9  The following sections are based on Salemink (1997, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2004).
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central highlanders. Whereas some lowlander in-migrants have 
become nouveau riche (and others went bankrupt in adverse market 
conditions), many indigenous communities and (extended) families 
have no use for the official division in forest land and agricultural land 
(a useless distinction for traditional swidden cultivators). Nor  does 
the concept of private land ownership (promoted through a land 
allocation program backed by western donors and big development 
banks) hold much promise for most highlanders, because the plots 
are too small for subsistence farming. They often lack the capital and 
knowledge to invest in cash-crops with long-term return — hence 
the frequent sale of official land titles by highlanders who then move 
deeper into the forest or become economically dependent on their in-
migrant neighbours (Salemink 1997).10 
Since 1975, many highlanders have abandoned their traditional 
community religions (often glossed as ‘animist’) which were highly 
localised in the sense that deities and spirits often housed in specific 
sites (mountains, rivers, forest groves, single trees or stones) in a 
‘Durkheimian’ sacralisation of the physical environment. With the 
transformation of the physical environment and its appropriation 
by outsiders without respect for its sacred nature, these localised 
religious beliefs and practices gradually lost their sacral character 
and significance along with the environment in which they acquired 
meaning. At the same time, changes in agricultural practices and in the 
(ethno-demographic) composition of the population rendered rituals 
progressively meaningless. On top of that, many rituals simply became 
too time- and resource-intensive, given the general environmental 
degradation and the economic impoverishment of the indigenous 
population. Faced with increasingly meaningless and burdensome 
rituals, many highlanders have abandoned their traditional religion and 
adopted a new one: Evangelical Christianity. Introduced and propagated 
without much success by American evangelical missionaries before 
1975, Evangelical Protestantism has become the existential safe haven 
of a large part of the indigenous population since the capitalist market 
reforms in the 1990s. This massive religious transformation sets them 
apart from the ethnic Việt lowlanders, but sacralises a new lifestyle 
imposed by the exigencies of capitalist development — austerity, 
10  This section is, of course, a generalisation, as the situation tends to vary according to 
locality and ethnic group. However, the occurrence of widespread unrest in February 2001 and 
April 2004 over issues of land ownership and religious freedom confirms this general analysis. 
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moderation, frugality, thrift, calculus, and individual responsibility 
— under the auspices of transnational modernity. And like the other 
transformations, this religious transformation cannot simply be rolled 
back or even stopped. 
The last type of transformation, then, concerns highlander 
subjectivities, or sense of personhood. During the ‘collectivist’ 
period of ‘socialist construction’ in reunified Vietnam (1975–85), the 
Communist Party attempted to create ‘New Socialist Person’ (Con người 
Xã hội chủ nghĩa Mới), who would be different from ‘Traditional 
Person’ in that the latter’s loyalties lay with the family, local group, 
and class, whereas ‘New Socialist Man’ would widen his horizon, 
subject his own desires to the goals of the state, and selflessly work 
to fulfil these goals. These attempts to create new socialist people 
were actively resisted, sabotaged or simply ignored in most parts of 
Vietnam, and certainly in the Central Highlands, where indigenous 
highlanders were singled out as primitive, backward, superstitious, 
or even reactionary. But the market reforms of the 1980s triggered the 
demise of ‘New Socialist Man’ and provoked the rise of a new type of 
person whom we might call ‘New Capitalist Man’, characterised by 
what Daniel Bell (1996) calls the ‘cultural contradictions of capitalism’. 
In the realm of production, capitalism puts a premium on (Weberian) 
frugality, calculus, and deferral of gratification. Whereas in the realm 
of consumption, capitalism promises immediate gratification of social, 
cultural, and economic desires (Bell 1996:54–76). 
In other words, capitalist culture thrives on the promise of absolute 
wealth and the hedonistic fulfilment of desire — the promise of 
finding paradise in consumption. Capitalism holds out the promise of 
an earthly paradise, but through consumption rather than production. 
Consumerism is not a concept that one would easily associate with 
Vietnam’s Central Highlands. Yet with integration into the global 
market, highlanders too are confronted with the imagery of wealth 
and consumption through the mass media, advertisement, tourism, 
and conspicuous lifestyles. They are now inescapably confronted 
with a new vision of modernity — a capitalist modernity, held up as a 
paradise in the making through consumption. I have never encountered 
anyone in Vietnam or elsewhere who did not wish to partake in the 
promises of material consumption, except for explicit religious 
reasons (in the narrow sense). But like transcendental religions, such 
as Buddhism or Christianity, capitalism requires a project of personal 
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transformation of the ‘reverse Weberian’ type. On a personal level, 
capitalist reforms are aimed at instilling a frugal, calculating and 
individualistic mentality — or, in the Vietnamese Central Highlands, 
turning clan-based and community-oriented subsistence farmers into 
individualistic agricultural entrepreneurs. Whether they continue 
to be farmers or day-wagers, they will be dependent on the market 
for their survival and thus have to conform to the exigencies of the 
market.
Central Highlanders Facing Intangible 
Cultural Heritage Practices
In this situation of wide-ranging ecological, economic, religious, 
and subjective transformations, the basis for community-based 
ritual life which UNESCO calls ‘gong culture’ is disappearing fast. 
In an economy that puts a premium on competitive individual — 
or at least household — performance, the community solidarity 
that underpinned  agricultural ritual is perennially under threat. 
With  livelihoods less and less based on the subsistence swidden 
agriculture of ‘eating the forest’ (cf. Condominas 1982), the cosmological 
environment as the context for ritual action ceases to have meaning, 
and the agricultural cycle changes with the new cash crops introduced. 
Many people lack the resources to invest in ritual, making them feel 
permanently in debt vis-à-vis their deities and hence at risk of hazard. 
In this situation, many highlanders opt for a new, more individualist 
and scripturalist religion with completely different liturgical ritual: 
Christianity. With the conversion to Christianity, the performance of 
gong music during life cycle rituals is no longer a matter of course, 
and is sometimes even actively condemned as ‘pagan’ by followers of 
the new religion. The cultural transmission of knowledge of ritual and 
gong music skills to younger generations is becoming difficult in this 
context.
While Christian highlanders condemn their ‘pagan’ past, the 
Vietnamese regime condemns highlander Christianity. In January 
2001 and April 2004, many highlanders demonstrated in some of the 
major towns in the Central Highlands such as Pleiku and Buôn Ma 
Thuột, as well as in some of the more remote districts such as Chu Xe in 
Gialai Province. Their demands concerned freedom of religion and land 
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rights, but were articulated overseas by the anti-communist diaspora 
organisation Montagnard Foundation as a call for ‘Dega’ autonomy 
— Dega being a new, politicised ethnonym for the indigenous groups 
of Vietnam’s Central Highlands. This putative association with Dega 
diaspora politics triggered a strong repression of highlander political 
and religious articulations. One of the frequently reported political 
responses were attempts by security personnel to force people to 
recant their Christian confession and to perform specific versions 
of ‘pagan’, non-Christian rituals — indeed, the very rituals that in 
the times of high socialism were branded backward, superstitious, 
unhygienic, and wasteful. I have discussed the dynamics of rights 
claims, protests, and repression elsewhere (cf. Salemink 2006); here 
I shall focus on Vietnam’s official response in terms of cultural politics. 
Just one month after the ‘first’ protest in 2001, Vietnam’s government 
gave the largest grant for social science research in its history — the 
equivalent of $1 million USD — for researching, collecting, recording, 
translating, analysing, and publishing the long epics of the Central 
Highlands. The project was managed and carried out by the Institute 
of Folk Culture Studies of the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, 
which over the years published well over 60 volumes of epics. The 
dossier for the UNESCO inscription of the Space of Gong Culture 
was prepared in 2004, right after the second protest during Easter 
2004. Just like the forced recantations of Christianity, the sudden 
conservationist cultural policies were predicated on religious and 
ritual practices that highlanders had already abandoned or were in 
the process of abandoning.
In other words, what was called (intangible) cultural heritage in the 
2000s, were religious concepts and cultural and ritual practices that 
had been condemned and suppressed by successive political regimes as 
backward and superstitious, and which had been rendered practically 
unsustainable by the disruptive ecological, economic, demographic, 
political, and cultural transformations in the Central Highlands. 
Given the deep politicisation of both Christian conversion and official 
cultural politics in Tây Nguyên, the label of heritage being given to 
largely abandoned cultural practices creates much tension within 
communities and between communities and state agencies. This is 
one of the dilemmas facing the gong practice among the Lạch group 
in Lâm Ðồng, as noted by the UNESCO report on ‘Safeguarding and 
Promoting Cultural Heritage against the Backdrop of Modernization’ 
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(Lê Hồng Lý et al. 2012). Many Christians refused to play the gong, 
or even to possess a gong set, seeing it as an instrument of the devil. 
In places where an accommodation could be reached between Christian 
liturgy and gong music, the report found that the official predicate of 
‘heritage’ bestowed by the state or by UNESCO incited local actors or 
even national agencies to make investments or ‘improvements’ that 
contradict the idea of heritage preservation;11 that disenfranchise 
local communities who used to be in control of the cultural practice 
now dubbed heritage; and that privilege outside actors or interests 
(tourism, economic, political) which conceive of intangible cultural 
heritage as a spectacle.
This brings us back full circle to Guy Debord’s analysis of the Society 
of the Spectacle. In the case of ICH, people themselves become a 
spectacle, just like the celebrities analysed by Debord (1994) and 
Rosemary Coombe (1998); but where celebrities become individual 
brands, central highlanders become collectively branded through 
the validation and certification processes undertaken or overseen 
by UNESCO. In the case of gong culture, it is specific ritual labour 
which used to acquire meaning within the setting of a restricted ritual 
community — and perhaps a slightly wider but vernacular ritual 
constituency — but which becomes a spectacle validated by outside 
experts and consumed by outside audiences of officials and tourists. 
As a spectacle — but not a ritual — such ICH becomes spectacular 
in the sense that aesthetic and performative aspects are privileged 
over substantive signification as ritual. This spectacularisation of the 
practice is predicated on external notions of ‘improvement’ that seek 
to make the performance shorter, louder and wilder — often in a 
context of artistic competition.
I witnessed examples of the latter at the ‘International Conference on 
Economic and Social Changes and Preservation of the Gong Culture in 
Vietnam and the Southeast Asian Region’ in Pleiku, 9–11 November 
2009, which took place in the context of an international gong music 
festival organised by Vietnam’s Ministry of Culture, Sports and 
Tourism to celebrate the UNESCO inscription of the Space of Gong 
11  In the late 1990s, the former director of the Huế Monuments Conservation Centre, Mr Thái 
Công Nguyên, showed me how he shortened the nhã nhạc court music scores, which in their 
original form were too long and hence ‘boring’ to watch by tourists. He conceived of that as an 
improvement. (I could give many examples of such improvements.)
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Culture one year earlier. The opening ceremony was a loud, pompous, 
mass-mediated performance choreographed by Vice-Minister and 
People’s Artist Lê Tiến Thọ, in which a swirling mass of hundreds of 
dancers, musicians, and drummers as well as some elephants performed 
a mockery of the quiet ritual gong music for an audience of officials 
and guests, local people and — via television — the nation. But an 
opening ceremony is often a grandiose event, certainly in Vietnam, 
and hence not necessarily representative for — in this case — gong 
music itself. But the festival itself had the format of a competitive 
music meeting, in which more or less professional gong troupes from 
different ethnic groups, provinces, and even countries performed in 
a competitive atmosphere, inducing the troupes to perform in ever 
more spectacular fashion — often adding drums to the performance 
as well. In such a context, gong music becomes professionalised, 
meaning that it is entirely taken out of the ritual context of the village 
community and is performed by semi-professional artistic troupes for 
outside audiences. As I noticed in my paper to the conference, what 
was missing in this movement of cultural decontextualisation from 
the ritual community and recontextualisation in a tourist context was 
any attempt to recontextualise gong music in a different ritual context, 
namely of church liturgy.12 Highlander Christians and Vietnamese state 
officials seemed too suspicious of each other to allow that to happen 
— with some Bahnar Catholic groups the proverbial exception as they 
incorporated gong music into church liturgy.
This can be interpreted as an instance of possessive cultural 
nationalism (cf. Handler 1985, 1991; Coombe 1998) in the sense that 
a particular cultural object — in this case practice — is seen as the 
property not of an individual (for example, an author or an artist), 
but of a collective. Whereas UNESCO seeks to ascribe ownership of 
ICH to specific cultural groups, in practice, the cultural practices 
that go under the label of heritage become the property of the state, 
which assumes the responsibility to protect, preserve, and manage the 
heritage. In this case, the heritagisation of gong culture amounts to a 
process of large-scale cultural dispossession. This happens first of all 
because of the wholesale ecological, economic, demographic, cultural, 
and cosmological transformation of the Tây Nguyên landscape, which 
works as a classic movement of enclosure in Karl Marx’s sense of the 
12  I made a similar observation in Salemink (2009).
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term. Secondly, the state performs a mockery of highlander gong 
culture in which highlanders have no say and from which they are 
largely absent. Thirdly, to the extent that highlanders perform, they 
are turned into a spectacle, devoid of ritual meaning and dispossessed 
of the product of their ritual labour. And fourthly, highlanders are 
practically prevented from reintroducing gong music into their new 
liturgical rites and thus from recontextualising it into their own ritual 
communities. Although the state is not directly implicated in the loss 
(sale, theft) of cultural objects such as gong sets (see Van Dat 2009), 
this does happen with reference to other ICH in Vietnam, such as the 
Worship of the Hùng Kings. 
When I visited the Hùng King Festival in the 1990s, it was largely a local 
affair, organised by ritual leaders from villages surrounding the Nghĩa 
Linh mountain, for a ritual constituency consisting largely of local 
people from Phú Thọ Province — especially young people for whom 
this was an occasion for courting and dating. In the 2000s, the festival 
had become a large-scale affair: the ngày giỗ tổ Hùng Vương became a 
national holiday in Vietnam, marking the ‘origin of the nation’ before 
the historic Chinese occupation (but, ironically, it was the first national 
day to be calculated by the Sino-lunar calendar (ngày 10 tháng 3 âm 
lịch)). It attracted large crowds from all over Vietnam, but especially 
high-level political officials from Hà Nội and the province, who 
assumed leading ritual roles as well. When I attended the festival 
on 10–12 April 2011 — in connection with a campaign for UNESCO 
inscription — I visited some of the temples in the surrounding villages 
that had been responsible for part of the rituals and had kept some of 
the ritual objects in those temples. Not only had the local committees 
been deprived of their responsibilities, but also of some of the original 
objects. (In another case, the cultural authorities substituted the ‘old’ 
ritual objects for new ones in the rituals themselves, which meant that 
the temples could keep the original items but not use them anymore in 
the rituals.) Dispossessed of their ritual responsibilities, local villagers 
were still expected to show up at the festival, but more as props in a 
ritual choreography directed by outsiders. 
This blatant ritual dispossession found its match in another, involving 
dance troupes from the Central Highlands. The Hùng Dynasty 
coincided with the Ðồng Sơn bronze drum civilisation, which is 
claimed by Vietnam as well other countries and regions, such as Yunnan 
(cf. Han Xiaorong 1998, 2004), as its national cultural property. Given 
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the superficial resemblance of the iconography on the bronze drums 
with stereotypical styles and scenes in the Central Highlands, it is 
assumed that contemporary central highlanders are similar to proto-
Việt from the time of the Hùng Kings, and hence the contemporary 
ancestors of the Kinh (Salemink 2008:161–162). At any rate, such Tây 
Nguyên drum troupes are aesthetically convenient performers at the 
Hùng King Festival, but in this way they are denied coevalness with 
our times (cf. Fabian 1983) and locked up in an imagined past. They are 
robbed of their contemporaneity with us, which at once legitimises the 
dispossession of their distinctly un-modern cosmological landscape 
— characterised as irrational, unscientific and uneconomic — 
and legitimises the denial of their right to choose a modern religion. 
Conclusion: Connection and Disconnection, 
Incorporation and Dispossession
Heritagisation — understood in its minimal meaning, namely as 
branding of sites and cultural practices as heritage — is a worldwide 
process, and the last two decades have witnessed an upsurge in 
heritage practices. Much of that was led by the efforts of UNESCO, 
but as an inter-governmental organisation UNESCO is little more than 
the sum of its parts — the member states — which all have their own 
reasons to be engaged in heritage. Worldwide, heritagisation emerged 
simultaneously with neoliberal governmentality (see also Coombe 
2013); in Europe with the rise of identity politics against the backdrop 
of globalisation, immigration and EU expansion; and in Vietnam with 
its integration into the region and the global market. Paradoxically, 
this infatuation with the past — in the form of dead (monumental) 
or living (intangible) heritage — is a by-product of late modernity, 
as Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (2006) argues. Because the label 
of heritage connects localities with nationally and internationally 
‘authorised heritage discourses’ (cf. Smith 2006), the process of 
heritagisation is fraught with paradoxes, especially with reference to 
intangible cultural heritage.
Intangible cultural heritage denotes living culture, but simultaneously 
reifies and objectifies it. It embraces the local communities (‘culture 
bearers’), but leaves the evaluation and valuation process to outside 
experts and agencies, with reference to global rather than local 
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cultural standards. It instrumentalises cultural practices because it 
usually suits the agendas of outsiders — intellectuals and cultural 
experts, local authorities, national governments — to recognise certain 
such practices as cultural heritage. It turns cultural practices and the 
people involved in those into spectacles, and hence into sites of outside 
intervention, assessment and accountability. It creates a new, bigger 
— national or international — public for cultural practices that might 
once have been reserved for their own community, often in the form of 
heritage tourism. It changes the environment of heritage practices by 
allowing that outside public — in the guise of tourists, state officials, 
experts, researchers and media — to come and see (or hear, smell, 
feel) these heritage practices. It generates economic benefits in the 
world’s largest economic sector — tourism, of which heritage tourism 
is an important part (cf. Hitchcock et al. 2010) — that are necessary 
to maintain the cultural practice in changing circumstances but that 
might not be shared with the community (even though all ritual 
practice requires material investment). Heritagisation — at World 
Heritage, Intangible Cultural Heritage, and state levels — celebrates 
the local, the unique, the specific, and the authentic, but brings in 
the global, which — according to UNESCO — is the major threat to 
cultural diversity. In order to combat some of the perceived negative 
effects of globalisation, more globalisation is called forth, and local 
communities are subjected to outside gazes and interventions. 
Heritagisation — especially of ‘intangible culture’ or ‘living’ 
cultural practices — turns the ‘culture bearers’ into spectacles, while 
dispossessing them of their ownership over their cultural objects and 
lives. First, as Guy Debord intimated, the spectacularisation of places, 
objects, people, and their practices (which is inherent to heritagisation) 
is predicated on a representational alienation — a disconnection 
between self and image — which is the price for connecting one 
image — as spectacle — to larger, state- and market-dominated 
arenas. Second, temporally speaking, the attraction of heritage lies 
in its claim to represent the past and to point the way towards the 
future, as I have argued elsewhere (Salemink 2014). Heritagisation, 
then, constitutes an appropriation of the past — often in the form of 
narrative monopolisation — and thus an attempt to control the future 
by certain elites at the expense of other (alienated) groups that become 
disconnected from the present and the future through the portrayal of 
them as the ‘living past’. Third, spatial connections and disconnections 
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occur when state- and market-operated incorporations of heritage 
sites, objects, people and practices link spatially marginal people to 
central agents and agencies that articulate an ‘authorised heritage 
discourse’ (cf. Smith 2006) which marginalises the people living close 
to, or embodying, the heritage. Finally, in terms of a class analysis, 
heritagisation — as suggested through my reading of the work by Guy 
Debord — constitutes a form of separation and hence alienation of the 
cultural sites, objects, practices, and knowledge from the people who 
produced, managed, or embodied these products of their ritual labour. 
Paraphrasing David Harvey (2005), heritagisation can be interpreted 
as another form of accumulation by dispossession in a neoliberalising 
world that attributes financial value, commoditises and commercialises 
everything. While connected to a national and global cultural market, 
UNESCO’s ‘culture bearers’ become disconnected from their culture 
turned spectacle. 
Paradoxically, heritagisation comes at the price of local disconnection 
from the cultural site, object, or practice that is officially labelled 
cultural heritage. The spectacularisation of culture that is intrinsic to 
the label of ‘Intangible Cultural Heritage’ separates local communities 
from their cultural practices, as other players — cultural experts and 
scientists, state agencies, tourist companies — effectively take over the 
management and organisation of the heritage for their own benefit. 
These communities are effectively disenfranchised from the legacy 
that they have formed over years of ritual labour. Thus, movements of 
connection and disconnection operate simultaneously or consecutively 
at different levels. In other words, the description and inscription of 
heritage sites, objects and practices result in the writing off of the 
constituent communities as viable and reliable cultural agents.
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Geographies of Connection 
and Disconnection: Narratives 
of Seafaring in Lý Sơn
Edyta Roszko
An unexpected sea breeze coming from the north on a Friday 
morning in June 2014 promised a bit of respite from the heat on Lý 
Sơn Island, located about 30 kilometres offshore from Quảng Ngãi 
Province in Vietnam and 123 nautical miles (ca. 228 km) from the 
Paracel Archipelago.1 Every Friday and Saturday, I sipped my morning 
coffee in one of the local café shops near the port, updated myself 
on village affairs, and observed the stream of Vietnamese tourists 
flowing from the ship onto the seashore. Most of them were taken 
by cars to newly built hotels and small guesthouses that quickly 
filled up with organised tour groups, mainly from Hà Nô ̣i and Hô ̀ Chí 
Minh City. Due to China’s repeated confiscation of Lý Sơn’s fishing 
vessels and harassment of their fishermen, Lý Sơn Island had become 
1  The research for this chapter was funded by the People Programme (Marie Curie Actions) 
of the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under REA grant 
agreement no PIEF-GA-2012-326795. This paper is also partially based on a 12-month period 
of ethnographic fieldwork conducted in 2006–07 in Lý Sơn, which received financial support 
from the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle. The author also wishes to 
acknowledge support from the 2014 Vietnam Update organisers and particularly thanks Philip 
Taylor for his close reading and many invaluable comments that have greatly improved this 
chapter. Oscar Salemink, Li Tana, and the two anonymous readers also deserve special mention 
for their thoughtful comments on the chapter.
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a putative symbol of  ‘defending  sovereignty’ over the ‘East Sea’ 
— the Vietnamese name for the South China Sea (Roszko 2015) — 
and became a destination for tourists eager to show their solidarity 
with the islanders who bore the brunt of the defence of the nation’s 
sovereignty.
A group of eight women in their late 50s who I met that Friday serve 
as an example of a new style of patriotic tourism in coastal areas that 
has become increasingly popular among urban Vietnamese. This kind 
of tourism — which is both secular and ritual — involves travelling to 
the country’s islands in order to experience the sea environment, food, 
and patriotism through entertainment and commemorative activities 
in spaces designated and designed by the state for remembering. 
The eight retired correctional police officers (công an điều chỉnh) from 
Hà Nội, Nha Trang, Buôn Ma Tuô ̣t, and Pleiku arranged with Lý Sơn 
authorities to meet with selected ‘poor fishing families’ and award a 
small sum of money to children who had achieved high grades in the 
village school. Following a new patriotic slogan, ‘the whole Vietnamese 
nation turns to the sea’ (ca ̉ Việt Nam hướng về biển), these women told 
me that they considered Lý Sơn Island to be the ‘navel of the nation’ 
(rôn bao của cả nước Việt Nam) and wanted to express their solidarity 
with local fishermen, whose months-long detention by China had been 
widely covered in Vietnam’s national media. In Vietnam’s traditional 
conception of the human body, the ‘human body [is] a microcosmic 
reproduction of the vast dynamic forces at work in the universe’ 
(Marr 1987:28), and the navel is considered the centre of the body. By 
calling Lý Sơn Island the navel of the nation, the erstwhile ‘excentric’ 
island has become the imagined centre of the country’s geo-body. 
How could a marginal place such as Lý Sơn Island become the nation’s 
navel in so few years?
Introduction
Although there are historical records of the presence of Lý Sơn 
Islanders on the Paracels acting on behalf of a Vietnamese polity (see 
Lê Quý Ðơn 1972; Bô ̣ Ngoa ̣i Giao Uy ̉ Ban Biên Giới Quô ́c Gia 2013), 
the conflict with China over the South China Sea has opened up a 
new maritime frontier that did not exist before — at least not in the 
same manner. Back in 2006 when I carried out my doctoral fieldwork, 
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few people had heard about Lý Sơn, and I observed few Vietnamese 
or foreign tourists visiting the island. However, eight years later, 
the conflict over the Paracel (Hoàng Sa) and Spratly (Trường Sa) 
archipelagos, with repercussions at local, national, and international 
levels, had inscribed the island at the centre of Vietnam’s history 
and geography, and as the destination for thousands of Vietnamese 
tourists from all over the country. For many Vietnamese, the island 
was at the centre of a re-imagined map of the nation’s territory, which 
now included both the land and the sea. Considered as a historic and 
contemporary stepping stone to the far-flung Paracels, Lý Sơn found 
itself in the middle of Vietnam’s imagined maritime and territorial 
geo-body, as brought out, for instance, in iconographic depictions of 
Vietnam’s map in daily televised weather reports. Lý Sơn thus became 
a figurative cartographic navel of the national geo-body.
The reason for this discursive connection between Lý Sơn and 
the Paracels can be traced back to the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, and throughout the nineteenth century, when specific 
seafaring communities, including from Lý Sơn, were given the right 
to collect goods from wrecked ships in exchange for the best share of 
the spoils for Vietnam’s rulers, thus giving both rulers and fishermen 
a material stake in and presence on the Paracel islands (Wheeler 2006). 
This connection was formalised through the Hoàng Sa (Paracel) navy, 
which consisted of sailors recruited from Lý Sơn Island (Lê Quý Ðơn 
1972:210). Many of the Hoàng Sa sailors died at sea and their bodies 
were never returned to their relatives, giving rise to special ritual and 
memorial practices in Lý Sơn. 
In the context of tensions with China over competing claims over the 
South China Sea during the early 1990s, the Vietnamese State turned 
its attention towards Lý Sơn as a valuable source of information about 
the sailors of the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa navies (Roszko 2010). A few 
years later, it issued a directive establishing a memorial site for the 
two flotillas. Facing rival claims from China to sovereignty over the 
archipelagos, the Vietnamese Party-state chose to frame its strategy 
not in economic terms, but with reference to historical and emotional 
stories of Vietnamese sailors who had sacrificed their lives at sea. 
Through gradually revealed family genealogies which are expected to 
shed new light on Vietnam’s putative long-standing sovereignty in 
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the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, members of Lý Sơn lineages have 
worked hard to recentre their marginal(ised) locality on the imagined 
map of the national territory — this time including the sea. 
Historian Dian Murray (1988:4) points out that uninhabited islands 
constituted little concern for neo-Confucian states such as China or 
Vietnam, where sovereignty was typically defined in terms of human 
habitation and social organisation. According to this view, the Paracels 
and Spratlys were considered by Chinese and Vietnamese imperial 
governments as a maritime hazard for safe navigation rather than as an 
integrated part of national territory. This changed in postcolonial times. 
The colonial encounter had a transformative effect on many Asian 
states, which were pushed to recognise the need for creating their own 
national geo-body — both the territory and the nation — through 
mapping, and thus crafting an outline of the map as a national symbol 
(Winichakul 1994; Roszko 2015). The current conflict with China over 
the South China Sea evokes strong emotions in Vietnam, where many 
people assert feelings of affection for the ‘ancestral’ grounds of the 
— largely uninhabited and uninhabitable — islands and islets of the 
Hoàng Sa (Paracels) and Trường Sa (Spratlys). As I describe elsewhere, 
repeated Chinese seizure of Vietnamese vessels and the detention of Lý 
Sơn fishermen has been widely covered in Vietnam’s mass media in the 
last five years, adding fuel to an already heated mediated debate about 
the disputed archipelagos in the South China Sea (Roszko 2015). At the 
same time, by designating officially approved spaces for expressing 
feelings of national pride, the Vietnamese state uses all possible means 
to encourage Vietnamese people’s identification with the expansion 
of Vietnam’s territory to include the contested waters in the South 
China Sea. 
Against the backdrop of the South China Sea dispute, this chapter 
examines what kind of shift in subjectivities is required of Lý Sơn 
people to navigate the state’s project and new economic opportunities 
that have emerged with the growing national interest in the island’s 
historical and cultural heritage. How does the Lý Sơn community 
actively recentre itself on the imagined map of the nation’s geo-body 
in its desire to become part of the modern world? As I demonstrate, 
people in nationally significant sites such as this have their own 
agendas and interpretations of history that favour local identities 
over all-embracing state visions (O’Connor 2003:271). In order to 
capture these processes at work, I open my discussion by exploring 
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territorial imaginaries associated with ‘Vietnameseness’ and spiritual 
and hierarchical boundaries between two modes of life — farming 
and fishing. In the subsequent section, I focus on the islanders’ 
gradual marginalisation in post-revolutionary Vietnam and their 
various aspirations to break their provincial status as fishermen by 
claiming the identity of traders and explorers as a way of life. In the 
final section, I analyse how Lý Sơn villagers position themselves in 
the context of Vietnam’s novel rhetoric that redefines the country 
from a rice-growing culture to a maritime nation. Ultimately, I suggest 
that islanders seek to produce their own version of locality against 
the backdrop of the territorial dispute and their victimisation by the 
Chinese coastguard, widely projected in the national media.
Territorial Imaginaries 
Colonial sources produced influential territorial imaginaries of 
Vietnam, centred on the terrestrial rice-growing Red River Delta as 
‘the cradle of Vietnamese civilisation’. This era is also the source of the 
cliché of the Vietnamese village as a politically autonomous, socially 
homogenous corporate community surrounded by a hedge and rice 
paddies (for example, Gourou 1936, 1940; McAlister and Mus 1970; 
Kleinen 1999). Moreover, the classic tripartite division of Vietnam 
into North, Centre, and South, metaphorically characterised by ‘“two 
rice baskets on a pole” — to describe the agrarian rich North and 
South held together by the poor but hard-working Centre’ is still alive 
in many historical accounts (Wheeler 2006:129–130). Keith Taylor 
(1998:971) has spoken against the ‘pan-Vietnamese village morphology’ 
that produces the hierarchy defined as ‘Vietnamese’ and points out 
different ways of acting Vietnamese that existed through space and 
time. Taylor’s (1998) critique of representations of Vietnamese history, 
culture, and territory as affirming unity and continuity is echoed in 
the work of Charles Wheeler (2006), Li Tana (2006) and John Whitmore 
(2006) and their attention to the coast. By conceptualising the littoral 
as a fluid rather than solid zone they offer a new perspective on 
Vietnamese society seen from the sea. Like the littoral, which is in a 
constant state of flux, this society must be seen as fluid and flexible as 
well (Pearson 1985, 2003).
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My own ethnographic work in coastal communities shows that 
potent intersections of religion, economy, politics, and ecology are 
particularly visible in such a contact zone where the state struggles 
to establish and increase its presence (Roszko 2011). The very idea 
of ‘Vietnameseness’ tends to underplay the regional, historical, and 
cultural differences, and to marginalise places such as Lý Sơn Island 
that are seen as representing an extreme, unusual, and unsettled 
situation that does not stand for the imagined Vietnamese territory and 
nation. The spatial marginality and ambivalence of such communities 
remains a major concern of the state, which tries to incorporate them 
through various cultural agendas and development programs, such as 
the already mentioned patriotic tourism. For instance, after several 
ports in China started to operate regular tours to the disputed Paracel 
archipelago, Vietnam’s Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 
responded by approving an ambitious project aiming to develop 
Vietnam ‘into a strong sea-based country, enriched by sea’ and protect 
national sovereignty.2 In the context of an imagined or real threat from 
China, many urban Vietnamese book tours to unpopular islands that 
were previously only loosely connected to the Vietnamese geo-body 
in order to — at least once in their life — experience the fatherland as 
seen from the sea.3 
In response to uneven access to education, healthcare, or basic 
infrastructure, along with China’s exclusionary claims on resources in 
the South China Sea, Lý Sơn people appropriate and capitalise on these 
national and geopolitical narratives in order to reproduce and relocate 
their locality in a desired way. The commemoration related to Hoàng 
Sa, which more recently has received the status of ‘national heritage’, 
provides the opportunity for Lý Sơn villagers to demonstrate the 
historical and communal value of their genealogies and temples, and 
reshape and redefine their local narratives and social identity beyond 
the category of fishermen. According to local family records (gia phả) 
the first 15 Việt families came from the mainland in 1609, divided land 
between them, and established two villages, An Hải and An Vĩnh, 
2  www.hanoitourist.com.vn/english/sea-travel/1817-sea-and-islands-a-driving-force-for-viet- 
nam-tourism-development, accessed 4 September 2015.
3  english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/travel/12151/marine--island-tours-chosen-to-show-patriotism.
html, accessed 4 September 2015.
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which nowadays form two communes.4 However, a source of anxiety 
for the islanders was the awareness that the Việt people on Lý Sơn 
Island were only the latest residents in a long history of settlement, 
and that archaeological evidence indicates that the Cham civilisation 
was present prior to the Việt arrival on Lý Sơn. Islanders assuaged 
such unsettled feelings by seeking to convey a sense of genealogical 
continuity with the mainland. During my conversations with the 
islanders, many of them betrayed a sense of awkwardness about the 
previous Cham presence, which is indisputable taking into account 
archaeological evidence. A Lý Sơn villager told me:
In the past, Bình Thuận was the place of origin for the Cham people 
but from there they spread to central parts entering Ðà Nẵng and 
Quảng Nam. In Lý Sơn there was not so many of them, so [the land] 
out here was intact. There was no one to have an exchange with at 
all. For that reason in the sixteenth and seventeenth century the Việt 
people occupied Champa and stayed there. Well, back then, people 
from all provinces were moving in and out … to other provinces. There 
were also people here [on the island] and the Cham also came here but 
then [Việt] occupied the islands. After that [Cham] did not come here 
anymore, they were not able to [laughing] … The Việt caught crabs, 
fish and snails which they ate through the day to survive. When more 
Việt occupied the island and stayed here the civil harmony began with 
Champa people.
When I asked what he meant by the ‘civil harmony with Champa’, 
he replied:
Still, there were a few Champa people here, they lived on this land. 
After those regarded as Champa died, they did not enter the island 
anymore, they were gone so the Việt people flocked together here. 
The passage quoted above is not an isolated example of the awkwardness 
associated with the previous Cham presence on the island. It reveals 
an immediate defensive reaction by islanders who tried to convince 
me of the absence of Cham people at the time when their ancestors 
arrived on the island. Despite the historical evidence that Champa 
consisted of several coastal states which occupied the south-central 
4  See, for example, Gia Phả — Hộ Võ Văn (Family annals — Hộ Võ Văn) kept by the Võ Văn 
lineage, An Vi ̃nh Commune, Lý Sơn District, Qua ̉ng Ngãi Province or Gia Phả — Hộ Phạm Văn 
(Family annals — Hộ Phạm Văn) kept by the Phạm Văn lineage, An Vĩnh Commune, Lý Sơn 
District, Quảng Ngãi Province.
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coast of Vietnam from the end of the first millennium BC (Southworth 
2004; Vickery 2009; Hardy 2009), many islanders maintained that 
the Cham were originally concentrated only in the southern part of 
Vietnam, in present-day Bình Thuận Province. Many villagers claimed 
that those Cham who stayed on the island gradually vanished and, 
generally, the Việt people outnumbered them. In this way, Lý Sơn 
people wanted to clear up any doubts about their identity, the rights 
over the land, or possible violence in the settlement process on the 
island. Yet, the surnames such as Mai, Ðinh, Tiêu, etc., suggest that 
the Vietnamese migrants on Lý Sơn Island intermixed with the Cham 
natives (very few of whom still lived in the area). In the process — 
masking their Cham origin — the descendants of these inter-ethnic 
marriages absorbed and retained most of the beliefs of the agrarian 
villages from which their Viẹt forefathers had come. 
While contemporary residents took possession of islands as Việt 
territory by means of a Việt-centric settlement history, villagers 
were grappling with the problematic notion of Cham predecessors, 
which unsettled their sense of territoriality. Indeed, as some authors 
argue, control over territory ‘is not only about use or power; it is 
also about meaning, claiming, consolidating, legitimacy’ (Vaccaro, 
Dawson and Zanotti 2014:3). Intriguingly, we obtain a very different 
understanding of how villagers emplace themselves in Lý Sơn history 
by considering their ritual relations with the Cham spirits that are 
to this day worshipped in many temples on the island. The ritual 
relationship with these spirits, predicated on the existence of a more 
powerful spiritual domain, was maintained through the ritual ‘buying 
or renting land’ (lễ tả thô) (Li Tana 1998:131; Tạ Chí Ðài Trường 
2005:264). Right into the twentieth century, the inhabitants of Lý Sơn 
performed a ‘ritualised bargain’ through a local ‘sorcerer’ with a Cham 
ancestral couple, Chúa Ngu Ma Nương, and made lavish sacrifices in 
order to keep the land fertile (cf. Li Tana 1998:131; Tạ Chí Ðài Trường 
2005). One of the oldest inhabitants of Lý Sơn Island described the 
ceremony concerning land ownership in the following words:
In the past, the North of Lý Sơn belonged to the Cham Kingdom 
[Chiêm Thành]. Our Kinh forefathers fought with the Cham Kingdom 
who were defeated and had to leave their land. The land remained and 
it was sacred [linh thiêng]; if our ancestors who wanted to inhabit it 
refused to worship them [the Cham deities] they would bring serious 
illnesses upon the village. That is why the forefathers installed an altar 
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[on the old Cham territory] for a wife and husband Chúa Ngu Man 
Nương. The couple managed the land and every five years the village 
organised the ritual of ‘request for land’ during which many oxen and 
buffalo had to be offered to keep peace. The ceremony was great and 
lasted several days and nights. The sorcerer [phù thuỷ] was invited 
too. He called the couple and asked them if they were satisfied with 
the offerings. If they said ‘yes’ they could stop but if they said ‘no’ 
they had to continue to make sacrifices of animals. The land belonged 
to them, without the offerings the village would be punished. If the 
husband required five pigs they would give him exactly five pigs. 
When queried about this they responded: ‘the husband was easygoing 
but to satisfy his wife was very difficult!’ 
By performing the large ceremony for the Cham spirits, such as the 
Uma Goddess and Chúa Ngu Ma Nương,5 the newcomers established 
themselves not only as rightful patrons of the new land but also tacitly 
apologised for taking this land away from the Cham natives. As the 
new owners of the territory they ritually accommodated the fact that 
other inhabitants once ruled over the land and its fertility. Through 
ritual procedures the spirits were pacified and incorporated into the 
pantheon of the new dominant community that gained local power. 
The new experience of the sea and the encounter with Cham 
civilisation prompted the Việt on Lý Sơn Island not only to adopt 
foreign spirits and beliefs into their own religious practices but also to 
willingly experiment with the material culture of their predecessors. 
Viê ̣t migrants learned seafaring techniques from the Cham and 
even the structure of their ships followed Cham principles (Li Tana 
1998:112; Pham, Blue and Palmer 2010; Pham 2013). Local  family 
annals (gia phả) provide information from the seventeenth to the 
nineteenth centuries that, due to the excellent seafaring capacity 
of the islanders, many were recruited by the feudal state to collect 
precious sea products and goods from wrecked ships in the Paracel and 
Spratly archipelagos. The eighteenth-century Vietnamese historian 
Lê Quý Ðôn (1972:210) reported the case of Vietnamese sailors who 
were allowed to move to Lý Sơn and were granted royal concession 
to explore the sea. Such practices were not unique to Vietnam, but 
also took place in other regions of Southeast Asia. In his interesting 
account on eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century migration and 
5  Uma Goddess is the name for the Hindu Great Goddess Paravati, usually associated with 
mountains. Chúa Ngu Ma Nương is a Cham spirit of a husband and wife. 
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trade practices of ‘sea people’ in Southwest Kalimantan, Atsushi 
Ota (2010:69) writes that during this period many migrants, called 
‘pirates’ by Europeans, established their communities in the coastal 
areas and ‘were engaged in various profitable activities such as trade, 
fishing, and cultivation, supplemented by occasional raids on traders, 
fishermen, and the villagers’. By calling these maritime migrant 
communities ‘sea people’, Atsushi Ota (2010:69) makes an interesting 
point that those communities were ‘within the political reach of states 
and settled under state rulers’ approval, but they were not completely 
politically integrated, maintaining privileges in certain activities, 
such as settlement in certain places and plundering’. This resembles 
the case of Lý Sơn, with its loose connection to the mainland’s political 
apparatus. As already mentioned, this connection was formalised as 
the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa navy, consisting of villagers recruited 
from Lý Sơn Island who operated in the vicinity of the Paracels 
and Spratlys, which today constitute the fishing grounds of Lý Sơn 
fishermen (Lê Quý Ðôn 1972:203, 210). 
The Dichotomy Between the Land and 
the Sea
Trần Quốc Vượng (1992:29) notes that in pre-colonial and colonial 
Vietnam, fishing was a despised occupation and fishermen constituted 
one of the most marginalised groups in society. Landless, without roots 
in the village and living in areas close to the sea and rivers, fishermen 
were discriminated against and deprived of the spiritual and material 
means offered by the village. The dichotomy between the land and the 
sea that constitutes Lý Sơn society is expressed in the two emic terms: 
làng and vạn. Traditionally, làng or ‘village’ constituted the territorial 
unit of Vietnamese society, with the political and ritual system 
localised in the đình (communal house), and represented a land-based 
lifestyle. In the đình, villagers spiritually ensured good harvest for the 
upcoming year through the worship of those who first broke the land 
under the plough (tiền hiền) and the founders of the village (tiền hậu).6 
6  In central and southern Vietnam, communal houses were characteristically erected in 
honour of the tiền hiền and the tiền hâ ̣u: those who first broke the land under the plough and 
the founders of the village. Where the communal house was a northern đình it was a shrine for 
the village guardian spirit. The guardian spirit of the village, or thành hòang, worshipped in the 
northern đình could be either a historical or a mythical person.
357
10 . GEOGRAPHIES OF CONNECTION AND DISCONNECTION
Generally, in central Vietnam, vạn referred both to a self-ruling fishing 
organisation and to a territorial unit with its own religious system 
localised in the lăng, a temple for the cult of a seafaring guardian 
spirit — the Whale. The fact that lăng means ‘tomb’ speaks volumes 
about fishermen’s concerns, as if through propitiating the Whale Spirit 
they sought protection rather than seeking to ensure and control the 
fertility of land and, hence, the village.
Lack of arable land and inability to grow rice is an important detail 
that sheds new light on the formation of categories such as làng and 
vạn in Lý Sơn. In the face of serious physical constraints to growing 
rice, islanders still tried to reproduce the hierarchical division between 
farmers and fishermen that they knew from the mainland. Coming 
from the northern coast of Thanh Hóa, Nghệ An, and Hà Tĩnh, some 
of the ‘founders’ and ‘great lineages’ might have had the lower status 
of fishermen, but in the new setting, by taking advantage of being 
first, they established themselves as a superior làng. The recognised 
descendants of the ‘founders’ formed dominant lineages and an 
unofficial channel of grassroots administration — chiefs of hamlets 
(xóm) and sub-hamlets (lân) — that operated as ‘patrilineages’ of 
the village. Other lineages that were ranked alongside the ‘founders’ 
but did not win the same power were those whose precursors came 
shortly after the founders; these lineages were called tộc lớn, or ‘great 
lineages’. This hierarchical stratification survives on the island until 
today and is displayed in religious and ritual practices. All of these 
groups recorded their genealogies (gia phả) in the ancestral halls 
of individual lineages. Others, who might have been fishermen or 
peasants, were not admitted to the đình order and did not share equal 
rights as village members because they arrived much later than the 
‘founders’ and ‘great lineages’ and did not have access to free land. 
They were required to obtain permission from the ‘founders’ or ‘great 
lineages’ to buy a plot of land and build a house on the territory of 
the village, but even in such cases they were not considered legitimate 
village members. Denied village membership, they joined forces and 
formed a vạn with its own civil code, although still subordinated to 
the village. 
In contrast to mainland central Vietnam, where fishing communities 
occupied sandy dunes and could be easily distinguished from 
agricultural villages with their surrounding rice fields, fishing and 
farming settlements on Lý Sơn Island merged because of the lack of 
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arable land for rice cultivation. More precisely, the two ‘municipalities’ 
of An Vĩnh and An Hải were established in the seventeenth century 
as two làng, but shared their territory with two vạn: Vĩnh Thạnh and 
An Phú. Vĩnh Thạnh vạn was positioned within the territory of An 
Vĩnh village, while An Phú vạn overlapped with An Hải village. This 
arrangement survives today. Those who formed a làng, however, could 
not claim superior status on the basis of investment in rice cultivation; 
nor could they produce the crop that would rescue the village from 
starvation in times of famine. Unable to keep strict physical boundaries 
between the làng and the vạn, làng members of the two villages 
nurtured these separate categories through ritual and ceremony, and 
through claims that their ancestors were the first settlers on the island 
who tamed the new ‘wild’ land and founded the villages.
Drawing on the annals and local narratives, we know that the Hoàng 
Sa and Trường Sa navies that collected and traded goods from wrecked 
ships consisted of those who were members of the founding lineages 
and those who belonged to the organisation called vạn. Moreover, 
according to An Vĩnh temple’s records, the vạn in Lý Sơn was more 
than just a fishing organisation; above all it was a trading organisation 
(vạn giao thương), a point that I will develop in more detail later.7 
The  popular saying that fishermen ‘soak up wealth like a sponge’ 
(giàu bọt nước) hints at the perception that their profit was not morally 
justified when compared with the hard work of preparing the soil for 
cultivation (Nguyễn Duy Thiệu 2002:118). Coastal settlements were 
seen as the frontier of pirates and smugglers who could always find 
a good hideaway somewhere along the South China coasts (see,  for 
example, Watson 1985; Murray 1987; Kleinen and Osseweijer 2010). 
Michael Pearson (2003:6) wrote: 
[p]irates and fisherfolk are ubiquitous, the former to be seen as 
macroparasites, human groups that draw sustenance from the toil 
and enterprise of others, offering nothing in return, the latter equally 
predatory, for unlike peasants they extract but do not cultivate, take 
but do not give. 
7  See the Hán-Nôm document of Vĩnh Thạnh vạn in An Vĩnh commune, Lý Sơn Island.
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In this sense, fishermen were regarded by the agriculturalists as a 
‘world apart’, a group living in the margins of society, ‘savages’ and 
‘barbarians’, who did not really represent the traditional Vietnam 
(Nguyễn Duy Thiệu 2002). 
In his classical monograph on Malay fishermen, Raymond Firth (1964) 
demonstrated that in coastal areas, fisherfolk often live side by side 
with people of other occupations, including farmers with whom they 
maintain economic and frequently intimate relations. Pearson (1985:3) 
goes a step further by stating that ‘land and the sea intertwine in 
complex and various ways’, arguing that we must avoid seeing the 
people living on the shore as totally land- or sea-oriented. Indeed, 
Lý  Sơn’s cosmology looks both  to the mainland and to the sea 
as  sources of livelihood and as cosmological and sovereign centres. 
Yet the example of Lý Sơn shows that they dichotomise two modes of 
life — farming and fishing — even though in everyday life they might 
mix the two activities. The two vernacular terms — làng and vạn 
— appeared in almost every conversation with villagers, indicating 
that they recognise a social difference between the land and the sea. 
The distinction between the two territorial domains was manifested in 
the erection of two separate temples — đình and lăng — which marked 
spiritual and hierarchical boundaries between the land-based village 
and the fishing community.
Nevertheless, such distinctiveness between sea and land activities 
preserved in the social and religious organisations of the Lý Sơn society 
does not exclude the possibility that these two types of community 
are in a constant state of flux. The example of Thiên Y A Na — 
a Vietnamised Cham Goddess of Pô Nagar who is believed to secure 
the livelihood of the fishermen on the seashore — well illustrates 
this phenomenon. Whenever I attended anniversary ceremonies for 
Thiên Y A Na in An Hải village, I was always astonished by the large 
number of fishermen who visited her temple and took part in religious 
observance. While in this temple, the làng carried out an important 
ritual aiming to ensure the fertility of the land. I also witnessed 
fishermen sacrificing to the goddess — once they gave two, or even 
three, fine pigs. They explained that when the goddess blessed them 
with good catches or they escaped a Chinese coastguard they gave 
back to her more than was expected. The ceremonies always took 
place in the late evening, enduring for many hours and ending with 
a feast before the sun broke the darkness. 
CONNECTED & DISCONNECTED IN VIET NAM
360
However, the làng was not always happy with the ostentatious 
sacrifices made by the vạn, and in some cases tried to regulate this 
matter. According to local narratives, in Lý Sơn at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, farmers found a whale beached on the shore 
just opposite the temple of the Goddess of Five Elements (Bà Chúa Ngũ 
Hạnh) which belonged to the village An Vĩnh. The villagers decided 
to include the seafaring deity in their spirit pantheon. The fishermen’s 
organisation of Vĩnh Thạnh protested and claimed rights to the beached 
whale. However, the farmers refused to yield and they strongly 
believed that the Whale Spirit chose their village to send rain in time of 
drought and to improve crops. Subsequently, the two communities of 
farmers and fishermen reached a compromise by building two separate 
temples called the Outer Dune Temple (Lăng Cồn Ngoài) and the Inner 
Dune Palace (Dinh Cồn Trong) to venerate the Whale Spirit, which was 
revered by fishermen and farmers alike under his full name ‘Great and 
Cruel General of the Southern Sea’ (Nam Hải Dạ Sa Ðại tướng quân 
tôn thần). It was decided that the fishermen’s anniversary celebration 
would precede the one organised by the farmers but it could not be 
held without the presence of the village elder — the ritual master of 
high sacrifice and representative of the founding lineage and hence a 
farmer — as a sign of the vạn’s respect for the village. In June 2007, I 
took part in the ceremony organised by the vạn. I witnessed that the 
vạn was not allowed to offer a pig, as this sacrifice was reserved for 
the làng, and instead was only permitted to present a chicken to the 
divinity. 
In saying that the islanders cognitively dichotomise the sea and 
the land, we should not associate their sense of territoriality with 
hierarchy, as enshrined in a permanent and immutable situation and 
structure (Kirsch 1973:35). Lý Sơn society is subject to a continuous 
process of change due to the ever-changing ecological, political and 
social conditions of its environment. Thus, the structure of the làng 
and the vạn in Lý Sơn is not permanent and static but constantly 
adapting to current situations. With a growing global demand for 
marine products and the global consequences of the South China Sea 
dispute, fishermen started to play a more important role in the village 
ritual domain to which the vạn had no previous access. Like in the 
past, when the feast in the đình served to increase status differences 
within the village, today the vạn uses the same means in order to earn 
‘permanent prestige and status relations’ as well as social recognition 
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(cf. Kirsch 1973:17). Renovating temples, appropriating the traditional 
right of the agricultural village to sacrifice pigs, and sponsoring village 
agricultural rituals became means of displaying their ritual ‘potency’ 
and thus their growing status in the Lý Sơn community. Each lavish 
sacrifice made by fishermen in agricultural temples served as evidence 
of their good catches and their material well-being and hence their 
spiritual ‘reward’. By resisting the exclusive ritual control of the làng, 
they turned the tables on the old hierarchy. 
This recent enhancement of fishermen’s economic position vis-à-vis the 
farmers and their ritual investment in agricultural temples reveals the 
complexity of local territorial imaginaries and the dichotomy between 
the land and the sea. It also suggests that fishermen are not just a 
disadvantaged group, but that they exploit the situation in order to 
demonstrate and cultivate their prestige in response to the changing 
political and economic context. This observation goes to the heart of 
Taylor’s (1998) argument that different modes of acting Vietnamese 
exist through time and terrain. Instead of looking at Lý Sơn villagers 
exclusively through the lens of the homogenising narratives of the 
nation, region, or historical process, it is worth remembering that they 
constitute not monolithic but rather heterogeneous entities entangled 
in complex relations in which they construct themselves within and 
across international, national, and local interests (Appadurai 1996).
Cosmopolitan Connections 
Lý Sơn villagers proudly talked about their ancestors’ engagement 
with other societies, and their extraordinary mobility and adventurous 
explorations to contest and change their present status as a remote 
or ‘sea-locked’ and ‘outlandish’ fishing community. Indeed, mobility 
and commercial networks between Cham, Chinese, and Việt across 
the South China Sea were long standing.8 Prior to Việt colonisation 
in the seventeenth century, Lý Sơn had been an important part of a 
network of wells providing fresh water to Cham sailors and foreign 
ships (Hardy 2009). Throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and 
nineteenth centuries, the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa sailors capitalised 
on various cosmopolitan and commercial links in the South China 
8  For the region of the Mekong Delta, see Taylor (2007).
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Sea by gathering gold, silver, swords, ivory, porcelain, cloth, wax, 
and other goods from the wrecked ships in the Paracels and Spratlys, 
and supplementing them with a large quantity of mother of pearl, 
snail, tortoise, and sea cucumber, which were submitted to the royal 
court in Huế.́ The sailors were allowed to keep a significant part of the 
harvested marine produce for their own profit (Lê Quý Ðôn 2006:155). 
The impressive and well preserved ancestor house built during the 
reign of the Minh Mạng Emperor (1820–41) by the family of Mr Tư 
(b. 1930)9 — the uncle of my host on Lý Sơn — bears testimony to the 
extraordinary profits derived from that trade and extensive maritime 
networks that connected Lý Sơn villagers and Chinese. During their 
voyages to the Paracels, the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa sailors occasionally 
met Chinese fishermen on the high seas and exchanged information 
(see, for example, Lê Quy Ðôn 1776:82b–85a in Nguyễn Q. Thắng 
2008). In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, some Fujianese 
or Hainanese who ventured into the Nanyang region (present-day 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia) to procure their catches of the sea 
cucumber (hải sâm, bêche-de-mer) stopped in Lý Sơn to obtain fresh 
sweet drinking water and peanut oil for cooking. Mr Tư revealed 
that generations of his family had built their wealth on the lucrative 
trade that involved the sea cucumber — a highly appreciated delicacy 
among Chinese. For a long time, Lý Sơn villagers did not develop a 
taste for sea cucumber, but knew how to process the marine animal in 
order to sell the product in Hội An — a former Cham port that from 
the seventeenth century onward attracted many Chinese as well as 
Japanese, Muslim, and European merchants. 
Under French colonial rule, the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa flotillas 
ceased to exist, but the seafaring capacity and trading profession of 
the islanders enabled their voyages to the south where they continued 
to explore new markets and expand their world and networks through 
translocal and transregional trade. The Lý Sơn seashore and adjoining 
waters were rich in fish, snails, sea urchins, and sea cucumbers, and 
provided trade for many. As the vạn in Lý Sơn functioned as a trading 
organisation, islanders traded with the mainland and sold whatever 
they caught and farmed: beans, peanuts, and — most famously — fish 
sauce, peanut oil, and fishing nets made of a special tree fibre (cây gay) 
grown on Lý Sơn. An informant from Lý Sơn explained that in the 
9  All personal names are pseudonyms.
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1930s his late father had worked as a ‘trader assistant’ (lái phụ) for 
one of the boat owners (chủ tuyền) on the island, travelling southward 
on the winter monsoon and returning northward with the summer 
monsoon. In November (lunar calendar), the northerly wind began 
blowing and in the following few months Lý Sơn people sailed to Sài 
Gòn for the Lunar New Year. The trip south was to buy rice, which was 
essential for Lý Sơn people’s livelihood. The father of my informant 
did not travel alone but was accompanied by a group of other sailing 
boats that followed him. En route, he made two important trade deals: 
he bought sugar (đường phên) in Quảng Ngãi and salt in Sa Huỳnh, and 
relied on established trade networks in Quy Nhơn, Nha Trang, and 
Hà Tiên. Disembarking in Sài Gòn or Cà Mau, he and the rest of his 
crew offered themselves as labourers to the French or Chinese, which 
gave them additional income for the purchase of rice. During March, 
the wind began to change course to a northerly direction, signalling 
the time for the return trip. In early summer, with a full load of rice, 
the group sailed in a northerly direction along the coast, passing 
different ports on the way. Since medicinal plants (thuốc nam) were 
highly sought after by islanders, Cham traders were welcomed on 
board, embarking at the port of Bình Thuận and remaining on board 
until reaching the island. The father of my informant would stop again 
in Sa Huỳnh to buy salt for resale in Lý Sơn. However, reaching home 
did not mean that the voyage was complete. Taking advantage of the 
southerly wind, he would resume his journey northward through the 
ports of Hội An and Huế where he would typically purchase blocks of 
jackfruit wood, for building ancestral houses, and Chinese porcelain, 
which was highly sought after by Lý Sơn islanders. 
The outbreak of the First and the Second Indochina Wars brought 
new political and economic pressures to the Lý Sơn people, who were 
trapped between two forces: the National Liberation Front and US 
troops. The strategic location of the island was used by the Vietnam 
Naval Forces — a command of the US Navy — to control passing ships 
and trawlers in the South China Sea but also by communist guerrillas to 
hide stolen weapons, for example. Lý Sơn fishermen were occasionally 
used by the Vietnam Naval Forces in military missions to the 
Paracels. However, in contrast to the mainland, Lý Sơn’s geographical 
position enabled it — to some extent — to avoid the turmoil of war. 
Importantly, most of the island’s religious structures survived the two 
Indochina wars, giving both the provincial authorities and the local 
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community a clear stake in recovering local commemoration of Hoàng 
Sa and Trường Sa sailors and applying for national recognition of this 
ceremony. In the eyes of Lý Sơn villagers, this commemoration was 
testimony that they were not backward but using their trading skills 
and the seafaring capacity that connected them with the rest of the 
world. Forty-nine-year-old Lý described this in the following words: 
Previously Lý Sơn people used to go on sailing boats and, I think, 
because of that, having only sailing boats they were still able to go to 
the Paracels. They kept sailing to the Paracels not because of the royal 
order, which at that time was just a small part of their activities, but 
because the Paracels were located on the Silk Road, the trade route of, 
for example, Chinese, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese; all kinds of people 
were passing there, so they [Lý Sơn people] followed that route and its 
trade up to the Paracels. There the Hoàng Sa flotilla was responsible 
for collecting things such as guns, steel or porcelain ... I am telling 
you some families in Lý Sơn if they traded they would get very rich. 
Lý Sơn was very rich so that the guiding principle of Lý Sơn [people] 
in that time was ‘to get rich one must do trade’ [muốn làm giàu phải đi 
buôn], or, as they put it, ‘without trade there will be no prosperity’ 
[Phi thương là bất phú] with the meaning that in order to get rich 
you must engage in trading, so those in Lý Sơn who did trade were 
economically better off.
When Lý said that villagers went to the Paracels regardless of the royal 
order, he meant that the islanders always had to strategise and seek 
various opportunities to make a living. He later added that Lý Sơn 
fishermen would continue to go to the Paracels or Spratlys without 
consideration for the state’s position for the same reason, because this 
is one of the very few options available to them to earn their living. 
While Lý sentimentally talked about the previous economic 
cosmopolitanism of islanders and their prosperity, he also depicted 
the dramatic changes and desperate years brought at the end of the 
Second Indochina War. The islanders’ mobility and trading networks 
were severely restricted after the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, 
particularly in the period of the collectivist subsidy economy which 
lasted from 1977–86. Lý Sơn villagers reported shortages of basic 
necessities such as rice, sugar, and salt, which had to be brought from 
the mainland. To sail to Quảng Ngãi they needed to obtain special 
permission from the local authorities. Such permission specified 
clearly how many days they were allowed to stay away. On the day 
of the trip, their names would be called loudly by the authorities 
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and only after presenting a valid document would they be allowed 
to embark on the small motor boat. The islanders recalled that the 
boat was filled with more people than it could properly accommodate, 
and  many were forced to remain crouched or in an uncomfortable 
position for eight or more hours until reaching Sa Kỳ. Villagers still 
managed to smuggle local products, such as garlic and onion, to sell on 
the black market in Sài Gòn in order to buy rice to take home. Hidden 
in baskets full of vegetables, the rice was then illicitly transported 
by the boat to the island. Villagers recalled that they had so little rice 
that they cooked it with sweet potato in order to fill their stomachs. 
It was during this period that Lý Sơn people sought to ensure their 
livelihood by capitalising on their seafaring skills.
In 1982, Mr Nha (b. 1948) was the first fisherman on the island to make 
a daring journey to the Paracels — using a simple administration 
map stolen from the local People’s Committee office. Later in the same 
year he guided another seven fishing boats. Navigation systems or 
nautical charts were not available at that time, as the local government 
feared that fishermen might seek to escape the country by sea. 
Initially, in the Paracels, the fishermen caught mainly flying fish (cá 
chuồn) which could be preserved using salt, but one year later when 
the technology became more accessible, they expanded their fishing 
territories, catches and methods. Fresh fish from the Paracels and 
Spratlys was transported to Ðà Nẵng, where ice was also obtained. 
However, along with the new market opportunities that appeared, 
most Lý Sơn fishermen chose to sell their catch to local women traders 
in Ðông Ba market in Huế. In 1989, Lý Sơn’s fish trade was ultimately 
moved to Sa Kỳ port — the closest point between the mainland and Lý 
Sơn — where it began to operate under the Border Guard Command 
(Công an Biên phòng) which provided the logistical facilities for the 
development of the local fish market. 
In the early 2000s, due to regular fishing expeditions to the Paracels 
and Spratlys and a diving technology that uses compressed air, 
Lý  Sơn fishermen were able to collect the sea cucumber in deeper 
waters, and the old trade in the Chinese delicacy underwent revival. 
With the booming fishing market, some of the Lý Sơn people who in 
the late 1960s and 1970s emigrated to Quảng Ngãi, Nha Trang, or Sài 
Gòn saw opportunities for profitable business. They bought marine 
products from Lý Sơn fishermen and sold these to exporters, often 
of Sino-Vietnamese origin. The exporters provided credit to these 
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intermediate traders who, in turn, were able to connect with fishermen. 
Initially, the cargo of sea cucumber, shark fin and, occasionally, turtle 
and turtle-shell and sea urchin, was sent to urban markets in central 
and southern Vietnam for export to China and Cambodia, but more 
recent destinations include ports in northern Vietnam. In the north, 
out of sight of customs patrols, fish and various marine products from 
Lý Sơn are traded across the border at fishing villages of Móng Cái and 
transferred to Chinese fishing vessels at sea, or transported directly 
by Sino-Vietnamese traders to Guangxi, Guangdong Province, or to 
Hainan Island. 
This thriving trade of marine goods has been caught between two 
opposing forces — the liberalisation of cross-border trade between 
China and Vietnam, and the simultaneous enforcement of borders 
on the sea. Already under French colonial rule, China had begun to 
show interest in the uninhabited islands of the Paracels and Spratlys, 
and to assert claims over them. But it was not until decades later, 
in 2001, that China first denied Lý Sơn fishermen rights of use to 
fishing grounds which for generations they had considered their own. 
In 1982 — the year in which Lý Sơn people recommenced their trips 
to the Paracels and deep-sea fishing began — the legal regime of an 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) came into force as a new provision of 
the International Law of the Sea. Until then, national borders at sea did 
not concern Lý Sơn fishermen, but with the enforcement of the EEZ 
they found themselves accused of entering restricted zones illicitly. 
As the economic, political, and military powerhouse in the region, 
China’s expansion of an exclusive coastal economic zone resulted in 
the enforcement of a seasonal fishing ban, the seizure and detention of 
Vietnamese fishermen, and the destruction of their vessels by Chinese 
patrol ships. China’s introduction of a map (in 2009) that engulfed 
virtually the entire South China Sea further exacerbated tensions and 
incidents in the region, in spite of a common history of commerce 
and exchange, and a shared understanding of marine life as common 
property (Roszko 2015). As the tensions over the Paracels and Spratlys 
worsened, occasionally erupting into anti-Chinese protests across the 
country, Lý Sơn villagers preferred to maintain a low profile for their 
trading activities with China. 
The status of Lý Sơn as a restricted border zone impels Lý Sơn villagers 
to strategically preserve those memories of economic cosmopolitanism 
that figuratively bring the island closer to Vietnam’s ancestry and 
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fatherland, simultaneously obscuring those shared with the Cham or 
Chinese. In doing so, they selectively underline that Lý Sơn Island 
was not an isolated place, but one situated at the crossroads of the 
Silk Road trade routes that spanned China, Hainan, Nanyang, and 
the rest of the world. Articulating alternative accounts of their 
ancestors’ engagement in long-distance voyages at sea, local markets, 
and commercial networks, Lý Sõn people conveyed an implicit 
protest against their dramatic domestication and reductive narrative 
representations brought about by a centrally planned economy after 
1975 and the politicised South China Sea dispute. As a result, these 
proud and skilful sea navigators and traders with cosmopolitan 
economic networks — who once did not hesitate to advertise to the 
royal court in Huế about their risky but profitable operations at sea — 
became reduced to mere fishermen.
Staging Citizenship on the South China Sea
Seeking to become part of the modern world, the people of Lý Sơn have 
begun to contest their island’s marginal location and seek to represent 
it as a strategic link between Vietnam and the disputed maritime areas 
to the east. By claiming that they are historically and emotionally 
bound not only to their natal villages on the coastal mainland, but also 
to the dispersed islets of the Paracels where their ancestors worked 
and died during marine operations, they projected their own meaning 
of territoriality. In Lý Sơn people’s highly localised perception of the 
nation’s territory, the modern border line shifted from the island to 
the Paracels and Spratlys, expanding and making Lý Sơn a virtual 
centre of Vietnam’s territory, now comprised of both land and sea. 
Being marginalised and economically left behind after the 
re-unification of Vietnam in 1975, Lý Sơn fishermen and farmers 
aspired to be recognised as translocal and ‘cosmopolitan’ subjects 
whose identity in previous centuries was built on extensive trading 
networks, and the experience of far-distance travel and exploration, 
rather than exclusively on fishing. As Nina Glick-Schiller and Andrew 
Irving (2015) show, cosmopolitanism is an ongoing process that allows 
those who feel provincialised and marginalised to be attentive to 
global processes without compromising their local interests. In the 
case of Lý Sơn, recentring the country’s geo-body became a matter 
of integrating the mainland territory, the two disputed archipelagos, 
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the familiar system of ancestor worship, their cosmopolitan economic 
networks, and the sacrificed Hoàng Sa soldiers into a new rendition of 
the imagined nation.
Capitalising on a newly discovered patriotism among islanders and 
consciousness about protecting ‘ancestral lands’ in the ‘East Sea’, in 
2014 the Vietnamese Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism selected 
Lý Sơn Island — considered a vanguard of Vietnam’s sovereignty — 
to host the national exhibition of Vietnam’s and China’s historical maps, 
under the slogan ‘Paracel and Spratly Islands belong to Vietnam — legal 
and historical evidence’. Most of the maps presented at the exhibition 
in a local museum were collected from various antiquarian bookshops 
around the world by Trần Ðình Thắng — a young Vietnamese who 
was born in Vietnam but raised in a foreign country. With the aim of 
raising morale among local fishermen and local soldiers stationed on 
the island, the exhibition on Lý Sơn was marked by the attendance 
of representatives of the Vietnam Naval Forces, central and local state 
authorities, and guest of honour Trần Ðình Thắng. The event was 
accompanied by a staged performance, including dance and patriotic 
songs, and widely broadcast in the national media. 
Until recently, the region of the Red River Delta in Vietnam was seen as 
the undisputed cradle of civilisation and representative of Vietnam’s 
‘authentic’ wet rice culture. However, the international debate over 
the South China Sea caused a significant change in rhetoric in Vietnam 
which redefined Vietnam from a rice-growing culture to a maritime 
nation (nước biển). Discursively, these territorial and mental shifts were 
marked by stories about the most recent ‘turn towards the ancestral 
sea islands’ (hướng về biển đảo quê hương) and the idea of Vietnam 
as a ‘nước biển’ (literally ‘sea country’, but more accurately ‘sea-
oriented country’), which is a contemporary invention of tradition 
that discursively places Vietnam in Tony Reid’s (1999) Malay World. 
Propaganda posters recently arranged at the front entrance to the local 
museum on Lý Sơn Island are part of that effort. The most interesting 
slogans proclaimed: ‘Vietnam is a maritime country’ (‘Việt  Nam là 
một quốc gia biển’), ‘The island is a home and the sea is a homeland’ 
(‘Ðảo là nhà biển là quê hương’), and ‘Each Vietnamese is a citizen of 
the sea’ (‘Mỗi người Việt Nam là một công dân biển’). While fishermen 
had previously been portrayed mainly in terms of socialist production 
— next to agriculture and forestry — the most recent Vietnamese 
state rhetoric turns Vietnamese fishermen into the heroic vanguards 
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of national sovereignty in the ‘East Sea’. Novel expressions of national 
identity and citizenship can also be seen in T-shirts bearing the 
slogan ‘Vietnamese nation is determined to preserve each plot of the 
Vietnamese land and sea islands’ (‘Dân Tộc Việt Nam Quyết Tâm Gìn 
Giữ Từng Tấc Ðất và Biển Ðảo Của Việt Nam’), or ‘Vietnam turns 
toward the East Sea’ (‘Việt Nam hướng về Biền Ðông’). These T-shirts 
became increasingly popular among many young Vietnamese tourists 
in Lý Sơn who wanted to publicly express their identification with 
fishermen and the sea.
I opened my paper with a vignette about a group of eight patriotic 
former policewomen who wished to express their solidarity with poor 
fishing families, who were suffering for the sake of the nation, through 
an act of compensation. Ironically, most of the families selected for the 
meeting with the former policewomen depended on agriculture and 
not the sea for their livelihood, as month-long fishing operations in 
distant waters required considerable expenditure on gear, vessel, fuel, 
and reserves of food. In spite of the diversity of livelihoods found 
on the island, the women saw its inhabitants exclusively through 
the prism of the highly politicised character of the South China Sea 
dispute. Pointing to a cultural and economic gap between those on the 
mainland and those on the island, they perceived the inhabitants of 
Lý Sơn as ‘nothing but sea people’ (‘người dân biển thì thế thôi’), and 
knowing hardly anything beyond living off the sea (biết chỉ làm biển 
thôi). Without help from the state — which was, for these women, an 
educator and patron of progress — the coastal areas such as the islands 
could not be developed. The women contested the islanders’ way of 
being Vietnamese, as certain customs on the island made them anxious 
— for example, they considered it unhygienic that many graves were 
located in the vicinity of human habitation. Although the women’s 
mission was to encourage fishermen to ‘cling to the sea, cling to the 
fishing grounds to defend national sovereignty’ (‘bám biển, bám ngư 
trường để bảo vệ chủ quyền tổ quốc’), they agreed that one could hardly 
consider Lý Sơn to be an attractive place to live, let alone a  tourist 
destination. One of the women said: ‘A touristic place is one of rest, 
entertainment and fun but there is nothing here’ (‘nơi du lịch là nơi 
nghỉ ngơi, giải tri và vui vẻ và ở đây chẳng gì có’). Her remark about 
the islanders’ pronunciation, which she found incomprehensible and 
odd, cast the islanders as somehow less authentically Vietnamese in 
comparison with the more ‘representative’ culture of northern Vietnam.
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Vietnamese tourists’ image of Lý Sơn as a navel of the nation was 
very much shaped by national media and recent tensions between 
China and Vietnam over the disputed waters in the South China Sea. 
Moreover, the media publicised contradictory images: on the one hand 
advertising Lý Sơn as a holiday destination with charming beaches, on 
the other hand underlining the island’s defence position and praising 
the extraordinary bravery of its inhabitants living under constant 
threat from China. As a result, many mainlander tourists imagined the 
island as a highly militarised place located somewhere in the vicinity 
of China, but soon experienced the absence of electricity10 and medical 
facilities, the conversion of beaches into garlic and onion fields, and 
the islanders’ ‘incomprehensible’ pronunciation. Taken together, 
these elements contributed to the perception of Lý Sơn as remote: 
a geographical and cultural backwater more suitable for a short, single 
visit rather than a longer stay. Most tourists perceived the islanders as 
an undeveloped fishing community bravely standing at the forefront 
of national sovereignty, in the very middle of Vietnam’s land mass and 
the sea, including the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos. 
Lý Sơn people were aware of these various perceptions about them 
and that they were seen as strange, odd, and at times funny. They felt 
uncomfortable about mainlanders’ remarks about their local accent. 
For example, while they tended to appreciate my adoption of their local 
pronunciation, they immediately warned me that I was not allowed to 
speak ‘Lý Sơn language’ on the mainland, because they sensed that 
mainlanders would make fun of them. While they understood that the 
island’s location made it a vanguard of Vietnam’s sovereignty, attracting 
thousands of tourists and opening new economic opportunities, they 
still became upset if the national media stretched this picture too 
far. They were afraid that it might scare tourists and give a wrong 
impression of the island as a dangerous place. They were especially 
wary of crowds of journalists and local researchers who spent only a 
day or two on the island, chasing stories about fishermen victimised 
by a Chinese coastguard, or chasing elders and their family records. 
An outspoken islander woman expressed her opinion that real poverty 
on the island rarely attracted attention. Another fisherman complained 
that some journalists lost interest when they learned that the damage 
10  At the time of fieldwork, between May and July 2014, the installation of a submarine 
cable providing power supply to Lý Sơn Island was under construction. Electricity only became 
widely available on the island in October 2014. 
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to his fishing boat came not from a Chinese coastguard but from a 
short circuit. Others who renovated old guesthouses or built new ones 
worried about their business and wanted the island to be seen as a 
modern, safe, and attractive place for tourists. Situated on ‘a tricky 
double edge — both cutting and peripheral’ (Chu 2010:26), Lý Sơn 
people worked hard to recentre their marginal(ised) locality within 
the categorical order of the modern nation-state’s cartography (Malkki 
1992) by projecting themselves as cosmopolitan subjects. While they 
willingly shared with other Vietnamese a sense of being a ‘navel of the 
nation’ by claiming a twofold status, as an integral part of Vietnam 
and as part of the Paracel archipelago, they searched for their own 
context in the process of constructing their place within the nation’s 
historical narrative and territorial map. 
Conclusion
In his analysis of the local consequences of the international conflict 
known as the Taiwan Strait Crisis on Jinmen Island, Michael Szonyi 
(2008) vividly shows effects of militarisation slipping into the daily 
life of people and individual imaginations. Yet, in cartographic 
iconographies of Vietnam, it is the sea and its islands that have become 
conspicuously visible in arenas as varied as posters, stamps, logos, 
and museum exhibitions. In these changing aesthetics of the nation, 
the continental landmass becomes ex-centric and the margins become 
centred, culminating in the rendition of Lý Sơn as the navel of the 
nation. The island became a symbol of heroic sacrifice in the name 
of all Vietnamese citizens, who started to identify themselves with 
the ‘Vietnamese waters’. In the case of Lý Sơn, this aesthetic shift 
is accompanied not by militarisation but by a changing geography 
of affect (Navaro-Yashin 2007) by which people who have never 
been on the Paracels or Spratlys claim a deep emotional bond with 
these ‘ancestral’ places and the desire to defend their ‘sovereignty’. 
This  affect is performed in a wide variety of ways: walling Lý Sơn 
Island against Chinese; emotional demonstrations in the streets of 
Hà Nội or Hồ Chí Minh City against Chinese occupation of ‘ancestral’ 
seas; and mainlanders showing solidarity with islanders — supposedly 
victimised by Chinese vessels — through patriotic tourism, donations 
and cultural campaigns. The changing geography of affect creates new 
spaces for interaction not just between state and society, but between 
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different ways of acting Vietnamese. The affect provoked by the 
‘ancestral land’ of the deep sea, fishing practices, new maps of the 
national geo-body, new development plans, and a new style of patriotic 
tourism in Vietnam’s coastal areas illustrates the multitude of ways 
in which people respond to local and global economic and political 
discourses. In this same sense, the submarine cable that connected 
Lý  Sơn Island with the national grid and provided a steady power 
supply in 2014 has been rendered not only as an item of cultural and 
socioeconomic development, but as an act of maintaining security, 
national defence, and sovereignty.11
Thinking about the economic cosmopolitanism of Lý Sơn people 
requires recognition that cosmopolitanism is about various groups 
of people whose actions are situated in different political, economic, 
and social niches, and who are driven by contradictory goals. 
The  islanders’ expanding universe — embedded in and shaped 
by global competition for resources in the South China Sea — was 
largely based on their local experience of long distance commercial 
fishing and trading, which has been interpreted by a large part of the 
Vietnamese population as Lý Sơn’s determination to exercise Vietnam’s 
sovereignty. Indeed, Lý Sơn’s fishermen and farmers began to tie their 
identity to the state emergency in connection with the Paracels and 
with Lý Sơn Island’s geopolitical role in this international dispute. 
However, the narratives about Lý Sơn’s translocal and transregional 
connections to the sea could be read as villagers’ desire to go beyond 
the image of their heroic and geopolitical role in the South China Sea 
that reduces them to the ‘suffering subject’ (Robbins 2013). In their 
desire to be modern, progressive, and attractive for the tourist 
industry, they seek to stage their own roles in this global dispute. Even 
though they might complain about enclosures and appropriations 
of terrestrial and maritime commons, and about the way they are 
being depicted as uncivilised and not-quite-Vietnamese, they often 
embrace the opportunity to take centre stage and become the centre 
of the nation for the eyes of the world to see — if only temporarily. 
The domestication and instrumentalisation of maritime populations in 
performances of and for the nation paradoxically draws the periphery 
11  See, for example, www.vietnambreakingnews.com/2014/03/contract-inked-on-power-
supply-for-ly-son-island/, accessed 31 August 2015. 
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into the centre. For a short-lived moment, Lý Sơn people could be 
confident that their dispossession can be read as a sacrifice — willing 
or unwilling — for being the navel of the nation. 
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